MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.1356
II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.1357
III. FINDINGS OF FACT .1358
A. Undisputed Facts.1368
B. Disputed Facts.1359
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS.1360
*1355 A. Age Discrimination And Reductions In Force. 1360
1. Fink’s Federal Age Discrimination Claim. 1360
a. Administrative prerequisites to suit under the ADEA.1360
b. The analytical framework for claims of age discrimination.1361
e. The prima facie case under the ADEA in a reduction-in-force case.1363
d. Fink’s prima facie case and showing of pretext.1364
2. Age Discrimination Under Iowa Law.1366
B. Disability Discrimination.'..1367
1. The Origins Of The ADA.1368
2. Disability Discrimination Under The ADA.1371
a. Analytical framework for ADA claims .1373
b. The prima facie case under the ADA .1373
c. Fink’s prima facie case.1376
2. Elements Of A Disability Discrimination Claim Under Iowa Law.1377
a. Protected disability. 1378
b. Fink’s disability.;.1378
C. Retaliation For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim .1379
1. Recognition Of The Public Policy Exception Under Iowa Law. 1379
2. Discharge For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim.1.1381
D. Intentional Interference With Employment Contract.1382
1. Interference With A Contract.1382
2. Interference With Business Advantages Or Relations.1382
E. Breach Of Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing.1383
F. Implied Contract.1384
1. The implied contract exception to at-will employment.1385
2. Fink’s Implied Contract Claim.1386
G. Discrimination Based On Political Affiliation Or Opinions.1387
H. Fink’s Damages Claims .1387
a. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216 and Ch. 670 .1387
i. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216.'.1388
ii. Municipal immunity from punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 670_1388
b. Liability for liquidated damages under the ADEA.1390
c. Kitzman’s liability.1391
I. Immunity Of The Grundy County Board Of Supervisors.1393
1. Standards for quasi-judicial immunity.1393
2. Quasi-judicial immunity of elected boards.1395
3. The Board’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity.1398
V. CONCLUSION .1398
In this employment discrimination case, the discharged employee has proceeded in the now typical fashion by presenting a cornucopia of federal and state statutory claims and state common-law causes of action. The employer has also responded in kind with a bounty of defenses, including the familiar employer’s incantation that the plaintiff has failed to generate a prima facie case of discrimination or failed to allege a claim supportable in law or fact. These claims and defenses must, of course, be treated with proper consideration. However, in addition to these familiar issues in employment litigation, the employer has introduced novel issues of common-law and statutory immunity of municipal employers and officials and quasi-judicial immunity of a local elected governmental board, which acted as an appellate body reviewing the employee’s grievance arising from her discharge.
A former county employee has brought suit against her former supervisor, the county treasurer, as well as the county and the county board of supervisors alleging age and disability discrimination in violation of both federal and state law, plus state-law claims of retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim, intentional interference with an employment relationship, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of a covenant or implied contract to discharge only for good cause, and retaliation for political opinions or affiliations.
The county board of supervisors has moved for summary judgment on the ground that it has absolute quasi-judicial immunity, because it acted only in a judicial capacity in reviewing the county treasurer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff. All defendants have moved for summary judgment asserting that the plaintiff cannot make out the necessary *1356 prima facie case on her discrimination claims, and further on the ground that they have offered an unrebutted legitimate reason, a reduction in force (RIF), for the termination. Defendants also raise specific arguments that the remaining claims are unsupportable in either law or fact, and attacking plaintiffs assertions of liability and punitive or liquidated damages against them.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Beverly Fink filed her petition at law in this matter in the Iowa district court in and for Grundy County on April 28, 1993, and demanded jury trial of all of the issues presented. Counsel for defendants- entered an appearance in the state court proceedings on May 5,1993, and filed a notice of removal of this action to this federal court on May 10, 1993. Defendants answered the petition at law in state court on May 13,1993, then filed a copy of the answer in federal court as a supplement to their Rule 20 list of pleadings filed in state court. On May 26, 1993, defendants also filed a jury demand on all issues presented in the petition, now properly called a complaint.
Fink’s complaint is in eight counts each alleging violations of either federal or state law, or both, arising from her discharge from her position as a “motor vehicle specialist” in the Grundy County Treasurer’s Office on August 31, 1992, when she was 52 years old, after approximately twenty-five years of employment with the Treasurer’s Office. The defendants are Susan Kitzman, who was the Grundy County Treasurer and Fink’s supervisor, the Grundy County Board of Supervisors, and Grundy County, Iowa.
Count I of the complaint alleges that Fink was discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and similar provisions of Iowa’s Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code § 216.6. Count II alleges disability discrimination in violation of Iowa Code § 216.6, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Nov. 21,1991,105 Stat. 1071. This count asserts that Fink’s disability is carpal tunnel syndrome, for which she underwent surgery in January of 1992. Count III alleges retaliatory discharge as the result of filing a workers compensation claim in connection with Fink’s carpal tunnel syndrome. Count IV alleges intentional interference on the part of Kitzman with Fink’s employment relationship with Grundy County. Count V alleges that Fink’s termination was in breach of an implied in fact covenant of good faith and fair dealing which required that she be discharged only for good cause. Count VI alleges that Fink’s termination was in violation of an implied in law covenant or contract of good faith and fair dealing which required that Fink be discharged only for good cause. Count VII alleges that Fink’s discharge violated an implied unilateral contract based on an ordinance of Grundy County which required that Fink be discharged only for good cause. Count VIII, the final count of the complaint, alleges that Fink was discharged in violation of a Grundy County ordinance that prohibits any discrimination based upon political opinions or affiliations.
On July 18, 1994, the Grundy County Board of Supervisors filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that it was entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity on Fink’s claims. The Board argues that it acted in a judicial capacity in hearing Fink’s grievance about her termination, thus serving as a board of appeal on an administrative decision. Fink resisted that motion for summary judgment on August 1, 1994, but, by leave of court, did not file a brief in support of her resistance until September 23, 1994. The Grundy County Board of Supervisors filed a reply to Fink’s resistance August 4, 1994, however. In the interim, on August 1, 1994, all defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the claims in Fink’s complaint. Fink resisted both motions for summary judgment on September 6, 1994, and filed a brief in resistance to the motions for summary judgment on September 23, 1994. On February 1, 1995, Fink moved to add additional authorities to her brief in resistance to the motions for summary judgment.
On February 3,1995, this matter was reassigned to me following my appointment as a district judge for the U.S. District Court for *1357 the Northern District of Iowa on August 26, 1994. This matter is now fully submitted, the court enters its ruling on the motions for summary judgment.
II. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes “that summary judgment is a drastic remedy and must be exercised with extreme care to prevent taking genuine issues of fact away from juries.”
Wabun-Inini v. Sessions,
The standard for granting summary judgment is well established. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part:
Rule 56. Summary Judgment
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move for summary judgment in the party’s favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon _ The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the ajfida-vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(b) & (c) (emphasis added);
see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
Procedurally, the moving parties, here all defendants, Kitzman, Grundy County, and the Grundy County Board of Supervisors, bear “the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for their motion and identifying those portions of the record which show lack of a genuine issue.”
Hartnagel,
*1358
“When a moving party has carried its burden under
Rule
56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita,
In
Anderson, All
U.S. at 249,
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned that “summary judgment should seldom be used in employment-discrimination cases.”
Crawford v. Runyon,
III. FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Undisputed Facts
The record reveals that the following facts are not in dispute. In August of 1992, Fink, *1359 who was 52 years old, had been employed in the Grundy County Treasurer’s Office for approximately twenty-five years.' Although she had for some time been designated a deputy treasurer, in January of 1991, Fink and a coworker were redesignated as “Motor Vehicle Specialists” by the County Treasurer, defendant Kitzman.
Kitzman was first appointed to the post of County Treasurer on May 1,1989, over other applicants to fill the position temporarily, including Fink. Kitzman was subsequently elected to the position in November of 1990. It appears from the complaint that Fink was approached as a candidate to run against Kitzman in the next election, but Fink asserts that she did not intend to run for election to the Grundy County Treasurer’s position.
During her employment with the County, Fink suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome. She was off work for some days in late 1991, and underwent surgery for the condition in January of 1992, during which time she also missed some days of work. However, she returned to work, with the only restriction placed upon her activities that she not lift heavy objects. This restriction does not appear to have impeded her performance of her job. Fink applied for workers compensation benefits for her carpal tunnel syndrome on the ground that such a condition was work-related. Fink did eventually obtain some workers compensation benefits.
On August 31, 1992, Kitzman gave Fink notice of termination of her employment in the County Treasurer’s Office. Kitzman admits that prior to terminating Fink, she attempted to secure the voluntary retirement of the other “Motor Vehicle Specialist,” who was a few years older than Fink. Kitzman has always asserted that her decision to terminate Fink was because Kitzman believed that the Treasurer’s Office was overstaffed owing to declining workload, which in turn resulted from a decline in population in the county. However, Kitzman admits that she decided who to terminate and when that termination should take place within the space of about half-an-hour. Kitzman notified the Grundy County Board of Supervisors of her decision to terminate Kitzman. By statute, Kitzman did not need authority from the Board to terminate an employee, nor did she seek such approval. See Iowa Code Ch. 331. Fink’s position has since been eliminated by the Board and is no longer funded. No one was hired to replace Fink.
Fink appealed her dismissal to the Grundy County Board of Supervisors. The Board, following an adversarial proceeding at which Fink was represented by counsel, affirmed Kitzman’s decision to terminate Fink.
B. Disputed Facts
There is a considerable dispute of fact over the reason or reasons for Fink’s termination. Kitzman asserts that she decided to reduce staff, without any directive from the Board, because technological and administrative changes, and a drop in the County’s population, justified such a reduction. Kitzman states that she chose to terminate Fink in order to reduce staffing in her office, as opposed to other employees, some of whom were younger and less experienced that Fink, because of Fink’s attitude, as demonstrated by Fink’s decision to take a vacation during one of the busy periods in the year for the Treasurer’s Office, and because of complaints about Fink from members of the public who had business in the treasurer’s office. Kitzman does not assert that these grounds were “good cause” for termination, only that they are the reasons Fink was chosen out of the possible employees to be terminated. Kitzman asserts that the “good cause” for her decision to terminate Fink was the need to reduce staff.
