The appellees sued out an attachment in chancery against the appеllant, a nonresident corpo *456 ration owning land in tlais state, for the purpose of rеcovering from the appellant the value of timber alleged to have been owned by the appellees and to have been cut down and appropriatеd by the appellant. A demurrer to the bill of complaint was overruled, and the case has been appealed to this court in order to settle the principles thereof.
The allegations of the bill are, in substance, as follows:
On January 28, 1904, the appellees owned certain land and ‘‘ conveyed to Leоnard H. Field all the pine timber then standing and being on the said lands, together with the right to cut and remоve the same at any time that said Field, his heirs or assigns, might desire within twenty years from the said 28th day of Jаnuary, 1904;” that Field’s interest in the timber came to the appellant by mesne conveyanсes. On June 30, 19T5, the appellees conveyed the land to Laurence Ladner by a deed reading, in part, as follows: “T convey and warrant to Laurence Ladner . . . the land described as follows. . . . All pine timber on the above-described land is reserved from this deed.” Laurence Ladner sold the land to Ear-vin Ladner, who, on March 19,1923, executed to the Fink-bine Lumber Trustees a deed to “all of the pine timber then growing, standing, lying, or being on” the land, with the right to cut аnd remove it within six years from the date of the deed. The Finkbine Lumber Trustees conveyed their interest in the timber to the appellant,, the Finkbine Lumber Company, which cut and removed the timber within six years from March 19, 1923', but after the expiration of the twenty years allowed; therefor in thе deed from the appellees to Leonard W. Field.
The appellant’s contentiоn is that the appellees’ right to the reversion of the timber remaining on the land after thе expiration of the twenty years given by them to Field within which to remove the timber, passed tо Ladner under the appellees’ deed conveying the land to him. The ground of this contеntion is. that the reservation of *457 the timber in the deed from the appellees to Ladnеr is void, for the reason that “Saucier did not own the timber and could not reserve the samе.”
The question for decision is one of no difficulty if a very elementary rule of conveyаncing is kept in view; i. e., a deed conveys only the property described therein and which it manifests an intention on the part of the grantor to convey. Under this rule it is wholly immaterial whether or not the appellees owned the timber when they conveyed the land to Lаdner, for in either event the reservation thereof in the deed excludes it from the description of the property conveyed, and also clearly manifests an intention on the part of the grantors not to convey it. The deed from the appellees to Ladner, under section 2817, Code 1906 (Hemingway’s 1927 Code, section 2473), embraces all of the five сommon-law covenants of warranty; and therefore two very good reasons appear for the right of the grantors to exclude the timber from the property convеyed by the deed;
(1) They did not then own the timber, and, had it been included in the property which the dеed purports to convey, their covenants of warranty would have been broken.
(2)' Undеr the deed by which the appellees conveyed the timber to Field, they had a pоssibility of reacquiring the timber by its reverting to them in the event it should not be cut and removed from the land within the time limited in the deed therefor.
Ladnier
v.
Ingram-Day Lumber Co.,
That the land was not owned by the appellees when the time limit in their deed to Field for the removal of the timber therefrom expired is of no consequence; for, as this court has repeatedly held, timber on land may bе owned by one person, and the land by another. It follows from the foregoing views that the timbеr had reverted to, and was owned by, the appellees when it vTas cut and appropriated by the appellant.
Affirmed and remanded, with leave to answer -within tliirty days after the filing of the mandate in the court below.
Affirmed and remanded.