Petition of FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Mrs. Helen Baures, John Marron, Tijeras Place Imp. Co., William C. Stein, Albert L. Matthew, Cale L. Karson, Jr., and Kay Karson, and Scanvest I Ltd., Appellants, v. BERNALILLO COUNTY VALUATION PROTEST BOARD, Appellee.
No. 2671.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Jan. 18, 1977.
560 P.2d 174 | 90 N.M. 110
The trial court, in my opinion, erred in not granting the defendant‘s motion for judgment N.O.V., because in my opinion, there was neither evidence nor inference from which the jury could have arrived at its verdict. See Tapia v. McKenzie, 85 N.M. 567, 514 P.2d 618 (Ct.App.1973).
Vance Mauney, Albuquerque, Toney Anaya, Atty. Gen., Santa Fe, John C. Cook, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
OPINION
SUTIN, Judge.
This is an appeal from orders entered by the Bernalillo County Valuation Protest Board. The protest was heard by only two members of the board and the order entered was signed by the chairman of the board. This was not in compliance with the law that a majority of the board attend the hearing. Petition of Kinscherff, 89 N.M. 669, 556 P.2d 355 (Ct.App.1976). The orders are void for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse.
This appeal demands additional guidelines for taxpayers and the board.
A. The county assessor has an alternative method of valuation.
The county assessor has a duty to follow a statutory method of valuation as provided in
In their protest and at the hearing, taxpayers relied on the “income method” in determining the valuation of their property for taxation purposes. The assessor had used the “cost methods of valuation.” Both methods are set forth in the alternative in
“It is Taxpayers’ position that the meaning of the quoted phrase is that ‘an income method’ will be used unless it also is inapplicable; then, if an income method cannot be used, ‘cost methods’ will be used. Taxpayers do not read the phrase to mean that either an income method or cost meth-ods may be used at the Assessor‘s discretion. If that were the intent of the Legislature, the phrase would have been written in such manner.” We disagree.
The word “or” as used in a statute is a matter of first impression in New Mexico. In construing a statute, we must give the word “or” its ordinary meaning, Mobile America, Inc. v. Sandoval County Commission, 85 N.M. 794, 518 P.2d 774 (1974), unless a different intent is clearly indicated. Winston v. New Mexico State Police Board, 80 N.M. 310, 454 P.2d 967 (1969).
It is agreed that the legislature did give priority to the first method of valuation, a valuation determined by sales of comparable property. It did not do so with reference to the succeeding methods. If the legislature intended to give priority to the second method, the “income method,” over the third method, the “cost method,” for any reason, it would have phrased the statute in language similar to the priority established in the first method of valuation.
Ordinarily, the word “or” as used in a statute is given a disjunctive meaning unless the context and the main purpose of all the words demand otherwise. Eastern Mass. St. Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts Bay T. Auth., 350 Mass. 340, 214 N.E.2d 889 (1966). “There is nothing to indicate that the word ‘or’ was used in the statute in other than its ordinary meaning, indicating an alternative such as ‘either one or another.‘” United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Security F. & I. Co., 248 S.C. 307, 149 S.E.2d 647, 650 (1966); People v. Smith, 44 Cal.2d 77, 279 P.2d 33 (1955); Council Plaza Redevelopment Corp. v. Duffey, 439 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1969); State v. Sawtooth Men‘s Club, 59 Idaho 616, 85 P.2d 695 (1938); State v. Kress, 105 N.J.Super. 514, 253 A.2d 481 (1969); Wood v. Paulus, 524 S.W.2d 749 (Tex.Civ.App.1975); Central Standard Life Insurance Company v. Davis, 10 Ill.App.2d 245, 134 N.E.2d 653 (1956).
The word “or” designates alternatives or separate categories. Its ordinary meaning should be followed unless it renders the statute doubtful or uncertain. It does not. The statutory language is clear and unambiguous.
In the instant case, the statute did not give taxpayers the right to determine the method of valuation. It gave the county
B. Taxpayer is entitled to a fair hearing.
On cases appealed to this Court, we find that hearings are two-pronged affairs which constitute confusion confounded. Taxpayer usually proceeds pro se to prove the merits of his protest by a method of valuation that he chooses which is usually different from that used by the assessor. The assessor usually produces no evidence on the taxpayer‘s method and relies on his own method of valuation. This problem must be resolved.
The right to a fair hearing presupposes that the taxpayer has been informed, prior to the hearing, of the method of valuation used by the county assessor. Otherwise, he cannot be expected to intelligently protest an assessment made.
(1) Taxpayer is entitled to notice from the assessor.
(3) state why the property owner believes the value . . . is incorrect and what he believes the correct value . . . to be; . . .
At the time the protest is filed, taxpayer does not know the method of valuation used by the assessor. No provision is made for notification of the assessor‘s method of valuation. As a result, taxpayer is unable to state why he believes the value is incorrect, or taxpayer states a method of valuation different from that used by the assessor. We believe the legislature should amend the “Property Tax Code,”
Nevertheless, taxpayer has the right to discover the method of valuation used. In Matter of Protest of Miller, 88 N.M. 492, 495, 542 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Ct.App.1975), we held that taxpayer has “a right to discovery similar in scope to that granted by Rules 26 to 37 of the Rules of Civil Procedure [
By this discovery process, taxpayer can obtain all information on the method of valuation used by the assessor.
(2) As an alternative, taxpayer is entitled to assistance from the board.
