{¶ 2} In 1993, appellant initiated his claims against appellee in the Belmont County Common Pleas Court. That case was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and appellant never pursued an appeal of that decision. Subsequently in 1995, appellant filed similar claims against appellee in the United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. That case too was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and appellant never pursued an appeal.
{¶ 3} More than ten years later, appellant, proceeding pro se, again filed similar claims against appellee in Monroe County Common Pleas Court on May 7, 2002 — the subject of the present appeal. On May 24, 2002, appellee filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2). In support of the motion, appellee attached an affidavit in which he stated that his rental car business is located and operated solely within Illinois and that he conducts no business in Ohio. On June 27, 2002, the trial court sustained appellee's motion and dismissed the case. This appeal followed.
{¶ 4} Before getting to appellant's assignments of error, we need to address the state of each parties' briefs. Appellant filed his pro se brief on February 3, 2003. The certificate of service indicates that appellant mailed a copy of the brief to counsel for appellee on January 27, 2003. App.R. 18(A) states that "appellee shall serve and file the appellee's brief within twenty days after service of the brief of the appellant." Appellee did not file a response to appellant's brief until October 14, 2003. In addition to being filed over seven months late, the filing is in no way compliant, either in substance or form, with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, we will consider the appeal as if no brief was filed by appellee. When appellee fails to file a brief, the court may accept appellant's statement of the facts and issues as correct and reverse the judgment if appellant's brief reasonably sustains such action. App.R. 18(C).
{¶ 5} Turning to appellant's brief, it appears to set forth eight assignments of error. Appellant has not argued each assignment separately as required by the appellate rules and, instead, has combined his argument for all assignments. See App.R. 16(A)(7). As we have noted in other similar cases in the past, "[a]lthough appellant is proceeding prose, pro se litigants are bound by the same rules and procedures as litigants who retain counsel. Meyers v. First Natl. Bank of Cincinnati
(1981),
{¶ 6} Appellant's first four assignments of error state respectively:
{¶ 7} "The failure of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas to provide independent, separate, and adequate state law grounds for failing to assert competent jurisdiction as specified in Supreme Court ruling: MICHIGAN v. LONG, 103 Sct 346,
{¶ 8} "The failure of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas to assert jurisdiction under Ohio Constitution Article
{¶ 9} "The failure of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant as required by Ohio Revised Code ORC
{¶ 10} "The failure of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas to discuss the doctrine of forum non convienens which is available to the courts of Ohio." (Sic.)
{¶ 11} "An appealable issue must be raised at the earliest opportunity to do so. State v. Williams (1996),
{¶ 12} Appellant never appealed the Belmont County Common Pleas Court order dismissing his case. Therefore, he waived any issues in that case and cannot now assert them in this case.
{¶ 13} Appellant also complains that the failure to pursue an appeal of the Belmont County Common Pleas Court order was the result of the ineffectiveness of his legal counsel at that time. However, a civil litigant, unlike a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997)
{¶ 14} Last, towards the end of appellant's brief, he requests relief from the Belmont County Common Pleas Court decision pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). A Civ.R. 60(B) motion can only be made in the trial court and cannot be, for the first time, entertained or considered by this court.
{¶ 15} Accordingly, appellant's first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error are without merit.
{¶ 16} Since the merit of appellant's remaining assignments of error depend on the trial court's determination that it did not have personal jurisdiction over appellee and since appellant did not separately argue them, they will be addressed together. They state, respectively:
{¶ 17} "The failure of the Belmont County Common Pleas Court and the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas to assert jurisdiction under the Rule of Locus of Injury"
{¶ 18} "The failure of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas and the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas to provide equal justice under the law and equal Protection under the law as required by the 14th Amendment US Constitution."
{¶ 19} "The failure of the Belmont Court of Common Pleas and the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas to provide access to the courts as required by the
{¶ 20} "The failure of the Belmont County and the Monroe County Courts of Common Pleas to recognize that a contract to pay all medical bills an for physical pain and suffering, and economic losses has existed pursuant to Ohio Revised Code ORC
{¶ 21} To the extent that these assignments of error take issue with the Belmont County Common Pleas Court decision, they are without merit for the reasons mentioned under appellant's first four assignments of error.
{¶ 22} Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a matter of law which appellate courts review de novo. BairdBros. Sawmill, Inc. v. Augusta Const. (June 19, 2000), 7th Dist. No. 98-CA-152.
{¶ 23} Once a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the trial court has jurisdiction. Keybank Natl. Assn. v. Tawill (1998),
{¶ 24} When determining whether a state court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant the court is obligated to engage in a two-step analysis. First, the court must determine whether Ohio's long-arm statute, R.C.
{¶ 25} R.C.
{¶ 26} "(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:
{¶ 27} "(1) Transacting any business in this state;
{¶ 28} "(2) Contracting to supply services or goods in this state;
{¶ 29} "(3) Causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
{¶ 30} "(4) Causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
{¶ 31} "(5) Causing injury in this state to any person by breach of warranty expressly or impliedly made in the sale of goods outside this state when he might reasonably have expected such person to use, consume, or be affected by the goods in this state, provided that he also regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;
{¶ 32} "(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state;
{¶ 33} "(7) Causing tortious injury to any person by a criminal act, any element of which takes place in this state, which he commits or in the commission of which he is guilty of complicity.
{¶ 34} "(8) Having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state;
{¶ 35} "(9) Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting."
{¶ 36} Initially, it should be noted that after appellee challenged personal jurisdiction in his motion to dismiss, appellant made no effort to respond to the motion and, therefore, did not meet his burden of establishing that the trial court has jurisdiction. See Keybank Natl.Assn., supra. In reviewing appellant's complaint, he does assert that the court has jurisdiction over appellee by virtue of R.C.
{¶ 37} In sum, appellant failed to satisfy the first step in establishing the trial court's jurisdiction over appellee. There were no facts alleged that the court had jurisdiction over appellee. In contrast, appellee's motion to dismiss illustrates and explains how the facts alleged in appellant's own complaint neither satisfies Ohio's long-arm statute nor comports with the Due Process Clause of the
{¶ 38} Appellant also discusses forum non conveniens. However, the question of personal jurisdiction, which goes to the court's power to exercise control over the parties, is a concept distinct from and typically decided in advance of venue, which is primarily a matter of choosing a convenient forum. See, generally, 4 Wright, Miller
Cooper, Federal Practice Procedure (1987) 224, Section 1063; 15 Wright, Miller Cooper, Federal Practice Procedure (1986) 3, Section 3801. See, also, Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Mgt. (1985),
{¶ 39} Accordingly, appellant's fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth assignments of error are without merit.
{¶ 40} The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Waite, P.J., and Vukovich, J., concur.