176 Ga. 80 | Ga. | 1932
This case came from the Court of Appeals by certiorari. The defendant filed an answer in the trial court, but in its absence verdict and judgment were rendered in favor of the plaintiff. During the term the defendant filed a petition to vacate and set aside the verdict and judgment, for matters'not appearing upon the face of the record, but the petition was not accompanied by a brief of the evidence. In 42 Ga. App. 99 (155 S. E. 227), the Court of Appeals held that the petition was in effect a motion for a new trial, subject to all the rules governing such a motion, and was fatally defective for want of a brief of evidence. It was further held that the ground of demurrer raising this point should have been sustained and the petition dismissed. There was no exception to this judgment.
The petition to set aside the verdict and judgment having been dismissed by the trial court in accordance with the remittitur from the Court of Appeals, the defendant then sought to prosecute a motion for a new trial, which it had filed during the same term but subsequently to the filing of such petition, which motion was accompanied by a brief of evidence. The plaintiff thereafter moved to dismiss the motion for a new trial, upon the ground that the petition to set aside the verdict and judgment was a bar to another
In Oliver v. Fireman’s Insurance Co., 42 Ga. App. 99 (supra), a case properly within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held that a motion or petition by the defendant to set aside a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff was in effect a motion for a new trial, subject to all the rules governing such a motion, and was fatally defective for want of a brief of evidence. This judgment of the Court of Appeals has not been reversed or set aside, and is now the law of the case, binding upon both parties in all subsequent stages of the litigation. Civil Code (1910), § 4336. The correctness of that decision, right or wrong, can not be drawn into question in the present ease, which is a continuation of the same litigation between the same parties. Compare Anderson v. Rheney, 152 Ga. 418 (110 S. E. 164). The decision appears, however, to be in accord with the decision by this court in Ellard v. Simpson, 166 Ga. 278 (142 S. E. 855), and cit. A motion or petition to set aside a verdict and judgment should be distinguished from a technical motion to set aside a judgment. Civil Code (1910), §§ 5957-60. There must be a motion for a new trial where there is an actual verdict. Hyfield v. Sims, 87 Ga. 280, 282 (13 S. E. 554); and see McCrary v. Gano, 115 Ga. 295 (41 S. E. 580). In view of the final adjudication that the petition to set aside the verdict and judgment was in effect a motion for a new trial, and was fatally defective for the reasons stated, it should, as between the parties, be treated as a motion, or as an attempted motion, for a new trial, which was not accompanied by a brief of the evidence. In Baker v. Johnson, 99 Ga. 374 (27 S. E. 706), a so-called motion for a new trial was filed, but no brief of evidence was submitted. This court .held: “Until the brief of evidence was prepared, presented, and ordered filed, a motion for a new trial was not made.” In Moxley v. Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 122 Ga. 493 (50 S. E. 339), it was held: “A paper setting forth the movant’s reasons for asking for a new trial is not, in legal contemplation, a motion unless it is accompanied by a brief of the evidence.” In Holloman v. Small, 111 Ga. 812 (35 S. E. 665), it was said that a paper purporting to be a motion for a new trial, but not accompanied by a brief of evidence,
Thus, if the motion or petition to set aside the verdict and judgment as originally filed required a brief of evidence in order to give it vitality, it amounted to only a step in the direction of making a valid motion, and, having been dismissed for such defect, should now be considered as amounting to nothing. The paper as filed was a mere embryo, and could not subsist or develop into a proceeding in court when the requisite brief of evidence was not supplied. Cf. McClendon v. Hernando Phosphate Co., 100 Ga. 219 (2) (28 S. E. 152); McFarland v. McFarland, 151 Ga. 9 (2) (105 S. E. 596). In Jordan v. Jenkins, 17 Ga. App. 58 (86 S. E. 278), the following ruling was made: “Even if the suing out of a prior purchase-money attachment could estop the plaintiff from setting up title to the property described in the attachment as the property of the defendant, no estoppel could result if the attachment proceeding was so defective that no judgment could have been based thereon.” Since the motion or petition to set aside the verdict and judgment Avas void, and was held void and was dismissed because not accom
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed.