Lead Opinion
Concurrence by Judge BERZON;
Concurrence by Judge MURGUIA
OPINION
In September 2011, Anwar al-Awlaki,
After the SDNY granted summary judgment in the Government’s favor, the Second Circuit reversed and ordered the release of one responsive OLC memorandum (“OLC-DOD memo”). Thereafter, the DOJ disclosed a second responsive memorandum (“OLC-CIA memo”) in the NDCA litigation. Nonetheless, the district court denied FAC’s request for attorney’s fees under FOIA.
I
More than a year prior to al-Awlaki’s death, two NY Times reporters, Scott Shane and Charlie Savage,'Submitted separate FOIA requests to OLC. Shane’s request, submitted in June 2010, sought “all Office of Legal Counsel opinions or memo-randa since 2001 that address the legal status of targeted killings, assassinations, or killing of peoplе, suspected of ties to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups by employees or contractors of the United States government.” New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice,
Savage’s request, submitted in October 2010, sought “a copy of all Office of Legal Counsel memorandum analyzing the circumstances under which-it would be lawful for United States Armed Forces or intelligence community assets to target for killing a United States citizen who is deemed to be a terrorist.” Id.
FAC was the first to file a FOIA request after al-Awlaki’s death. On October 5, 2011, it asked the DOJ for “a legal memorandum prepared by OLC concerning the legality of the lethal targeting of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born radical cleric who, according to federal government officials, was killed September 30, 2011 in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen.” FAC alleged that “[t]he memorandum was the subject of a story (‘Secret U.S. memo sanctioning killing of Aulaqi’) in the September 30, 2011 Washington Post, in which multiple (albeit unnamed) administration officials discussed the memorandum and internal government debates on the legal issues addressed in it.”
Two days later, on October 7, 2011, the NY Times made another FOIA request, identical to the Savage request, and twelve days later, on October 19, 2011, the ACLU submitted FOIA requests to three agencies — DOJ, the Department of Defense (“DOD”), and the- CIA — seeking various documents concerning the targeted killings of United States citizens in general, and al-Awlaki, his son, and another American citizen, Sаmir Khan, in particular.
All FOIA requests were met with resistance by the agencies; they were the subject of either a so-called “no number, no list” response or a so-called Glomar response.
On June 21, 2013, the DOJ issued a modified response to FAC’s FOIA request, “acknowledging the existence of one responsive OLC opinion. pertaining to the Department of Defense” — the GLC-DOD Memo — but “refusing to confirm or deny
Despite acknowledging its existence, the Government refused to disclose the OLC-DOD memo — as well as any other related documents — in both litigations, claiming an assortment of FOIA exemptions and privileges.
In between the SDNY and NDCA decisions, there were a number of public disclosures that subsequently impacted the Second Circuit’s decision. As recounted by the circuit court,
[a]fter the [SDNY] entered judgment for the Defendants, one document and several statements of Government officials ... became publicly available. The document was captioned “DOJ White Paper” and titled “Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qaeda or an Associated Force”
(“White Paper”).
Based upon the release of the White Paper and the Government officials’ statements, the Second Circuit concluded that “waiver of secrecy and privilege as to the legal analysis in the [OLC-DOD Memo] ha[d] occurred.” Id. It accordingly ordered, inter alia, the disclosure of a redacted version of the OLC-DOD Memo, and submission to the district court of “other legal memoranda prepared by OLG ... for in camera inspection and determination of waiver of privileges and appropriate redaction.”
In so holding, the Second Circuit paused to distinguish the NDCA’s decision denying FAC’s FOIA request for the OLC-DOD memo, even though that decision— unlike the SDNY’s — was rendered after the White Paper had surfaced. It believed that the NDCA had been “under the impression that there ha[d] been no official disclosure of the White Paper,” and therefore, “did not assess its significance,” whereas before the circuit court, “the Government ha[d] conceded that the White Paper, with its detailed analysis of legal reasoning, ha[d] in fact been officially disclosed.”
The district court directed that before the Government filed its response to FAC’s motion, the parties should “meet and discuss whether the Second Cirсuit’s order that the DOJ disclose the OLC-DOD memorandum mooted the instant case.” Thereafter, on August 28, 2014, the parties submitted a joint status report, stating that “[o]n August 15, 2014, Defendant United States Department of Justice (“Defendant”) released to Plaintiff First Amendment Coalition (“Plaintiff’) a second memorandum, pertaining to a contemplated CIA operation against Anwar al-Aulaqi.” Joint Status Report at 2, First Amendment Coalition v. United States Dep’t of Justice (N.D.C.A. 2014) (No. 12-1013) (emphasis added).
The parties agreed that “these disclosures resolved all substantive disputes in the case,” but “disagreed regarding whether the Court should vacate its summary judgment order and whether Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees.”
