Fisher v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York (In Re MacFarlane Webster Associates)Fisher v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York (In Re MacFarlane Webster Associates)
Bеfore the court is the motion of a senior mortgagee of MacFarlane Webster Associates (“MacFarlane Webster” or the “Debt- or”) seeking,
inter alia,
an order pursuant to section 707(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,
I
The facts are largely undisputed. Macfarlane Webster acquired premises known as 40 West 45th Street, New York, New York (the “Premises”) on April 18, 1985, Compl. ¶ 7, with funds borrowed from Bank Leumi Trust Company of New York (the “Bank” or “Bank Leumi”), Compl. ¶ 10; Ans. ¶ 5; Cassirer Aff. ¶ 3, Consol.Agrt. (Exh. B), Mortgage (Exh. D), Note (Exh. E). In consideration of those acquisition funds and additional construction funds, the Debtor executed promissory notes and mortgages to Bank Leumi in the combined sum of $10,931,000. Id.
When the Debtor subsequently experienced difficulty in making repayments, Bank Leumi commenced a foreclosure action against it. Cassirer Aff. ¶ 10, Notice of Pendency (Exh. J). The Bank agreed on July 16, 1987 to settle the action by extending the maturity date of the notes and permitting the Debtor to grant a junior mortgage in favor of Eagle SA Funding Company (“Eagle”) in exchange for $2.5 million in new financing. Compl. ¶ 11; Ans. ¶ 6; Fox Aff., Modif. & Ext.Agrt. (Exh. C); Cassirer Aff. ¶ 11, Note (Exh. K).
Soon thereafter, the Debtor again defaulted in paying installments of interest and principal. Compl. ¶ 11; Cassirer Aff. ¶ 12. The Bank commenced a foreclosure action. Compl. 1111; Ans. 116. Approximately six months later, the Bank, Eagle and the Debtor, among others, entered into a stipulation agreement. Cassirer Aff. ¶ 13, Stip. & Order dated 5/17/88 (Exh. M). As part of the agreement, the Bank promised not to pursue its foreclosure action against the Debtor for a four month period in exchange for a consent judgment of foreclosure and sale to be entered if the Debtor did not make payment on a date certain. Id. The consensual judgment of foreclosure and sale established the liability of the Debtor to the Bank. Id. Eagle, in writing, consented to it. Id.
The Debtor again defaulted; the Bank filed the judgment on January 31, 1989, some nine months later. Cassirer Aff. 1114, Consent Judgment (Exh. N). It is alleged that during the Bank’s moratorium, the Debtor made numerous unsuccessful attempts to sell the Premises, but none of the five offers it received exceeded $16 million. Compl. ITU 17-21.
The referee appointed to sell the Premises advertised the time and place of the foreclosure sale, and served notice upon all parties in interest. Cassirer Aff. 1115, Referee's Report (Exh. P). The Bank postponed the sale to allow the Debtor to negotiate a proposed joint venture agreement which would have provided funds to satisfy the debt owed to the Bank. Id.; Cassirer Aff. 1115, Stip. (Exh. O); Compl. ¶ 22. The Debtor was not able to conclude the agreement, and the Bank re-noticed the sale. Compl. 1122; Cassirer Aff. ¶ 16, Referee’s Report (Exh. P).
Eagle, the Debtor, and approximately seven to ten people, attended the auction sale held on May 31, 1989. Cassirer Aff. 1I’s 17, 18; Compl. ¶ 13. The Bank made the winning bid of $9 million. Compl. ¶ 13; Cassirer Aff. 111117, 18, Referee’s Report (Exh. P).
