32 Mont. 354 | Mont. | 1905
delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the former appeal in this case (Finlen v. Heinze, 28 Mont. 548, 73 Pac. 123) a sufficiently explicit statement of facts was made, to which reference is now had, and a repetition of the whole avoided. It will be sufficient in this instance to say that in 1898 plaintiff, Finlen, held certain leases and bonds upon the interests of John Devlin, Mrs. Devlin, Mrs. Eeilly, and Mrs. Kelly in the Minnie Healy lode mining claim, and had options to purchase those interests at any time on or before February 3, 1900, upon the payment of $100,000; that in December, 1898, F. Augustus Heinze, hereafter referred to as defendant Heinze, entered into possession of the property, claiming that by oral agreement made on November 21, 1898, Finlen had transferred his leases, bonds, and options to defendant Heinze, and had agreed to execute a writing evidencing such transfer. In February, 1899, Finlen made an unsuccessful effort to recover possession of the property, and in June following commenced this action in ejectment. To the complaint filed, defendant Heinze interposed an answer, and, by way of an equitable counterclaim, pleaded the agreement of November 21st, alleged a breach by Finlen, and asked that specific performance be decreed. To this counterclaim Finlen filed an answer, and to this answer defendant Heinze replied; and upon such counterclaim, answer, and reply the equitable portion of this action was tried, a decision rendered, and de
On July 29, 1903, the remittitur from this court was filed in the district court, and on August 10th counsel for the defendant Heinze moved the court to advance the cause and set it for trial. This motion was granted, and the cause set for September 16th. Plaintiff objected to the cause being set for trial, and moved the court to change the venue, on the ground that Judge Harney, who had presided at the former trial, was-disqualified from again trying the same. On September 12th this motion was denied, and the cause was thereupon transferred to department No. 2 of the same court, presided over by Judge Olancy. On September 16th Judge Clancy proceeded to trial, whereupon plaintiff objected to its trial in department No. 2 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and objected to -the hearing at that time for the reason that plaintiff was not ready for trial. These objections were overruled, and the trial proceeded upon the counterclaim of the defendant Heinze, the answer of plaintiff, Pinlen, thereto, and the reply of Heinze to this answer, the defendant Heinze assuming the affirmative of the issue. After the direct testimony in behalf of defendant Heinze was concluded, he was permitted, over the objection of plaintiff, to amend his counterclaim. The court found the issues in favor of defendant Heinze, and entered a decree in his favor, from which decree, and an order overruling plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, these appeals are prosecuted.
Some of the errors specified by the appellant were directly involved upon the former appeal, and were there considered and determined. The decision of this court in that instance became the law of this case as to all such questions. (Murray v. Polglase, 23 Mont. 401, 59 Pac. 439, and cases cited; Mahoney v. Butte Hardware Co., 27 Mont. 463, 71 Pac. 674.)
1. It is contended that “the facts do not sustain the findings.” We assume that what is meant by this is, that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the findings of the court.
