83 Mo. 517 | Mo. | 1884
Appellants had a judgment against respondent on which an execution was issued and placed in the hands of the sheriff of Lewis county, who made a return to the execution showing that he had set apart a certain tract of land to defendant, as a homestead. Plaintiffs moved to quash that portion of the sheriff’s return. The court overruled the motion, and the cause is here on appeal.
The following is the admitted evidence in the cause: “ It is admitted by the parties to this suit that the deeds,
Maurice Prindeville, the respondent, herein testified as follows: “That at the time of the purchase of the lands in controversy he was a citizen of, and resided in the state of Ohio ; and at the time of said purchase he intended to move upon said land and live thereon. But he did not do so until March 1st, A. D. 1871, when he and his family moved on said land. That while he was a citizen of the state of Ohio, he owned no real estate in said state; that he lived upon a rented farm.” On these facts is respondent entitled to the premises exempt from execution as a homestead ?
It will be observed that both plaintiffs and defendant resided in the state of Ohio, when the debt was incurred. The debt was contracted in June, 1869. The defendant’s deed was recorded in Lewis county, Missouri, in 1866. The defendant with his family moved onto the land in 1871, and they have ever since resided there. Defendant owned no real estate in the state of Ohio. Plaintiffs obtained their judgment on which this execution issued in the circuit court of Lewis county, on the 15th of March, 1882. Our statute, Rev. Stat., sec. 2695, provides
The case of Stanley v. Baker, 75 Mo. 60, was one in which Baker had a homestead in the town Of Lancaster, and, while occupying it as a homestead, purchased a tract of land in Schuyler county, near Lancaster,^and his deed to that land was recorded in 1869. In 1873 he contracted a debt on which a judgment was obtained against him in 1877. In 1876 he sold his residence property in Lancaster for $1,300, which he expendedla improvements upon the land; but no part of the money received on the sale of his town property was used in the purchase of the land, and this court held that the latter was not exempt as a homestead from execution on that judgment. This opinion was based upon section 2696, wMch clearly enough subjects a second homestead acquired otherwise than as therein specified to debts contracted subsequent to its acquisition. It will not allow one who owns a homestead to sell it, and with other of his own means,
The case at bar presents entirely dissimilar facts. Prindeville had no homestead in this state, prior to his occupancy of the land in controversy, and the language of the homestead law is broad enough' to give him a homestead in the land, exempt from plaintiff’s demand, unless the fact that both parties were residents of the state of Ohio when the debt was contracted and the land was acquired works a different result. No case is cited from the Yermont. reports, from which state we borrowed our statute, involving the precise question for determination in this. ' Nor do the cases and authorities cited by appellants’ counsel to the effect that domicile in the state, is necessary to entitle one to a homestead, help us to solve the question here. That domicile in this state is necessary, is conceded, and that defendant has been domiciled in this state and on this identical land ever since he removed to the state is not controverted. Can the fact, that when he acquired the land and had his deed recorded, and when the debt was contracted, he and plaintiffs were citizens of another state, deprive him of the homestead right ?
The policy of the law is to secure housekeepers and heads of families homes which cannot be taken from them for debts contracted after the acquisition of the homestead. The acquisition of the land must be followed by its occupancy as a homestead by the claimant, and this occupancy, whenever it occurs relates back to the time when the deed was filed for record. West River Bank
It was suggested in the argument, that, if one could secure a- homestead by purchasing land with the intent to make it his home, he might, have a homestead in every county in the state, or in every state in the Union, having a homestead law similar to ours; but this suggestion overlooks the question of occupancy. The head of a family may have a tract of land in every county in the state, and intended each for his homestead when he purchased it, but he can only have a homestead in that which he occupies as such. The right to a homestead in this state does not depend upon the residence of the claimant and his creditor, or • either of them, when the land was acquired. A citizen of another state, when he becomes a citizen of this state, is as much entitled to a homestead as if he had been born in the state, and had never resided elsewhere. The law, by its terms, pays no regard to the residence of the claimant when he acquired his land. It simply regards the status of the party when the homestead right is claimed, and, if it is his original homestead in this state, the date of the filing of his deed, and his occupancy of the land before a judgment rendered against him becomes a lien upon it, establish his right if the debt was contracted after the deed was filed for record.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
