Lead Opinion
This appeal involves a dispute over the ownership of church property in Chatham County. Plaintiffs filed suit in their own names and in the name of First Christ Holiness Church, Inc. (“First Christ”) against Owens Temple First Christ Holiness Church, Inc. (“Owens Temple”) to quiet title to the property and for an accounting. First Christ alleged that both it and Owens Temple had been in possession of the property for decades and that the faction of the congregation that had aligned itself with First Christ was the rightful owner. In its answer, Owens Temple claimed First Christ lacked the authority to file the complaint because it did not have the approval of a majority of the congregation. Owens Temple also counterclaimed to quiet title in its own name.
Owens Temple filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. In support, Owens Temple submitted an affidavit by the secretary of the congregation. She explained that First Christ was an umbrella organization composed of the members of Owens Temple and the members of several small affiliated churches; that she maintained the business and membership records for both the umbrella organization and Owens Temple; and that the members of Owens Temple constituted a majority of the members of First Christ. Owens Temple also filed an affidavit from one of the pastors stating that none of the congregation’s members were aware of any meeting by the umbrella organization to decide corporate issues such as whether to authorize the filing of the complaint by plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs failed to respond to Owens Temple’s motion, and the trial court granted it. The trial court recited the following holding from this Court’s decision in Gervin v. Reddick:
It is well-settled that a court of equity will take jurisdiction over disputes involving churches when property rights are involved and when suit is brought on behalf of a majority of the congregation.1
This Court has a solemn duty to inquire into its jurisdiction to entertain an appeal whenever there may be any doubt as to its existence.
The most likely exception would be the exception to the final judgment rule for orders granting summary judgment “on any issue or as to any party.”
The trial court purported to grant partial summary judgment in Owens Temple’s favor based on its lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the claims contained in the plaintiffs’ complaint. However, a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a summary judgment, regardless of how it is styled. A summary judgment is a judgment on the merits of the underlying claims or defenses.
The trial court’s order is best viewed as an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-17. This section of the Civil Practice Act provides that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,” and that “[t]he capacity of an individual, including one acting in a representative capacity, to bring or defend an action shall be determined by the law of this state.”
There appears to be little disagreement between our view and that articulated by the dissenting opinion. The dissenting opinion recognizes that in deciding what a trial court’s order actually is, substance rather than form controls, and that the trial court erred in describing its order as one granting summary judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dissenting opinion also appears to accept our determination that the trial court’s order is best viewed as one dismissing the complaint for failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-17 and even acknowledges that a real party in interest objection generally does not go to the merits of an action, but instead is a “matter in abatement” for which summary judgment is inappropriate.
The dissenting opinion nevertheless concludes that the trial court’s order was a judgment on the merits and therefore properly treated as a grant of partial summary judgment because it conclusively determined that “there does not exist any real party in interest who could be substituted as plaintiff’ to challenge Owens Temple’s claim of title to the property. This statement reads too much into the trial court’s order. The trial court found, not that Owens Temple was the only real party in interest who could possibly raise the claims asserted in the complaint, but rather that these particular plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to show that they could do so. Others may yet emerge who claim authority to speak on behalf of First Christ who have better evidence to support their claim than these plaintiffs were able to muster. After all, one of the primary functions of OCGA § 9-11-17 is “to protect the defendant... against a subsequent action
Accordingly, the trial court’s order is not subject to the exception to the final judgment rule for grants of partial summary judgment, and the plaintiffs failed to follow the procedures for obtaining a certificate of immediate review. This appeal must be, and hereby is, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Notes
Gervin v. Reddick,
Fulton County v. State,
Fulton County v. State, supra,
Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta,
OCGA§ 5-6-34 (a) (1); Crane v. State, supra,
Crane v. State, supra,
OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).
Levingston v. Crable,
Ogden Equip. Co. v. Talmadge Farms, Inc.,
Stephens v. Shields,
See Porter v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp.,
OCGA§ 9-11-17 (a), (b).
Smith v. 6595 RR Corp.,
Wurlitzer Co. v. Watson,
Dept. of Human Resources ex rel. Holland v. Holland,
Rigdon v. Walker Sales & Svc., supra,
Walden v. John D. Archbold Mem. Hosp., Inc.,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I concur fully in the majority’s conclusion that the trial court’s order amounted to a dismissal for failure to comply with OCGA § 9-11-17; that such a dismissal constitutes the grant of a plea in abatement; that, as such, the appeal of the dismissal order cannot be brought under OCGA § 9-11-56 (h); and that, accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed due to appellant’s failure to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures prescribed in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). I write separately only to note that I believe it unnecessary to disapprove, as the majority’s opinion does, the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Walden v. John D. Archbold Mem. Hosp.,
In Walden, supra, the issue presented was whether dismissal or substitution of parties was the proper remedy where no real party in interest existed at the time the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted. Id. at 277-278 (4). The Court of Appeals reasonably held that the trial court did not err in ordering dismissal because no real party in interest existed at that time for purposes of substitution (though a real party in interest did exist as of the time of appeal). Id. at 278-279 (4). Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, Walden did not hold that the lack of existence of a real party in interest somehow converts what would be the grant of a plea in abatement (where a real party in interest existed but was not named in the suit
In sum, I conclude that the result reached by the majority is not inconsistent with Walden and that it is thus unnecessary to disapprove Walden as the majority does. With this caveat, I concur in the majority’s opinion.
See, e.g., Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Multi Fuel Corp.,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In dismissing this appeal, the majority ignores the fact that there does not exist any real party in interest who could be substituted as plaintiff. In these circumstances, the defense of “real party in interest” cannot constitute a matter in abatement. Thus, a motion for summary judgment was appropriate, and the grant of that motion was directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-56 (h).
The trial court purported to grant the defendant congregation’s motion for summary judgment based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction. However, we must consider the substance of that motion and order. “ ‘[I]t is an elementary rule of pleading that substance, not mere nomenclature, controls.’ [Cit.]” State v. Smith,
Ordinarily, a “real party in interest” objection “does not go to the merits of an action, but rather is a matter in abatement for which summary judgment is inappropriate. [Cits.]” Tri-County Investment Group v. Southern States,
such a motion is to be treated as a matter in abatement, in that the erring party, rather than having judgment entered against him, is now simply precluded from proceeding with the suit until the error has been corrected by the substitution of the proper party plaintiff.
Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fleet Multi Fuel Corp.,
When the judgment was entered in this case, only the defendant congregation, because it constituted the majority of the umbrella organization, was arguably authorized to bring suit on behalf of that organization. However, “[a] person cannot sue himself; the same person cannot be both plaintiff and defendant in the same action, even in different capacities. [Cits.]” Connell v. Murray,
Accordingly, the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs could not represent the umbrella organization because only the defendant congregation constituted a majority did “not abate [the] action until a proper party plaintiff can be substituted[,]” but rather “resulted in a final disposition of [the] action and thus constituted [the grant of] a plea in bar. The motion to dismiss ... therefore when supported by evidence outside the pleadings became a summary judgment. [Cit.]” Burry v. DeKalb County, supra. Thus, contrary to the majority, a direct appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment is available pursuant to OCGA§ 9-11-56 (h), and the plaintiffs were not required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b). I therefore dissent to the dismissal of this appeal.