On the part of defendant Heinze it is further claimed that prior to November 21st Finlen and John MacGinniss, Heinze’s agent, had been negotiating for an assignment by Finlen toHeinze of Finlen’s leases and bonds or options on the property, and that these negotiations had progressed so far that MacGinniss had given to Heinze’s counsel, McHatton, memoranda of an agreement for the assignment of Finlen’s leases and bonds on the property, and that McHatton had drawn up two writings embodying a contract conformable to MacGinniss’ ideas of the agreement he had made with Finlen; that on the afternoon of November 21, 1898, Finlen went to McHatton’s. office, where these writings were presented to him; that Finlen objected to and refused to sign them; that at McHatton’s suggestion they went to see MacGinniss at his office with the-Montana Ore Purchasing Company; that there they met MacGinniss, the defendant Heinze, and his brother Arthur P. Heinze, and for some time discussed the proposed transfer;;
Einlen positively denies that any complete agreement was entered into, and states that the principal subject of the conversation on November 21st was the suit against the Boston and Montana Company, and that he (Einlen) gave Heinze permission to go into the possession of the property for the purpose of doing development work with reference to the subject matter of this suit. The facts remain, however, that Einlen admits that he went to McHatton’s office on the afternoon of November 21st; (he says he went there to see about the suit, but admits that while there nothing whatever was said about the suit, but that McHatton presented to him drafts of an
While it is conceded that McHatton was to draw up a written contract for Einlen’s signature, it appears that he neglected to do so, and upon the cross-examination of Einlen this testimony appears: “Q. In this conversation on the 21st of November, 1898, you said your word was as good as your bond? A. And I say it right now. If you had carried out your contract, I would have carried mine out.” This answer appears to have been directed to Judge McHatton, who was conducting the cross-examination, who then asked Einlen this question: “Q. What was my contract that I failed to carry out ? A. Tour contract was to have the agreement drawn out by the time I
The district court had a right, and it was its duty, to weigh the evidence in the light of the surrounding circumstances, and particularly with reference to the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the respective stories told by the principal actors in the case. Finlen’s version is that the only agreement actually entered into on November 21st was that a suit should be commenced by Finlen, in Finlen’s name, against the Boston and Montana Company, for the use and benefit of Heinze; that the proceeds, if any, from the suit, should go to Heinze; that the purpose of the suit was to make it appear that Finlen was in litigation with the Boston and Montana people, and to that extent, at least, occupying a friendly position toward Heinze, who was involved in considerable litigation with that company; that he gave Heinze permission to go into the Minnie Healy claim and do an amount of development work unlimited, so far as this record shows, or at least left entirely to the caprice of Heinze, and yet all to be done at Finlen’s expense. The result is that Finlen lent his name, his property and resources, and his influence in the community to Heinze, who, according to that version, had no interest whatever in the Minnie Healy property, merely for the purpose of enabling Heinze to harass
Furthermore, Finlen’s contention tbat tbe expense incurred by these men employed by Heinze in tbe Minnie Iiealy mine after December 23d was properly charged to him (Finlen) seems inconsistent witb Wishon’s statement tbat Finlen told him afterward to make out a bill to Heinze for this expense, and collect tbe same. Heinze’s version is tbat tbe agreement of November 21st for tbe sale of Finlen’s interests to Heinze was completed, and tbat under tbat agreement be put bis men to work, and tbe expense incurred was to be bis expense. As many other men do who take leases upon mining ground, be was expending bis money witb a chance of losing it, or of discovering ore of sufficient value to make tbe investment a profitable one.
As tending to corroborate tbe testimony of Heinze, bis brother, MacGinniss, and McHatton, it is conceded tbat an action was commenced in tbe name of Miles Finlen (this appellant) against tbe Boston and Montana Company witb reference to this particular vein heretofore alluded to; tbat such action was commenced on December 5, 1898; tbat Wishon verified tbe complaint; and tbat McHatton acted as counsel for tbe plaintiff in tbat action. It is further a conceded fact tbat on December 23d Heinze’s employees went to work in tbe Minnie Healy claim, McFarlane acting as superintendent, and Ma-honey as foreman; tbat all tbe men employed therein or discharged therefrom were employed or discharged by Mahoney; and tbat this character of work continued until about February 24, 1899, when Finlen attempted to gain control of tbe property, and for tbat matter until this action was commenced in
John Devlin, one of the owners of the Minnie Healy claim, who had given Einlen an option on his interest (an option which it is claimed by Heinze was assigned to him by the oral agreement of November 21st), testified that in November, 1898, before Einlen went East, he (Einlen) told Devlin that he did not intend to do any more work on the Minnie Healy, and that he intended to turn the property over to Heinze.
John Telling, a miner, who had had some dealings with Einlen with reference to this mining claim, by which Einlen had become indebted to him, testified that he saw Einlen with reference to his matter in December, 1898, upon Einlen’s return from the East, and in a conversation he asked Einlen, “How is the Minnie Healy looking?” that Einlen replied, “I don’t know how it is looking. T have turned it over to another party”; that Telling asked, “Who is the party that you turned it over to ?” and Einlen replied, “Mr. Heinze and company”; that Telling asked, “What about our agreement?” and Einlen replied, “Well, if I make my money out of it, what I have invested in it — that is, $54,000 — I will' pay you according to our agreement.”