The district court vacated its summary judgment order, but held that based upon the parties’ concession that “no substantive issues remain,” the case had been rendered moot since the parties had decidеd “to abandon their right to review.” In so holding, the court reasoned that “Plaintiff abandoned its right to pursue its motion for reconsideration, to appeal this Court’s summary judgment order and to challenge the redactions to the OLC-DOD memorandum and the CIA memorandum.” And as for the defendant, “[n]ot only did the government abandon its right to seek en banc review in the Second Circuit or to file a petition for a writ of certiorari, it voluntarily disclosed the CIA memorandum to Plaintiff in this case.... ” (emphasis added). The district court then denied FAC’s motion for attorney’s fees because “Defendant in this case released the documents largely as a result of the Second Circuit’s ruling in NY Times, not as a result of the ruling in this case.”
This appeal followed.
“Because an award of fees under [FOIA] is discretionary, we review for an abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings or an incorrect legal standard.” United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus., Local 598 v. Dep’t of Army Corps of Engineers,
FOIA was enacted in 1966. “Without question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view....” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose,
Congress passed substantial amendments in 1974, among them an attorney’s fees provision awarding fees and costs to a FOIA plaintiff who had “substantially prevailed.” 1974 Amendment to the Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561. The fees provision “has as its fundamental purpose the facilitation of citizen access to the courts to vindicate the public’s statutory rights,” and “‘a grudging application’ of the attorney fees provision ‘would be clearly contrary to congressional intent.’ ” Exner v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Congress did not provide any context to the cryptic “substantially prevailed” standard, but decisional law did. In Church of Scientology, we explained:
To be eligible for an award of attorney’s fees in a FOIA suit, the plaintiff must present convincing evidence that two threshold conditions have been satisfied. The plaintiff must show that: (1) the filing of the action could reasonably have been regarded as necessary .to obtain the information; and (2) the filing of the action had a substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information.
Although we did not specifically employ the word “catalyst,” we remanded to the district court to assess whether the plaintiff had substantially prevailed — and therefore was eligible for attorney’s fees — in light of the disclosure of a number of documents during the course of litigation before the complaint was dismissed. Church of Scientology, therefore, represented a “catalyst theory of recovery”; namely, an “alternate theory for determining the prevailing party if no relief on the merits is obtained.” Kilgour v. City of Pasadena,
In 2001, however, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the catalyst theory to the recovery of attorney’s fees under the Fair Housing Amendments Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, holding that the theory would impermissi-bly “allow[ ] an -award where there is no judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t. of Health & Human Res.,
(i) The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.
(ii) For purposes of this subsection, a complainant has substantially prevailed if the -complainant has obtained relief through either — (I) a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree; or (II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E).
Subsection (E)(i) is identical to FOIA’s earlier fee award provision. But subsection E(ii)(II), relevant to this appeal, expressly allows recovery based on “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.”
As we further explained in Locke, this .new.provision “addresse[d] a relatively new concern that, under [the prior statute], Federal agencies ha[d] an incentive to delay compliance with FOIA requests until just before a court -decision’ [was] made that [was] favorable to a- FOIA requester.” Id. (quoting 153 Cong. Rec. S158701-04 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007) (statement' of Sen. Leahy, sponsor of the 2007 Amendments)). Section E(ii)(II) was designed to' clarify, therefore, “that Buckhannon does not apply to FOIA cases,” since under that provision, “a FOIA requester can obtain attor
We have not had an opportunity since the passage of the 2007 amendment to decide whether it restores the causation standard under the catalyst theory applied in Church of Scientology. But six circuit courts to have addressed the impact of the amendment have held that it simply rеinstated the pré-Buckhannon catalyst theory of recovery. See Brayton v. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 641 F.Sd 521 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Warren v. Colvin,
Judge Murguia and I believe that we should join our sister circuits in holding that, under the catalyst theory, there still must be a causal nexus between the litigation and the voluntary disclosure or change in position by the Government. Thus, the plaintiff in this case had to present “convincing evidence” that the filing of the action “had a substantial causative ef-feet on the delivery of the information.” Church of Scientology,
In doing so we explicitly reject the notion that the 2007 amendment eliminated the need to establish causation once a lawsuit has been initiated. The statute cannot plausibly be read that way. There may be a host of reasons why the Government has voluntarily released information after the filing of a FOIA lawsuit. One obvious example is that previously classified information may have subsequently become unclassified for reasons having nothing to do with the litigation, or “administrative compliance with statutory production requirements, rather than ... [the] FOIA suit triggered the release of the bulk of the documents.” Van Strum v. Thomas, No. 88-4153,
Ill
In Church of Scientology we remanded to the district court to make factual findings regarding three factors which a court should consider in determining whether the plaintiff had substantially prevailed: (1)
Unlike Church of Scientology, there is no need to remand to determine eligibility since the undisputed material facts meet those criteria.
