162 N.W. 929 | S.D. | 1917
Action for possession of personal property; judgment in favor of intervening defendant; appeal from judghent and from an order denying a new trial.
The following are the facts' material to the questions presented on appeal: One B. died, leaving a widow and several minor children. He was indebted to- 'appellant bank. After hisi death, bis widow gave her individual note to take up- the notes evidencing such indebtedness. She secured said note by a chattel mortgage covering personal property belonging to the estate of deceased. She was subsequently appointed administratrix of such estate. Subsequent to such appointment this action was brought to obtain the possession of the mortgaged property for purpose
“In matters of -estoppel there is a clear distinction between the law of property and the law of evidence.”
’Appellant has -cited no authority in support of such novel preposition, and we apprehend that none can be found. It -certainly would be a.n anomalous -situation if one who ha-d a right to
“This claim was for loaned money, ' * * * its payment could have1 been, and it was just and right that it should have been, enforced against the estate m the regular way, had not the widow of the deceased, being satisfied that it was just, discharged it, by the payment of the $300 to the appellant, before grant of administration to her.”
We are unable to discover -any -equities against the e-state under the facts of the present case. It does not appear but what appellant, in making the original loans to deceased, relied solely upon the personal credit of its debtor; there being no evidence that he haldl 'any property other than such .as was- exempt unlder the laws of this state. When the debtor died appellant was left with neither a legal nor equitable claim enforceable against this estate. It certainly acquired no equities by -taking a mortgage against -that
There are no other -as-signimemts meriting consideration.
The judgment a-n-dl -order appealed from are affirmed.