2006 Ohio 4368 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2006
Lead Opinion
{¶ 3} While the denial of a motion to intervene has been held to be an appealable order, Fifth Third Bank, (Central Ohio) v.Banks, Franklin App. No. 04AP-860, 2005-Ohio-4972, the Ninth District has held that such an order must be accompanied by Civ.R. 54(B) certification to be final. See, e.g., Gehm v.Timberline Post Frame, Summit App. No. 22479,
{¶ 4} The problem with the Ninth District's analysis is that it makes what we consider to be a fundamental error in applying Civ.R. 54(B). That rule applies to "all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties." By its very nature, a motion to intervene presupposes that the entity seeking to intervene is not a party. If it were a party, there would be no need to intervene. To further demonstrate the point, Civ.R. 10(A) requires a pleading must designate all of the parties to an action.
None of the pleadings in this case list State Farm as a party. Indeed, while it had an interest in the outcome of the case by virtue of its policy of insurance issued to the clinic, its obligation to provide a defense does not make it a "party" to the action. Therefore, Civ.R. 54(B) language would be highly inappropriate.
{¶ 5} We therefore find, consistent with prior authority from this court, that the denial of a motion to intervene is a final order. See McKesson Medical-Surgical Minnesota, Inc. v. MedicoMed. Equip. Supplies, Inc., Cuyahoga App. No. 84912,
{¶ 7} The court's decision to grant or deny intervention under Civ.R. 24(A) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.Meyers v. Basobas (1998),
{¶ 8} The basis for State Farm's intervention is abundantly clear — it sought to have the court submit a specific verdict form which, if Ahmed were to be found liable for his alleged misconduct, might find that he engaged in intentional conduct which would fall outside of insurance coverage. Intervention at this admittedly late stage of the proceedings would have caused no delay to the proceedings, nor would it have needlessly complicated the trial. Indeed, intervention would only streamline the resolution of questions of indemnity under the State Farm policy.
{¶ 9} Of course, neither Filippi nor Ahmed wishes for a specific verdict. Ahmed's desire to avoid a specific verdict is obvious. For her part, Filippi would wish to avoid a specific verdict because, in the event that she were to prevail at trial and obtain a large damage award, it is conceivable that the award would exceed Ahmed's ability to pay. Without State Farm's coverage, she might not recover her full measure of damages.
{¶ 10} But neither of these reasons is even marginally relevant to the substantive issue of intervention. Recently, inCrittenden Court Apt. Complex v. Jacobsen/Reliance, Cuyahoga App. Nos. 85395 and 84252,
{¶ 11} "The final factor to be considered, the circumstances of the case, militate in favor of Westfield and Fidelity's limited intervention. The extent of Westfield and Fidelity's financial exposure, if any, would depend on the legal basis upon which Crittenden Court obtained a verdict against Jacobson/Reliance and Bowen and Associates. Further, only Westfield and Fidelity have an interest in identifying the basis for a verdict in Crittenden Court's favor, because that would determine the extent of their duty to indemnify. Moreover, even if Westfield and Fidelity filed a separate declaratory judgment action, that would be ineffective because the legal basis for a verdict in favor of Crittenden Court could be determined only by jury interrogatories submitted in this case, and only Westfield and Fidelity had the interest to obtain that determination.
{¶ 12} "In fact, issues determined in one proceeding at times may be given preclusive effect in a later proceeding. See GrangeMut. Cas. Co. v. Uhrin (1990),
{¶ 13} "Under analogous circumstances, the court in Petermanv. Pataskala (1997),
{¶ 14} This analysis applies with equal force here. The court gave no reason for denying the motion to intervene. While the court usually has no obligation to set forth its reasons for deciding a motion, the substantial interest involved certainly required something more. Indeed, both of the parties to the action affirmatively wish to keep State Farm out of the litigation just so that State Farm will be unable to challenge any future claim for indemnity. This is such a transparent basis for denying intervention that we find it to be, in the absence of any other compelling factor, a reversible abuse of discretion.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
This cause is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs assessed against plaintiff-appellee.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Karpinski, P.J., Concurs. Kilbane, j., Dissents with separate opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
{¶ 15} I respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion and would find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying State Farm's intervention at such a late stage in the proceeding.
{¶ 16} In reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to intervene, the proper standard of review is whether the trial court's action constituted an abuse of discretion. Young v.Equitec Real Estate Investors Fund (1995),
{¶ 17} In the instant case, the trial court was intimately familiar with the underlying case and the surrounding procedural history. It was therefore entrusted with the sound discretion of allowing intervention as the unique facts and circumstances of each case permit. Denying State Farm's requested intervention at such a late stage of the proceeding and seeking questions of liability coverage which are more appropriately disposed of in a traditional declaratory judgment action was, therefore, well within the discretion of the trial court. See Howell v.Richardson (1989),
{¶ 18} Even if this court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, State Farm nonetheless failed to comply with Civ.R. 24(C). Despite submitting both a motion to intervene and an amended motion to intervene, the trial court found that State Farm had failed to set forth a claim or defense as required under Civ.R. 24(C). Although State Farm had the option of providing Dr. Ahmed with a defense or rejecting his claim, it agreed to provide such a defense. If it intended to enter this civil action, it had ample opportunity to do so and had ample opportunity to set forth a claim or defense when attempting to intervene.
{¶ 19} Filippi filed her civil action in June 2003; yet, despite its role in this proceeding, State Farm failed to request an independent intervention. Instead, approximately three months before trial was scheduled to begin, State Farm moved to intervene without full compliance with Civ.R. 24(C). Although Civ.R. 24 is generally liberally construed in favor of intervention, see Blackburn v. Hamoudi (1986),
{¶ 20} State Farm also cites to Schmidlin v. D VEnterprises (June 1, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 76287, where this court found an insurer's application for intervention was timely although it was filed sixteen days before trial. The instant case, however, presents distinguishable circumstances. First, inSchmidlin, there was no contention that the proposed intervening insurer did not comply with the procedural requirements of Civ.R. 24(C). Second, the insurer's need to intervene did not arise until the plaintiff had filed an amended complaint, creating an issue over the applicable coverage limit which would fix the insurer's duty to indemnify. Finally, and unlike the instant case, there is no indication that the proposed intervenor had been managing the defense of the case since its inception and therefore had a greater understanding of the risks and necessities involved.
{¶ 21} For these reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the intervention, and I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