A.When the Document Was Released
The NDCA litigation spanned almost two and a half years, from its inception on February 29, 2012 until the OLC-CIA memo was released on August 15, 2014. In Church of Scientology we embraced the district court’s observation in Exner “that when information is delivered may be as important as what information is delivered.”
The same can be said of the present case. FAC was met with abject resistance throughout the entire litigation until the OLC-CIA memo was produced roughly two and a half years after the lawsuit was initiated, and almost a year and seven months after the Government waived any secrecy or privilege with the official release of the White Paper.
B. What Actually Triggered the Document’s Release
There is no question that the Second Circuit’s decision in the SDNY litigation was an impetus for FAC to continue its litigation, But what actually triggered the release of the OLC-CIA memo was that FAC sought to vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment. It was the appellant’s “dogged determination,” therefore, that led the district court to “direct” the parties to discuss whether the litigation was moot, and which resulted in the Government’s decision — as acknowledged by the lower court — to “voluntarily disclose[ ] the CIA memorandum to [FAC].” Because of FAC’s efforts, the public then learned that the OLC-DOD memo was not the first memo addressing the justification for the drone attack, nor was it identical to the prior OLC-CIA memo. Plaintiffs litigation, therefore, “triggered the release of additional or key documents.” Van Strum,
C. Whether Plaintiff Was Entitled to the Document at an Earlier Time
There is no reason why the district court failed to recognize, as the Second Circuit
IV
In sum, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to consider and apply the relevant factors that we articulated in Church of Scientology for determining whether FAC had substantially prevailed. Its limited view of causation was at odds with Church of Scientology’s more enlightened view that, as here, multiple factors may be at play. It was, moreover, inconsistent, with -Congress’ intent — once again — that the award of FOIA counsel fees “has as its fundamental purpose the facilitation of citizen access to the courts,? and should not be subject to “a grudging application.” Exner,
Since we have determined eligibility as a matter of law because there are no material facts in dispute, remand is required solely for the district court to determine the fees to which FAC is entitled.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
Notes
. This spelling is used by the district court and in the parties’ briefs. We adopt it, except in some quotations in which the name is spelled “al-Aulaqi” or “al-Aulaki.”
. A determination of eligibility “does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to attorney’s fees.” Church of Scientology v. United States Postal Serv.,
. "A no number, no list response, acknowledges the existence of documents responsive to the request, but neither numbers nor identifies them by title or description.” New York Times,
. Unlike the NY Times and FAQ which only submitted FOIA requests to the OLQ the “ACLU submitted FOIA requests to three agencies: DOJ (including two of DOJ’s component agencies, [the Office of Information Policy] and OLC), DOD, and CIA.” New York Times,
. In the SDNY action, the Government submitted Vaughn indices — filings identifying records withheld with explanations for why they were withheld — which identified unclassified documents, such as “an e-mail chain reflecting internal deliberations concerning the legal basis for the 'use of lethal force against United States citizens in a foreign country in certain circumstances” and "email traffic regarding drafts of the speech given by [Jeh] Johnson at Yale Law School and a speech delivered by Attorney General Holder at Northwestern University School of Law.” New York Times,
. The "several statements of Government officials” to which the Second Circuit refers include John O. Brenhan, "testifying before the Senate Select. Committee on Intelligence on February 7, 2013, on his nomination to be director of CIA, [who] said, among other things, 'The Office of Legal Counsel advice establishes the legal boundaries within which we can operate.’ ” New York Times, 756 F.3d at 111 (quoting Open Hearing on the Nomination of John O. Brennan to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113 Cong. 57 (Feb. 7, 2013)). They also include a May 2013 letter Attorney General Eric- Holder wrote to Sena
. On June 30, 2014, in response to the Second Circuit’s mandate, Judge McMahon — the presiding SDNY judge — ordered the Government to disclose for in camera review ”[u]n-redacted copies of the 'other legal memoran-da prepared by OLC and at issue here' ” within twenty-one days of the order. New York Times v. United States Dep’t of Justice, No. 11-9336 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014) (order instituting circuit court mandate) (citing New York Times,
. The Second Circuit’s effort to distinguish the NDCA’s failure to order the release of the OLC-DOD memo because it believed that the district court was of the “impression” that it was not officially disclosed was charitable since, in addition to being officially disclosed to Truthout, the White Paper was also disclosed to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senate Select Intelligence Committee, House Judiciary Committee, and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Moreover, in its memorandum in opposition to the Government's summary judgment motion, FAC expressly advised the district court of the release of the White Paper and the various prior statements of the Government officials. See PL Opp. to MSJ at 2-4, 12, 21, First Amendment Coalition v. United States Dep't of Justice (N.D.C.A. 2013) (No. 12-1013). The memorandum was filed on October 3, 2013, six months prior to the NDCA’s decision of April 11, 2014, granting the Government’s motion and dismissing the complaint. Specifically, FAC told the court that when it was released, "the President's spokesman confirmed that the White Paper was authentic, that it was the official position of the Government, and that it was adapted from classified memoranda which had been providеd to Congress.” Id. at 3. The memorandum also alluded to the fact that the White Paper “along with copious other pieces of official evidence” had previ
. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bies stated, in a written declaration, that the Government also released on August 15, 2014 a redacted version of the OLC-CIA memo to the NY Times and ACLU "consistent with a court order from the [SDNY],” notwithstanding the SDNY’s order that all documents be submitted in camera. Since the Government publicly disclosed the OLC-CIA memo in the NDCA litigation, there was obviously no longer a reason to submit it for in camera review.