John Hoy testified that between November 15 and 22, 1898, Einlen told him that he had turned the Minnie Healy over to Heinze, and in the following January, in Helena, repeated the same declaration.
Hugh I. Wilson, who in 1898 was a tenant of Einlen, testified that in the fall of 1898 Einlen told him that he did not think that he would ever make a mine out of the Minnie Healy claim, and in November of that year told Wilson that he had disposed of the property to Heinze.
Heinze’s employees McFarlane and Mahoney were given possession of the mine by Cook, who was Einlen’s watchman at the mine; and Cook testified that Einlen told him in the fall of 1898 that, if Heinze came to look at the Minnie Healy
Wishon, who was Finlen’s agent and foreman at another mine, testified that in November, 1898, Finlen told him he thought Heinze would take hold of the Minnie Healy, and for ¡Wishon to give him possession if he came for it; that, acting under this instruction, he (Wishon) instructed Cook accordingly.
A witness (O’Neill) testified that he was working for Finlen in the Minnie Healy claim in the fall of 1898; that at the time the shaft was in bad condition, and he spoke to Finlen with reference to repairing it; that Finlen said to him: “Get along the best way you can. I expect to transfer the property at any minute to Mr. Heinze.”
It is contended by appellant that certain circumstances tend to support Finlen’s version, and to contradict Heinze and his witnesses. For instance, some of the men employed and bills for some of the materials used in this mine from December 23d to February 15th were paid by Finlen; that the first ore shipment made after December 23d was smelted at the Montana Ore Purchasing Company’s smelter, of which Heinze was general manager; that an ore statement of the same was made out to Finlen,. and a check for the net value of such shipment, amounting to $294, was executed and delivered by the smelter company to Finlen, though it was never presented for payment or paid; that some of the men employed at the mine from and after December 23d were men who had formerly worked for Finlen in this same mine; and that finally Heinze’s witnesses have, on different hearings of this cause, testified to contradictory statements of fact.
The explanations tendered for these matters are: MacGinniss, who was Heinze’s agent, and acting for him, testified that, some time after Heinze commenced work on December 23d,
Wishon also testified that he reported this agreement to Einlen upon his return from the East, and that Einlen approved it, and at one time thereafter directed Wishon to make out a bill on Heinze for the amount then due, and get the money; that he (Wishon) did commence to make out such bill, but through his own negligence it was not completed at the time this controversy arose. The clerk or bookkeeper at the Montana Ore Purchasing Company smelter testified that he made out the ore statement to Einlen, presumably under the instruction of some one there — possibly MacGinniss — but he is unable to remember definitely.
MacGinniss, who made out the check to Einlen for this ore shipment, testified that he knew that, under the arrangement which he had with Wishon, Heinze was then indebted to Einlen for more than the amount of the ore shipment on account of payments made to men and for supplies, and that he sent Einlen this check as a part payment on that account.
With reference to the re-employment of the men who had formerly been employed by Einlen at the Minnie Healy mine, Heinze, MacGinniss and McHatton testified that, in the conversation of November 21st, Einlen asked Heinze to employ Cook, who was then employed by Einlen as watchman at the Minnie Healy, and that Heinze agreed to do so. It appears that, at the suggestion of McEarlane, Cook was employed by Mahoney as a shift boss.
Particular stress is laid upon the fact that, at the former trial of this cause, defendant Heinze testified respecting the agreement of November 21, 1898, that the payment to Finlen of $54,000 was to be made in two equal installments — $27,000 one year after the expiration of the leases and bonds, (which was February 3, 1900), and $27,000 two years after the expiration of the leases and bonds. In his counterclaim he alleges that these payments were to be made one and two years, respectively, after he should have taken up the bonds from the Devlins, Beilly and Nelly, and received deeds for the property, and upon this trial he testified according to the allegations of the counterclaim. In explanation of this apparent contradiction, defendant Heinze testified that he told Einlen that, if he should take up the leases and bonds, he would, in all probability, not do so until the date of their expiration, ■ as that was his custom respecting such matters, and so thoroughly was he imbued with this idea that upon the former trial of this cause he made use of the terms “due date of the bonds” and “date of his taking them up” interchangeably, and as meaning precisely the same thing.
