Action upon two notes for $3,000 each, executed by Thomson Arnold, James Arnold, and William D. Erazer, dated August 22, 1893, payable respectively at' sixty and ninety days after their date to the Eirst .National, Bank of Huntington, at its bank in Huntington, Indiana, the indorser waiving presentment for payment' and notice of non-payment, and indorsed, “Eirst National Bank" of North Manchester, Indiana, Ruskin Arnold, Cashier.” The complaint, which was in four paragraphs, sought to charge the appellee, the Eirst Nátional Bank of North Manchester, as joint maker, or indorser. The latter answered in fifteen paragraphs, the first of which was a general denial under oath. Reply by appellant. There was a special finding of facts with conclusions of law thereon. The court found' that the Eirst National Bank of North Manchester neither executed nor indorsed either of the notes sued upon, and one of its conclusions was that the appellant take nothing by its suit against the Eirst National Bank of North Manchester. The errors assigned and not waived by failure to discuss them are those calling in question the correctness of the conclusions of law, and the ruling of the court upon the motion for a new trial.
The special finding was substantially as follows: That on and before November, 23, 1892, the appellant, the Eirst National Bank -of Huntington, was, and had been, a national bank organized under the “National Bank Act”, carrying on its business in the city of Huntington, Huntington county, Indiana, and that one William McGrew was its
The conclusions of'law (so-called) were as follows-: “(1) Judgment for costs for William D. Erazer. (2) Plaintiff take nothing in this suit from defendant, Eirst National Bank of North Manchester, hut said First National Bank of North Manchester have judgment for its costs herein, and judgment against James Arnold and Thomson Arnold for $8,370.97.”
In form, these conclusions of law are so far from what they should be that we feel it our duty to call attention to their defects. Conclusions so stated may be held sufficient in cases where it clearly appears that, upon the facts found, the law is with the party in whose favor they are announced; but the adoption of such forms cannot be commended. They are in no sense proper' statements of conclusions of law. As mere directions to the clerk for the preparation of 'an entry, they might be serviceable; but they are not what the law intends, nor what the parties to the action are entitled to have. Many important questions of law arose upon the several findings of fact, and the plain rules of correct practice required that a conclusion of law should be stated upon every issue of fact formed by the pleadings and tried by the court.
(1) Under the errors assigned, the first question pre
.The decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Auten v. United States Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 19 Sup. Ct. 628, 43 L. Ed. 920, and in Aldrich v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 176 U. S. 618, 20 Sup. Ct. 498, 44 L. Ed. 611, leave nú room to doubt that, in the opinion of that court, a national bank -may borrow money, either directly upon its own obligations, or by rediscounting notes'or bills -in its possession. It is also made manifest by these decisions that the authority of a bank officer to effect such loans in the name of the bank, or on its behalf, may be presumed from the custom of the- borrowing bank, the usage of the parties, or the usage of communities. Even where the officer negotiating the loan is without authority to do so, the subsequent retention of the moneys by the borrowing bank, with knowledge of the facts, is held to be a ratification of the acts of the bank officer in negotiating the loan, and to render the bank liable. Conceding the power of the bank to borrow money, 'the question in these cases seems to be one which üiust be determined .by the ordinary rules of agency.
' Do the facts of this case bring it within any-of these principles ? The application for the loan, out of which the notes in suit grew, was made by James Arnold, the vice-president of the Manchester bank. The note which he offered to the Huntington bank was signed by himself and Thomson Arnold. He represented that the proposed loan was for the use of the Manchester bank. The Huntington bank refused to take the paper unless indorsed by the alleged beneficiary. Such a note was afterwards presented to the Huntington bank by the vice-president of the Manchester hank, with'the indorsement of the Manchester bank, signed by its cashier. It was known by the Huntington bank that this cashier, with the knowledge of the directors of the Manchester bank had
, We think that the form of the. note on which the money was procured was immaterial, and that the Manchester bank was equally bound whether it signed the note as maker or indorser. If the statements made to the Huntington bank by the officers of the Manchester bank were true, then james Arnold, Thomson Arnold, and William D. Frazer made the paper for the accommodation of the bank, and, as between themselves, the Manchester bank was primarily liable for the payment of the notes.
The thirteenth' and fourteenth findings of. fact were as follows: (13) “The court finds that the defendant, the First National Bank of North Manchester, Indiana, did not execute either of the notes sued upon.” (14) “The court finds that the defendant, the First National Bank of North Manchester, Indiana, did not indorse either of the notes sued upon, but did indorse the $5,000 note given January 'll, 1892, as alleged, yet did not execute.” (sic) These so-called findings of fact seem rather to be conclusions of law, and add nothing to the force of the finding. In our opinion, the1 court erred in its second conclusion of law that the plaintiff should take nothing from the defendant, the First National Bank of North Manchester.
(2) In considering the ruling upon the motion for a new trial, we need not examine the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the special finding, or the consistency of that finding with the law. The. views we have ex
The court, upon the objection of the appellee, refused to permit William McGrew, the cashier of the Huntington bank, to testify that, after the original loan, and before the execution of the notes given in renewal thereof, Jesse Arnold, the president of the Manchester bank, told him, McGrew, that the note of $5,000 was the loan of the bank, and was all right. This evidence was competent, and should have been admitted. It was important to the Huntington bank to ascertain at any time whether the note discounted by it was, in fact, executed by the Manchester bank, and for its benefit. If the note was a forgery, if its execution had been procured by fraud, if it had been indorsed in the name of the bank without authority, or if the Manchester bank had any defense to it, the Huntington bank not only had a right to know the facts, but it had an interest in ascertaining those facts at any time while it held the paper. Such an inquiry addressed by the holder of a promissory note to the supposed maker or indorser of the instrument is pertinent and important, if made at any time before the maturity of the note,- and the answer of the maker, or his legal representative, is competent evidence on behalf of the holders of the note on the trial of an action upon the instrument.
The ninth and.tenth reasons for a new trial are not available to the appellant because the paper alleged to have been erroneously excluded by the court is not in the bill of exceptions. As we cannot examine it, we are unable to determine whether it was coippetent evidence or not.
The eleventh and twelfth reasons for a new trial were the admission by the court, over the obj ection of the appellant, of the following testimony, and the refusal of the court, upon the motion of the appellant, to strike it out. On his direct examination, Jesse Arnold, a witness for the appellee, was asked the following question: “If there was anything
The sixteenth - reason for a new trial was the exclusion by the court of evidence offered by appellant of the custom of national banks, and national bank officers, in the vicinity of the North Manchester bank, to borrow money for the use of such banks without special authority from the board of directors. Proof of the general usage as to the manner of doing business by national banks in the community, and in the vicinity of the borrowing bank, including the methods adopted for supplying the temporary necessities of such banks for money, the nature of the authority required to be shown by the officers of the borrowing banks, and other circumstances connected with such transactions, was admissible; but, neither the question proposed, nor the particular facts expected to be established by it, came within the rule in such cases.- The court did not err in sustaining the objection to the question. ■
Eor the error of the court in its second conclusion of law, and for its error in overruling the appellant’s motion for a new trial, the judgment is reversed, with instructions to grant a new trial, and for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.