. In oral argument before this panel, Jonathan Segal, counsel for appellant, disclosed confidential information related to offers made by his opponent in mediation before the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program. This is in clear violation of Ninth Circuit Rule 33-1(c)(4), which states that any written or oral communication made in Ninth Circuit Mediation Program settlement discussions may not
. The district court in Exner embraced the catalyst theory language in Vermont Low Income,
. The Government appropriately concedes that FAC’s claim was not insubstantial.
. Notably, although we are not bound by their view of the law, the parties agree that the Church of Scientology causation standard applies, although they, of course, disagree as to its application in the present case.
. It is difficult to conceptually square Judge Berzon's opinion that causation is irrelevant with the reality that the bringing of the litigation was itself a cause for what subsequently occurred. Causation, therefore, is very much in play, requiring the plaintiff to establish under the plain reading of the statute — both before and after the amendment — that it thereafter "substantially prevailed.”
, There may be other factors in a given case that may be relevant to whether the plaintiff had substantially prevailed, but these three factors clearly suffice in the present case.
. Judge Murguia does not join in Part III because she "do[es] not agree that the district court clearly erred in its causation finding." Murguia Concurrence at 887. But reversal is required whenever a district court employs "an incorrect legal standard,” United Ass’n of Journeymen,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in the judgment:
I agree with the result reached by both of my colleagues. But I have a fundamental disagreement with both of them regarding the reach of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). fees provision, and so concur only in the judgment.
Contrary to Judge Block’s position, , the text of the fees provision, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), plainly does not require a causal nexus between the litigation and the agency’s disclosure. It is inappropriate and impermissible to read one in, even though other courts have done so.
Judge Block represents that a majority of the panel holds that a FOIA plaintiff “ha[s] to” present evidence that the litigation had a “substantial causative effect” on the disclosure to be eligible for fees absent a judgment in her favor. Lead Op. at 876 (internal citations omitted); see also id. (reading other circuits’ law to affirm “the need to establish causation” between the litigation and a voluntary agency disclosure for a plaintiff to be eligible for fees) (emphasis added).
Our inquiry begins with the statute. If the text is clear, as it is here, it ends there as well. United, States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
A FOIA complainant is eligible for attorney fees if she has “substantially prevailed.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). A person has “substantially prevailed” if she “has obtained relief through either — (I) a judicial order ... or (II) a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). We are concerned with subsection (II).
Parsing that subsection, it has three elements. First, the complainant must have “obtained relief’; in this context, the re-questor must have received from the agency some of the information she was suing for. Second, the relief must, have been obtained through “a voluntary or unilateral change” in the agency’s position. This element contemplates the willing disclosure of information to the complainant by an agency, in contrast to one brought about, by “judicial order” or “enforceable written agreement or consent decree,”. as envisioned in subsection (I). Lastly, the claim must be “not insubstantial.” Id. No more, no less. Conspicuously absent from Congress’s definition of a '“substantially prevailing” complainant is the existence of a “causal nexus between the litigation and the voluntary disclosure or change in position by the Government.” Lead Op. at 876.
Nor does the text of the applicable provision offer any language that could includе a hidden causation requirement.
First, to “obtain relief ’ from an agency simply means to receive the information a requestor is seeking, whether that be documents, a Vaughn index, or a response acknowledging the existence of relevant documents. The fact of relief does not relate to the impetus behind the- agency’s action.
The next element of the provision — “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency” — if anything cuts against a reading that requires a “substantially prevailing” complainant to demonstrate causation. “Voluntary” may mean “done without any present legal obligation” to do so,-but in another sense it means “not constrained, impelled, or influenced by another.” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 2499 (1971) (emphasis added). A “unilateral” disclosure is one “done, made, undertaken, or shared by one of two or more persons or parties,” id. at 2564, which includes actions taken by one party independently of the other. These words, standing alone, indicate independent action not caused by the complainant’s litigation.'.
