9 F. Cas. 44 | D. Mass. | 1865
In this case a large quantity of cigars, and a small quantity of sugar and molasses, have been condemned and sold, having been found on board the American schooner Atlantic under circumstances which showed very clearly an intention to smuggle them into the United States. Several persons have filed petitions for the share of the proceeds of the forfeiture provided by sect. 91 of the collection act of 1799, which enacts, among other things, that in all cases where such fines, &c., shall be recovered, in pursuance of information given to the collector, by any person other than the naval officer or surveyor of the district, a certain share shall be given to such informer.
That this court has jurisdiction of this controversy is clear. Hooper v. 51 Casks of Brandy [Case No. 6,674]; Westcot v. Bradford [Id. 17,429]; McLean v. U. S., 6 Pet. [31 U. S.] 404.
It is not denied that some officers of the customs, other than the collector himself and the surveyor and naval officer, all of whom share in all these forfeitures, may themselves be informers. This has been decided so far as inspectors are concerned, and perhaps is true of deputy-collectors. Hooper v. 51 Casks of Brandy, ubi supra; Brewster v. Gelston, 11 Johns. 390; Sawyer v. Steele [Case No. 12,406], Arid, as to officers of revenue cutters, the act itself is explicit in their favor. But I am not aware that it has ever been said or thought that an officer, being charged with the special duty of searching a vessel, in purusance of definite information given by another person, could become the informer by reason of the diligence, fidelity, and success with which he prosecuted the search, and found what he was sent to seek. To allow this would be contrary to the general principles of law, and to the intent of the revenue laws, which expect the collector and his subordinate officers to pursue the course indicated by the information with all the means and effort that may be necessary.
Who, then, gave the collector the information in pursuance of which this search and seizure were made, and the forfeiture was recovered? Mr. Beetle and Mr. Luce each says that he did; the former, because he received the telegram and sent it to the collector; and the latter because he carried the telegram, and gave, as he says, some oral information. Mr. Luce denies that Mr. Beetle “sent” him to the collector, and says that ho agreed with Mr. Beetle, that, as the wind would keep the vessel in port, it was better to consult with the collector, and to procure the services of the cutter. There is no doubt that he carried the telegram, with Mr. Beetle’s consent; and whether he is to be •considered as Mr. Beetle’s messenger, or not, is immaterial, in the view I take of the case. Mr. Vinson says, in his deposition, that, acting on the despatch, and on oral information received from Mr. Luce, he ordered the search and conditionally the seizure, and that either information would have been sufficient. It is to be regretted that Mr. Vinson should have mau.^ tins general statement, which is calculated to leave an erroneous impression. The evidence shows quite conclusively that Mr. Luce had no informa
Again, it is assumed, that the collector must personally receive the information which is the foundation of such a claim; and thereupon it is argued that Mr. Beetle and Mr. Luce, or one of them, as the evidence may be thought to favor the views of one or the other, appropriated the information contained in this telegram, and gave it out again to the collector, as their own. and so became the informers. But. on this supposition, they had no right to read the telegram, or reading it, to do any thing but forward it as quickly as possible to the collector. The law does not recognize a title to telegrams, or their contents, acquired by appropriation by persons intervening between the sender of the despatch .and the person to whom it is addressed. The telegraphic operator, who has not filed a claim, would stand, in this respect, full as well as these petitioners: he was nearer the source of knowledge, and his position was not more confidential. But the assumption is itself without warrant. The deputy-collector has, in law, a recognized position, with all or nearly all the powers of a collector; insomuch that for example, an oath required by statute to be taken before the collector is well taken before his deputy, without proof of the absence or inability to act of the principal; U. S. v. Barton [Case No. 14,534].
•It is plain, therefore, that Mr. Beetle had power to receive this despatch for the col- . lector, and to act on it. He was the collector, for all purposes, at Holmes Hole, and the moment he received the despatch, the collector had, in law, received it; the information had been officially communicated, and the inchoate right to the reward had attached. All that was done after that was executive, and was in pursuance of the information so given and received.
I must decide, therefore, that Mr. Smith •was the person and the only person who gave to the collector of the district of Edgar-town the information, in pursuance of which the forfeiture of the cigars was recovered, and is entitled to one-fourth of their net proceeds. The evidence does not clear up the question about the sugars, and their value is comparatively trifling. I cannot say that any one informed against them, as the case is presented. The form of decree is shown in Jones v. Shore, 1 Wheat. [14 U. S.] 475.
Mr. Smith adjudged sole informer.
[From 2 Int. Eev. Kec. 108.]
[Prom 2 Int. Rev. Rec. 108.]