A protest board is a quasi-judicial body. It has a duty to see that a fair hearing is held. A taxpayer, with or without the assistance of counsel, is entitled to know the method of valuation used by the assessor, as well as the techniques of appraisal made to warrant the valuation. At the time taxpayer is given notice of a hearing on the merits, the board should give taxpayer notice that the method of valuation used, and the appraisal made, are available in its office for inspection. If it desires, it can send this information to taxpayer along with the notice of the hearing on the merits.
(3) As another alternative, separate hearings can be held.
A two step process is necessary: (1) the selection of a proper method of valuation and (2) a hearing before the board on the merits.
Where a dispute arises between the assessor‘s and the taxpayer‘s methods of valuation, the statute makes no provision for a solution of this dispute.
At a hearing before the board on the selection of a method of valuation, taxpayer shall present competent evidence to create an issue of fact and request the board to determine the proper method of valuation. When a proper method of valuation has been determined, a final hearing can later be held to decide the merits of the protest. If the assessor‘s method of valuation is not selected by the board, the assessor shall revalue the property based upon the method selected. If the method selected is contested on appeal, we can decide which
C. Accepted appraisal techniques shall be used by county assessor, and by taxpayer to overcome presumption of correctness of assessor‘s valuation.
In using any of the methods of valuation authorized by this subsection the valuation authority shall apply generally accepted appraisal techniques.
On the matter of the application of “generally accepted appraisal techniques” by the county assessor, he uses the current New Mexico State Manual.
The value of property determined by the county assessor is presumed to be correct.
When a taxpayer overcomes the presumption of the correctness of the assessor‘s method of valuation, the burden shifts to the assessor to prove that his method of valuation utilized a “generally accepted appraisal technique.” The board shall then determine the merits of the protest.
In the instant case, taxpayers did not overcome the presumption because they used, as evidence, the “income method” of valuation. At a new hearing on its protest, taxpayers have the burden of overcoming the presumption under the “cost methods of valuation” if that method is adopted by the board.
D. The board‘s primary duty is to determine “market value” of property for purposes of taxation.
“[T]he value of property for property taxation purposes shall be its market value . . .”
Section 72-29-5(B) .
“In determining market value of property for assessment, * * * market value has been defined as a price which a purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner willing, but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be applied.” Peterson Prop., Etc., supra [549 P.2d at 1078]; Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Property Appraisal Dept., 83 N.M. 251, 490 P.2d 968 (Ct.App.1971).
Essential factors in determining market value are those set forth in “generally accepted appraisal techniques.”
An appraiser is “A person appointed by competent authority to make an appraisement, to ascertain and state the true value of goods or real estate.” Black‘s Law Dic-
By use of a competent appraiser who follows the generally accepted appraisal techniques, the assessor can best determine the “market value” of property for property taxation.
E. For purposes of appeal, the board must prepare a decision and order.
. . . . after considering all the evidence presented at the Protest Hearing ORDERS:
() That no change be made in the valuation records of the County Assessor :
() That the valuation records be changed to reduce the valuation . . . . . . . .
() That the valuation records be changed to increase the valuation . . . . . . . .
() OTHER:
Upon appeal, under
(1) arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion;
(2) not supported by substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole; or
(3) otherwise not in accordance with law.” [Emphasis added].
By inadvertence, the legislature omitted the requirement of a “decision” by the board under
“It is generally required, either on constitutional grounds or under statutes so providing, or even apart from statute, that an administrative body or officer must make findings of fact on the issues presented to it in an adjudicatory proceeding. [T]he action or determination is void unless it is supported by findings of the basis or quasi-jurisdictional facts conditioning its power.” 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies And Procedure § 139, at p. 464 (1951).
The written order form signed by the chairman contains no information upon which the order is based. For purposes of judicial review, the order must, at least, indicate the reasoning of the board and the basis on which it acted. See City of Roswell v. New Mexico Water Qual. Con. Com‘n, 84 N.M. 561, 505 P.2d 1237 (Ct.App. 1972).
When this Court does not know the reasoning or basis upon which the order was entered, we cannot determine whether the decision and order of the board should be set aside. Mr. Justice Cardozo‘s often quoted observation is apt:
We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.
Reversed. Taxpayer is granted a new hearing. It may be based upon an amended protest. The hearing shall be held in compliance with the guidelines herein set forth.
HERNANDEZ and LOPEZ, JJ., concur.
HERNANDEZ, Judge (specially concurring).
Because of the manner in which many of the protest hearings have been conducted, I believe it is advisable to reiterate some of the well-established principles and rules governing administrative hearings for the future guidance of the various County Protest Boards.
Protest Boards are quasi-judicial bodies and even though the technical rules of evidence and the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply at protest hearings (
The essence of a fair hearing is the right to be fully informed of what you are contending against. How else can a taxpayer be expected to protest an assessment intelligently if he doesn‘t know what it is based upon? Woody v. R.R. Co., supra. This information should either be sent to the taxpayer or he should be informed where and when it is available for his inspection. A third alternative would be to hold a bifurcated hearing. At the first part the Board would be presented with the evidence of how the assessment was arrived at. At the second part the taxpayer would present his evidence and arguments. A protest hearing should not be viewed as an adversary proceeding with the Board arrayed against the taxpayer, even though the taxpayer has the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness of the assessment (
I recognize that one of the main purposes of administrative law is to provide a more flexible and informal procedure than is possible before courts. However, informality must not be practiced to the point that a hearing becomes a summary proceeding, a mere formality preceding a predetermined result.