Fink contends that Kitzman fired her because of her age, and because Kitzman perceived her to be disabled. Additionally, Fink contends that Kitzman fired her in retaliation for filing a workers compensation claim. Fink points to evidence that younger employees with fewer years of service were retained when she was terminated. She also points to Kitzman’s efforts to compel the only employee in the office older than Fink to retire as suggesting that Kitzman intended to remove older employees. Fink also asserts that Kitzman perceived her to be disabled because of her affliction with carpal tunnel syndrome. Fink states that Kitzman told *1360 her on more than one occasion not to attempt to get money out of the county for her carpal tunnel treatment. Kitzman counters that she did not know Fink ever obtained any money from the county, and, in fact, that it was her understanding that Fink’s worker’s compensation claim had been denied.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The court deems it most appropriate to address the motion for summary judgment filed by all of the defendants as to each of Fink’s claims seriatim. The court will then return to the question raised by the motion for summary judgment of defendant Grundy County Board of Supervisors, which is whether that body is entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial immunity for its actions in affirming Kitzman’s discharge of Fink. The court’s analysis of the motion for summary judgment filed by all of the defendants therefore begins with discussion of Fink’s age discrimination claims and defendants’ proffer of a legitimate reason, a reduction in force, or RIF, for their decision to terminate Fink.
A. Age Discrimination And Reductions In Force
Fink has brought her age discrimination claims under both federal law, specifically, the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and under Iowa state law, found in Iowa Code Ch. 216 (formerly chapter 601A). The analysis of an age discrimination in employment claim begins with examination of the goals and prerequisites for suit under the ADEA and determination of the proper allocation of the burdens of proof on such a claim. This course is particularly appropriate, as Iowa applies the analytical framework and standards articulated in federal cases to claims under chapter 216, a matter the court will address further below. The court will therefore examine Fink’s ADEA claim first, then turn to her state age discrimination claim.
1. Fink’s Federal Age Discrimination Claim
The ADEA’s goal is to “promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). Thus, the ADEA forbids employment discrimination against employees aged forty and older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a);
Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc.,
a. Administrative prerequisites to suit under the ADEA
The ADEA requires that within 180 days of the alleged unlawful conduct by an employer, the employee file a charge outlining the unlawful conduct with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982).
3
The EEOC then notifies the employer and seeks “to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.”
Id.
If the parties have not compromised after 60 days, the employee can file a civil suit under the ADEA.
Id. See also
*1361
Lorillard v. Pons,
b. The analytical framework for claims of age discrimination
The allocation of the burden of proof in ADEA cases has been held to be the same as in cases arising under Title VII of the Civil Eights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc.,
It is axiomatic that employment discrimination need not be proved by direct evidence, and indeed, that doing so is often impossible, because, as the Supreme Court has said, “There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”
Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Fin.
*1362
Corp.,
Under
McDonnell Douglas
and its progeny, the employment discrimination plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie
case of discrimination by producing evidence that would entitle the plaintiff to prevail unless contradicted and overcome by evidence produced by the defendant.
White v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
If a
prima facie
case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing evidence that the employer made the questioned employment decision for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.
White,
The Supreme Court has made clear that the ultimate inquiry is whether the employer intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
In two recent decisions, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered in more detail the plaintiff’s burden to show discriminatory intent when the employer has offered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
*1363
its actions.
See Lidge-Myrtil v. Deere & Co.,
[t]o survive summary judgment at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of evidence of some additional facts that would allow a jury to find that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretext and that the real reason for its action was intentional discrimination. St. Mary’s Honor Center, — U.S. at -,113 S.Ct. at 2747 . These additional facts may be limited solely to proof of pretext....
Krenik,
The court will therefore consider, if Fink presents an adequate
prima facie
ease, if she has also presented “additional facts” to rebut the defendants’ proffer of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her discharge sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to discriminatory intent. However, the finding of discriminatory intent is generally for the trier of fact.
Burger v. McGilley Memorial Chapels, Inc.,
c. The prima facie case under the ADEA in a reduction-in-force case
The importance of the
prima facie
showing is that it creates the inference that the employer terminated the plaintiff for an impermissible reason.
Hardin,
However, as this case involves a discharge in the context of a purported reduction in force, a further modification of the
prima facie
case is necessary. In the context of a reduction in force, the fourth element of the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case cannot be shown because the position is not filled by another or left open, but eliminated or combined with another position.
Hardin,
In most reduction in force cases,
the evidence generally demonstrates that the company had some kind of plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs. These plans generally include objective criteria by which to determine which jobs will be eliminated and often include objective evidence of a business decline.
Bashara,
However, on its most recent contact with this issue in
Hardin,
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that “[w]hen a company’s decision to reduce its workforce is due to the exercise of its business judgment it need not provide evidence of financial distress to make it a ‘legitimate’ RIF.”
Hardin,
[A] company does not need to provide objective criteria for determining who should be discharged to make the RIF “legitimate.” Whether criteria [are] provided does not overcome the fact that the company made a business decision to reduce its workforce and therefore had a legitimate reason for terminating qualified employees.
Hardin,
1) [the plaintiff] was at least forty years old at the time of termination; 2) [the plaintiffs] job performance met the employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) [the plaintiff] was terminated despite his performance; 4) [the plaintiffs] job continued to exist in its various parts; and 5) [the plaintiffs] age was a determining factor in defendants actions.
Id.; Bashara,
d. Fink’s prima facie case and showing of pretext
The court concludes that Fink has, at the least, generated a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her prima facie case of age discrimination in this reduction-in-force case. Plaintiff was within the protected age group at the time of her termination. Kitzman, while admitting that Fink’s performance entered into her decision to terminate her instead of other employees,' repeatedly asserts in her motion for summary judgment and supporting brief that she did not fire Fink for poor performance. Thus, at a minimum, there is a genuine issue of material fact that Fink was performing at a level *1365 that met her employer’s legitimate expectations. Fink was indeed terminated.
As to the fourth element, whether Fink’s job continued in its various parts, defendants argue that Fink’s job was entirely “gone.” Plainly, this is not so. Defendants even concede as much when they agree that as the result of Fink’s termination, the remaining employees would simply have had more to do. The court is not persuaded that Fink’s job had to carry with it some unique duties for it to continue in its various parts after her termination. It is sufficient, the court believes, that the duties Fink previously performed, even if at the time she performed them other employees performed identical duties, still had to be done by someone after Fink’s termination, either by increasing the identical workload on remaining employees, or by assigning some or all of Fink’s workload as additional assignments to an employee who had not previously performed those duties.
This issue was also raised in the
Hardin
decision. In that case, the plaintiff presented evidence that other engineers were transferred into the research and development division of the company around the same time as the plaintiff was dismissed and that there were several engineers within the division who held the same job title and had virtually the same duties and responsibilities as the plaintiff.
Hardin,
Thus, the only sticking point on Fink’s
prima facie
case is whether or not she has shown “additional evidence” that age was a factor in her discharge under the RIF.
Hardin,
[Plaintiff] first asserts that the cursory manner in which [the decision-maker] determined who to discharge suggests [the company] terminated him for an improper reason. [The decision-maker] acknowledged that he was free to terminate any two employees within his department from his lowest paid employees (custodial workers) to his highest paid employees. [The decision-maker] made his decision to fire [the plaintiff] and [another employee] after a thirty minute discussion with [his immediate subordinate]. [The decision-maker] found that [the plaintiff] and [the other employee] were the obvious persons to be terminated as “[t]hey had the poorest performance record, they were making the least contribution, they seemed to be the worst fit in the department, they had the least interpersonal skills, [and] they were not making a contribution to the department sufficiently to choose someone else.”
[The decision-maker] made these conclusions without consulting with [the plaintiffs] direct supervisor and without reviewing [the plaintiffs] or any other employee’s personnel records. The only time [the decision-maker] had reviewed employee records was when he reviewed portions of [the plaintiffs] and other department employee’s personnel files upon being transferred to R & D in September of 1988.
In the past, we have looked to an employer’s method of determining which employees to discharge for evidence of possible discriminatory intent. See Bashara,26 F.3d at 825 ; Hillebrand,827 F.2d at 367 . See also Christie v. Foremost Ins. Co.,785 F.2d 584 , 587 (7th Cir.1986) (the method used by the defendant might “show that the defendant was not really trying to decide which employee had greater poten *1366 tial”). [The decision-maker’s] stated objective was to determine which two employees had the least potential and provided the least to the department. [The decision-maker’s] reliance on incomplete research and his failure to even consider other employees, raises the question whether [the decision-maker] was actually trying to determine which two employees had the least potential and therefore, raises a material issue of fact whether his stated reasons for choosing Hardin are pretextual.
Hardin,
In the present case, Kitzman has acknowledged that there was no directive from the board of supervisors for reducing the workforce, nor a general plan for undertaking such a reduction, only her own view that the office was overstaffed. However, under Hardin, Kitzman’s “business judgment” that her office was overstaffed is sufficient to make a reduction in force legitimate even without evidence of financial distress or some kind of plan to reduce expenses by eliminating jobs involving objective criteria by which to determine which jobs will be eliminated and without objective evidence of a business decline.
Even if Kitzman’s reduction in force was legitimate, the court finds that there is a genuine issue of material fact generated in the record concerning the fifth element of Fink’s prima facie case, her showing that age was a determining factor, precluding summary judgment. Fink argues that Kitz-man made a spur of the moment decision to terminate her in an angry reaction to Fink’s taking vacation time during a busy period in the Treasurer’s Office. Kitzman argues that she decided to terminate Fink on the basis of her work performance, poor attitude, complaints from persons with business in the Treasurer’s Office, and her decision to take time off at the busiest time of the year. These allegations and counterallegations are similar to those raised in Hardin. In the present case, Kitzman retained employees with a shorter period of service and less experience with the range of tasks within the Treasurer’s Office. In this case, as in Hardin, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact generated by the hastiness of Kitzman’s discharge decision and the lack of consideration of other employees for discharge.
Kitzman’s position is not enhanced by her statement that she first attempted to obtain the voluntary retirement of an employee even older than Fink. Her targeting of another, even older employee, as someone she urged to retire before terminating Fink suggests an age discriminatory animus, because in both that employee’s case and in Finks, it appears from the record that Kitzman did not consider terminating younger employees with fewer years of service and less experience in the office prior to urging the one employee to retire and terminating the other. There is therefore some additional showing that age was a factor in Kitzman’s decisions regarding staffing of her office and in particular in her decision to terminate Fink. Furthermore, as in Hardin, this same evidence generates a genuine issue of material fact that Kitzman’s proffered reasons are pretex-tual. Defendants are therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s age discrimination claim under the ADEA. The court turns next to consideration of Fink’s state-law age discrimination claim.
2. Age Discrimination Under Iowa Law
In the past, the Iowa Supreme Court has applied federal principles and analytical framework to civil rights cases under Iowa Code Ch. 216.
Landals v. George A. Rolfes Co.,
Membership in the protected class is age-neutral under Iowa Code Ch. 216, which
*1367
prohibits discrimination in employment “because of age” of an employee, with the exception that under Iowa Code § 216.6(8), persons under eighteen years of age are not covered if they are not considered by law to be adults, and under Iowa Code § 216.6(6), the employee is over forty-five years of age in an apprenticeship program.