Other instances of like apparent contradictions are called to our attention, and it is incumbent upon us to say what, if any, importance we shall attach to the fact that the district court,, which had the witnesses present in court before it, observed their demeanor while testifying, and could determine from their maimer their apparent fairness or lack of fairness, after consideration of all the evidence found the issues in favor of defendant Heinze.
In Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 32 Mont. 159, 80 Pac. 6, decided March 13th, this court gave attention to section 21 of the Code
In Hardware Co. v. Gardner (S. D.), 99 N. W. 1105, the doctrine announced in the Randall Gase above, is reaffirmed, and it is there said: “The findings of the trial court are presumptively correct, and it is only when this court is satisfied that, there is a clear preponderance of the evidence against such findings that such presumption will be overcome, and the decision of the trial court reversed. (Randall v. Burk Township, 4 S.
In Wisconsin, under a statute similar to our own, substantially the same rule is adopted as that announced in the South Dakota cases. In Spuhr v. Kolb, 111 Wis. 119, 86 N. W. 562, it is said: “A careful examination of the evidence shows that, if the witnesses are believed, their testimony overwhelmingly sustains the findings of the court. There are suspicious circumstances and contradictions in the evidence, which might justify a trial court in discrediting those witnesses, but the situation so arising is one upon which the trial court has peculiar advantages for reaching a correct conclusion. The manner and appearance of the witnesses in the explanation of such discrepancies is of very great value. The case therefore especially invites the application of the rule that, upon evidence fairly justifying either of two inferences, the decision of the trial court must control.”
In Washington the same result is reached. In Roberts v. Washington Nat. Bank, 11 Wash. 550, 40 Pac. 225, it is said: “In determining the facts established by the proofs the findings of the trial court should receive consideration, but cannot be allowed to control when, in the opinion of this court, they are contradicted by a clear preponderance of the evidence.” (See, also, Chantler v. Hubbell, 34 Wash. 211, 75 Pac. 802.)
In Utah, under a constitutional provision similar to our Code, section 21, above, as amended, a rule similar to that prevailing in South Dakota has been adopted. In McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah, 261, 49 Pac. 649, it is said: “While we have power, under the Constitution, to review questions of fact in an equity case, still, when such cases have been regularly tried before a court of chancery, and facts found on all material issues, we will not disturb such findings unless they are so manifestly erroneous as to demonstrate some oversight or mistake which
In Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah, 240, 51 Pac. 980, the same court held that, under the constitutional provision above referred to, the supreme court has power in equity cases to go behind the findings and decree of the trial court, consider all the evidence, and decide on which side the preponderance thereof is. In Elliot v. Whitmore, 23 Utah, 342, 90 Am. St. Rep. 700, 65 Pac. 70, the decisions in the two former cases are reaffirmed.
The same rule seems to prevail in the federal courts. In Lopez v. Collier, 129 Fed. 104, 63 C. C. A. 606, it is said: “The case presents simple questions of fact. The evidence is conflicting. Several witnesses testified for libelant, and proved up his case. They were contradicted by several witnesses produced by defendant to prove up his case. The testimony was all taken in presence of the trial judge, who thus had an opportunity to see the witnesses and observe their demeanor while testifying; and, on the evidence, we are not able to say that he reached an erroneous conclusion.”
In Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585, 12 Sup. Ct. 759, 36 L. Ed. 552, the same rule is announced as follows: “The cause was referred to a master to take testimony therein, ‘and to report to this court his findings of fact and his conclusions of law thereon.’ This he did, and the court, after a review of the evidencé, concurred in his findings and conclusions. Clearly, then, they are to be taken as presumptively correct, and unless some obvious error has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious or important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, the decree should be permitted to stand.”
