8 S.D. 7 | S.D. | 1895
This was an action by respondent against appellants upon a negotiable promissory note made by them to DeLaney Bros. The note was dated September 17, 1892, and became due November 17, 1893. On the 22d day of September, 1892, the payees indorsed the note, “without recourse” to the respondent bank. The appellants answered both a general denial and an affirmative defense, based upon a breach of warranty of the property for which the note was given. At the close of the evidence, the court directed a verdict. for the respondent, and this appeal is from a judgment entered upon such verdict.
All the assignments of error are subordinate to two general propositions maintained by appellants: First. That a national bank cannot become the owner of commercial paper by purchase; that the attempted purchase is ultra vires and void, and consequently gives it no title or ownership upon which it can maintain an action. Appellants cite a number of cases which would sustain their contention. See Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198; Bank v. Pierson, 24 Minn. 140; Lazear v. Bank,
It is next contended by appellants that the court erred in directing a verdict for plaintiff on the theory, as announced by the court, that “the evidence also shows that it [the note] was transferred to an innocent holder for value before maturity; that the defense attempted to be offered by defendants is not good under the law.” The note was made to DeLaney Bros., and by them indorsed to the respondent bank. The presumption is that it was indorsed for a valuable consideration, and in the ordinary course of business. Comp. Laws, Sec. 4470. Appellants’ contention is that its transfer for a valuable consideration was denied by the answer, and. at least left in so
It is true DeLaney says that he got “either money or a credit for this amount”; and again: “I do not know as I received the money. If I didn’t I received a credit.” This is negative, and proves nothing either way as to the receipt of money. He further stated in answer to the question: “For what was this note given to the bank?” “It was given for money.” Question: “How much money?” Answer: “$1,000.” Mr. Cummins, the cashier testified: “They got credit for the amount of the note.” He was asked “whether or not there was any money paid there at that time,” and answered, positively: “There was.” With this positive answer to the distinct and positive question of fact, with nothing militating against it, the trial court was justified in accepting the fact as proved. The most that can be said for DeLaney’s testimony is that he was not certain whether he received money or a credit, and it is not at all inconsistent with the cashier’s positive statement that money was actually paid at the time. The cashier also testifies that the DeLaneys ‘ ‘got credit for the amount of the note. ” It appears that the DeLaneys had at the time a current account with the bank, and it certainly would not be an unusual transaction in banking for the bank to credit the account with the amount of the note, and charge the account with whatever money was paid, thus putting the whole transaction on the books of the bank; and this seems to be just what was done, by the testimony of both witnesses. It is true that it does not appear what amount of money was paid at the time, unless the testi
Upon the evidence brought up by this record, the jury could not have found that the bank did not part with value for this note; or that the amount of money so paid was so inadequate as to raise a suspicion of bad faith; for, as to the first proposition, the undisputed evidence was pointedly the other way, and, as to the second, there was no evidence touching such question. Under these conditions, the trial court properly held that the respondent bank was a bona fide holder for value, and this necessarily shut out affirmative defense. The judgment is affirmed.