Hulme,
Under Iowa’s age discrimination law, Iowa Code Ch. 216, the plaintiff establishes a
prima facie
ease of age discrimination if the plaintiff shows that he or she is a member of the protected age group, the plaintiff was qualified for the job he or she was performing, the plaintiff was discharged, and the plaintiff was replaced by a younger person who had comparable or lesser qualifications.
Landals,
the employee cannot rely solely on termination to establish a prima facie case when an employer makes cutbacks due to economic necessity. Holley v. Sanyo Mfg., Inc.,771 F.2d 1161 , 1165 (8th Cir.1985). Nor is it sufficient for an employee to show only that she was the victim of a cutback in the labor force necessitated by depressed economic conditions and that the job was combined into the duties of a younger employee to meet the requirements of a prima facie case. Sahadi v. Reynolds Chemical,636 F.2d 1116 , 1117 (6th Cir.1980). The plaintiff must come forward with additional evidence that age was a factor in her termination. Duffy [v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp.], 738 F.2d [1393,] 1395 [ (3d Cir.), cert. denied,469 U.S. 1087 ,105 S.Ct. 592 ,83 L.Ed.2d 702 (1984) ].
Wing v. Iowa Lutheran Hasp.,
In the present case, Fink is a member of the protected class under the Iowa age discrimination statute. The court also recognizes that Fink at least arguably has shown the other elements of his prima facie case. She was qualified for her position in the Treasurer’s Office, she was discharged, and following her discharge, younger employees with less time on the job were retained.
The court therefore turns to the next stage in the analysis of Fink’s state-law age discrimination claim, which, as under federal law, is consideration of the defendant’s proffered reasons for the discharge and attempts of the plaintiff to rebut that reason as pretextual. The framework for that analysis under Iowa law is the same as under federal law.
Landals,
B. Disability Discrimination
As with her age discrimination claim, Fink has brought her disability discrimination claims under both federal and state law. Her federal disability discrimination claim is based on the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. 102-166, Nov. 21, 1991, 105 Stat. 1071. Her state-law disability claim is brought pursuant to Iowa Code Ch. 216. The court will consider the federal claim first, then turn to the state-law claim.
*1368 1. The Origins Of The ADA
The ADA provides that no employer “shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to ... the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees.... ” 42 U.S.C. § 12112. This language of the ADA is substantially identical to that of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which forbids discrimination “by reason of his handicap.”
Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., Inc.,
The ADA and its attendant regulations were enacted, in part, to address perceived inadequacies in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
Helen L. v. DiDario,
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Because Congress found further that public officials historically have been among the major perpetrators of segregated services in this country,
see
Timothy M. Cook,
The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Move To Integration,
64 Temp. L.Rev. 393, 400, 416 (identifying state laws mandating segregation of persons with disabilities and suggesting an analogy with the “Jim Crow laws” mandating racial discrimination), Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, incorporates the “non-discrimination principles” of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but extends them to state and local governments.
Helen L.,
[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
42 U.S.C. § 12132.
The ADA was not the first attempt to address the limitations of existing legislation to eradicate discrimination on the basis of disabilities. Periodically through the mid-1980s there had been attempts to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include people with disabilities. See, e.g., H.R. 370, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). In 1983, the United States Commission of Civil Rights observed that “[hjandicap discrimination and, as a result, its remedies differ in important ways from other types of discrimination and their remedies,” therefore disability rights laws explicitly modelled on prior civil rights statutes were not necessarily effective. U.S. Comm’n On Civil Rights, ACCOmmodating The SpectRum of Individual Abilities 48, 149 (1983). A federal judge had a more blunt assessment:
[T]he Title VI and Title IX models were not automatically adaptable to the problem of discrimination against the handicapped, but involved a very different undertaking.
*1369 Indeed, attempting to fit the problem of discrimination against the handicapped into the model remedy for race discrimination is akin to fitting a square peg into a round hole....
Garrity v. Gallen,
Problems involved in trying to transfer principles and legal analysis developed in race and sex discrimination cases wholesale to disability discrimination were interwoven with other difficulties and shortcomings of disability nondiscrimination statutes prior to the ADA. Experience with the application of such prior statutes, including section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, uncovered or highlighted weaknesses of such laws arising from their statutory language, the limited extent of their coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and erratic judicial interpretations. Legal commentators have extensively described and lamented the flaws in the working, interpretation, and implementation of federal disability nondiscrimination statutes prior to the ADA.
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis And Implications Of A Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 413, 430-31 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
In enacting the ADA, Congress found that “[h]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and ... such forms of discrimination ... continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2). Helen L., 46 F.3d 325, 332. The purpose of the ADA in light of this history of discrimination was summarized by Congressman Dellums:
The history of different, separate, and unequal treatment of persons with disabilities, especially those with severe disabilities, could not be clearer. That history is in fact a stark reminder of the prejudice and misunderstanding that has characterized the treatment of minority citizens. This disparate treatment establishes an abundant factual predicáte for the relief granted by [the ADA], The Americans With Disabilities Act is a plenary civil rights statute designed to halt all practices that segregate persons with disabilities and those which treat them inferior [sic] or differently. By enacting the ADA, we are making a conscious decision to reverse a sad legacy of segregation and degradation.
136 Cong.Rec. H2599 (daily ed. May 22, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dellums). Almost ten years earlier, a disabled legal scholar and disability rights advocate had written that
[t]he history of society’s formal methods for dealing with handicapped people can be summed up in two words: segregation and inequality. Individuals with handicapping conditions have faced an almost universal conspiracy to shunt them aside from the mainstream of society and to deny them an equal share of benefits and opportunities available to others.... At every juncture, the handicapped person has met with attempts to “push” him or her aside and to withhold that which is taken for granted from other persons.
Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Legal Rights Of HANDICAPPED PERSONS: CASES, MATERIALS, And Text 51 (1980).
Before passing the ADA, Congress conducted fourteen hearings at the Capitol, and another sixty-three field hearings, and reviewed hundreds of discrimination diaries submitted for the legislative record by persons with disabilities. AMERICANS With Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on S.933 Before the Senate Comm, on Labor and Human Resources and the Subgomm. on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (testimony of Justin Dar, Chairman of Task Force on Rights and Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities). Congress was confronted with testimony that
[b]y almost any definition, Americans with disabilities are uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged. They are much poorer, much less well educated and have much less social life, have fewer amenities and have a lower level of self-satisfaction than other Americans.
Senate Subcomm. on the Handioapped, S. Hrg. 166, pt. 2, at 9 (1987) (statement of
*1370
Humphrey Taylor); quoted in S.Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989); also quoted in H.R.Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31 (1990), 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 267, 313. Congress found that its hearings, investigations, and other sources revealed severe prejudice and discrimination towards disabled persons persisted in this country: Persons with disabilities, especially those with severe, noticeable disabilities, were told outright that they had been excluded because others would fee uncomfortable around them.
See, e.g.,
S.Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989), and H.R.Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 30 (1990) (a New Jersey zoo keeper refused to admit children with Down’s syndrome because he feared they would upset the chimpanzees; and, from remarks of Rep. Vanik, citing as an example of discrimination on the basis of disability from
Alexander v. Choate,
Various draft bills to combat disability discrimination were introduced in 1988, and Congressional hearings followed. H.R. 4498, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong.Rec. E1307 (daily ed. April 29, 1988); S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 Cong.Rec. S5110 (daily ed. April 28, 1988). A revised ADA bill was introduced in the 101st Congress on May 9, 1989. S. 933, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong.Rec. S4978 (daily ed. May 9, 1989); H.R. 2273, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 Cong. Rec. H1690 (daily ed. May 9, 1989). The House and Senate versions were eventually reported out of committees, the House version was passed on May 22,1990, by a vote of 403 to 20. 136 Cong.Rec. H2638 (daily ed. May 22, 1990). Following conferences on differences between the House and Senate versions, the House approved the final version of the bill by a vote of 377 to 28 on July 12, 1990, 136 Cong.Rec. H4629 (daily ed. July 12, 1990), and the following day the Senate passed the ADA by a vote of 91 to 6. 136 Cong.Rec. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
In the final form of the ADA, Congress concluded that “[i]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination-” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5).
Helen L.,
2. Disability Discrimination Under The ADA
Under the ADA, “disability” is broadly defined to include not only “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [the disabled] individual,” but also “ha[ving] a record of such an impairment,” or the state of “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A), (B), (C);
Vande Zande,
Those regulations indicate that the question of whether an impairment is substantially limiting turns on ‘(1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the [actual or expected] permanent or long-term impact ... of, or resulting from, the impairment.’ 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. at 403 (1992).
Cook v. State of R.I. Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals,
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found the third prohibition, that the employer regards the employee as disabled, fits with the goals of the ADA, because “[m]any such impairments are not in fact disabling but are believed to be so, and the people having them may be denied employment or otherwise shunned as a consequence.”
Vande Zande,
[t]he Fourth Circuit held that the employer did not regard the employee as handicapped simply because it found that he could not meet the demands of this particular job. “The statutory reference to a substantial limitation indicates instead that an employer regards an employee as handicapped in his or her ability to work by finding the employee’s impairment to foreclose generally the type of employment involved.”
Chandler, 2
F.3d at 1392 (quoting
Forrisi,
[a]n employer’s belief that an employee is unable to perform one task with an adequate safety margin does not establish per se that the employer regards the employee as having a substantial limitation on [the employee’s] ability to work in general.
Id. at 1393.
The ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8);
see White v. York Int’l Corp.,
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has formulated a two-pronged test of whether a person is “qualified” within the meaning of the ADA:
First, we must determine whether the individual could perform the essential functions of the job, i.e., functions that bear more than a marginal relationship to the job at issue. Second, if (but only if) we conclude that the individual is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, we must determine whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would enable [the individual] to perform those functions.
Chandler,
There are, of course, limits upon what accommodation is required under the ADA:
The ADA does not, for example, necessarily insulate from discharge someone whose underlying disability causes him to be frequently drunk on the job. The ADA is not a job insurance policy, but rather a congressional scheme for correcting illegitimate inequities the disabled face. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a).
Hedberg,
To “accommodate” a disability is to make some change that will enable the disabled person to work. An unrelated, ineffica-cious change would not be an accommodation of the disability at all. So “reasonable” may be intended to qualify (in the sense of weaken) “accommodation,” in just the same way that if one requires a “reasonable effort” of someone this means less than the maximum possible effort.... It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to enable a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, or even that an accommo *1373 dation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit however slightly. But, at the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit. Even if an employer is so large or wealthy ... that it may not be able to plead “undue hardship,” it would not be required to expend enormous sums in order to bring about a trivial improvement in the life of a disabled employee....