The last stone , to turn over — the “not insubstantial” element — yields no implicit causal nexus requirement, either. Whether a claim is “substantial,” or “not insubstantial,”
Those three elements are all a FOIA complainant needs to “substantially pre
In short, Congress spelled out in detail the meaning of “substantially prevailed,” but did not include any causation or motive requirement. We are not free to interpose one. “There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and specifically enacted.” Lamie v. U.S. Trustee,
II
The lead opinion does not (and could not) locate the causal nexus requirement in the amended statutory text. Instead, it finds the causation requirement in cases pre-dating both Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources,
As the lead opinion notes, Lead Op. at 875, Buckhannon was understood by this Court to foreclose attorney fees under the “catalyst theory” that had been embraced by most courts of appeals. See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n,
Where I part ways with the lead opinion is in interpreting precisely what the statutory amendments did — specifically, how they overruled Buckhannon. The lead opinion represents that the amendments “simply reinstated the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory of recovery,” Lead Op. at 876, including the requirement of a causal nexus. In adopting this characterization, the lead opinion is in good company — as it notes, several other circuits have assumed that the amendments restored the status quo ante. See, e.g., Summers v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Notably, the causation requirement often led, as it does here, to complicated, fact-bound determinations. See Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
But Congress did not do that. Instead, Congress opted explicitly to define “substantially prevailing]” when it amended the statute,
Ill
The lead opinion, and the decided eases reading the new statute to incorporate pre-Buckhannon law on the catalyst theory, make two points: (1) legislative history indicates that Congress meant to overrule Buckhannon and restore the status quo ante for FOIA suits;
Where the statutory text is clear, it should not be defeated by legislative history unless the plain meaning threatens entirely to frustrate Congress’s intentions in enacting the statute. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, —, U.S. —,
Examining the legislative history in this instance is useful to, confirm that there is no nonobvious reading of the statutory language compelled, or even supported, by that history. To the contrary, the history affirmatively indicates a purposeful decision to avoid the factually difficult causation question.
The lead opinion is correct that the amendments appear to have been motivated by concern about the effect of Buckhahnon on fees in FOIA cases.
Moreover, the drafting history of the amended statute supports my view that § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) has no causation requirement, Earlier versions of the bill defined a complainant as “substantially prevailing” if she obtained relief through a judicial order or
if the complainant’s pursuit of a nonfriv-olous claim or defense has been a catalyst for a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party that provides a substantial part of the requested relief,
OPEN Government Act of 2005, S. 394, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (emphasis added); see also H.R. 867, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005) (same language). But the next round of bills dropped .the “catalyst” element, instead requiring, only that a complainant obtain relief through “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party, where the complaintant’s [sic] claim or defense was not frivolous.” S. 849, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); see also H.R. 1309, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007) (same except “in a case in
The remarks by drafters of the final bill directly confirm that the decision to leave out a causation concept was deliberate. “Floor statements by the sponsors of the legislation are given considerably more weight than floor statements by other members, ... and they are given even more weight where, as here, other legislators did not offer any contrary views.” Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Court for C.D. Cal.,
Senator Kyi, a proponent of the amendment that became the statutory language, believed the substantiality test was “well-suited” to evaluating fee requests because “courts should be able to apply [it] without further factual inquiry into the nature of a complaint.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10,989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007). By so providing, Senator Kyi reported, the amendment (<addresse[d] one of the Supreme Court’s major concerns in the Buckhannon case, that ‘a request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.’” Id. (citing Buckhannon,
Another sponsor of the bill, Senator Le-ahy, opined that “a FOIA requester can obtain attorneys’ fees when he or she files a lawsuit to obtain records from the Government and the Government releases those records before the court orders them to do so.” 153 Cong. Rec. S15,704 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2007). Senator Leahy’s careful explanation of the new'fees provision in his own bill captures the mechanics of the provision, which — as his statement reveals — has no causation requirement.
One line in the Senate report accompanying S. 894 did say that the bill “clar-if[ies] that a complainant has substantially prevailed ... if the pursuit of a claim was the catalyst for the voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party.” S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 6 (2007) (emphasis added). But, as I have noted, the statutory language does not use the term “catalyst,” or “causation,” or “because of,” or anything similar, in defining “substantially prevailed.” To substitute one phrase in one line in a committee report for the statute’s áctual definition is to commit'the precise sin which has led to the near-complete demise — in my view unfortunate — of legislative history in interpreting statutes: Congress as a whole voted on the statute as written, and should not be taken as instead adopting arguably contrary language in a committee report absent extremely good reason. See King,
Clearly, Congress could have chosen to — and initially did — draft a provision codifying the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory, by using the very word “catalyst,” which courts had construed for decades to include a causation requirement. But it ultimately chose not to do that. The statute enacted by Congress and signed by the president did not reinstate the pre-Buckhannon definition of “substantially prevailing,” but instead devised a new one. “[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
IV
We should take no comfort from the fact that other circuits have read into the fees provision a causation requirement, and should not join them in insisting upon this statutory mirage.
