112 Ky. 734 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1902
Opinion of the court by
Affirming.
Previous to August 4, 1891, the appellant, the First National Bank, loaned to the Masonic Savings Bank $29,586.59, partly secured by collateral. On that day the latter bank, through its president, Jacob Krieger, Sr., applied to Adolph Schmidt, president of the former bank, for a further loan of $3,000. This application was refused unless collateral was pledged. Shortly after the application for the loan, was refused, Krieger again applied for a loan of $3,000. He brought his check, as president, on the Masonic Savings Bank, for that amount, a'nd tendered as collateral five bonds of the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Company, for $1,000 each. Schmidt, for the bank, agreed to mafe the loan, and
Issues of law and fact were involved infjhis case. To recover, it was essential for the appellee to sh'ow that the five bridge bonds belonged to Krieger, not to the Masonic Savings Bank; for, if they belonged to it, then Krieger’s trustee had no cause of action. To show they did, appellee introduced T. W. Spindle, president of the appellee, as a witness. It is urged that the court erred in permitting him to give certain testimony. As wé have concluded that the appellant can not now complain of the alleged error, we do not pass upon the question as to whether the court did err in the admission of the evidence. The reason for the conclusion will be hereinafter given.
Counsel for appellant insists that tlie bonds were pledged to pay the $3,000, but, as they were not pledged to pay that debt only, the law appropriates their proceeds to the payment of the balance which is due the appellant by the •Masonic Savings Bank; and, further, it is claimed that there was an agreement at the time the bonds were pledged that they were to be a lien for the entire indebtedness of the bank. It is the contention of the appellee that they were pledged only for the $3,000 debt, and that when that was paid it was entitled to have them, surrendered to it. We do not understand that there is much disagreement between counsel as to the law with reference to the rights of bankers’ general liens on collaterals pledged to them. The ap
We can not say that, at first blush, the veirdict appears to be flagrantly against the weight of the evidence. Besides two juries have found that the collateral was a special pledge for a particular debt. Under such circumstances, we do not feel authorized to reverse the case on the ground that the verdict is flagrantly against the weight of the evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
Petition for rehearing by appellant overruled.