[One could argue that] the function of the “undue hardship” safe harbor, like the “failing company” defense in antitrust liability ... is to excuse compliance by a firm that is financially distressed, even though the cost of the accommodation to the firm might be less than the benefit to disabled employees.
[However, t]his interpretation of “undue hardship” is not inevitable — in fact probably is incorrect. It is a defined term in the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the definition is “an action requiring significant difficulty or expense,” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
Vande Zande,
The conclusions of the court in Vande Zande concerning the extent of the required accommodation are reinforced by the legislative history of the ADA itself on this point. The report of the House Committee on Education and Labor states:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison,432 U.S. 63 ,97 S.Ct. 2264 ,53 L.Ed.2d 113 (1977), are not applicable to this legislation. In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a de minimis cost for the employer. By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of “requiring significant difficulty or expense” on the part of the employer, in light of the factors noted in the statute — i.e., a significantly higher standard than that articulated in Hardi-son. This higher standard is necessary in light of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaningful employment opportunities for people with disabilities.
H.R.Rep. No. 101-485,101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 68 (1990), 1990 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 350; see also H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 40 (1990); S.Rep. No. 101-116,101st Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1989).
a. Analytical framework for ADA claims
To qualify for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish (1) that he or she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he or she is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation (which the plaintiff must describe), he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the employer terminated the plaintiff “because of’ the plaintiff’s disability.
White,
b. The prima facie case under the ADA
Although courts have applied the
McDonnell Douglas
framework with some consisten
*1374
cy, this court finds that the circuit courts of appeals have been somewhat reluctant to articulate the proper
prima facie
case for ADA claims with which to begin the analysis. In
Hedberg,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered, without deciding,
7
the elements of a
prima facie
case under the ADA.
Hedberg,
The court concluded first that where the employer did not know of the plaintiffs disabilities, the employer could not have discharged the plaintiff “because of’ the disability.
Id.
at 932. The court in
Hedberg
identified a number of courts that had come to similar conclusions under the ADA or analogous statutes designed to prevent disability discrimination.
Id.; see also Landefeld v. Marion General Hosp., Inc.,
The court in Hedberg also concluded that
Where disabilities are not obvious, it may be that part of the plaintiffs prima facie case would be to demonstrate knowledge of the disability on the employer’s part, as is necessary for Title VII religious discrimination. See Beasley [v. Health Care Serv. Corp.], 940 F.2d [1085,] 1088 [(7th Cir.1991)]; Redmond [v. GAF Corp.], 574 F.2d [897,] 901-02 [(7th Cir.1978) ]. All we decide today, however, is that where there is no genuine issue that an employer did not know of an employee’s disability when it decided to fire him, the employee cannot make out a case of discriminatory discharge.
Hedberg,
However, finding themselves in the quandary of being left without precise guidance from the circuit courts of appeals articulating
*1375
the propér
prima facie
ease for an ADA plaintiff, the district courts have hit upon two possible formulations, as demonstrated by a sampling of recent ADA decisions. In one group are those courts that apply a
prima facie
case that is indistinguishable from the elements of an ADA case as described above: a plaintiff must establish (1) that he or she is a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he or she is qualified, that is, with or without reasonable accommodation (which the plaintiff must describe), he or she is able to perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) that the employer terminated the plaintiff “because of’ the plaintiffs disability.
See, e.g., Ricks v. Xerox Corp.,
This court agrees with those decisions holding that the proper prima facie case under the ADA is that most closely resembling the prima facie showing required for other forms of employment discrimination: the plaintiff need not show at the prima facie case phase that he or she was terminated “because of’ a disability. Rather, the plaintiff need only make a showing that gives rise to an inference of discrimination on the basis of disability. Hence, the plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an adverse employment decision, and that plaintiff was replaced by a non-disabled person, one with a lesser disability, or one whose disability is more easily accommodated, or the plaintiff was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees, those with lesser disabilities, or those whose disabilities are more easily accommodated.
The court admits that no other authority has included in its formulation of the
prima facie
case under the ADA the comparison of the plaintiff with persons with lesser or more easily accommodated disabilities. However, the court does not believe that the protections of the ADA come into play only if the disabled plaintiff was replaced by or treated less favorably than a reore-disabled person, just as in an ADEA case, it is not necessary that the plaintiff be replaced with a person from outside the protected class, only that the plaintiff be replaced by a
younger
person.
Rinehart,
One court, confronted as is this court with an ADA claim in a reduction-in-force context, found that the modifications in the
prima, facie
case for such a scenario, discussed extensively above in reference to Fink’s ADEA claim, were also applicable to an ADA claim.
Aucutt,
c. Fink’s prima facie case
Fink argues that she was “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA because she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, had a record of that affliction, and, further, was regarded by Kitzman as being disabled. The court has unearthed only a few cases in which a plaintiff based a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA upon affliction with carpal tunnel syndrome. Some of these cases are not of assistance on the issues before the court here.
Lintemuth v. Saturn Corporation,
Of more interest are two other decisions. In
McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc.,
In an unpublished opinion, another court concluded that a plaintiff who could no longer use a keyboard at all as the result of carpal tunnel injury no longer was a “qualified individual” because use of the keyboard was and “essential function” of his job.
Feliberty v. Kemper Corp.,
In the present case, the court finds that Fink cannot meet the first element of her prima facie case, whichever formulation is used, because she cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The record suggests, at most, that Fink had a lifting restriction as the result of her carpal tunnel syndrome, but that she was not limited in any other way. The record does not demonstrate a genuine issue of fact that the lifting restriction substantially limited any major activity, or even that it impaired Fink’s job performance. The record also demonstrates that Fink was able to, and did, perform all of the essential functions of her employment without any accommodation. Nor has Fink presented any evidence that the lifting restriction restricted any particular function of her present job or restricted her overall employment opportunities. Fink’s evidence that her employer regarded her as being impaired is also insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact on the question. At most, Fink has shown that Kitzman was aware that Fink had carpal tunnel syndrome, and had missed work for surgery to improve that condition. After her return to work, Fink asserts that she was compelled to work overtime to make up for missed work, but this does not indicate that Kitzman considered her disabled; if anything, it indicates that Kitzman did not consider that Fink’s condition prevented her from performing any of the essential functions of her job.
Furthermore, the court finds that consideration of the regulations promulgated under the ADA show that Fink has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630. The nature and severity of her condition are, according to her own evidence, slight. She has offered no evidence whatsoever as to whether her condition can be expected to improve, continue, or deteriorate, and also has failed to present any evidence that her condition will have any actual or expected long-term impact on her life or employment prospects. In these circumstances, the court concludes that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s disability discrimination claim under the ADA for failure to establish a prima facie case.
The court is by no means saying that carpal tunnel syndrome cannot be the basis for a protected disability under the ADA. The court has no doubt that there are people sufficiently impaired by carpal tunnel syndrome to qualify as “disabled” persons under the ADA, and would, on a proper factual showing, find that the ADA provided them with protection from discrimination on the basis of their disability. However, such a factual showing has not been made in this case.
2. Elements Of A Disability Discrimination Claim Under Iowa Law
Fink has also alleged disability discrimination in violation of Iowa Code Ch. 216. Iowa Code § 216.6 (formerly § 601A.6) makes it an unfair or discriminatory employment practice to discharge any employee “because of’ a disability “unless based upon the nature of the occupation.” Iowa Code § 216.6;
Sierra v. Employment Appeal Bd.,
(1) that the employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that the employee was qualified to retain the job; (3) the employee was terminated; and (4) it is more likely than not that the termination was based on an impermissible consideration.
Miller v. Sioux Gateway Fire Dep’t,
a. Protected disability
The threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff can show that he or she is a disabled person subject to protection under Iowa Code § 216.6.
Miller,
b. Fink’s disability
For the same reasons Fink was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA, *1379 she is not “disabled” within the meaning of Iowa Code Ch. 216. Fink has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that her carpal tunnel injury substantially limited any major activity, or even that it impaired Fink’s job performance. Furthermore, nothing in the record raises a genuine issue of material fact that Fink is disqualified from a wide range of other available jobs. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s claim of disability discrimination brought pursuant to Iowa Code Ch. 216.
C. Retaliation For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim
Fink’s third claim is that she was discharged in violation of public policy for filing a workers compensation claim. Defendants argue that there is no evidence that Fink was discharged for filing a workers compensation claim. They assert that when Kitzman terminated Fink, although she knew Fink had filed a workers compensation claim alleging that her carpal tunnel syndrome was work-related, Kitzman understood that Fink’s claim had been denied. Defendants assert that Fink was terminated only for the reasons Fink gave, none of which violate public policy. Fink, on the other hand, asserts that she was told directly by Kitzman not to file a workers compensation claim or to try to get money from the county for her carpal tunnel affliction.
1. Recognition Of The Public Policg Exception Under Iowa Law
The Iowa Supreme Court was slow to recognize a cause of action for the wrongful discharge of an at-will employee, instead relying on the general rule that an at-will employee may be terminated at any time, for any reason.
See Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc.,
[t]his court has never expressly recognized a public policy exception [to the employment at will doctrine], although we recently noted its increasing acceptance in other jurisdictions. [Citations omitted].
While we hinted in Abrisz that, under proper circumstances, we would recognize a common-law claim for a discharge violating public policy, we did not apply it there because the facts did not establish such a violation. We observed, moreover, that “[c]ourts should not declare conduct viola-tive of public policy unless it is clearly so.” Abrisz,270 N.W.2d at 456 . It has been observed, in fact, that successful common-law claims for wrongful discharge have been based in large part on violations of independent statutory policy, not those established by court decisions. See Note, Protecting Ah-Will Employees [Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith], 93 Harv.L.Rev. at 1822-23.
Northrup v. Farmland Indus., Inc.,
*1380
It was not until 1988 that the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a cause of action for discharge that frustrates a well-recognized and defined public policy of the state in the case of
Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., Inc.,
As the law now stands in Iowa, the general rule is still that an at-will employee may be discharged at any time, for any reason, or no reason at all.
Borschel v. City of Perry,
Under the public policy exception, the Iowa Supreme Court has recognized causes of action for tortious discharge where an employer’s retaliatory discharge would conflict with certain legislatively declared goals.
Lara,
The legislature may explicitly prohibit the discharge of an employee who acts in accordance with a statutory right or duty. See, e.g., Iowa Code eh. 216 (1993) (civil rights statute transferred from Iowa Code eh. 601A). Discharge of an employee because of age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion, or disability is an unfair employment practice. Iowa Code § 216.6. Remedies are provided employees who are discharged in violation of the statute. See Iowa Code § 216.15. Our civil rights statute, however, preempts an employee’s claim that the discharge was in violation of public policy when the claim is premised on discriminatory acts. Hamilton v. First Baptist Elderly Hous. Found.,436 N.W.2d 336 , 341-42 (Iowa 1989).