To the same effect is the decision in Warren v. Keep, 155 U. S. 265, 15 Sup. Ct. 83, 39 L. Ed. 144, where it is said: “There was a considerable amount of this evidence, and it was to some extent conflicting. 'The master acted in view of this
It is true that a different rule is promulgated by some of tbe courts. For instance, in Oregon it is said that tbe decision of tbe lower court will only be consulted for tbe purpose of resolving a doubt wbicb may arise from tbe conflicting and contradictory nature of tbe evidence. (Nessley v. Ladd, 29 Ore. 354, 45 Pac. 904, and cases cited.) But we prefer to adopt tbe other view, and bold that it is incumbent upon tbe appellant to show that "the preponderance of tbe evidence is against tbe findings of tbe trial court, before we will disturb such findings upon tbe ground of insufficiency of tbe evidence.
Some contention was made upon tbe bearing that section 21, as amended, is unconstitutional. But we are not impressed with tbe argument offered. In fact, under tbe construction wbicb we have given to tbe statute above, tbe objections to tbe validity of tbe Act are largely obviated. Tbe Act does not purport to impose upon tbis court any additional original jurisdiction. It does not require us to try tbe cause de novo in tbis court, in tbe sense in wbicb a trial anew is generally used, or in wbicb it is used in section 1161 of tbe Code of Civil Procedure, when applied to appeals from justice courts to tbe district courts. No new pleadings can be filed in tbis court; neither can any new evidence be received. Tbe Act only requires us to review tbe facts as presented in tbe record, and under like statutory provisions it is quite generally held that' tbe appellate court can either render a judgment itself, or direct what proper judgment shall be entered in tbe trial court.
Considering tbis rule of construction announced above, and tbe fact that tbe trial court bad tbe witnesses in tbis case before it, and further considering that tbe testimony of Finlen given on cross-examination is equivocal and evasive in many instances, and that be stands squarely contradicted by a large
Some contention is made that, while the evidence shows that at the conversation on November 21st reference was made to the payment of supplies then in the mine, and of men then engaged as watchmen about it, the finding of the court is that this was not a part of the agreement with reference to which specific performance is now sought, but a separate and independent transaction. An examination of the record discloses that this finding of the court is made upon testimony given directly to that effect — testimony not denied, except in so far as Finlen’s general denial of any agreement having been made may be considered a denial. Under the rule just announced, this contention is not well made.
2. It is said that defendant Heinze, having disputed plaintiff’s right in the property, cannot have specific performance of the contract. But counsel for plaintiff are mistaken in the facts. There is no such denial in any of the pleadings upon which this cause was tried. It appears that such denial is embraced in Heinze’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint in the ejectment action, but that answer is not properly before us on this appeal. As we have heretofore said, the only pleadings properly before the court below and before this court are Heinze’s counterclaim, Finlen’s amended answer thereto, and Heinze’s reply to this answer.
3. It is contended that by commencing an action in Finlen’s name against the Boston and Montana Company, or suffering it to be done, Heinze thereby estopped himself to claim that he succeeded to Finlen’s interests on November 21st. If an estoppel at all, it would be an estoppel in pais, with reference to which it is said in 11 American and English Encyclopedia of Law, second edition, 421: “The most usual application of the doctrine of estoppel in pais arises from the misrepresentation
4» Error is assigned to the refusal of the district court to change the venue, and to its transferring the cause for trial to Department No. 2, presided over by Judge Clancy. It is not easy to determine from the motion for change of venue just what the particular grounds thereof are. Objection is made to Judge Harney making any order in the cause or trying the same “for the reason that said judge is disqualified from acting in said cause, for the reason and on the grounds contained and set forth in the opinion of the supreme court of the state of Montana rendered in said cause. * * * The plaintiff therefore moves that this cause be transferred to the proper county,” etc. This motion was made at a time prior to the Second Extraordinary Session of the Eighth Legislative Assembly, which amended sections 180 and 615 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the statute in force respecting a change of the place of trial at that time was section 615, above, before it was amended. Four separate grounds are stated in that, section, but it is apparent that this motion could not have been based upon any one of them, unless it was subdivision 4, which provides for a change of the place of trial “when from any cause the judge is disqualified from acting.” At that time the disqualifications of a judge to sit or act in an action or proceeding were enumerated in section 180 of the same Code,
The objection made to the trial of the cause before Judge Clancy was upon the ground of “lack of jurisdiction, owing to its [said cause] having been transferred to said Department 2 irregularly.” It is not contended that the district court of the second judicial district of the state of Montana did not have jurisdiction of this cause. So far as the transfer of the cause from one department to another is concerned, that is a matter controlled by the rules adopted by the several departments of that court for their own convenience. Furthermore there is no showing made of any prejudice to this plaintiff in the transfer of this cause to Department No. 2 for trial.
