72 So. 701 | Miss. | 1916
delivered the opinion of the court.
This suit was brought in the circuit court of Madison county by the appellant, First National Bank of Iowa City, against John McGrath & Sons Co., Inc., for a balance of two hundred and fifty dollars and interest due by appellees upon the following’ note, viz.:
“No. 8827. Chicago, Illinois, July 16, 1909. For value received, the undersigned promises to pay at Chicago, Illinois, to the order of the Puritan Mfg. Co. five hundred dollars as follows: two hundred and fifty dollars January 1st after date, two hundred and fifty dollars August 15,1910. A discount of six percent, will be given if the full amount of this instrument is paid at maturity of first installment. Nonpayment of any installment for more than thirty days after maturity renders remaining installments due at holder’s option. John McGrath & Sons Company, James J. McGrath, Secretary & Treasurer. ”
Indorsed on back: “Pay First National Bank of Iowa City, Iowa, or order. Puritan Manufacturing Company, by M. H. Taylor, 1/22/10 pd. two hundred and fifty dollars. ’ ’
The above note was given by the appellee to the Puritan Manufacturing Company, which is domiciled also at Iowa City, Iowa, for the purchase of a certain bill of goods consisting of jewelry. The first installment of two hundred and fifty dollars was paid, and this suit is for the second installment.
On September 9, 1909, the Puritan Manufacturing Company assigned this note to the appellant as part of some collateral security for a loan then made to the Puritan Manufacturing Company of one thousand dollars by the said appellant bank. This note of 'the Puritan Manu
The state of Illinois some years ago adopted the uniform negotiable instruments law which was adopted in Mississippi this year. This case is practically on all fours with that of Johnson County Savings Bank v. Yarbrough, above cited. It is the general law of the land
It therefore follows that the defenses interposed in this case are not maintainable against the appellant.
It is insisted by the appellee that the appellant should have taken advantage of these defenses by a demurrer to the special plea and notice, instead of by a motion for a peremptory instruction. The plaintiff in the court below had the right to do either or both as he desired, and he lost nothing by failing to demur.
Reversed and remanded.