Borschel,
In the absence of an express prohibition, the court of appeals found an implied cause of action for wrongful termination when the reason for discharge is the employee’s failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment. Wilcox v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc.,458 N.W.2d 870 , 872 (Iowa App.1990). The court of appeals found that the violation of a statute prohibiting an employer from requiring an employee to take a polygraph examination was a violation of public policy, thus a private cause of action existed. Id. at 872. At the time the claim arose the statute did not expressly allow for a cause of action. This statute was later amended to so provide. Id.
Also we have found an implied prohibition against retaliatory discharge based on an employee’s exercise of a right conferred by a clearly articulated legislative enactment. See Lara v. Thomas,512 N.W.2d 777 , 780 (Iowa 1994) (discharge in retaliation for filing partial unemployment claim); Niblo v. Parr Mfg., Inc.,445 N.W.2d 351 , 353 (Iowa 1989) (employee discharged because she threatened to file a workers’ compensation claim); Springer [I],429 N.W.2d at 560 (cause of action exists when the employee’s discharge serves to frustrate the public policy expressed in the workers’ compensation statute).
Borschel,
2.Discharge For Filing A Workers Compensation Claim
The case in which the Iowa Supreme Court first recognized a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine was in fact a case in which the plaintiff claimed to have been discharged for filing a workers compensation claim.
Springer I,
Plaintiff must prove all of the following propositions:
1. Plaintiff was an employee of defendant.
2. Defendant discharged plaintiff from employment.
3. Defendant discharged plaintiff because she filed a workers compensation claim.
4. The discharge was a proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff.
5. The nature and extent of the damage. If the plaintiff has failed to prove any of these propositions, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages. If the plaintiff has proven all of these propositions, then the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
Springer II,
*1382 In the present ease, the court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact on some of the elements of Fink’s retaliation claim. Defendants concede that Fink can demonstrate the first two elements, employment and discharge. They argue, however, that she cannot show the third element, discharge because she filed a workers compensation claim. The court does not agree. Fink has produced sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment that Kitzman threatened her not to file a workers compensation claim, told her the county would not pay for her treatment, and told her she doubted that Fink’s condition was work-related. These statements roughly parallel those found sufficient for a jury to conclude that the plaintiff had been fired for filing a workers compensation claim in Niblo. The defendants have succeeded in creating a controversy as to whether Kitzman or anyone else expressed antagonism towards Kitzman for filing a workers compensation claim, but have failed to prove that Kitzman did not make such statements. A genuine issue of material fact therefore exists precluding summary judgment against Fink on her retaliation claim.
D. Intentional Interference With Employment Contract
Fink’s next claim is that Kitzman intentionally interfered with her employment contract with the County. Leaving aside, for the moment, the question of whether or not Fink even had a contract governing her employment relationship with the County, the court finds that Kitzman could not have interfered with such a relationship as the tort is formulated under Iowa law.
1. Interference With A Contract
The Iowa formulation of the tort of intentional interference with performance of a contract by a third person is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977):
One [Kitzman] who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another [Fink] and a third person [Grundy County] by inducing or otherwise causing the third person [Grundy County] not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other [Fink] for pecuniary loss resulting to the other [Fink] from the failure of the third person [Grundy County] to perform the contract.
Grahek v. Voluntary Hosp. Co-op.,
This tort is not committed by parties to the contract; the tortfeasor must interfere with a contract between another and a third person. Grahek, supra, at 35. The tort plainly requires that a third party, who is a party to the underlying contract, be induced or caused to act by the alleged tortfeasor, who must be a stranger to the contract. Id. In the present case, Fink has alleged that Kitzman, the Grundy County Treasurer and her superior in her employment with the County Treasurer’s Office, interfered with Fink’s employment with the County. However, under state law, only the county treasurer can hire or fire employees in the Treasurer’s Office. Therefore Kitzman, as the representative of the County controlling Fink’s employment -with the county, could not interfere with a contract between Fink and the County. Fink therefore cannot pursue a claim of tortious interference with a contract.
2. Interference With Business Advantages Or Relations
Unlike tortious interference with a contract, the tort of interference with business relations or advantages does not require a showing that a contract existed between the plaintiff and another.
Toney v. Casey’s General Stores, Inc.,
1. The plaintiff had a prospective [contract or business relationship] with a [third person].
2. The defendant knew of the prospective relationship.
3. The defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the relationship by [set forth the particulars supported by the evidence].
4. a. The interference caused [the third person] not [to enter into or continue] the relationship [or]
b. The interference prevented the plaintiff from [entering or continuing] the relationship.
5. The amount of damage.
Iowa Civil Jury Instructions, 1200.2;
see generally, Nesler v. Fisher & Co., Inc.,
E. Breach Of Covenant Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing
There is some overlap among Fink’s state-law claims of implied covenants or contracts establishing a good cause requirement for her termination. Counts V, VI, and VII each assert that the defendants’ termination of her employment runs afoul of an implied obligation not to do so except for good cause. Fink’s state-law claims of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, on the basis that such a covenant was implied-in-faet (Count V), or implied-in-law (Count VI), may be disposed of briefly. Defendants correctly state that the Iowa Supreme Court has never recognized such a cause of action in an employment context.
Porter v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l., Inc.,
*1384 [t]he doctrine stems from the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing recognized in all contracts. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981). Applied in the employment context, an employee proving a prima facie case of unjust termination could shift to the employer the burden of proving good faith as a defense. The classic case invoking such a duty of good faith would be the discharge of a thirty-year employee six months before a pension vests, or the dismissal of an employee for spurning the affections of a co-worker.
Only a small handful of states have adopted the doctrine. Although Fogel suggests we adopt the action as a tort, four of the five states that recognize the covenant treat it as a contract-based action. New Hampshire, the leading state recognizing the covenant of good faith, has since limited the action to dismissals that are in violation of public policy.
The majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the covenant have unequivocally rejected it.
Fogel,
In
Fogel,
the court’s rejection of the cause of action was in part because the facts in the record simply did not compel consideration of the claim.
Fogel,
In the present case, the court sees no reason to consider a cause of action specifically rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court on a number of occasions. Although there has been a suggestion of a discharge in violation of public policy, thus providing some basis for the claim under the New Hampshire formulation of the tort,
Fogel,
F. Implied Contract
Fink’s claim in Count VII, that she was terminated in violation of an implied unilateral contract requiring that she only be discharged for good cause, requires the court to return to the second exception Iowa law recognizes to the employment at-will doctrine.
13
Although the employment at-will doctrine allows termination of an at-will employee for any reason, an exception to the doctrine exists where a contract is created,
*1385
for example, by an employer’s handbook or policy manual, establishing other standards for discharge.
Borschel,
1. The implied contract exception to at-will employment
The implied unilateral contract exception to the employment at-will doctrine has been considered by Iowa courts in relatively few eases.
See French v. Foods, Inc.,
(1) the handbook is sufficiently definite in its terms to create an offer; (2) the handbook has been communicated to and accepted by the employee so as to create an acceptance; (3) the employee has continued working, so as to provide consideration.
Id.
(quoting
Fogel,
The threshold legal question, however, is whether the terms of the handbook “are sufficiently definite to constitute an offer of continued employment.”
French,
In
McBride,
[b]asically, a unilateral contract of employment may be created when an employer provides a handbook containing disciplinary procedures to a worker, the expressions contained in the handbook (in light of surrounding circumstances) give the worker a reasonable understanding of continued employment, and the employer has reason to know of the worker’s understanding. Cannon v. National By-Products, Inc.,422 N.W.2d 638 , 640-41 (Iowa 1988); see Young v. Cedar County Work Activity Center,418 N.W.2d 844 , 848 (Iowa 1987); see also Pine River State Bank v. Mettille,333 N.W.2d 622 , 624-26 (Minn.1983)....
Claims under unilateral contract theory frequently break down because the disciplinary provisions are too indefinite to create an offer, ... or there is no acceptance because the disciplinary provisions are never communicated to the employee....
[In this case,] [t]he employee manual makes no clear reference to grounds or procedures for termination so it cannot constitute an “offer” of continued employment. ... Further, [the handbook] can afford not protection to [the employee] because it was distributed to department *1386 heads, not to employees, thus eliminating the “acceptance” element.
McBride,
However, even these formalities of contract formation may not suffice to override a statutory codification of the employment at-will doctrine for public employees. In
Norton v. Adair County,
In addition to cases considering contracts implied by written materials that purported to control the employment relationship between the parties, Iowa courts have also considered claims that an employment contract had been implied in fact. In
French v. Foods, Inc.,
In
Porter v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc.,
2. Fink’s Implied Contract Claim
Fink argues that an implied contract arose by operation of Grundy County Resolution # 17 91/92, the relevant provisions of which are as follows:
14. Discrimination because of political or religious opinions or affiliations or because of race, national origin or other non-merit factors shall be prohibited. This applies to any member of the public or any person involved in recruitment examination, appointment, training, promotion, retention, discipline or any other aspect of personnel administration. Discrimination against any member of the public or any person in employment on the basis of age or sex or physical disability will be prohibited except where specific age, sex, or physical requirements constitute a bona-fide qualification necessary to proper and efficient administration.
15. It is the policy of Grundy County to provide equal opportunity in employment to all persons. An individual shall not be denied equal access to county employment opportunities because of race, creed, color, religion, national origin, sex, age or physical or mental disability when the criterion of the job descriptions are [sic] met. It is also the policy of Grundy County to affirmative action measures to correct deficiencies in the county employment system where those remedies are appropriate. This policy shall be construed broadly to *1387 effectuate its purposes. Coverage includes all aspects of employment, such as hiring, promotion, discipline, pay, benefits, training, and layoff.
Grundy County Resolution # 17-91/92, Defendants’ Statement Of Material Facts.
Even assuming it could be shown that the parties to this dispute met the formalities for creation of an implied contract, offer, assent, and consideration, on the basis of this Resolution, the court concludes that this resolution does not in any way suggest that termination shall only be for cause. Instead, the Resolution establishes only that terminations may not be for discriminatory reasons. Although the Resolution also establishes a Grievance Policy, in paragraph 18, that policy provides for resolution of disputes through various levels of authority. It does not provide any criteria for the original decision, such as termination, challenged by the griev-ant.
Compare McBride,
G. Discrimination Based On Political Affiliation Or Opinions
Fink’s final claim is that she was terminated because she had been a political rival of Kitzman. Such a ground for termination would indeed be prohibited by Resolution # 17-91/92. The defendants argue that the exclusive remedy for such a wrongful termination is the grievance procedure established in the resolution itself, and that Fink lost her final appeal under this grievance procedure. Fink has argued elsewhere in her resistance to the motion for summary judgment, albeit not in reference to this issue, on which she offers no argument, that the court should compel the defendants to follow their own rules.