5. Likewise the contention that the court erred in proceeding to trial on September 16th is without merit. There was no application for a continuance, and no showing made why the plaintiff could not and did not try the case at that time as well as he ever could have done.
6. At the commencement of the trial the plaintiff moved the court to exclude the witnesses. This motion was denied, and error is predicated upon this ruling. Section 3371 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: “If either party requires it, the judge may exclude from the courtroom any witness of the adverse party, not at the time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other witnesses.” This statutory provision exists in many of the states, and it is quite uniformly held that the meaning of such a provision is that the application is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the trial court, and that no review will be had, except for a manifest abuse of such discretion. (Abbott’s Trial Briefs, Civil Jury Trials, 133, and cases cited.) In the absence of any showing of prejudice, the action of the trial court will not be disturbed.
7. Upon the former appeal in this case this court held that there was a material variance between the pleading — counter
8. Numerous errors are assigned upon the rulings of the trial court in receiving and excluding evidence. We have examined these, and, without reviewing them in detail, think no prejudicial error was committed. Special attention may properly be given to one of these assignments. Upon the cross-examination of John MacGinniss, a witness for the defendant Heinze, he was asked if he knew one Ada H. Brackett. An objection to this question was sustained, whereupon counsel for the plaintiff made the following offer of proof: “The purpose is, and I expect to show, if I am allowed to get answers to the questions, that the Ada Brackett referred to in the question was employed by John MacGinniss, in behalf of Mr. Heinze and the Montana Ore Purchasing Company, ostensibly as a stenographer, but really for the purpose of intimately assoex ating with Judge Harney, one of the judges of this court, who tried this cause formerly, as an agent in behalf of E. Augustus Heinze.to negotiate for a corrupt decision in this cause, and that she so served the defendant E. Augustus Heinze, with the result that a decision of that character was procured, and that
But does this error necessitate a reversal? If the evidence excluded was substantive evidence which tended to support tbe plaintiff’s theory of tbis case, or to destroy tbe theory of tbe defendant Heinze, then tbis court would be compelled to order a new trial. But tbe only purpose of tbis character of evidence was to affect tbe credibility of tbe witness, and, assuming that evidence tending to prove tbe facts set forth in tbe offer bad been presented to tbe court, or assuming tbe most extreme view, that tbe witness MacGinniss bad waived bis constitutional privilege and bad admitted tbe facts set forth in tbe offer, tbe utmost then that could have been asked of tbe trial court would have been that it disregard tbe evidence given by tbe witness MacGinniss in so far as tbe same is not corroborated by other credible evidence. An examination of tbe record will show that all of tbe testimony given by tbe witness MacGinniss touching any material matters connected with tbis suit is corroborated by tbe testimony of.other witnesses, who, so far as tbis record shows, are entitled to credence. But we may go further than tbis, and say that, if we disregard all tbe testimony given by tbe witness MacGinniss and bold it for naught, there is still a clear preponderance of tbe evidence in favor of tbe findings of tbe trial court — such a preponderance that, if tbe district court bad disregarded MacGinniss’ testi
9. Again, it is contended that the contract, if proved, is so-incomplete that specific performance will not be enforced; and numerous details of a contract such as appellant seems to think this should have been, in order to render it valid, are suggested as having been omitted. We recognize tbe rule to be as stated by' Mr. Justice Story in Smith v. Burnham, 3 Sum. 435, Fed. Cas. No. 13,019, as follows: “It is a general rule not to interfere to direct specific performance of any agreement where tbe terms of tbe contract. are not all definite and full, and in its nature and extent are not made out by clear and unambiguous proof.” But what terms are to be made out by clear and unambiguous proof? Tbe particular terms which tbe parties to tbe contract saw fit to incorporate in it, or all tbe terms-which an astute lawyer might incorporate in a contract respecting tbe same subject? Clearly tbe former, and not the latter, and tbe mere fact tbat Heinze and Finlen did not decide upon or even discuss many matters which might properly bave been considered and agreed upon by them will not prevent, a court of equity from decreeing specific performance of tbe particular contract witb respect to matters upon which they did agree, if sucb matters make up a complete agreement, witb respect to which specific performance can be bad. If Heinze- and bis witnesses are to be believed, then a complete agreement was entered into, and tbe fact tbat sucb an agreement was made and its particular terms are shown by clear and convincing proofs.
