37 Conn. App. 423 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1995
The plaintiff, First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Rochester (First Federal),
The following facts are necessary for a proper resolution of this appeal. The plaintiff began a foreclosure action against the defendants
On remand, the plaintiff reclaimed its motion for a deficiency judgment. The defendant objected to the motion, asserting that the motion was untimely under § 49-14 (a). On April 12,1994, the trial court sustained the defendant’s objection and denied the plaintiff’s motion for a deficiency judgment, concluding that the
The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly denied its motion for a deficiency judgment and sustained the objection of the defendant in violation of § 49-14 (a). We disagree.
The issue presented on appeal is whether the thirty day period for filing a motion for a deficiency judgment is calculated from the last law day, in this case December 23, 1991, or the day on which title vests, December 24,1991. We conclude that the statute clearly and unambiguously provides that the critical time is the day of “expir[ationj” or the end of the time limited for redemption — the last law day, namely, December 23, 1991.
“A basic tenet of statutory construction is that when a statute ... is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Genotti, 220 Conn. 796, 807, 601 A.2d 1013 (1992); Nichols v. Warren, 209 Conn. 191, 196, 550 A.2d 309 (1988). Section 49-14 (a) provides in relevant part: “At any time within thirty days after the time limited for redemption has expired, any party to a mortgage foreclosure may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment.” The statute is clear on its face that the expiration of the time limited for redemption is the event that activates the thirty day period within which to file for a deficiency judgment.
The word “after” means “[ljater, succeeding, subsequent to, inferior in point of time or of priority or preference. Subsequent in time to.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). According to the statute, the thirty day period within which to file a motion for a deficiency judgment begins to run “after” the redemption period has ended. The time limited for redemption expired at midnight on December 23, 1991. Because
“The word within [as used in § 49-14 (a)] is of critical importance. The meaning of within is not longer in time than; Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d Ed.); not later than; 69 C.J. 1315; 45 Words & Phrases (Perm. Ed.), p. 378. The word within is almost universally used as a word of limitation, unless there are other controlling words in the context showing that a different meaning was intended.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission, 177 Conn. 584, 586-87, 418 A.2d 939 (1979). No different meaning was intended in § 49-14 (a). The statute clearly identifies the day on which the time limited for redemption expires as the activating day.
The plain language of § 49-14 (a) requires that December 23,1991, the date on which the time limited for redemption expired, be excluded from the calculation, and the following day, December 24, 1991, be counted as the first day of the thirty day period. “It is well settled that the day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained is to be excluded from the computation.” Infante v. Porath, 29 Conn. App. 465, 468, 615 A.2d 1073 (1992), citing Lamberti v. Stamford, 131 Conn. 396, 397-98, 40 A.2d 190 (1944). Under § 49-14 (a), “the day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained” or the activating day is the day on which the time limited for redemption expired. Any party to a mortgage foreclosure, therefore, may file a motion for a deficiency judgment at any time within thirty days after the last day for redemption has expired. In this case, excluding the day on which the time limited for redemption expired, the first full day of the period was December 24,1991, and the final day was January 22, 1992.
Further support for our interpretation is found in Norwich Land, Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 3, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975), which involved the interpretation of the time limitation under General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 16-35. That statute required that an appeal be taken “within thirty days after the filing of such order” by the commission. General Statutes (Rev. to 1975) § 16-35. In calculating the thirty day period, our Supreme Court excluded the day on which the commission filed its order, December 19, thereby holding that this was the activating day, and the calculation began with the following day. The thirtieth day fell on January 18, thus, the filing on January 20 was untimely. Id., 3.
Two cases, Royce v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 177 Conn. 584, and Hanson v. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 10 Conn. App. 14, 521 A.2d 208 (1987), interpreting the limitations period of General Statutes (Rev. to 1977 and Rev. to 1985) § 4-183 (b)
We recently dealt with a time limitation in Infante v. Porath, supra, 29 Conn. App. 465, involving the four month limitation set forth in Practice Book § 377. Practice Book § 377 provides in relevant part: “Any judgment rendered or decree passed upon a default or nonsuit may be set aside within four months succeeding the date on which it was rendered or passed.” The trial court had rendered judgment on April 29, 1991. Infante v. Porath, supra, 468. On appeal, we held that the plain language of Practice Book § 377 required that the date of judgment not be included in the calculation, so that the time period started to run on April 30, 1991. Id., 467.
The language of § 49-14 (a) is strikingly similar to the language of the statutes discussed above. Our interpretation of the time limitation in this case is consistent with the decisions in those prior cases interpreting similar language.
We conclude that the final law day on which a party can redeem is the expiration date for the time limited for redemption. That day is the activating date for the thirty day period within which to file a motion for a deficiency judgment. That day, therefore, must be excluded from the calculation of the thirty day period.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
General Statutes § 49-14 provides in relevant part: “(a) At any time within thirty days after the time limited for redemption has expired, any party to a mortgage foreclosure may file a motion seeking a deficiency judgment. ...”
The defendant Harold R. Connelly is the record owner of the subject property by virtue of a quitclaim deed from the named defendant. As used in this opinion, the term defendant refers to the named defendant.
In the first appeal, we held that a typographical error in the docket number on the plaintiff’s motion for a deficiency judgment was a circumstantial defect and did not negate the filing of the motion on January 23,1992.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1985) § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “(b).... Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all
General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 31-293 (a) provides in pertinent part: “If either such employee or such employer brings such action against such third person, he shall forthwith notify the other, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of such fact and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and the other may join as a party plaintiff in such action within thirty days after such notification, and, if such other fails to join as a party plaintiff, his right of action against such third person shall abate . . . .”
The issue involved in Maresca v. DeMatteo, 6 Conn. App. 691, 506 A.2d 1096 (1986), differs from the issue in this case. In Maresca, the issue was whether the computation of the period in which to file a motion for a deficiency judgment runs from the expiration of the law day for the owner of the equity of redemption or from the expiration of all the law days, including those of subsequent encumbrancers. The measuring event, not the method of counting, was the issue. The holding in Maresca is quite clear and quite limited: “As General Statutes § 49-14 (a) would not be triggered until title became absolute in the plaintiff as of May 1, 1984, the motion was timely filed.” Id., 694. It appears that the calculation was incorrect because May has thirty-one days, but that issue was never addressed by the court.