The court concludes that Fink’s failure to offer any argument or to identify any evidence to support her claim of termination in retaliation for political affiliation is fatal to that claim. The bald allegations of the complaint, without more, are insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Fink is required under Rule 56(e) to go beyond the pleadings, and by affidavits, or by the “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Fed. R.Civ.P.
56(e);
Celotex,
H. Fink’s Damages Claims
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on some of Fink’s damages claims. Specifically, defendant Kitzman asserts that her conduct as alleged is not sufficiently wilful to entitle Fink to punitive damages on any claim. Furthermore, she asserts that as an elected official exercising discretion within her legal authority, she cannot be subjected to personal liability of any kind, including imposition of punitive damages. 14 Kitzman also argues that her reliance on the advice of the county attorney, taken before she discharged Fink, insulates her from imposition of liquidated damages on Fink’s federal claims even if her conduct could still be found to be “wilful.” Defendants also argue that punitive damages are not authorized for violations of Iowa Code Ch. 216, nor are punitive damages authorized against municipalities by Iowa Code Ch. 668A.
a. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216 and Ch. 670
i. Punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 216. Iowa Code § 216.15(8)(a)(8) *1388 (formerly § 601A.15(8)(a)(8)) provides the Iowa Civil Rights Commission to impose as damages for violation of the provisions of the Iowa Civil Rights Act
[pjayment to the complainant of damages for an injury caused by the discriminatory or unfair practice which damages shall include but are not limited to actual damages, court costs- and reasonable attorney fees.
Upon pursuit of a claim under chapter 216 in the courts, Iowa Code § 216.16(5) provides that
[t]he district court may grant any relief in an action under this section which is authorized by section 216.15, subsection 8 to be issued by the commission. The district court may also award the respondent reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs when the court finds that the complainant’s action was frivolous.
The Iowa Supreme court has consistently rejected the argument that these statutory provisions authorize punitive damages. In
Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n,
[a] later federal court decision interpreting Iowa law predicted this court would not allow an award of punitive damages under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. High v. Sperry Corp.,581 F.Supp. 1246 , 1247 (S.D.Iowa 1984). That court reasoned that “the phrase ‘not limited to actual damages’ in the Iowa statute [Iowa Code section 601A.15(8)(a)(8) ] does not necessarily imply the availability of punitive damages.” Id. The court went on to state that it could not find a single instance where an administrative agency’s award of punitive damages was upheld. Id. at 1248. The court acknowledged a different result might be reached if the express language of the statute granted the Commission the power to award punitive damages. Id.
Id. The Iowa Supreme Court then conducted its own search for cases in which punitive damage awards by administrative agencies had been upheld, and found that “[t]he general rule is that an administrative agency cannot award punitive damages absent express statutory language allowing such an award.” Id. The court adopted this “settled rule of law,” and concluded that the Commission was not authorized to award punitive damages to a civil rights complainant. Id.
Most recently, in
Smith v. ADM Feed Corp.,
[ujnlike Title VIII [sic], chapter 601A does not permit an administrative agency, or the district court under section 601A.16(5), to award punitive damages. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers, Local Union No. 238 v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n,394 N.W.2d 375 , 384 (Iowa 1986). In Chauffeurs, we noted the general rule that an agency cannot award punitive damages absent express statutory language and concluded that the language “but not limited to actual damages” in section 601A.15(8)(a)(8) does not necessarily imply that punitive damages are available. Id. (citing High v. Sperry Corp.,581 F.Supp. 1246 , 1247 (S.D.Iowa 1984); accord EEOC [v. Detroit Edison Co.], 515 F.2d [301,] 308-09 [ (6th Cir.1975) ].
Smith,
ii. Municipal immunity from punitive damages under Iowa Code Ch. 670. Defendants argue further, however, that Iowa Code § 670.4(5) provides immunity to the municipal defendants from the imposi *1389 tion of punitive damages on any of Fink’s claims. 15 The court finds that the position of the defendants is true as to Fink’s surviving claim under Iowa common law, the retaliatory discharge claim. Iowa Code § 670.4(5) provides municipalities with immunity from punitive damages. It removes that immunity if the express statute dealing with such claims does provide for the imposition of such damages. Id. However, the retaliatory discharge claim is founded on the common law and not upon a statute, so that no statute expressly provides either for this cause of action or for punitive damages for the successful plaintiff. Therefore, Iowa Code § 670.4(5) provides the municipal defendants with immunity from punitive damages on this common-law claim. However, the immunity provided by Iowa Code § 670.4(5) would not extend to Kitzman, because the statute applies only to municipal defendants.
The municipal defendants next argue that Iowa Code § 670.4(5) provides them with immunity to Fink’s punitive damages claims on her surviving federal claim as well. This is plainly not so. Even in suits involving both state-law claims and federal claims against municipalities, Iowa state courts have applied the provisions of chapter 670 only to the state-law claims, deciding the federal issues of liability and punitive damages solely on the basis of federal decisions.
See, e.g., Willson v. City of Des Moines,
*1390
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[municipal defenses— including an assertion of sovereign immunity — to a federal right of action are, of course, controlled by federal law.”
Owen v. City of Independence,
However, punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34;
Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc.,
[liquidated damages serve as a deterrent to willful violations of the Act, see Trans World Airlines, [Inc. v. Thurston], 469 U.S. [111,] 125, 105 S.Ct. [613,] 623,83 L.Ed.2d 523 [(1985)], and while there is an aspect to such damages that is punitive in nature, Rademaker v. Nebraska,906 F.2d 1309 , 1313 (8th Cir.1990), they are not the equivalent of punitive damages. See Bruno v. Western Elec. Co.,829 F.2d 957 , 967 (10th Cir.1987).
Williams,
In the present case, the court concludes that punitive damages are not available at all on Fink’s surviving claims under the ADEA and Iowa Code § 216, nor are punitive damages available against the municipal defendants on Fink’s surviving retaliatory discharge claim. Two damages issues remain, however. The first is whether defendants showed sufficient “willfulness” to be held liable for liquidated damages under the ADEA. The second damages issue is whether Kitz-man can be held liable for any damages at all as an elected official who acted within her legal authority in firing Fink.
b. Liability for liquidated damages under the ADEA
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the standards for “willfulness” under the ADEA found in
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,
In Trans World Airlines, ... the Supreme Court held that an employer’s violation of the ADEA is “willful” if “the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.”
Brown,
To support an award of liquidated damages [under the ADEA], therefore, the sole relevant determination is whether the evidence meets the standard that the employer “either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the ADEA.” The question is not whether the evidence used to *1391 establish willfulness is different from and additional to the evidence used to establish a violation of the ADEA, but whether the evidence — additional or otherwise — satisfies the distinct standard used for establishing willfulness.
Brown,
The defendants contend that,- because Kitzman consulted with the county attorney prior to terminating Fink, the finder of fact could determine that there was a “willful” violation, but nonetheless could not impose liquidated damages, citing
Hill v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc.,
The court finds further that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kitzman acted willfully in discharging Fink, such that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s liquidated damages claim. Fink has presented evidence sufficient to suggest that Kitzman targeted Fink for termination on the basis of age, and did terminate her, with reckless disregard for whether her termination was prohibited by the ADEA. That evidence is discussed above in the court’s determination that summary judgment is inappropriate on Fink’s substantive claim of violation of the ADEA.
c. Kitzman’s liability
Kitzman argues the rather extraordinary position that she cannot be held liable at all on any of Fink’s claims, because she was an elected official acting within her authority in terminating Fink. Kitzman cites
Elview Constr. Co., Inc. v. North Scott Community Sch. Dist.,
Although Kitzman has not specifically invoked its provisions, Iowa Code Ch. 670 provides a more plausible ground for arguing the immunity of a public official from the claims presented here. Kitzman and the other defendants have argued the essential elements of this statutory immunity defense by asserting that Kitzman’s conduct in discharging Fink was in the performance of a “discretionary function” of her office. However, Iowa Code Ch. 670 (formerly chapter 613A) limits, but does not eliminate, the liability of such qfficials:
Suits against municipal employees in their individual capacities existed before the tort claims act, just as tort claims against other parties. See Vermeer v. Sneller,190 N.W.2d 389 , 391-92 (Iowa 1971). Except as modified by chapter 613A, such rights of action remain intact. Thus we held in a similar ease against employees of a municipality that if the employee’s acts are out *1392 side the scope of employment, the tort claims act is inapplicable....
Lamantia v. Sojka,
The first provision of Iowa Code Ch. 670 to modify that common law tort liability is Iowa Code § 670.8 (formerly § 613A.8). It provides that, although the governing body of municipalities must defend, “save harmless and indemnify” officers and employees against “any tort claim or demand,” that provision does not provide for the immunity of such individuals, only that a defense and indemnity must be provided by the municipal employer. Iowa Code § 670.8. Furthermore, the duty to defend, indemnify, and save harmless does not extend to liability for punitive damages.
Id.; Vlotho v. Hardin County,
Iowa Code § 670.12, however, does provide for Kitzman’s immunity from liability, albeit with certain exceptions:
All officers and employees of municipalities are not personally liable for claims which are exempted under section 670.4, except claims for punitive damages, and actions permitted under section 85.20 [workers compensation]. An officer or employee of a municipality is not liable for punitive damages as a result of acts in the performance of a duty, unless actual malice or willful, wanton and reckless misconduct is proven.
Iowa Code § 670.12. Kitzman could assert, and the county has asserted, that the acts complained of here fall within Iowa Code § 670.4(3):
3. Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance, or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the municipality, whether or not the discretion was abused....
Specifically, defendants assert that Kitzman performed a “discretionary function” when she terminated Fink. However, such an assertion fails as a matter of law. In
Hansen v. City of Audubon,
In Butler [v. State of Iowa,336 N.W.2d 416 , 419-20 (Iowa 1983) ], we further defined planning and operational as follows:
The planning level is generally characterized as the policy making stage and is said to encompass decisions “that involve the formulation of policy, that call for a weighing of competing interests, that require an assessment of the practicability or feasibility (including the consideration of budgetary constraints) of a proposed course of action, or that entail an evaluation of how the public interest will best be served.
The implementation of decisions made at the planning level is operational; decisions made at the operational level are not covered by the discretionary function exception.
336 N.W.2d at 419 (citations omitted). We went on to hold that the State’s decision not to update previously installed guardrails was made at the operational, rather than the planning, level and did not meet the exception of a discretionary decision. Id. at 420.