Notwithstanding its having consented to the foreclosure sale, Eagle filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition against the Debtor on June 20, 1989, prior to recordation of the referee’s deed. Pl.’s Memo., p. 52; Defs’ Memo., p. 7. The Debtor did not oppose the petition. On the Debtor’s default, this Court entered an order for relief under the Bankruptcy Code in August 1989. The Bank’s assignee, EOR Two of New York, Inc. (“EOR”), received and recorded the
The Trustee brought an adversary proceeding against the Bank and EOR, on November 13, 1989. Principаlly, the complaint seeks to void the foreclosure sale as a fraudulent transfer under sections 544(b), 548(a), 550(d) and 551 of the Code. It alleges that an appraisal of the Premises by the Debtor and offers made to the Debtor establish that the fair market value of the Premises at the time of the foreclosure sale ranged from $15 million to $16 million. Compl. TUT 16-21. There is no indication in the record that the Premises have since appreciated in value.
Dividends payable in the bankruptcy case would be attributable to recovery from the Trustee’s action. Only the Bank and Eagle would appear to be entitled to them if the action is successful. The Debtor’s liability on its senior mortgage debt, as of the date of the sale, was $13,956,637.79, inclusive of all costs, Cassirer Aff., Referee’s Report, p. 2 (Exh. P), Order (Exh. U), and, on the Eagle mortgage, as of the date of the Petition, in excess of $3.6 million, Pet. H 1. Interest on the Bank’s mortgage continues to accrue. Since the aggregate debt owed the Bank and Eagle would exceed the alleged fair market value of the collateral, Eagle is undersecured.
As affirmative defenses, the Defendants asserted that the foreclosure judgment was entered upon consent of all parties, including the Debtor and Eagle, that the Debtor was afforded fair consideration and reasonably equivalent value for the sale, res judi-cata and collateral estoppel, the doctrine of unclean hands, waiver and estoppel, and lack of standing. They then brought the instant motion to dismiss the chapter 7 case under section 707(a) or for abstention under section 305 of the Code and to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
II
Section 707(a) of the Code,
The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a hearing and only for cause, including—
(1) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(2) nonpayment of any fees and charges required under Chapter 123 of title 28; and
(3) failure of the debtor in a voluntary case to file, within fifteen days or such additional time as the court may allow after the filing of the petition commencing such case, the information required by parаgraph (1) of section 521, but only on motion by the United States Trustee.
A
The language of the statute thus requires the bankruptcy courts to determine, on a case by case basis, whether an abuse constituting cause has occurred.
See In re Sky Group Int’l., Inc.,
B
Interpreting
Prior to 1938, the former Bankruptcy Act did not expressly preclude a creditor from commencing an involuntary case because of his prior conduct. The statute only explicitly required proof of an “act of bankruptcy” on which the involuntary petition was based.
2
See
In the seminal case
Moulton v. Coburn,
It must be assumed that the assenting creditor had knowledge of his rights under the Bankruptcy Act and voluntarily chose to assent to the terms of the assignment in preference to exercising his rights under the act.... [An] election results from his choice of rights which are inconsistent with the enforcement of rights under the Bankruptcy Act.... He has chosen between two rights, one of which is derived from an instrument in which a clear intention appears that he should not enjoy both.
The Second Circuit, in
In re Goldman-Rosenzweig Co., Inc. (Amer. Woolen Co. v. Amer. Silk Mills, Inc.),
[Creditors who voluntarily assent and participate in the general assignment for the benefit of creditors, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentations, are es-topped from thereafter filing or becoming parties to a petition in bankruptcy.... [W]hen a creditor elects to deal with a deed of composition or arrangement as valid, instead of exercising his right to treat it as an act of bankruptcy or as void for non-compliance with the bankruptcy law, he is precluded from afterwards supporting a bankruptcy petition against the debtor.
