702 N.Y.S.2d 418 | N.Y. App. Div. | 2000
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims (King, J.), entered November 25, 1998, upon a decision of the court following a bifurcated trial in favor of claimants on the issue of liability.
On March 6, 1995 at approximately 7:20 p.m., claimant George Fisher, Jr. and his family were involved in an automobile accident while traveling on United States Route 4 in the
Thereafter, claimants commenced this action alleging, inter alla, that the State was negligent in failing to adequately provide for and inspect the road markings on Route 4 that signal the entrance to the plaza. Specifically, claimants asserted that the white arrow painted in the left-turn lane of the northbound side of Route 4 improperly directed traffic into an exit lane of the plaza. Following joinder of issue, a bifurcated trial was held and the Court of Claims found that the State’s placement of the arrow was confusing and a proximate cause of the accident, apportioning liability 50% to the State and 50% to claimants. An interlocutory judgment was entered and this appeal by the State ensued.
We affirm. Initially, it is well settled that the State has a duty to keep its highways in a reasonably safe condition (see, Friedman v State of New York, 67 NY2d 271, 283-284; Montgomery v State of New York, 206 AD2d 737, 739). While the State enjoys qualified immunity with respect to matters involving traffic design engineering, it may be found negligent when the highway planning decision at issue evolved without adequate study or lacked a reasonable basis (see, Friedman v State of New York, supra, at 284; Zecca v State of New York, 247 AD2d 776, 777). Moreover, where the State undertakes to erect warning signs, “they must be reasonably adequate for the intended purpose” (Hicks v State of New York, 4 NY2d 1, 7). The Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (hereinafter MUTCD; 17 NYCRR ch V) sets forth standards for evaluating the reasonableness of the State’s decisions as to the placement of road markings, such as the white arrow at issue here (see, Zecca v State of New York, supra, at 777-778; Peckham v State of New York, 54 AD2d 599).
We note that the MUTCD requires that traffic control devices “convey a clear, simple meaning” and “give adequate time for proper response” (17 NYCRR 200.1 [e] [1]). It further provides that they “should be properly positioned with respect to the point, object, or situation to which they apply to aid in conveying the proper meaning” and that “[g]ood location * * * should allow a driver traveling at normal speed adequate time to make the correct response” (17 NYCRR 200.1 [e] [2] [ii]). The foregoing evidence, as well as Fisher’s testimony regarding the manner in which the accident occurred, provide ample support for the conclusion that the positioning of the white arrow violated these standards. Consequently, we find no basis for disturbing the Court of Claims’ finding with respect to the State’s negligence.
Likewise, we reject the State’s claim that its negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. Fisher testified that he observed the white arrow directing traffic into the entrance of the plaza prior to making the turn. As the photographs indicate, the arrow was located beyond the yellow dividing line directly across from the exit lanes in a manner likely to confuse drivers seeking to enter the plaza especially at night. While Fisher testified that he followed the black car ahead of him into the plaza and did not see oncoming traffic until his car was struck, this testimony does not establish that his negligence was the sole cause of the accident. To the contrary, the evidence supports the Court of Claims’ finding that the State’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. Inasmuch as our recent decision in Hersman v Hadley (235 AD2d 714, lv denied 90 NY2d 802) is factually distinguishable from the case at hand, the State’s reliance upon it is misplaced.