Hansen,
In the present case, Kitzman’s decision to reduce staff bears all of the indicia of a planning decision. However, her decision to fire Fink as part of that reduction in force was an operational decision. The decision to terminate a particular employee was the implementation of her decision to reduce staff made at the planning level, and therefore is operational; decisions made at the operational level are not covered by the discretionary function exception. Id. Kitzman is not entitled to immunity under Iowa Code § 670.12 for her operational decision to fire Fink. For the same reasons, the municipal defendants could not assert that they should be exempt from liability for Kitzman’s conduct under Iowa Code § 670.4(3). Because Kitzman’s conduct does not fall within the discretionary functions exception, the county cannot assert the immunity provided by this subsection either.
I. Immunity Of The Grundy County Board Of Supervisors
In its own motion, the Board has moved for summary judgment on Fink’s claims on the ground that its only involvement with the circumstances of Fink’s termination was in Fink’s appeal to the Board of her grievance arising from Kitzman’s decision to terminate her. The Board argues that it acted in a judicial capacity in adjudicating that appeal, and therefore it is entitled to judicial or quasi-judicial absolute immunity. However, “[g]iven the sparing recognition of absolute immunity by ... the Supreme Court ..., one claiming such immunity must demonstrate clear entitlement.”
Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Mental Health,
1. Standards for quasi-judicial immunity
A recent synopsis of the standards for entitlement to this kind of immunity was stated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Since Butz [v. Economou,438 U.S. 478 , 508,98 S.Ct. 2894 , 2911,57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) ] the Court has made it clear that application of judicial immunity outside the traditional judicial context is premised upon the existence of procedural guarantees and safeguards comparable to those found in federal administrative adjudication proceedings. In Cleavinger v. Saxner,474 U.S. 193 ,106 S.Ct. 496 ,88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985), the Court refused to extend absolute judicial immunity to members of a prison discipline committee re *1394 sponsible for hearing cases involving inmates charged with prison rules infractions. Citing Butz, the Court reaffirmed its “functional approach” to absolute immunity, stressing that such immunity “flows not from rank or title or ‘location within the Government,’ ... but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.” Id. at 201,106 S.Ct. at 500 (citation omitted).
Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep’t of Mental Health,
First, the analysis of quasi-judicial immunity depends upon “‘the character of the act in question, not the character of the actor,’ ”
Forrester,
The Supreme Court found that
[t]he doctrine of judicial immunity is supported by a long-settled understanding that the independent and impartial exercise of judgment vital to the judiciary might be impaired by exposure to potential damages liability. Accordingly, the “touchstone" for the doctrine’s applicability has been “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights.” [Burns],500 U.S., at 498 ,111 S.Ct., at 1946 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). When judicial immunity is extended to officials other than judges, it is because their judgments are “functional[ly] comparable]” to those of judges — that is, because they, too, “exercise a discretionary judgment” as a part of their function. Imbler v. Pachtman,424 U.S., at 423, n. 20 ,96 S.Ct., at 991, n. 20 . Cf. Westfall v. Erwin,484 U.S. 292 , 297-298,108 S.Ct. 580 , 584,98 L.Ed.2d 619 (1988) (absolute immunity from state-law tort actions available to executive officials only when their conduct is discretionary).
Antoine,
— U.S. at -,
“For it is a general principal of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to *1395 act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to every one who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or useful.”
Id.,
— U.S. at -n. 10,
In
Cleavinger,
the Court recognized that lack of two particular factors precluded application of judicial or quasi-judicial immunity to a prison disciplinary review committee: “independence” and the availability of procedural safeguards similar to those found in the Administrative Procedures Act.
Cleavinger,
[T]he members of the committee, unlike a federal or state judge, are not “independent”; to say that they are is to ignore reality. They are not professional hearing officers, as are administrative law judges. They are, instead, prison officials, albeit no longer of the rank and file, temporarily diverted from their usual duties.... They are employees of the Bureau of Prisons and they are the direct subordinates of the warden who reviews their decision. They work with the fellow employee who lodges the charge against the inmate upon whom they sit in judgment. The credibility determination they make often is one between a co-worker and an inmate. They thus are under obvious pressure to resolve a disciplinary dispute,in favor of the institution and their fellow employee.... It is the old situational problem of the relationship between the keeper and the kept, a relationship that hardly is conducive to a truly adjudicatory performance.
Cleavinger,
Under the [Prison] Bureau’s disciplinary policy in effect at the time of respondents’ hearings, few of the procedural safeguards contained in the Administrative Procedure Act under consideration in Bute were present. The prisoner was to be afforded neither a lawyer nor an independent nonstaff representative. There was no right to compel the attendance of witnesses or to cross-examine. There was no right to discovery. There was no cognizable burden of proof. No verbatim transcript was afforded. Information presented often was hearsay or self-serving. The committee members were not truly independent. In sum, the members had no identification with the judicial process of the kind and depth that has occasioned absolute immunity.
Cleavinger,
2. Quasi-judicial immunity of elected boards
This ease illustrates well the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that “[unfortunately, the various activities of most [government] officials cannot be [easily or definitively] characterized as only administrative, legislative, or judicial.”
Haskell v.
*1396
Washington Township,
impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial or adjudicatory in nature, even though the decision-making body and the form of the proceedings are legislative. “A judicial inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.” Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. [210] at 226, 29 S.Ct. [67] at 69 [53 L.Ed. 150 ] [ (1908) ]. “A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on rights which may arise in the future, and there must be an actual controversy over an issue.... The form of the proceeding is not significant. It is the nature and effect which is controlling.” In re Summers,325 U.S. 561 , 566-67,65 S.Ct. 1307 , 1310-11,89 L.Ed. 1795 (1945) (state supreme court’s refusal to admit bar applicant held judicial proceeding). Here, the board of aldermen, sitting as a board of impeachment, was required to perform an adjudicatory function in deciding whether there was legal cause to impeach the mayor and, if so, whether to remove the mayor from office. See Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights,796 S.W.2d 52 , 56-57 (Mo.Ct.App.1990) (purely political reasons do not constitute requisite legal cause for impeachment; legal cause means misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfea-sance). In other words, the board of aldermen, sitting as a board of impeachment, functioned like judges in that they were required to determine whether bias existed, to hear testimony and receive evidence, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, and to make findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Id. at 437.
The court then considered whether, in light of the Cleavinger and Butz factors, the aldermen were entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The court concluded that the public interest in decisions free from intimidation was served by applying immunity, procedural safeguards were in place in the form of a state administrative procedures act, the case was contested and adversarial, the parties were allowed to conduct discovery, oral evidence was taken under oath, parties were allowed to call and examine or cross-examine witnesses, a record of the proceedings was kept, and a written set of findings of fact and conclusions of law followed. Id. Furthermore, the role of precedent was important in the impeachment proceedings, and judicial review was available. Id. The court next considered whether the aldermen were sufficiently insulated from political influence:
the individual board members are elected officials and to that extent are not insulated from political influence. However, political or electoral pressure alone cannot deprive government officials of absolute immunity or qualified immunity; after all, legislators are the quintessential elected officials and they enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken in a legislative capacity. Similarly, many state judges are elected and nonetheless enjoy absolute immunity for acts taken in a judicial capacity. We think that, at least for purposes of immunity analysis, the insulation-from-political-in- *1397 fluenee factor does not refer to the independence of the government official from the political or electoral process, but instead to the independence of the government official as a decision-maker. We think the individual board members as decision-makers in municipal impeachment proceedings are as independent as administrative law judges or as federal or state judges. Unlike the members of the prison disciplinary committee in Cleavinger who were prison employees and the direct subordinates of the warden who reviewed their disciplinary decisions,474 U.S. at 204 ,106 S.Ct. at 502 , the individual board members are not employees and have no direct supervisors. They are certainly not subordinate to the state judges who review the impeachment decision, and they are under no institutional pressure to resolve the dispute in any particular way. Individual board members are admittedly not “professional hearing officers” like administrative law judges, state judges or parole board members. Nonetheless, as adjudicators in impeachment proceedings, they must be fair and impartial. See Fitzgerald v. City of Maryland Heights,796 S.W.2d at 59 .
In sum, we hold that defendants acted in a judicial capacity in voting to impeach the mayor and that their function as a board of impeachment was sufficiently comparable to “classic” adjudication so as to justify absolute immunity from personal liability for damages.
Brown,
In contrast, in
Zamsky v. Hansell,
Similarly, in
Stewart v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ.,
the Court has explicitly declined to extend absolute judicial immunity protection to actions taken by school board members. In Wood v. Strickland,420 U.S. 308 ,95 S.Ct. 992 ,43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975), the Court noted that school board members function as “adjudicators in the school disciplinary process,” and they must “judge whether there have been violations of school regulations and, if so, the appropriate sanctions for the violations.” Id. at 319,95 S.Ct. at 999 . However, despite the school board’s adjudicative function, the Court held that board members were to be protected by qualified immunity only: “[Ajbsolute immunity would not be justified since it would not sufficiently increase the ability of school officials to exercise their discretion in a forthright manner to warrant the absence of a remedy for students subjected to intentional or otherwise inexcusable deprivations.” Id. at 320,95 S.Ct. at 1000 . See also Cleavinger,474 U.S. at 204-05 ,106 S.Ct. at 502 (explaining the Court’s holding in Wood and relying on Wood’s holding to deny absolute judicial immunity to a prison’s Institution Discipline Committee). Although this case involves a school board’s decision to discharge an employee rather than an instance of student disci *1398 pline, as was involved in Wood, we conclude that the function of the school board in this case was substantially similar to the function of the board in Wood. The Court’s ruling in Wood therefore precludes an extension of absolute immunity to the defendants in this case.
Id. at 1508.
In
Bettencourt v. Board of Registration in Medicine of the Commonwealth of Mass.,
First, does a Board member, like a judge, perform a traditional “adjudicatory” function, in that he decides facts, applies law, and otherwise resolves disputes on the merits (free from direct political influence)? Second, does a Board member, like a judge, decide eases sufficiently controversial that, in the absence of absolute immunity, he would be subject to numerous damages actions? Third, does a Board member, like a judge, adjudicate disputes against a backdrop of multiple safeguards designed to protect a physician’s constitutional rights?
