1936 BTA LEXIS 674 | B.T.A. | 1936
Lead Opinion
It is the position of the petitioners that the payment of $50,000 by Van Vleet to Ellis, the surrender by Ellis of 7,880.91 shares of Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation stock, the receipt by him of $253,166.75, the transfer by Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation of its real estate to the Chemical Realty Co. and the distribution of stock of the latter corporation, and finally the transfer of the remaining assets to McKesson & Bobbins, Inc., for stock and cash and the distribution in liquidation to the stockholders of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation were steps in a reorganization or merger of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation with McKesson & Robbins, Inc., consummated on January 31, 1930, and that there was no closed nor completed transaction during the year 1929 from which Ellis realized
In First Seattle Dexter Horton National Bank v. Commissioner, 77 Fed. (2d) 45, the general rule was stated from 13 C. J. 561, § 525, to the effect that “a contract is entire when by its terms, nature and purpose it contemplates and intends that each and all of its parts and the consideration shall be common to the other and interdependent.” Considering the agreement and the supporting facts in the instant case in the light of the language just quoted, there is no doubt in our minds that the disposition by Ellis of his 15,905 shares of stock in Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation was one transaction rather than two. From the time the option was given on May 6,1929, there was never any thought in the minds of the parties but that if the plan went through it should go through in toto and each and every stockholder of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation would surrender his entire holdings therein for cash, stock in the realty company, and stock in McKesson <& Robbins, Inc. There was no thought or intention on the part of Ellis, Van Vleet, the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation, or McKesson & Robbins, Inc., that Ellis or any other stockholder would dispose of or surrender any portion of their holdings except as a step in the disposition of their entire holdings and the complete liquidation of Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation.
The conditions of management and ownership of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation were such that it would not be reasonable to assume that a transaction would have been entered into by either Ellis or Van Vleet that did not provide for the disposition of the entire holdings of one or both. There was never any thought or agreement for partial liquidation. Cf. Commissioner v. Blum, 75 Fed. (2d) 699, affirming 29 B. T. A. 580. It is true one step in-the transaction took the form of a surrender by Ellis of 7,880.91 shares of his stock prior to the final transfer of assets to McKesson. The evidence indicates, however, that the negotiations were originally based on an understanding that McKesson- was to acquire %he drug business and assets, except real estate, of Van Vleet-Ellis
Considering all the facts and circumstances, we think there is no doubt that Ellis disposed of his 15,905 shares of Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation stock as a unit and the gain or loss to him must be computed on the basis of one transaction. First Seattle Dexter Horton National Bank v. Commissioner, supra; West Texas Refining & Development Co. v. Commissioner, 68 Fed. (2d) 77; Omaha Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 26 B. T. A. 1128; Fred L. Dickey et al., Executors, 32 B. T. A. 1283; cf. Bruce v. Helvering, 76 Fed. (2d) 442.
We are further of the opinion that the alternative contention of the respondent is not sustained by the facts. The plan outlined in the agreement fixed the time for its final consummation as not earlier than January 15 nor later than January 31, 1930. It also appears from the agreement that liability on the part of McKesson was subject to certain conditions precedent and that these conditions were met in January 1930 and at the time of closing, when McKesson paid to the depositary the stock and cash required of it under the contract.
The facts do show, however, that Ellis did receive a substantial portion of the consideration for his stock during the year 1929. It is also apparent that the consideration paid over in 1929 was received by Ellis as his own, with full confidence that all conditions would be met and the transaction would be completed as provided in the agreement. He is accordingly taxable in 1929 if and to the extent that the consideration received in 1929 exceeded $576,116.33, the basis for his stock. The facts show that he received in that year $253,166.75 in cash and 15,905 shares of stock in the Chemical Kealty Co. It is the Commissioner’s contention that the Chemical Kealty Co. stock had a fair market value of $19.33 per share. Even though
Having determined that Ellis realized no gain in 1929 in connection with the surrender of his stock in the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation and the liquidation of that company, it is not necessary to consider and determine whether or not the acquisition by McKesson of the business and a portion of the assets of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation, consummated in 1930, constituted a reorganization within the meaning of the statute, since the reorganization provisions have to do only with the recognition and not the realization of gain. We do not have the year 1930 before us.
With reference to the item of $49,241.67 realized by Ellis on the note paid to him by Van Vleet under date of September 21, 1929, the respondent is sustained. This payment was made by Van Vleet individually for himself and other members of his family who were stockholders of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation. It was no part of the agreement between the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation and McKesson & Robbins, Inc. It represented the price that Van Vleet and other stockholders were willing to pay to Ellis in order to obtain a favorable vote from him with reference to the McKesson transaction, and, while it is true that the agreement was occasioned by the option granted to McKesson by the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation, neither of these corporations was a party to the agreement, nor obligated by it. It was a- side transaction between two of the stockholders of the Van Vleet-Ellis Corporation. While it is true that the language of the agreement of May 16, 1929, supports the contention that the money was not to be paid until the closing by the two corporations, the intent of the language was the subject matter of a dispute between the parties at the time Ellis received-the sum of $253,166.75 and submitted his resignation as chairman of the board of directors. It was his contention that the money was then due and owing, and after some discussion between the parties and their counsel the note for $50,000, payable on January 31, 1930, was executed by Van Vleet and delivered to Ellis and a new agreement setting forth the purposes for the payment was attached to the note. The note was an ordinary note payable on a given date in the future and the language of the new agreement indicates that the note was then and there given in satisfaction of the obligation of Van Vleet and for the performance of acts done and to be done by Ellis. It was income to Ellis when received. Alworth-Washburn Co. v. Helvering, 67 Fed. (2d) 694.
Reviewed by the Board.
Decision will be entered under Rule 50.