10. It is said tbat there is no mutuality in tbe contract of November 21st, and tbat specific performance will not be enforced, and section 4412 of tbe Civil Code is cited in support of tbis contention. It is, however, conceded by appellant’s-counsel tbat a strictly optional contract may be enforced in equity by tbe bolder of tbe option in tbe same manner tbat
Furthermore, it appears that defendant Heinze has kept and performed all the terms of the contract by him to be kept or performed, and therefore the defense of a want of mutuality is not available. In Burnell v. Bradbury, 67 Kan. 762, 74 Pac. 279, respecting this doctrine, it is said: “It is well settled that, where a contract has been fully performed by one party, want of mutuality cannot be set up by the other as a defense to an action for specific performance. There is no room for the party in default to say that he could not enforce performance for want of mutuality. There is nothing left to be done by anyone but himself. The want of mutuality has no application in an action for specific performance where it is shown that the party seeking relief has fully performed all the conditions of the contract.” (2 Beach on Contracts, sec. 889; Newell’s Appeal, 100 Pa. St. 513; Bigler v. Baker, 40 Neb. 325, 58 N. W. 1026, 24 L. R. A. 255; Grove v. Hodges, 55 Pa. St. 504; Lindsay v. Warnock, 93 Ga. 619, 21 S. E. 127.)
11. Criticism is made as to the character and extent of Heinze’s possession of the claim from December 23d to February 24th, and as to the amount expended by him in improving the property. It is said that his possession was not of that exclusive character necessary to entitle him to specific performance, and, as evidence of this, attention is directed to the fact that during such period Wishon, Finlen’s foreman, visited the mine four or five times, and at one time, at least, directed Mahoney’s attention to the condition of the shaft. But Wish-on’s testimony is that he had nothing whatever to do with employing or discharging or directing the men, or with the mining operations; and considering that, according to Heinze’s,
It appears from the testimony of Camochan, Heinze’s bookkeeper, that during December Heinze paid out on account of work done and materials furnished by him at the mine $202.19; in January, $475.72; and from February 1st to 24th, $3,-664.27. This, of course, is in addition to the amount paid out by Finlen under the agreement between MacGinniss and Wishon, and which was to be repaid to Finlen under Heinze’s version of the transaction, at least. The amount and character of the work are shown by the testimony of McFarlane and Mahoney, and the returns from the smelter. The work consisted in cleaning out the mine, which had practically been abandoned, and replacing the tracks, air pipes, and other appliances, in repairing machinery already in the mine, in running drifts and cross-cuts in the mine, and in discovering bodies of valuable ore, and mining and smelting the same. Considering the fact that Finlen had spent a not inconsiderable fortune in attempting to discover ore in paying quantities, and had altogether failed, and that he had become discouraged, and had taken out the mining appliances, and, as a number of witnesses say, had declared his intention not to spend any more money on the property, he is hardly in a position to criticise the operations of some one else, who, as the evidence shows, in two or three weeks after taking possession of the property had uncovered ore bodies of sufficient size and value to make it possible for Finlen to recover the $54,000 which he. had all but lost.