Bettencourt,
3. The Board’s claim of quasi-judicial immunity
In the present case, the court concludes that, although it is a very close question, the Board is not entitled to quasi-judieial immunity for its involvement in Fink’s appeal of her grievance arising from her termination. Admittedly, the appeal procedure bears many of the marks of an adjudicatory function, including adversarial proceedings, opportunity to present testimony, representation of the complainant by counsel, written findings and conclusions, and some procedural safeguards. Furthermore, the critical factor is not that the Board was elected, nor that it voted on disposition of Fink’s appeal. The critical factor in analysis of this attempt to invoke the privilege is that the Board both acted as the appellate body and had originally promulgated the regulations whereby Fink brought her complaint before the Board. Thus, the Board was not properly insulated from the regulations in question. This factor is not undercut by the lack of guiding principles for the exercise of the power to discharge employees in the resolution establishing the grievance appeal procedure; rather, it is supported by it. The Board is left free to apply whatever standards it deems appropriate to the particular grievance before it, and that broad discretion was granted by the resolution the Board itself enacted. Furthermore, the lack of standards in the resolution suggest that precedent and prior articulation of principles had little to do with the Board’s ultimate decision. Thus, the court concludes that the Board is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in this case, and its motion for summary judgment on that ground must be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
The court concludes that the motion for summary judgment by all defendants must be denied in part and granted in part, while the motion of the Board must be denied in its entirety. First, as to Fink’s claim of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA, the court concludes that Fink has, at the least, generated a genuine issue of material fact on each element of her prima facie case of age discrimination in this reduction-in-force case. Kitzman, while admitting that Fink’s performance entered into her decision to terminate her instead of other employees, has repeatedly asserted that she did not fire Fink for poor performance. Kitzman’s assertions, at a minimum, generates a material issue of fact as to whether or not Fink was performing at a level that met her employer’s legitimate expectations. Furthermore, despite defendants’ contentions that Fink’s job is “gone,” there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her job, in its various parts, continued, because other employees must do some of the duties formerly assigned *1399 to Fink, even though her duties were not unique. More importantly, the allegations and counterallegations concerning the speed with which Kitzman made the discharge decision and the reasons she selected Fink to be discharged when she retained younger employees with less experience provide “some additional evidence” that age was a factor, something Fink must show to preclude summary judgment on her ADEA claim. As with Fink’s federal age discrimination claim, there is a genuine issue of material fact on her state-law age discrimination claim precluding summary judgment.
However, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both Fink’s federal and state-law claims of disability discrimination. The court first concluded that the proper prima fade showing for a claim of disability discrimination under the ADA was one similar to the prima fade case of discrimination in other contexts, which requires the plaintiff to establish an inference of discrimination on the basis of a disability. The court concluded further that the inference could arise even if the employer replaced the plaintiff with a person with a lesser or more easily accommodated disability, rather than replacing the plaintiff with a non-member of the protected class. However, the court concludes that Fink has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact that she is sufficiently disabled to invoke the protection of either the ADA or Iowa Code Ch. 216. The record demonstrates only that Fink is subject to a lifting restriction as the result of her carpal tunnel syndrome, but does not establish that this restriction impaired either her performance of her job with the County or impaired her pursuit of a wide range of employment opportunities. Nor did Fink present sufficient evidence to generate a material issue of fact that her employer regarded her as disabled. For the same reasons Fink was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA, she is not “disabled” within the meaning of Iowa Code Ch. 216. Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s disability discrimination claims.
As to Fink’s claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim, Fink has produced sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment. Fink’s evidence suggests that Kitzman threatened her not to file a workers compensation claim, told her the county would not pay for her treatment, and told her she doubted that Fink’s condition was work-related, A genuine issue of material fact therefore exists concerning whether Fink was fired for pursuing such a claim precluding summary judgment on Fink’s retaliation claim.
The court next concludes that Fink cannot pursue a claim of tortious interference with a contract, because Kitzman, as the representative of the County controlling Fink’s employment with the county, could not interfere with a contract between Fink and the County. Nor could Kitzman interfere with a business relationship between Fink and the County, for whom Kitzman acted, because she was a party or agent of a party involved in the relationship, not a stranger to the relationship. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s interference with a contract or business relationship claims. Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s claim of breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because the court is not inclined to entertain a claim repeatedly rejected by the Iowa Supreme Court. Furthermore, such a claim in the circumstances presented here would seem redundant, because Fink already has a viable claim for discharge in violation of public policy. Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s claim under an implied contract, because the court concludes that the resolution to which Fink points as implying such a contract simply does not establish a “good cause” requirement for her dismissal, and, even if it did, a municipal resolution could not override the statutory at-will status of an employee of the Grundy County Treasurer’s Office, found in Iowa Code § 331.553(2). Defendants are also entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s claim of retaliation for political opinions or affiliation, because Fink has failed to designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(e);
Celotex,
As to the issues of liability and immunity raised by defendants, the court concludes *1400 punitive damages are not available for Fink’s claims under Iowa Code Ch. 216, and Iowa Code § 670.4(5) provides the municipal defendants with immunity from punitive damages on Fink’s surviving common-law claim of retaliatory discharge. Such a state-law defense cannot apply to a federal claim, but punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. Instead, the ADEA provides for “liquidated damages.” The court rejects the argument that consulting an attorney provides immunity to a liquidated damages claim under the ADEA and finds further that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Kitzman acted willfully in discharging Fink, such that the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Fink’s liquidated damages claim under the ADEA.
The court has next rejected Kitzman’s assertion of a common-law immunity for her acts as an elected county official, finding that the ease she cites in support of that proposition must be construed far too narrowly to provide immunity in the circumstances here. However, the court has also considered Kitz-man’s statutory immunity under Iowa Code § 670.12, but concludes as a matter of law that Kitzman’s decision to terminate Fink was operational, and therefore not a “discretionary functibn” entitling her to the immunity found in IoWa Code § 670.4(3). For similar reasons, the County cannot invoke the immunity of Iowa Code § 670.4(3) for claims against it for Kitzman’s alleged misconduct.
Finally, although it is a very close question, the court finds that the Board is not entitled to summary judgment on its own motion asserting quasi-judicial immunity. The court finds that the critical factor in analysis of this attempt to invoke the privilege is that the Board both acted as the appellate body and had originally promulgated the regulations whereby Fink brought her complaint before the Board. Thus, the Board was not properly insulated from the regulations in question. Therefore, its motion for summary judgment on the ground of quasi-judicial immunity is denied.
Thus, the motion for summary judgment filed by the Board is denied in its entirety, and the motion for summary judgment of all defendants is denied in part and granted in part as described above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record.
Hartnagel v. Norman,
. The ADEA prohibitions protect workers over age forty. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). As originally enacted, the ADEA covered employees from 40 to 65 years old. Pub.L. No. 90-202, § 12, 81 Stat. 607 (repealed 1978). The maximum age was raised in 1978 to cover persons aged 40 to 70 years. Pub.L. No. 95-256, § 4, 81 Stat. 607 (repealed 1986). In 1986 Congress removed the upper age limitation entirely, Pub.L. No. 99-592, § 2, 100 Stat. 3342-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)), except for bona fide mandatory retirement laws for firefighters and law enforcement officers, Id. §§ 3-4, 100 Stat. 3342-43 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(i), and tenure for college professors over age 70. Id. § 6, 100 Stat. 3344 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(d)).
. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1) states the following:
No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed—
(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred ...
. A federal employee claiming age discrimination in violation of the ADEA
has the option of bringing suit in federal court in the first instance, or of pursuing administrative remedies before the EEOC and then suing in federal court if not satisfied with the administrative results. See 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) and (c). With respect to civil actions brought directly to federal court, the federal employee must give the EEOC notice of intent to sue within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct, and then must wait 30 days before filing suit. Id. § 633a(d). The ADEA provisions applicable to federal employees who pursue administrative remedies before initiating a private suit do not, however, contain an express statute of limitations to govern how long after final agency action the employee has to file a civil action. We must therefore "borrow” an appropriate limitations period from an analogous state or federal provision. Stevens v. Department of Treasury,500 U.S. 1 , 7,111 S.Ct. 1562 , 1567,114 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991).
Long v. Frank, 22
F.3d 54, 56 (2d Cir.1994),
cert.
denied, - U.S. -,
. These congressional findings are similar to those of Justice Stevens and Justice Marshall in their concurrences in
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
[a] regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation soon emerged that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow. Massive custodial institutions were built to warehouse the retarded for life; the aim was to halt reproduction of the retarded and "nearly extinguish their race.” Retarded children were categorically excluded from public schools, based on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported need to protect nonretarded children from them. State laws deemed the retarded "unfit for citizenship.”
Id.
at 462-63,
. All of the cases cited below as grappling with the question of the proper prima facie case under the ADA also naturally assume that the prima facie case is part of a McDonnell Douglas analysis. The court has only cited here cases that contain some discussion of the propriety of applying this analysis to an ADA claim.
. The court stated, "We need not decide the precise elements of a
prima facie
case of discrimination under the ADA.”
Hedberg,
. Courts using both formulations of the
prima facie
case cite
White,
. Thus, under Iowa law, there is no uncertainty about the application of a burden-shifting analysis or about the elements of the prima facie case as there was with Fink’s ADA claim.
Another distinction between claims of disability discrimination based on the ADA and those based on Iowa law exists on the meaning of reasonable accommodation under each act. The Iowa Supreme Court embraced the standard for accommodation of disabilities articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
TWA v. Hardison,
. The opinion in Springer I cites no fewer than thirteen other states that had judicially recognized the public policy exception to employment at will:
. A more essential distinction, in most cases, between this tort and the tort of interference with contractual relations is that for the tort of interference with business relations or advantages, the tortfeasor must be shown to have had as a purpose for the interference “to financially injure or destroy the plaintiff" while no such showing of intent is necessary for the tort of interference with a contract.
Burke v. Hawkeye Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
. Defendants assert as a further ground for dismissal of Fink's intentional interference claim that
Grahek
stands for the proposition that Iowa Code Ch. 216 preempts claims of intentional interference with employment relations.
Grahek,
. The first exception, discharge in violation of public policy, was discussed above in Section IV.C.l, beginning at page 1379.
. Kitzman has argued that she has "good faith immunity” as an elected county official.
. Liability is imposed on state subdivisions in Iowa Code § 670.2:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.
For the purposes of this chapter, employee includes a person who performs services for a municipality whether or not the person is compensated for the services, unless the services are performed only as an incident to the person’s attendance at a municipal function.
The liability imposed in Iowa Code § 670.2 is then subject to exemptions or immunities pursuant to Iowa Code § 670.4, which provides, inter alia, as follows:
The liability imposed by section 670.2 shall have no application to any claim enumerated in this section. As to any such claim, a municipality shall be liable only to the extent liability may be imposed by the express statute dealing with such claims and, in the absence of such express statute, the municipality shall be immune from liability....
3. Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance, or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the municipality, whether or not the discretion was abused....
5. Any claim for punitive damages.
(Emphasis added).
. As to historical immunity for judges,
[¡judicial immunity apparently originated, in medieval times, as a device for discouraging collateral attacks and thereby helping to establish appellate procedure as the standard system for correcting judicial error.... [Jjudicial immunity also protected judicial independence by insulating judges from vexatious actions prosecuted by disgruntled litigants.”
Brown v. Griesenauer,