Recognizing the opportunity for abuse, Congress followed those cases and added sеction 59(h),
In Dinerman, an insurance brokerage business was sold to the alleged bankrupt for cash and promissory notes. The sole stockholders of the bankrupt pledged their shares to the seller for payment on the notes. When the bankrupt defaulted on the notes and the sellers sought possession of the stock, the stockholders, as directors, voted to execute a general assignment for the benefit of creditors. One of the stockholders, also a creditor of the alleged bankrupt, then filed an involuntary petition against the bankrupt under the Act alleging the general assignment as the act of bankruptcy. The bankrupt, then under the sellers’ control pursuant to the assignment, sought dismissal of the petition on' the grоund that a creditor, who in his role as a director and stockholder in the bankrupt, induces the bankrupt to make a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, should be precluded from filing a petition in bankruptcy alleging the general assignment as an act of bankruptcy. The court observed:
A creditor who initiates or procures a general assignment makes a choice between bankruptcy and assignment proceedings .... It is not unfair to hold him to his choice by withholding from him the right to file a bankruptcy petition alleging the assignment which he induced as an act of bankruptcy. On the other hand, a creditor who merely files his claim with an assignee in a general assignment proceeding which has already been instituted cannot be said to have made the same free choice between bankruptcy and general assignment.
Since the petitioning creditor voted for the assignment as a director and a shareholder, he was one of the principal parties in inducing the assignment and having thus procured the assignment, he could not complain of it by alleging it as an act of bankruptcy. Whether the court labelled its holding estoppel, election of remedies, or volenti non fit injuria, see supra at p. 697 and note 3, he was disqualified and the petition dismissed.
These cases, although arising in the context of a pre-petition creditor complaining of an act of bankruptcy to which he consented or participated in bringing about with knowledge, stаnd for the proposition that a bankruptcy proceeding is not to be
To be sure, Congress, in enacting
But, rather than eliminate the ability to address abuse of the general type found in the
Dinerman
line of cases, Congress through enacting
C
Indeed, without such construction of
Nor can it be said that the enactment of
These notions give rise to the further notion that a chapter 7 proceeding involving a debtor corporation or partnership does not raise the strong concern for discharge of honest individual debtors that is the principal purpose of the chapter. Corporate and partnership debtors are not eli
In sum, construction of
D
Better reasoned authority under the Code, moreover, indicates that the courts can, on a case by case basis,
Sky Group,
In
Sky Group,
In
In re John Oliver Co., Inc.,
In contrast, the court in
In re Win-Sum Sports, Inc.,
These courts, unlike the
Sky Group
Court, failed to recognize that Congress did not contemplate or intend the bankruptcy courts being unable to address abuse and to recognize the limited scope of
Ill
In the case at bar, Eagle clearly consented in writing to foreclosure of the single asset оf the Debtor. Unlike the creditors in
John Oliver,
Eagle makes no claim that it was unaware of its rights or relevant facts when it did so. It makes no allegation as to any irregularities in the sale.
See
79 N.Y.Jur.2d Mortgages § 714 (1989). No fraud or bad faith on the part of the Debtor or Bank Leumi in procuring Eagle’s consent is alleged. Although the complaint contains general allegations of fraud and bad faith, Compl. ¶ 9, it truly specifies actual or constructive fraud only through the foreclosure sale, Compl. Till 15, 18, 20-23. While Eagle did not induce or initiate the foreclosure action, it, nevertheless, affirmatively consented to it, attended the sale, and had the opportunity to bid. It was not a mere passive participant. At no time, although afforded the opportunity аt the sale and the confirmation hearing, did Eagle object to the foreclosure sale.
12
Instead it appears on this record that Eagle knowingly gave its consent on the basis of its right to proceeds of the foreclosure sale in excess of the Bank’s debt, if any, and the right to seek a deficiency judgment against the Debtor, and its remedies under state law to overturn the sale.
See
79 N.Y. Jur.2d Mortgages §§ 701, 706-719, 756 (1989). Unlike the petitioning creditors in
Sky Group
and
John Oliver,
Eagle made “a free choice” between foreclosure and bankruptcy, or consented to extra-bankruptcy relief, within the meaning of
Dinerman,
Here, moreover, there is more than mere consent by Eagle. Not only did Eagle consent to an extra-bankruptcy remedy, the bankruptcy protection it has invoked is for the benefit of no party other than itself. That benefit is to be accomplished by the Trustee’s complaint to avoid the very foreclosure sale to which it consented on the ground that bids were insufficient at a sale of which Eagle was given notice and even attended.