The lead opinion suggests that the fee provision “cannot plausibly be read” in a way that does not incorporate a causation requirement. Lead Op. at 876. But the cases it cites for this proposition all predate Buckhannon and the statutory amendments. Id. at 876. They are evidence of nothing more than what a pre-Buckhan-non plaintiff needed to show in order to be “substantially prevailing” under existing judge-made law on fees for catalyst complainants. To the extent they impose a causal nexus requirement, they have been superseded by statute and have no bearing on whether fees are available to First Amendment Coalition or any requestor seeking fees under § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II).
But even taking the lead opinion’s concern on its merits, my reading of the statute is an entirely plausible one. As Senator Kyi’s statement quoted above suggests, Congress probably wanted courts to avoid difficult determinations of causation — as shown by this case — by creating, in effect, a presumption of causation when agencies unilaterally change position as to a possibly meritorious disclosure request after a lawsuit has been filed. The pre-Buckhan-non standard required difficult multi-factor inquiries by the district courts to determine whether the lawsuit “actually” caused the disclosure or not. Congress could sensibly want a more administrable test for screening out complainants who ought not to recover attorney fees.
Additionally, Congress may have wanted to make whole plaintiffs who simply should not have had to resort to litigation to obtain the information they wanted, having necessarily already made an appropriate, “not insubstantial” request for disclosure to the agency, which was denied.' See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)-(3) (providing for disclosure of non-exempt agency documents).
In short, malting FOIA complainants eligible for fees without demonstrating a causal nexus is neither absurd nor “threaten[s] to destroy the entire statutory scheme.” Guido,
y
My objection to Judge Murguia’s analysis of fee eligibility is fundamentally the same as my objection to the lead opinion. Her alternative theory of eligibility is entirely divorced from the words of the statute we must apply to determine if FOIA plaintiffs are eligible for fees.
Under Judge Murguia’s approach, First Amendment Coalition is eligible for fees because it would have prevailed on the merits but for unilateral government action, in this case the failure of the government to disclose to the district court that the White Paper had been officially released. Concurring Op. at 890. Judge Murguia maintains that her approach is “consistent with FOIA’s'text,” Concurring Op. at 890, but her concurrence fails to engage with the text of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II) at all.
Again, a plaintiff who does not obtain a judgment may nonetheless “substantially prevail,” and thus be eligible for fees, if she has obtained relief through a voluntary or unilateral change in agency position on a “not insubstantial” claim. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii)(II). Judge Murguia’s approach replaces the words of the statute with a different substantive standard: the plaintiff is eligible if she is “correct on the merits” (emphasis added), or would have prevailed in the FOIA suit, but for the government’s unilateral- actiоn “outside [the plaintiff’s] control.”
Finally, I note once again that one result of Judge Murguia’s alternative analysis is that there is no majority holding as to whether, absent judicial relief, a plaintiff must demonstrate a causal nexus between the lawsuit and the disclosure.
VI
Applied to the facts of this case, First Amendment Coalition is a “substantially prevailing” complainant. It obtained relief — the OLC-CIA memo — before judgment through a voluntary change in position by the Department of .Justice on a “not insubstantial” claim. See Lead Op. at 875 n.12 (noting the government’s concession that the claim, is not insubstantial). The statute does not require us to, and indeed we may not, “read an absent word” (or provision) into the statute. Lamie,
* * * * *
For these reasons, I concur only in the judgment (with one exception noted, see note 1, supra).
. With the exception of footnote 10 of Judge Block’s opinion, which I join.
. I will refer to Judge Block's opinion for the court as the "lead opinion.”
. “The double negative in the amendment was not my proposal and I accept no responsibility for that grammatical infraction.” 153 Cong. Rec. S10,989 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kyi).
. A complainant who is "eligible” for fees is not necessarily “entitled” to them; I am only concerned here with the effect of the statutory amendments on eligibility for fees. See Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n v. Locke,
. Oregon Natural Desert Association states that the statutory amendments reinstated the pre-Buckhannon catalyst theory, perhaps implying a causation requirement.
. Before 2007, the terse fees provision in FOIA provided for fees and costs “in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (2006).
. See, e.g., Lead Op. at 875 (quoting floor statement); Or. Nat. Desert Ass’n,
. In particular, the sponsors of the bill worried about the strategic timing of FOIA disclosures by agencies to avoid paying fees. See S. Rep. No. 110-59, at 3-4 (2007) ("[F]ederal agencies have an incentive to delay compliance with FOIA requests until just before a court decision that is favorable to a FOIA requestor,"); 153 Cong. Rec. S15.704 (daily ed, Dec. 14, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (same),
. Only one court seems to have entertained the notion that the statute, read plainly, does not include a causation requirement. See Sai v. Transp. Sec. Admin.,
. As a practical matter, where there is litigation pending and the basis for the release of information is substantial, I suspect instances in which the information is released for reasons entirely independent of the litigation are likely rare. The old catalyst theory, after all, required only a “substantial causative effect,” nоt that the lawsuit be the sole or determinant cause of disclosure. Cf. ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
. Judge Murguia implies bad faith on the part of the government in this case, a suggestion on which I take no position. It is not clear if bad faith is required under her theory of eligibility or is merely one instance of action but for which a plaintiff would have recovered.
