IRWIN WILLIAM FISH, APPELLANT, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, RESPONDENT.
No. 7852
Supreme Court of Nevada
May 10, 1976
274 Nev. 272 | 549 P.2d 338
Robert List, Attorney General; George E. Holt, District Attorney, Dan M. Seaton, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and Elliott A. Sattler, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent.
OPINION
By the Court, ZENOFF, J.:
Irwin W. Fish, also known as Bill Fish and Bill Faisch, was convicted by a jury of the first-degree murder of Abraham Schwartz whose body was discovered in a shallow grave near Las Vegas in September of 1972.
At triаl, it was established that Fish and three accomplices, David Miller, Douglas Webb and Benny Shoemaker, conspired in the abduction and execution of Schwartz. The critical evidence produced at trial consisted primarily of the testimony of three witnesses: David Miller (who testified under a grant of immunity from the state), his wife Constance and the wife of Douglas Webb, Suzanne.
On appeal, Fish claims (1) that the trial court erroneously permitted David Miller and his wife Constance to relate certain conversations which occurrеd outside the presence of Fish; (2) that the trial court erroneously refused to give certain proposed instructions to the jury; and (3) that insufficient evidence was producеd at trial to corroborate the testimony of David Miller.
1. A significant portion of David Miller‘s testimony consisted of his account of conversations with and between his fellow conspirators. Such testimony is admittedly hearsay, was acknowledged as such by the trial court but nevertheless was admitted into evidence over objection by trial counsel. The triаl court correctly observed that the hearsay statements fell within a well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Hearsay statements may be admitted into evidence where the statement “is made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
The amount of independent evidence necessary to prove the existence of a conspiracy may be slight, it is enough that only prima facie evidence of the fact is produced. Goldsmith v. Sheriff, supra. The evidence that Webb, Miller, Shoemaker and Fish conspired to kill Schwartz is substantial. Miller testified that on April 27, 1972, Fish told Miller and Webb that he was having trouble with Schwartz and that they would have to “take care of him.” At that meeting Fish gave Miller and Webb Schwartz‘s address and a description of his car. They began to follow and observe Schwartz and checked in with Fish intermittently. Prior to the killing they stayed in a motel in Las Vegas leased and operated by Fish withоut paying for their accommodations. The day before the killing, in the presence of Miller and Webb, Fish telephoned Schwartz and arranged to meet him the following morning. Before Schwartz arrived at the designated meeting place, Fish again met with Webb and Miller and outlined in detail the murder plan and furnished them with “knock-out drops,” the use of which the plan rеquired.
The related facts are prima facie evidence of a conspiracy and therefore constituted a sufficient foundation for admitting the extra judicial stаtements of Fish‘s coconspirators made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
2. Constance Miller, not a coconspirator, testified to conversations overheard by her between Miller, Webb, Shoemaker and Fish. The fact that she was not a coconspirator does not preclude her testimony under
Constance Miller related many statements overheard by or
It should be noted that many of the statements related by Mrs. Miller were made by Fish or were madе in Fish‘s presence and therefore were admissible as admissions or adopted admissions.
3. Fish proposed several jury instructions with the hope that the jury would be permitted to find that Mrs. Miller and Mrs. Wеbb were accomplices whose testimony would require corroboration. The trial court rejected his proposed instructions on the ground that there was no evidеnce suggesting that the two women were accomplices. The record supports that finding. We find no error in the giving or refusal to give instructions by the trial court.
4. Fish finally contends that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of David Miller. The record indicates otherwise. Fish concedes that he knew Schwartz, that the body was found аnd the murder weapon recovered. Independent of Miller‘s testimony, Constance Miller and Suzanne Webb stated that David Miller admitted that the murder weapon was registered tо him. They further testified that Webb, Miller and Shoemaker spent a considerable amount of time with Fish ostensibly under his employ but did no actual work;
Fish‘s secretary testified that Fish instructed her to send money orders to Webb and Miller who were at that time in Cumberland Gap, Kentucky.
Don Sure, a salesman from southern California, testified that Fish had done business with Schwartz and that Fish had told Sure that he was going to kill Schwartz because of an unsatisfactory business relationship.
Joseph Di Rodeo testified that he overheard Fish threaten Schwartz stating, “you‘re next.” Fish admitted that he had made an appointment with the deceаsed for 8:30 a.m. on the day of the murder, just prior to which was the last time Schwartz was seen alive. Fish also admitted to a detective that he made the statement, “I wish I could push a button and destroy Schwartz.”
The record also discloses that Fish‘s car was used in perpetrating the homicide and that his accomplices depended upon him for financiаl support both before and after the killing.
Thus, the record is replete with facts suggesting a close association among Fish and the killers. The record also clearly suggests thаt Fish had a motive to kill Schwartz while, independent from their association with Fish, the actual perpetrators (Miller, Webb and Shoemaker) did not.
The corroborative evidenсe presented in this case, under all the rules and principles announced by this court, is more than ample to support Fish‘s conviction. For example, see LaPena v. State, 92 Nev. 1, 544 P.2d 1187 (1976); LaPena v. Sheriff, 91 Nev. 692, 541 P.2d 907 (1975); Eckert v. State, 91 Nev.183, 533 P.2d 468 (1975); Austin v. State, 87 Nev. 578, 491 P.2d 724 (1971); Marquette v. State, 91 Nev. 696, 541 P.2d 1099 (1975); State v. Hilbish, 59 Nev. 469, 97 P.2d 435 (1940).
Affirmed.
BATJER, MOWBRAY, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
GUNDERSON, C. J., concurring:
I concur in the result.
