Thomas E. FISHER, Petitioner,
v.
Thе CITY OF MIAMI, a Municipal Corporation, Thomas Marshall, and William Jackson, Respondents.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Frates, Fay & Floyd and Larry S. Stewart, Miami, for petitioner.
John R. Barrett, City Atty., and John S. Lloyd, Asst. City Atty., for respondents.
Nichols, Gaither, Beckham, Colson & Spence and Alan R. Schwartz, Miami, amicus curiae.
THORNAL, Justice.
By a petition for certiorari we have for review a decision of a District Court of Appeal which has been certified to us as one which passes upon a question of great public interest.
We must determinе whether a Florida municipality is subject to an award of punitive damages in an action for an intentional tort committed by an employee while acting within the scope of his employment.
Fisher sued the City of Miami and two police officers. He claimed compensatory and punitive damages for an alleged unlawful assault. The triаl judge granted the City's motion to strike the claim for punitive damages. He subsequently entered a summary final judgment for the City. The judge had the view that a municipality cannot be held liablе for an intentional tort committed *456 by its employees. On appeal, the Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed the summary judgment on the authority of its decision in Simpson v. City of Miami, Flа.App.,
Since the decision contains a question which has been certified to us as one of great public interest we proceed immediately to a consideration of the merits.
The petitioner has argued primarily the punitive damages aspect of the problem. Additionally, the respondеnt has discussed the related problem of the liability of a municipality for an intentional wrong. By our opinion in City of Miami v. Simpson,
We reach the punitive damages problem. The petitioner Fisher contends that a Florida municipality is now subject to рunitive damages in a proper case. He relies primarily upon Hargrove v. The Town of Cocoa Beach, Fla.,
In Hargrove we dealt with a concept of liability and сertain situations out of which an obligation to pay damages might arise. Except as specifically limited, it laid aside the governmental-proprietary dichotomy аnd recognized a right to compensation for a wrong done. We did not there deal with the extent or amount of recovery. In setting aside the outmoded distinctions which prеviously had precluded recovery, we grounded our justification on the individual's right to compensation for a wrong done. The significance of Hargrove has been evidenced by its accеptance by other courts and its endorsement by the legal writers. Furthermore, three sessions of the Legislature have now intervened and there has been no legislative restriction on the Hargrove rule. We have given it further recognition by our opinion in City of Miami v. Simpson, supra.
In summary, Hargrove took cognizance of the injustices which had been produced by an antiquated concept of immunity. It proceeded to right those wrongs by clarifying the basic element of liability. It did so in the posture of allowing compensation for wrongs done. We think the results have been both salient and salutary. Despite all of this, we did not go beyond compensation as the ultimate to be achieved from the liability there imposed.
Petitioner insists that Florida is already committed to the allowance of punitive damages in the instant situation by the decision of this Court in City of Miami v. McCorkle, supra. Admittedly, the problem was involved in sоme measure in that decision. However, it was not there resolved. McCorkle cannot be accepted as a definitive conclusion that punitive damages аre recoverable against a Florida municipality. The reason appears from the opinion. The point was raised but not settled. The McCorkle court specifically avoided a holding on the point by deciding that the jury had obviously declined to allow any punitive damages. Hence, the question of the basic allowability of such an award was not there ripe for a decision.
*457 In proceeding to a judgment here we should recall that the primary basis for an award of damages is compensation. That is, the objective is to make the injured party whole to the extent that it is possible to measure his injury in terms of money. The award of punitive or exemplary damages constitutes an exception to the purely compensatory aspect of the damages concept as a means to right a wrong. McCormick on Damages, Section 77. Compensatory damages are recoverable as a matter of right. Punitive damages are not an absolute right. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. McRoberts,
Basically, the justification for a punitive award is to punish the offender and to deter others from committing similar wrongs. Smith v. Bagwell,
The majority of the District Court here announced numerous cogent reasons for this conclusion. Most of them are well-documented by the annotation in Desforge v. City of West St. Paul,
The public policy which motivates the conclusion appears to be sound. Since punishment is the objective, the people who would bear the burden of the award the citizens are the self-same group who are expected tо benefit from the public example which the punishment makes of the wrongdoer.
Another aspect of the matter is the rule which permits evidence of the wealth of a tortfeasor as a measure of the amount of punitive damages which should be awarded. Maiborne v. Kuntz, Fla.,
The petitioner and amicus curiae recognize the evidentiary point last discussed. Howеver, they urge that we hold for punitive damages but prohibit evidence of the wealth of the city. This apparent compromise would completely eliminate the рunishment element which is a prime justification for the award at the outset. This is so because there would then be no guide to the jury regarding the amount necessary to administer еffective punishment.
The deference element likewise adds little justification for this type of award against a municipality. In the first place it is to be assumed that the municiрal officials will do their duty and if discipline of a wrongdoing employee is indicated, appropriate measures will be taken without a punitive award.
Further, a huge award against the City would not necessarily deter other employees who generally would be unlikely to be able to pay a judgment assessed against them personally.
We conclude that, in the present state of the law on the subject, we should align ourselves with the vast majority of the courts which hold that, in the absence of some legislative рronouncement, municipalities are not liable for punitive damages when sued for a wrong committed by an employee.
Agreeing as we do with the decision under review, the writ is discharged.
It is so ordered.
*458 DREW, C.J., and THOMAS, ROBERTS, O'CONNELL and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
CALDWELL, J., concurs in judgment. See dissent in City of Miami v. Simpson, Fla.,