This is an abuse the courts are not to ignore: if the Trustee prevails in his complaint and the foreclosure sale consented to by Eagle is avoided, only Eagle will benefit since no allegation is made that the value of the property exceeds the secured claims of the Bank and Eagle under
For the foregoing reasons, the instant bankruptcy case must be dismissed. Submit order.
Notes
. In relevant part,
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate’s interest in such property ... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
. Under § 3(a) of the former Bankruptcy Act,
.
See also In re Lucey Mfg. Corp.,
. Section 59(h) provided;
A creditor shall not be estopped to act as a petitioning creditor because he participated in any prior matter of judicial proceeding, having for its purpose the adjustment or settlement of the affairs of the debtor or the liquidation of his property, or to allege such prior matter or proceeding as an act of bankruptcy, unless he has consented thereto in writing with knowledge of the facts, if any, which would be a bar to the discharge of the debtor under this Act.
. Prior to 1938, the courts generally held that participation in a general assignment for the benefit of creditors might disqualify a creditor from petitioning, but disagreed on the extent of participation necessary to result in disqualification. Although the courts differed as to whether the mere filing of a claim, receipt of a dividend, passive acquiescence, or active participation was necessary to disqualify a petitioning creditor, they unanimously held that a creditor who participated in inducing the act of bankruptcy, as contrasted with a creditor who merely participated after the act was induced, was precluded from petitioning.
See Dinerman,
.
If the petition is not timely controverted, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under which the petition was filed. Otherwise, after trial, the court shall order relief against the debtor in an involuntary case under the chapter under'which the petition was filed, only if—
(1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the subject of a bona fide dispute; or
(2) within 120 days before the date of the filing of the petition, a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver, or agent appointed or authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property of the debtor for the purpose of enforcing а lien against such property, was appointed or took possession.
.
Only after notice to all creditors and a hearing may the court dismiss a petition filed under this section—
(1) on the motion of a petitioner;
(2) on consent of all petitioners and the debt- or; or
(3) for want of prosecution.
.
In
Carden,
the objecting creditor sought dismissal to prevent avoidance of a judgment lien in its favor, precisely the harm Congress sought to eschew by revising § 18(b). It was not alleged that the petitioning creditor had committed an abusive act. Not addressed by the court, therefore, was whether the case would have been dismissed in circumstances such as those in the instant case,
i.e.,
where the petitioning creditor committеd an act which would have been grounds for dismissal under another provision of the statute, and where unsecured creditors stood to lose nothing from dismissal. Thus it cannot be argued that permitting a non-petitioning creditor to dismiss for abuse under
.
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if its finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.
.
. Misplaced is the Trustee’s reliance on
In re Kragness,
. The letter of the Trustee’s counsel to the state court. Fox Aff., Letter dated 12/1/89 (Exh. P), was written on behalf of the estate, not Eagle, his former client, Compl. ¶ 17. Moreover, the objection to confirmation of the sale as violative of the stay was not pressed.
. The
Sky Group
Court declined to abstain from the case under § 305, finding that only the secured creditor stood to benefit from abstention while all creditors would be substantially or entirely satisfied in a bankruptcy proceeding.
See
The
Win-Sum
Court dismissed the petition under
The leading commentator indicates that both
. By holding that maintaining the petition would constitute an abuse of Chapter 7, we do not purport to engraft a standard for abuse. We note only that in these
sui generis
circumstances, there is a clear abuse of Chapter 7 constituting cause under
Given our holding that the bankruptcy case is to be dismissed, we do not consider the alternative request for abstention under