. There are other measures for dealing with bad-faith litigation tactics, like sanctions, that have foe virtue of not altering foe. substantive law.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment:
I write separately to explain my reasoning in this challenging case.
, FOIA allows for an award of attorney fees to eligible parties who can show their entitlement to fees. Where a FOIA plaintiff prevails on the merits of her claim, eligibility for fees is straightforward. Where a FOIA plaintiff does not prevail on the merits of her claim, but the Government nonetheless releases some or all of the information sought through a unilateral disclosure, eligibility for fees is less straightforward. The leading test for analyzing eligibility in these circumstances asks whether the plaintiffs litigation was a “substantial causative effect” of the disclosure of the information. See Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
On the first question, I join in the analysis of part II of the opinion, finding that recovery under a catalyst theory continues to require causation. On the second question, I do not join in the opinion’s analysis, because I do not agree that the district court clearly erred in its causation finding. On the third question, I conclude that First Amendment Coalition is eligible for fees. The Department of Justice (the DOJ) prevented First Amendment Coalition from prevailing on the merits, and the district court erred by failing to take into account the DOJ’s conduct when analyzing eligibility. I therefore concur in reversing the district сourt’s judgment on' First Amendment Coalition’s eligibility for a fee award, and in remanding to consider- First Amendment Coalition’s entitlement to fees,
I. Background
In 2010, lawyers in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the DOJ wrote two memoranda analyzing the targeted killing of an American citizen abroad: a memorandum from the OLC to the U.S. Department of Defense '(the OLC-DOD Memorandum) and a memorandum from the OLC to the Central Intelligence Agency (the OLC-CIA Memorandum). These memoranda-were not public, and various Government agencies refused to confirm or deny their existence. When First Amendment Coalition submitted its FOIA request in 2011, these two memoranda were within the scope of the request. DOJ did not provide these memoranda to First Amendment Coalition, or confirm or deny their existence. First Amendment Coalition then litigated in pursuit of the still-undisclosed and unacknowledged responsive materials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (NDCA). Other parties brought similar FOIA actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). /. .. '
The SDNY plaintiffs lost on the merits of their suit in early 2013. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (NY Times I),
In the NDCA litigation, the DOJ and First Amendment Coalition filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the release of the materials First Amendment Coalition had requested. .The DOJ did not mention the White Paper in the opening brief for its second motion -for summary judgment. After First Amendment Coalition emphasized the leaked White Paper -in its briefing, the DOJ in its reply to its motion for summary judgment and opposition to First Amendment Coalition’s cross-motion stated: “The White Paper is a draft document that was originally provided in
In early 2014, the NDCA district court ruled against First Amendment Coalition on the merits of the cross-motions for summary judgment. In its order, the district court observed that First Amendment Coalition “makes much of the fact that the unclassified White Paper prepared for Congress has been leaked and acknowledged by the Government. However, there has been no ‘official disclosure’ of the White Pаper.” The district court’s statement that there was no official disclosure was incorrect given the prior DOJ release of the White Paper in response to the Truthout FOIA request. Id.
Ten days after the NDCA district court ruled against First Amendment Coalition on the merits, the Second Circuit reversed the SDNY district court and ordered the release of a redacted version of the OLC-DOD Memorandum. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (NY Times II),
Even if these statements assuring the public of the lawfulness of targeted killings are not themselves sufficiently detailed to establish waiver of the secrecy of the legal analysis in the OLC-DOD Memorandum, they establish the context in which the most revealing document, disclosed after the [SDNY] District Court’s decision, should be evaluated. That document is the DOJ White Paper[.]
Id. at 138; see id. at 141 (“Whatever protection the legal analysis might once have had has been lost by virtue of public statements of public officials at the highest levels and official disclosure of the DOJ White Paper.”).
Thе Second Circuit’s opinion also included the following paragraph, referencing the NDCA litigation:
The recent opinion of the District Court for the Northern District of California, ... denying an FOIA request for the OLC-DOD Memorandum, is readily distinguishable because the Court, being under the impression -that “there has been no ‘official disclosure’ of the White Paper,” .... did not assess its significance, whereas in our case, the Government has conceded that the White Paper, with its detailed analysis of legal reasoning, has in fact been officially disclosed.
Id. at 139 (internal citations omitted).
