In this action for damages for personal injuries caused by an automobile accident, plaintiff obtained a judgmеnt against both defendants, who are father and son. The son’s negligence was admitted. The father’s liability was based solеly on the family purpose doctrine after an evidentiary hearing on that issue before the trial court. The fathеr appeals, contending that the trial court erred in finding the family purpose doctrine applicable to the facts of this case. We affirm.
The family purpose doctrine is based on the theory that when an automobilе is maintained by the owner for the pleasure or convenience of his family, a member of the family who uses it with the knowledge and consent of the owner is the agent of the owner, and the latter is responsible for the negligencе of the user.
Kraxberger v. Rogers,
The father originally purchased the pickup in May, 1976, as a source of parts with which to rеbuild another truck which he owned. After he used it for that purpose, his son reassembled the pickup with his father’s permission. The son testified that in October or November of 1976, his father agreed to sell him the pickup for about $450 or $500; the son made weekly payments of $15 to $30 to his mother. The son also testified that he had finished making payments by the date of the accident in March, 1977, but he could not say precisely when the payments were completed. The father testified that he thought the son had paid the full price, but he could not be sure because his wife had *424 collected the payments. She did not testify. The certificate of title was never transferred from father to son, and there was no receipt or bill of sale recording the transaction. Neither parent ever drove the truck. The son was respоnsible for its upkeep. The father testified that his son "had been using the pickup pretty much at his own discretion for some time prior” to the accident, but that he sometimes placed restrictions on his son’s use of the vehicle. The trial court concluded that there was a question of fact as to the ownership of the truck and found that the father was the owner. 1
ORS 481.115(1) and 481.117 provide that the certificate of title to a motor vehicle is prima facie evidеnce of ownership.
See Wisbey v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
The father’s ownership of the vehicle and the fact that it was being driven by the son at the time of the aсcident create a prima facie case of agency.
Gossett v. Van Egmond,
The father arguеs that proof of ownership alone does not sustain application of the family purpose
*425
doctine. He contends that it is also necessary to prove first, that he maintained the vehicle, and, second, that it was being used as a family vehicle. He relies on
Bolton v. Schimming et al,
Wе have found no cases analyzing maintenance as a requirement distinct from ownership in the applicatiоn of the family purpose doctrine. The cases holding that proof of ownership establishes a prima facie case of agency under the doctrine imply that maintenance is not a separate requirement. Assuming arguendo that it is, however, we conclude that "maintenance” by the owner means only that the owner must have some relation to or control over the vehicle and its use beyond the legal relationship established by the certificate of title. Here, that criterion is met by the father’s occasional restrictions on his son’s use of the pickup and their attempt to secure insurance coverage under the family policy.
The father also cоntends that the requirement of "use by members of the family for their joint or individual pleasure and convenience” is not met because the son was the only member of the family who drove the pickup, except for two or three occasions when his older brother drove it while home on leave from the service. The family purpose elеment of the doctrine has always been applied broadly. For instance, in
Steele v. Hemmers,
Affirmed.
Notes
The trier of fact is not required to accept the testimony of interested witnesses as conclusive.
Gossett v. Van Egmond,