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Fields v. State
627 S.W.2d 714
Tex. Crim. App.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 in his remain The asserts FIELDS, Appellant, ground prosecutor error that Douglas

ing Mark during closing improper remarks made phase. prose The argument penalty Texas, Appellee. The STATE cutor stated: 64519. No. “Now, people say after we all have heard hearing reading newspaper or some- Appeals of Texas. Criminal crime such as thing on the radio about a 3, 1982. Feb. violence, this, crime, ‘Why an act of March Rehearing Denied something?’ a lot they people don’t do of times blame it on the courts.” objection appellant objected

The but his prosecutor continued: was overruled. The say, ‘Why don’t people “You have heard they something people, about it?’ And do they it on the say,

like sometimes blame They prosecutors courts. blame on but it people you like who sit in jury box that set It is these sentences. up through, up is not are —it —we

prosecutor through. I am That burden of

prosecuting my is off of shoulders. now, you

burden is on I would like but you you to understand that are now in position being ‘they’, people those

who something have to do with the crimi- justice

nal system country. in this And you would like for to be able to leave today you courtroom when have set sentence, your they knowing that something done' about it.” Appellant improper contends that it was an plea for injected law enforcement and facts

outside the record. in Burns (Tex.Cr.App.1977) 556 S.W.2d 270 denied, cert. (1977) L.Ed.2d argument a similar upheld proper plea as a enforce for law ment. ground of error is overruled. judgment is affirmed. *2 Boudloche, Perry, appeal

Charles Paul Falls, only, appellant. Wichita for Timothy Eyssen, Atty., D. Dist. Wichita Falls, Huttash, Austin, Atty., Robert State’s for the State.

OPINION

ROBERTS, Judge. appeal

This is an from a conviction Penal capital murder as defined V.T.C.A. briefly. examine him I did not with Code, 19.03(a)(3). finding After See. paper at that time. I left some him guilty, “yes” answered to complete. for him tests special the first two issues submitted under 37.071(b), Art. Punishment V.A.C.C.P. he “Q him that you at time tell Did assessed at death. you, didn’t talk with didn’t you? with have to discuss this was convicted murder- *3 Brown, estranged tests ing Linda the wife of left the “A I remember. I don’t day I went James the Wichita Falls and the next Officer Brown of with him He Department, back, had them. April Police 1975. The and he not done well, if stating a note single gunshot deceased died a wound. left me of that — you. like I can read it to proof you would showed that Officer Brown tests, doing the says, It T don’t mind appellant hired the murder to commit the I I have arrested since been challenge not but does $400. jury trial court to declare a mistrial. The court granted the request. made ferring to an ris was during prosecutor’s questions appellant’s mistrial over may appellant guilty had been began. This trial ment Tomlison, psychiatrist. and on evidence Leon the On “Q On Outside the “A “Q Yes. psychological 1976. On May sufficiency was successfully chosen. January June Morris, stage have to evaluation, Prior to the time that advise have to talk to me? IDid January 21,1977, questioned On consisted of the the appellant. selected, proceeded given second trial counsel State’s 21, 1976, May 11, 1976, of the the Defendant presence advise 18, 1977, inadmissible talk to of this trial the State’s psychologist, examination was to was arrested on appellant’s the evidence. the trial court declared Mr. charged. case-in-chief, objected about 10, 1976, jury to a normal jury him that elicited appellant concerning you? (sic) Morris, began. a third trial At that after three any warnings testimony selection for oral jury objection. and asked the At that testimony he you This time he did one of conclusion, statement point, found he didn’t Dr. Dr. selection January did this did punish- began. jurors Mor- Jack only you the Dr. the not do: re- he “A The “Q “Q “A I believe I “Q [*] the tests? that That John tests. ley, told both April they come this this first. I left not to this py to the Defense information and I told Mark Did ney’s requested any tests. er have day before So, will have Can not, Therefore, any evaluations I told him the first time. time, the Defendant’s you you did but he did day you tell was what date? [*] office, 16th, 1976, Douglas Martin of the district consider the tests I talked examination, testing I told him tell Mr. Fields to talk I he had not done of them them that did. to do this up with for me to I’m not have to I do picked [*] and talked that lied to at attorney before Fields, it, sorry. ‍​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍I was but before I to April not don’t might be so I did [*] the my that I had been that you I would attorney, and I if postponed. trust time that many participate 15th, Mark they had lawyer about know note examination, might first at later, whether [*] to Mr. Bai- any of talk with Mr. any time anything tell that, the relevant up Fields.’ wheth- day or times. do. I attor- if result doing make [*] with hap- him, any day the nоt At or evidence “A Yes. could be used The first time that I saw him himof 15th, April him? 1976. I talked dards, very likely he is to encounter “A I I don’t remember for sure whether or did not. rules difficulty with and laws very likely be in trouble over and “Q say you You cannot did? over and over. “A I say I cannot that did. I do remem- ber discussing with attorney at [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] the time. Doctor, “Q opinion as to you do have an “Q present? Was he whether this Defendant is likely criminal of vio- to commit acts “A No. “Q [*] And [*] you examination and evaluation made [*] of Mark [*] [*] Douglas [*] “A tute a lence in the future that will would continuing say he threat very likely society? consti- to.” Fields was done direction testified, Dr. After Morris Dr. Tomlison *4 is that correct? presence was of the questioned outside jury: Yes, sir, “A Judge Kirk. Tomlison, “Q you, the di- Dr. did under “Q request you Did Mr. Fields ever rections of Mark see come and talk with him? Fields, Douglas in Defendant No, “A he did not.” this ease? Upon testimony, the conclusion of this Yes, I “A did. appellant’s objected attorney to allow- “Q you you Do when recall first saw ing testify. Dr. Morris to further basis The him? objection of the appellant was that the had 10th,