The Second Circuit subsequently published the OLC-DOD Memorandum in a revised decision. See NY Times III,
II. Catalyst Theory
First Amendment Coalition argues that the NDCA litigation substantially caused the release of the OLC-DOD Memorandum and the OLC-CIA Memorandum. First Amendment Coalition’s principal theory for why it had a “substantial causative effect” on the DOJ’s release of both the OLC-DOD and OLC-CIA memoranda is that its NDCA litigation — and the prospect of Ninth Circuit review — affected the Government’s choices. First Amendment Coalition points to the DOJ’s decision nоt to contest the release of the OLC-DOD memorandum the Second Circuit ordered, and the DOJ’s decision to release the OLC-CIA memorandum before any federal court ordered the DOJ to do so. The NDCA district court rejected First Amendment Coalition’s arguments, finding that the DOJ “in this case released the documents largely as a result of the Second Circuit’s ruling in NY Times, not as a result of the ruling in this case.”
The district court’s ruling on causation is a factual finding, and we review for clear error. See Ass’n of Cal. Water Agencies v. Evans,
III. A Different Ground for Fee Eligibility
In the majority of FOIA fee cases, the catalyst theory of recovery will be the appropriate way to analyze the plaintiffs eligibility for fees. But, to my mind, a
In my view, however, there is no need to rely on a catalyst theory or re-write the “substantial causative effect” test.
At the time of its adoption, the substantial causative effect test established “that a court judgment is not a prerequisite for an attorney fees award under” FOIA. Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson,
To illustrate, suppose the Government, on the eve of defeat in FOIA litigation, unilaterally releases the requested information, thereby mooting the case and preventing the plaintiffs from securing a judgment. The' plaintiffs’ efforts in litigation compelled the disclosure of information, and the plaintiffs would have prevailed absent the Government’s conduct. Accordingly, we would award attorney fees to the plaintiffs under á catalyst theory, even though they did not secure a judgment on the merits. The instant case presents a different variation on this situation, but the same considerations should still apply.
First Amendment Coalition and the SDNY FOIA plaintiffs sought the same underlying materials for the same reasons. Thp DOJ then took a unilateral action that prevented .-First .Amendment Coalition from prevailing on the merits, by failing to describe the White Paper candidly to the NDCA district court, Because the DOJ did not inform First Amendment Coalition or the NDCA district court about the official release of the White Paper in response to the .FOIA request, the DOJ deprived the NDCA district court of the opportunity to ■ rule on. a complete record. The district court even admitted that it “may not have been fully apprised of. the facts surrounding the White Paper” in making its earlier ruling, a conclusion reached only with the clarity provided by the Second Circuit decision. The Second Circuit recognized the White Paper was critical,' and that the DOJ’s representations to- the NDCA district court had differed in a material way. Something has gone wrong when a district court learns of relevant information first from another court, let alone material, casе-dispositive information. E.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co.,
First Amendment Coalition failed to prevail primarily because of unilateral Government actions, outside its control. The district court erred in not recognizing
Under these circumstances, the same rationales apply as- in “substantial causative effect” cases. First Amendment Coalition acted in good faith, brought a timely action, and was correct oh the merits. A ruling in First Amendment Coalition’s favor would likely have made First Amendment Coalition eligible without even the need to rely on any alternate theory of recovery. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)®. First Amendment Coalition was unable to recover because of the DOJ’s unilateral action in how the DOJ characterized the White Paper to the court. The DOJ prevented First Amendment Coalition from prevailing and establishing its eligibility via a favorable judgment, id. § 552(a)(4)(E)®, and we therefore may look to alternate bases establishing First Amendment Coalition’s eligibility to recover, id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). The district court erred as a matter of law by not accounting for the DOJ’s actions when analyzing First Amendment Coalition’s eligibility for recovery, and by limiting its analysis to actual causation.
Accordingly, I would reverse the district court for legal error, not for its underlying causation finding. When we take into account the DOJ’s conduct, First Amendment Coalition has established its eligibility for an award of fees. I therefore join my colleagues in reversing the district court ruling on eligibility, and remanding for a determination of First Amendment' Coalition’s entitlement to fees.
. It appears the district court was referring to NY Times II.
. For instance, we have two available explanations for why the DOJ ultimately voluntarily disclosed the OLC-CIA Memorandum to First Amendment Coalition. The first explanation is that the DOJ concluded that the waiver determinations the Second Circuit made regarding the OLC-DOD Memorandum applied with equal force to the OLC-CIA Memorandum. See NY Times III,
. As noted above, I join in the opinion's conclusion that causation remains a requirement of the "substantial causative effect" test for a catalyst theory of recovery. See Opinion, Part II.
. In analyzing whether First Amendment Coalition is entitled to fees, as opposed to merely eligible, the district court will be able to consider agency behavior or reasonableness, See Button v. IRS,