105 Ky. 509 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1899
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is alleged in the petition in this action that by section 35 of an alleged ordinance of the city of Louisville, approved April 1, 1896, entitled “An ordinance providing for certain licenses for the sinking fund of the city of Louisville,” it is, among other things, ordained that every person, firm or corporation engaged in the business of contracting for public, municipal, railroad, or bridge work shall pay a license fee of $100 per annum; and by section 41 of the alleged ordinance it is ordained that “all licenses shall be paid for in advance in lawful money of the United States, and it shall be unlawful for any firm, person or corporation to carry on the business, occupation, or profession, or to use or exhibit any articles therein mentioned, in the city of Louisville, without first having paid the license herein required for the same;” and by section 44 of said ordinance it is ordained that “any person, firm, or corpora* tion violating any of the provisions of this ordinance, where a different fine has not been provided for, shall be fined not
A demurrer was sustained to plaintiff’s petition, and
It is earnestly insisted for appellant that there is in law no such corporation or organization as the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville. That the expression of the act of July, 1893, which says that “The board of sinking fund commissioners is hereby continued under the existing law,” is void, and of no effect, and is in violation of sections. 51-59 and 167 of the Constitution. But, inasmuch as said Sinking Fund Commissioners are not parties to this suit, nor does it appear that they are seeking to enforce the collection of the tax, nor the fine imposed by the police court, we deem it unnecessary to enter into a discussion as to the fact whether there are any legal Commissioners of the Sinking Fund of the City of Louisville.
From the allegations made in the petition it seems clear to us that the imposition of the license tends to increase the expenses incident to the improvement of sidewalks, streets, etc., and would be imposing additional burdens upon property owners fronting on such improvements. It is also manifest that the imposition of such license is inconsistent with the general law and ordinance providing that such improvements or work should be let to the lowest responsible or reliable bidder, and for that reason must be held to be illegal and invalid. It is manifestly just and right that all improvements made, the cost of which is to be taxed against the property owners, should be made at the least possible cost; and it is equally manifest that such ordinance as the one in question tends to lessen the number of persons who would be inclined to file bids or propositions for doing work, and tends to create a monopoly in the business of public works. It is also
That such license fee as that under consideration tends to lessen the number of bidders, and consequently increase the cost of such improvements, is riot open to serious question, and it seems to us unreasonable that the city should order improvements to be made, and. then impose a license tax upon the party who undertakes to do the work. Hence it follows that any ordinance or act • of the Legislature authorizing or imposing any such license fee is unconstitutional and invalid. The prohibition,asked for should have been granted.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to award the writ of prohibition, and for proceedings consistent herewith.