738 A.2d 224 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1998
The plaintiff, First Church of Christ, Scientist, appeals from the decision of the defendant Ridgefield historic district commission (commission) denying an application by the plaintiff for a certificate of appropriateness to allow the installation of vinyl siding on its church building. The plaintiff appeals pursuant to General Statutes §
This matter came before the commission by application dated May 5, 1995. On June 3, 1995, a site inspection was held at the plaintiff's site and representatives of the plaintiff were given the opportunity to explain their application. On June 20 and June 21, 1995, members of the commission traveled to New Canaan to view an aluminum clad church. The purpose of the inspection was to view the application of aluminum trim, the same trim application as proposed herein. A public hearing was held on June 21, 1995, at which time the plaintiff detailed its proposal to the commission.2 The application was denied by a vote of five to zero. Notice of the denial was sent out on June 26, 1995.
An appeal to this court was filed on July 5, 1995. On October 6, 1995, the plaintiff filed a motion for trial de novo, claiming that no adequate record was made of the proceeding before the commission. By order filed March 26, 1996, the court directed that a new hearing be held so that a full and complete record would be available to the court. A new public hearing was convened on May 21, 1996. At the hearing, the commission agreed to conduct a site inspection at the Goshen church, which had been cited throughout the hearing as an example of the proposed contractor's work.
On June 8, 1996, the commission members made the trip to the Goshen church, at which time the members met with the proposed contractor, Ted Brown. The trip was documented by a transcript and numerous photographs. *92
On June 15, 1996, the commission made a final site inspection at the plaintiff's church in Ridgefield before the commission concluded the public hearing on June 20, 1996, at which the commission voted five to zero to deny the application. Notice of such decision was duly mailed by certified mail to the plaintiff and received on June 28, 1996.
In its amended appeal filed September 26, 1996, the plaintiff alleges that the commission acted illegally, arbitrarily and in abuse of its discretion in denying its application. Once filed, the "[p]rocedure upon such appeal shall be the same as that defined in [General Statutes] §
The trial court reviews the commission's decision "`only to determine whether it was unreasonable, arbitrary or illegal.'"Schwartz v. Planning Zoning Commission,
In the present case, the commission stated the following reasons for their decision denying the plaintiff's application: (1) the church is in a prominent location *93 within a historical neighborhood, and nontraditional materials are not appropriate; (2) a change in the materials or design would diminish the integrity of the church; (3) the smooth siding on the front pediment and lower story on the south side of the building would be altered by the installation of V-groove siding, thus changing the design; (4) application of vinyl siding and aluminum trim would alter shadow lines of projecting and receding elements; (5) vinyl becomes cupped in its profile over a period of time in contrast to wood, which remains flat and straight; and (6) aluminum used as trim may dent and peel.
The record before the commission reflects that the plaintiff's proposal to "reclad" its church with vinyl siding does not fall within the scope of "ordinary maintenance or repair." Pursuant to General Statutes §
Repair has been defined as "the restoration to a sound or good state after decay, dilapidation or injury." Ingalls v. RogerSmith Hotels Corp.,
Further, as was noted by a member of the commission, the United States Department of the Interior Standards (standards) provides in part that, "maintenance generally involves the least amount of work needed to preserve the materials and features of the building. . . . For example, maintenance of a frame building would include caulking and painting; or, where paint is extensively cracking and peeling, its removal and the reapplication of a protective paint coating." Also, the standards provides that deteriorated architectural features shall be repaired rather than replaced wherever possible. In the event replacement is necessary, the new material should match the material being replaced in composition, design, color, texture and other visual qualities. *95 Since the plaintiff is not proposing to reapply or restore the existing material, i.e., a coat of paint, the plaintiff's proposal falls outside the scope of "ordinary repair." Therefore, the record reflects that the plaintiff's proposal necessitated a certificate of appropriateness from the commission.
A review of the record reveals evidence that the commission applied the proper standards of review, while also taking into account the appropriate considerations. General Statutes §
"In looking at the window and door trim, Mr. Hancock also noted that with the application of insulation and vinyl siding, the trim would become recessed rather than project as it does now. Mrs. [Leslie] Ide, a commissioner, commented that the detail of the moldings over the doors and the windows would be lost with the application of bent aluminum trim. The moldings would be simplified. Mr. Hancock also commented that the double seams, where lengths of vinyl siding would overlap, would be more pronounced than existing seams where single clapboards are butted together in a staggered manner. Mrs. Ide also pointed out the smooth siding on the lower level and how it contrasts with the clapboard. This clear distinction would be lost if vinyl clapboard or V-groove were used."
In reviewing the plaintiff's application, Kathryn Rosa, a commissioner, stated that the commission needed to decide if the proposal was appropriate, or if it was incongruous to the historic district. John Connors, a commissioner, added that the commission would consider how the vinyl siding would look from the public street, sixty feet away. Thus, the record reveals that the commission looked carefully at the plaintiff's proposal, applied the proper standard of review, and considered the relevant factors pursuant to General Statutes § 7147f (a) and § 6.6 of the Ridgefield Code of Ordinances.
As for the plaintiff's contention that the commission abused its discretion by exceeding the bounds of permissible aesthetic considerations, our Supreme Court has stated that aesthetic considerations are valid in land use regulation. Figarsky v.Historic District Commission,
In the present case, the plaintiff's alleged hardship is the costs associated with painting the church. These costs, however, do not relate to "topographical conditions, district borderline situations or because of other unusual circumstances solely with respect to a certain parcel of land. . . ." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes §
An argument of prejudgment or bias "must be supported by some evidence proving probability of bias before [the commission] can be faulted" and there is a presumption of the commission's impartiality, which the plaintiff has the burden to overcome.Huck v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Agency,
In support of its predetermination argument, the plaintiff asserts that "no applications for certificates of appropriateness to install vinyl siding have ever been granted by the commission." At the May 21, 1996 hearing, counsel for the plaintiff asked if the commission, as a matter of policy, believed vinyl siding to be, per se, inappropriate, to which Rosa responded: "I can only tell you from the record that we have never approved vinyl siding in the historic district." Further, Connors *99 stated, "I don't think we would have accepted the application had we made a determination that vinyl siding is, per se, not permissible, so I think the act of the commission in [accepting] the application under the statute means that we will consider what you present to us."
A review of the record reveals ample evidence showing that the commission fully considered the plaintiff's proposal. On June 10, 1995, the commission held a site inspection at the plaintiff's church. Then, on June 20, and June 21, 1995, the commission traveled to New Canaan to view an aluminum clad church to view the application of aluminum trim, the same trim application proposed by the plaintiff. On June 21, 1995, the commission held a public hearing to consider the plaintiff's proposal. On May 21, 1996, the commission held another public hearing concerning the plaintiff's proposal. On June 8, 1996, the commission made a sixty-five mile trip to Goshen so that they could conduct a site inspection at a church that has vinyl siding. On June 20, 1996, the commission made a final site inspection at the plaintiff's church. In light of the foregoing, the record indicates that the plaintiff had the opportunity fully to present its views, and that the commission fully considered the plaintiff's proposal.
To support its selective enforcement argument, the plaintiff contends that the commission allows a modern art museum in the historical district to erect semipermanent sculptures that came within the meaning of General Statutes §
Thus, the evidence in the record amply supports the commission's decision denying the plaintiff's application for a certificate of appropriateness.
Accordingly, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.