77 Neb. 570 | Neb. | 1906
This is an appeal from a decree of tbe district court for Madison county, directing the payment of a fund in court to certain of tbe appellees, and excluding tbe appellant from participation therein. There appears to be no dispute as to tbe facts- Tbe record shows that on tbe 21st day of June, 1900, Frank Moore entered into a contract in writing with a school district in Madison county, whereby he agreed to erect a school building and furnish
On the 11th day of September, 1900, the contractor borroAved $2,000 from the First' National Bank of Madison, Nebraska, to pay for labor and material required in the erection of the building, and Avhich was used for that
After the surety company had undertaken to complete the school building, certain payments on the contract price were made direct to it by the school district, which, with the amounts theretofore paid to the contractor, or on his orders, and a small amount of damage for delay in the completion of the building deducted from the entire contract price, left a balance of $1,802 due and owing from the school district by the terms of the .contract. As there were several claimants for this fund and the school dis
The appellant contends that the contractor’s obligation to the surety company with respect to its succession to his right to payment from the district amounts to no more' than “an agreement for a future assignment dependent on the condition precedent of a ‘breach or default’ on the part of Moore (contr ictor) in fulfilling bis contract with the school district.” This contention is based on that portion of the application hereinbefore quoted, the argument being, in substance, that, as the application preceded a binding contract between the contractor and the school district, the contractor’s rights under such contract did not have even a potential existence when the application was made and therefore were not assignable. That argument would be of doubtful validity even were we to assume that the quoted language of the application amounts to an assignment, or attempted assignment, of the contractor’s rights under his contract with the school district to the surety company. The application, until accepted by the surety company, was a mere offer, and did not become binding until the bond furnished thereon had been accepted and approved by the school district. On the other hand, the contract between the contractor and the school district was not perfected and did not become binding and effective until the bond had been accepted and approved by the school district. The two contracts, therefore, are interdependent, and became binding and effective at the same instant.. It may be said in passing that the quoted clause of the application is substantially included in the quoted provisions of the bond. Whether an assignment of a subject matter which becomes potentially existent at the very instant the assignment is executed is valid, is a question we do not feel called upon to decide at this time, because, in our opinion, the surety company’s relation to the fund is not that of an assignee, or one claim
This brings us to the contest between the appellant and the parties claiming by virtue of their proceedings in garnishment. As we have seen, the assignments under which the appellant claims are prior in point of time to either of those proceedings. Those claiming under such proceedings contend that the assignments to the appellant are of no effect because the subject matter of the assignments had no actual nor potential existence when they Avere made. This contention cannot be sustained. At the time the two assignments were made there was a valid and existing contract between the contractor and the school district, and his rights thereunder Avere assignable. As was held in Perkins v. Butler County, 44 Neb. 110: “An assignment of moneys not yet earned, but expected to be earned in the future under an existing contract, is in equity valid and enforceable.” The rule is thus stated in 4 Cyc. 17: “Anticipated profits under existing agree
As to that portion of the decree which permits the surety company to take and hold any .portion of the fund to protect itself against the claims of the Bank of Colfax,
It is therefore recommended that the decree of the district court be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to enter a decree conforming to the views expressed in the foregoing opinion.
Judgment accordingly.