12. Finally, it is said that the counterclaim is insufficient. It is said that Heinze does not offer to do equity: First, that he does not specifically offer to pay the $54,000; and, second, while he specifies the time of making the payments as one and two years, respectively, after he should take up the leases and bonds, he nowhere states when he actually took them up.
In Christiansen v. Aldrich, 30 Mont. 446, 76 Pac. 1007, this court said: “It is said that the complaint is defective for failing to show a tender of the balance of the purchase money before the action was brought. It is undoubtedly the general rule that, if a part of the purchase price is still due and payable, the plaintiff seeking to have the conveyance compelled must allege and prove a tender of it, and bring it into court. But the rule is not invariable. An exception to it is where it is apparent from the pleading that a tender would be useless. ‘Where the vendor claims to have rescinded, repudiates, and denies the obligation of the contract, placing himself in such a position that it appears that, if the tender were made, its acceptance would be refused, then no tender need be made by the vendee. * * * In such case it is enough if the plaintiff offer by his bill to bring in the money when the amount is liquidated and he has his decree for the performance.’ ” And numerous authorities in support of this doctrine are there collated. If this decision announces the correct rule — and we are satisfied that it does — then it is apparent that the counterclaim contains all the necessary allegations, and is not open to the criticism directed against it.
2. As to when Heinze actually took up the leases and bonds is quite immaterial, except upon a theory suggested by counsel
As applied to this case, then, that section means that Finlen is entitled to interest on each of those payments except during such time as he himself prevented Heinze from making then. If Heinze had deposited the amounts in court at the time of filing his counterclaim, no one would insist that' he must now pay interest on them; and under the authority of Christiansen v. Aldrich, supra, he was not required to make such deposit or tender, for the reason that, as Finlen denied the existence of the contract, such deposit or tender would have been useless. Not only did Finlen deny that any contract whatever was made, but he took the initiative, and commenced this action to recover possession of the property in controversy. So far as this record shows, the only thing which interposed and prevented Heinze from making these payments when they became due was Finlen’s own acts, and these bring the case within section 4280, above. This interference on Finlen’s part arose before either payment became due, and continued until the trial, so that now, having prevented such payments being made on time, he cannot ask interest by way of damages or compensation for the delay which he himself occasioned.
Affirmed.
I do not agree with all that is said in the majority opinion, nor do I concur in the result reached.
Under the Act of 1903 (Second Extraordinary Session of 1903, page 7, chapter 1), I think the rule to be that this court may not disturb the findings of the district court unless the evidence preponderates against them. (Bordeaux v. Bordeaux, 32 Mont. 159, 80 Pac. 6.) This view is supported by the weight of authority and reason, because, under the procedure which must be observed touching the taking of evidence by the trial court, and its reproduction in this court, we cannot on review have the advantage of seeing the witnesses and observing their manner while testifying. These are important elements, which this court cannot consider and weigh. In those states in which the evidence in equity cases is all presented in the form of depositions, these important elements of proof are not before the trial court. Therefore the appellate court can just as well try the case de novo and reach an independent conclusion. Under the statute the power of this court is limited merely to xeview. The findings of the trial court must therefore be treated as prima facie correct, at least.
I assume, also, for the purposes of this case, the proposition that a preponderance of evidence is sufficient to support a finding of any fact in a civil case. But these propositions do not conflict with another, especially applicable to cases for specific performance of parol contracts; that all the terms and conditions of the particular contract must be established by the evidence clearly and definitely, and if any of them are left in doubt or uncertainty, or if any part of the contract as set out, as a whole, still rests in treaty and requires further negotiation, it will not be specifically enforced.
Furthermore, I think the decree should, in any event, be so amended as to require the defendant to pay interest upon the installments of the purchase price from the time at which they respectively fell due, and that for the purpose of fixing these dates the cause should be remanded for further proof. The
These views may seem somewhat technical, but an action for specific performance of a parol contract proceeds and must be -sustained, if at all, upon grounds which are more or less techni■cal.
