The defendants Thomas E. Minogue and Michelle C. Minogue (hereinafter the defendants) appeal from the granting of a prejudgment remedy (PJR) of attachmеnt of their real property. The defendants claim that the trial court improperly granted the PJR because (1) the plaintiff
This action arose out of a commercial real estate lease. In 1988, the plaintiff leased commercial real estate located at 37 Unquowa Road in Fairfiеld to the named defendant, TKPK, Ltd. Payment and performance of the subject lease was guaranteed by the defendants Thomas E. Minogue and Michelle C. Minogue. In January, 1991, TKPK, Ltd., defaulted on the lease payment and subsequently abandoned the property. TKPK, Ltd., is no longer a party to this action. After a demand
I
General Statutes § 52-278d (a) provides that a trial court may issue a PJR if it determines that there is “probable cause to sustain the validity of [the plaintiff’s] claim.” It is firmly established that the trial court’s hearing in probable cause is not intended to be a full scale trial on the merits of the plaintiff’s сlaim. “The plaintiff does not have to establish that he will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the claim. . . . The court’s role in such a hearing is to determine probable success by weighing probabilities. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calfee v. Usman,
Appellate rеview of the granting of a PJR is extremely narrow and focused. In determining probable cause, the trial court is vested with wide discretion and our role in reviewing the trial court’s action is limited to determining whether the court’s conclusion was reasonable. Anderson v. Nedovich, 19 Conn. App.
“ ‘In the absence of clear error [the Appellate Court] should not overrule the thoughtful decision of the trial court, which has had an opportunity to assess the legal issues which may be raised and to weigh thе credibility .. . of the witnesses.’ ” Three S. Development Co. v. Santore,
Our review of the trial court’s conclusions of law is likewise severely limited. “Thus, we do not decide whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court were correct or erroneous. We review the legal conclusions of the trial court only to the limited extent of determining whether its conclusion^] [were] reasonable. . . . This can only mean that if review of the record indicates that the trial court reached legаl conclusions which have a reasonable basis, those conclusions must stand, even though a plenary review of them might well yield a different result. Any more complete process would lead us into the trap of determining the ultimate correctness of legal conclusions which the trial court has decided are only probably correct, and doing so on the basis of facts which the trial court has decided are only probably true, but which it has not found to be proven by a рreponderance of the evidence.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babiarz v. Hartford Special, Inc., 2 Conn. App. 388, 394,
The trial court properly determined that there wаs probable cause to support the plaintiffs application.
II
The defendants next complain that the Connecticut PJR statutes are uncоnstitutional because they do not require that a plaintiff seeking a PJR post a bond or other security. Our attention has not been directed to a trial сourt ruling on this issue. Examination of the transcript discloses that the defendant raised the issue in argument. Following a colloquy between the court and defense counsel on this issue, however, they went off on a tangent involving other matters. Consequently, the trial court never ruled on the bond issue. We cannot pass on the correctness of a trial court ruling that was never made. To be entitled to review, a claim must be both raised and decided in the trial court. Berry v. Loiseau,
If the defendants intended to take uр this issue on appeal, it was their obligation to move for articulation to create an adequate record for appellate rеview. Without such articulation the defendants have failed to furnish a proper record for review. Practice Book § 4061; Walton v. New Hartford,
The defendants next argue thаt the probable cause standard of our PJR statutes violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States because it is vague, without standard, and permits a party unfair tactical advantage over an adversary.
This issue was not raised in the trial сourt. The rules of practice provide that the Appellate Court is not bound to consider a claim that was not distinctly raised at trial. Practicе Book § 4185. “This rule applies to constitutional claims. . . . [OJnly in most exceptional circumstances can and will this court consider a claim, constitutionаl or otherwise, that has not been raised and decided in the trial court. . . . The [defendants have] pointed us to no such exceptional circumstances in the present case and, accordingly, we decline to review the merits of this claim.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, supra,
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Notes
The term plaintiff refers to the named plaintiff, Harold Fischel, individually, dоing business as Fischel Management. There are, however, two other plaintiffs in this appeal, Harold Fischel as trustee for his daughters’ trusts and Trust Realty Corpоration. Harold Fischel, as trustee for his daughters’ trust, originally owned the property in question and entered into the initial lease transaction with the defendants. Subsequent to the lease transaction, Harold Fishel, as trustee, conveyed the property by quitclaim deed, and thereafter assigned the lease to Trust Realty Corporation. During the entire lease period, the named plaintiff served as landlord and agent for Harold Fischel, trustee.
The plaintiffs submitted this PJR application subsequent to the institution of the present action pursuant to General Statutes § 52-278h.