164 F.2d 707 | D.C. Cir. | 1947
This petition for review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals for the District of Columbia requires us to determine how the real estate of a decedent is to be valued for inheritance tax purposes.
A second question in the case is whether, in the circumstances here presented, an .inheritance tax can be imposed with respect to the transfer of assets less than six months after a prior tax had been levied with respect to the transfer of the same assets.
These questions arose from the following situation: Willis W. Fisher, who died May 13, 1946; devised an undivided interest in real estate to his wife, Mary I. Fisher. She filed an inheritance tax return listing the undivided interest at $22,278.00, which was its then current valuation for taxation determined under the process prescribed by §§ 704 to 709. But the assessor, for the computation of the inheritance tax, appraised the interest in realty at $37,125.00.
Mrs. Fisher died intestate in October, 1946, and the interest passed to her three sons. Her administrator filed an inheritance tax return showing the divisions of her estate among her heirs at law, but claiming that no inheritance tax was due. The assessor disagreed and, in computing a tax, again appraised the undivided interest in real estate at $37,125.00.
The action of the assessor with respect to both estates was sustained by the Board of Tax Appeals, and the taxpayers have asked us to review that action.
Whether the assessor is bound by the current annual valuation made under the section of the Code referred to above in appraising real estate for the purpose of computing an inheritance tax depends, in large part, upon the true meaning of the crucial language in § 709, which is that the valuation made under that and the five preceding sections “shall constitute the basis of taxation for the next succeeding year.”
We have no doubt that the legislative intent was that such valuation should be the basis for the imposition of the next succeeding year’s real estate levy. Section 709 is a part of the Congressional enactment known as the “District of Columbia Revenue Act of 1939.”
The pertinent portion of § 1603 is as follows: “The appraisal thus made shall be deemed and taken to be the true value of the said property or interest therein upon which the said tax shall be paid, * *
Had it been the legislative purpose to require that the valuation under § 709 be used by the assessor in appraising the realty of one who died during the next succeeding year, it is unthinkable that § 1602 would have been written in its present form into the same piece of legislation. In construing a statute it is, of course, necessary to give effect to all its provisions^ if possible; different portions of a statute will not be held to be repugnant to each other if
Moreover, the provision for equalization in the assessing procedure outlined in §§ 704 to 709 indubitably stamps the valuation finally reached under that procedure as a basis for the levy of a tax on the real estate itself.
“The words ‘equalize’ or ‘equalization,’ as used in revenue statutes of the kind now under consideration, have an accepted meaning throughout the country. Cooley, in his work on Taxation (2d Ed. p. 421), says:
“ ‘Equalization of assessments has, for its general purpose, to bring the assessments of different parts of a taxing district to the same relative standard so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax.’ ”
A tax on inheritance or succession is not a property tax, but is a duty or excise laid upon the privilege of taking property by descent.
It is our view, therefore, that the inheritance tax in question here is not in any sense a tax upon the interest in realty, but is an excise required to be measured by the market value of the interest at the time the owner died.
The petitioners did not plead or prove in the proceeding before the Board of Tax Appeals that the market value of the property at the time of either death was less than the assessor’s appraisal, but pinned their faith to the proposition that the former valuation was forced upon the assessor by § 709. Since we have rejected that contention, it follows that the Board was correct in upholding the assessor’s action.
Affirmed.
These sections of the Code set up a carefully worked out arrangement for the annual assessment of all parcels of real estate in the District of Columbia, including equalization by a Board of Equalization and Review, and final adoption "by the Commissioners of the District.
53 Stat., pt. 2,.p. 1085, c. 367.
In Huidekoper v. Hadley, 177 F. 1, 8, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 505, the Eighth Circuit said,
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 20 S.Ct. 747, 44 L.Ed. 969; Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384, 42 S.Ct. 324, 66 L. Ed. 676.
State v. Hogg, 123 Tex. 568, 72 S.W.2d 593, and the numerous authorities there cited. See also In re McGhee’s Estate, 105 Iowa 9, 74 N.W. 695, and Warner v. Corbin, Tax Comin’r, 91 Conn. 532, 100 A. 354.
In Warner v. Corbin, Tax Comm’r, decided by the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut, there were involved facts almost identical with those of the case now before us, apparently under substantially similar statutes. There the tax commissioner made application, as he was permitted to do by statute, to the Probate Court for a reappraisement of the decedent’s estate to furnish a basis for the ascertainment of the succession tax. Warner objected on the sole ground that the real estate in question had been theretofore assessed for the purposes of taxation at the sum which appeared in the inventory and appraisal on file in the court. The Connecticut court pointed out that the inheritance tax is not a tax on real estate and held that the value at which the realty had been assessed for taxation did not bind the tax commissioner in appraising it for inheritance tax purposes.
The pertinent portion of that section is: “(f) Where any beneficiary has died or may hereafter die within six months after the death of the decedent and before coming into the possession and enjoyment of any property passing to him, and before selling, assigning, transferring, or in any manner contracting with respect to his interest in such property, such property shall be taxed only once, * * * ”