79 F. 706 | 8th Cir. | 1897

SANBORN, Circuit Judge,

after stating’ tlie case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

An insolvent debtor may use with impunity any of his property that is free from the liens and the vested equitable interests of Ms creditors to purchase a homestead for Mmself and Ms family in Ms own name. If he takes property that is not exempt: from judicial sale and applies it to this purpose, he merely avails himself of a plain provision of the constitution or the statute enacted for the benefit of Mmself and his family. He takes nothing from Ms creditors by this action in which They have any vested right. The constitution or statute exempting the homestead from the judgments of creditors is in force when they extend the credit to him, and they do so in the face of the fact that he has this right. Xor can the use of property that is not exempt from execution to procure a homestead be held to be a fraud upon the creditors of an insolvent debtor, because that which the law expressly sanctions and permits cannot be a legal fraud. Jacoby v. Distilling Co., 41 Minn. 227, 43 N. W. 52; Kelly v. Sparks, 54 Fed. 70; Sproul v. Bank, 22 Kan. 238; Tucker v. Drake, 11 Allen, 145; O'Donnell v. Segar, 25 Mich. 367; North v. Shearn, 15 Tex. 174; Cip*708perly v. Rhodes, 58 Ill. 346; Randall v. Buffington, 10 Cal. 491. When the appellees sold their farm in Nebraska, and bought and took possession of their homestead in Kansas, the bank had acquired no lien and no specific equitable interest in any of the property of its debtor. It was his simple contract creditor, and it had no vested right in ejther his property or his residence. He had the right to change his residence from one state to another, and to secure for himself a homestead in- any state where he chose to live. If, therefore, he had taken the conveyance of his homestead in. Kansas in his own name, it would have been exempt from the judgment of the appellant.

The only question remaining is whether the farm lost this exemption because he caused it to be conveyed to his wife. Upon this question the authorities are not in accord. The supreme court of Minnesota declares that such a transaction is a fraud upon creditors, and subjects the property so acquired to the payment of their debts. Sumner v. Sawtelle, 8 Minn. 309 (Gil. 272); Rogers v. McCauley, 22 Minn. 384. The supreme court of Kansas, on the other hand, holds that a homestead purchased and paid for from the unexempt property of the husband .is equally exempt from judicial sále, under the constitution of that state, whether the title is taken in the name of the husband or in that of the wife. Monroe v. May, 9 Kan. 466, 475, 476; Hixon v. George, 18 Kan. 253, 258. The decisions of the highest judicial tribunal of the state of Kansas, which we have cited, settle this question in the case at bar. The question involves the construction and effect of the constitution and statutes of that state, and the decisions of it by that court establish a rule of property there, which has prevailed without modification for a quarter of a century. As was said by Mr. Justice Field in Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 196, at page 203, in speaidng of a law of the Republic of Mexico which had subsequently become, in effect, a local law of the state of Texas:

“The interpretation, therefore, placed upon it by the highest court of that state must, according to the established principles of this court, be accepted as the true interpretation, so far as it applies to titles to lands in that state, whatever may be our opinion of its original soundness. Nor does it matter that in the courts of other states, carved out of territory since acquired from Mexico, a different interpretation may have been adopted. If such be the case, the courts of the United States will, in conformity with the same principles, follow the different ruling so far as it affects titles in those states.”

The construction by the highest judicial tribunal of a state of its constitution or statutes, which establishes a rule of property, is controlling authority in the courts of the United States, where no question of right under the constitution and laws of the nation and no question of general or commercial law is involved. Brashear v. West, 7 Pet. 608, 615; Allen v. Massey, 17 Wall. 351; Lloyd v. Fulton, 91 U. S. 479, 485; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532, 534; Jaffray v. McGehee, 107 U. S. 361, 365, 2 Sup. Ct. 367; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670, 686, 10 Sup. Ct. 354; Randolph’s Ex’r v. Quidnick Co., 135 U. S. 457, 10 Sup. Ct. 655; White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329, 9 Sup. Ct. 309; Chicago Union Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 235, 10 Sup. Ct. 1013; Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 10 Sup. Ct. 1012; Madden v. Lancaster Co., 27 U. S. App. 528, 535-537, 12 C. C. *709A. 566, 570, 65 Fed. 188, 192; Ottenberg v. Corner, 40 U. S. App. 320, 22 C. C. A. 163, 76 Fed. 263, 269. The decree below is in accordance with the constitution and statutes of the state of Kansas, as they have been construed by its supreme court, the property in controversy is situated in that state, and its title is fixed by that construction. Let the decree be affirmed, with costs.

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