not been warned that he did not have to “A I saw him on June the tests, talk participate to Dr. Morris or in the “Q many How times thereafter? and that he had not been warned that “A Just the one time. results of the tests could be evi- used as “Q right, sir, you, to the All did dence him. trial The court over- County time —he was in Wichita objection. ruled the jail at that time? returned, When the was Dr. Morris County jail. “A He was in Wichita asked then about results of his “Q you Prior to the time that talked tests: him, with he you did advise him that “Q you diagnostic Do have a impression you? did not have talk with this Defendant? “A No. Yes, “A certainly, do. diagnosis His “Q you Did advise him that the results personality anti-social disorder. your in examination could be used “Q Generally, can you lay tell us in were against him if he evidence terms.what the anti-social personali- tried for offense? ty disorder means? “A Not I remember. “A Generally speaking, refers appellant’s attorney then made the The criminal kind of This orientation. objection testimony same to Dr. Tomlison’s very individual has a con- weak It, as he had made to that of Dr. Morris. conscience, science or no has too, control, was overruled. poor impulse inadequate has regard for other people and his feel- jury, Before the Dr. Tomlison testified ings very are shallow. examination, upon be- based he Honor, “MR. RICHIE: is Your this appellant an lieved that “anti-social repetitious. He us told that once. describing personality” pattern. After this “THE COURT: Overruled. personality pattern, asked: the witness was (Continuing) person “A “Q you The little an has Would individual such as

regard society’s rights just likely and stan- have con- described

tinue to come into sible because his contact with soci- arrest was based on less ety words, illegally, probable in other than they grounds cause. These of er- would problem organized with ror attack the sufficiency of the affidavit society? support request filed of the for an arrest “A “Q Yes. “A [*] come into conflict with the law? Yes, my opinion question was, he would.” [*] [*] would he continue to as I understand [*] [*] [*] it, warrant or the affidavit. Our search of the record in this case did not reveal either appellant document. The introduce into evidence either the arrest did evidence at a warrant. contention before trial and Although pre-trial hearing, appellant he failed to presented request raised that either document be At included in the the time of the examinations Drs. appellate reasons, record. For these noth- Tomlison, Morris and appellant was in ing presented for review. custody. He had bеen indicted and was represented by an attorney. appellant ground error, one never raised the competence issues of his to contends that his confession is inadmissible stand sanity trial or his at the time of the because it was promises. induced Although offense. the record contains no only any promise evidence of was the testi court, written order the trial both doc- mony wife that the dis tors testified that their examinations were attorney trict told her that at the direction of the court. Dr. Morris did not need an attorney because he would further testified that he had been instruct- *5 given immunity prosecution from if he ed to determine appellant whether the against testified his co-defendants. Even if competent to stand trial. promise concluded that such a would appellant’s have rendered the confession in The record fаils to reflect that the admissible, there testimony was no that this appellant was advised before the examina promise, any, if was made to the defendant. tions that he right had a to remain silent finding appellant’s trial court’s any and that statement he made could be by confession was not any promises induced used punishment phase him at the supported by ground the record. The of of his trial. error is overruled. We hold that the admission of the testi- error, grounds In two of mony of Drs. Morris and Tomlison violated contends that the trial court erred in over- appellant’s right against self-incrimina- ruling change his motion for of venue. On guarantied by tion as the Fifth and Four- 15, 1976, jury June before was chosen teenth Amendments to the United States trial, appellant’s for the second the appel- I, Constitution and Art. 10 of the Texas Sec. change lant filed a motion for of venue. Constitution. erroneous admission of properly supported by The motion was affi- testimony requires a reversal of the County davits of two residents of Wichita appellant’s conviction. Estelle v. V.A.C.C.P., required by Art. 31.03. The Smith, day pre-tri- next another filed (1981); State, Clark paragraph al motion. One of that motion (Tex.Cr.App.1981). S.W.2d asked his venue motion be carried along jury. with the voir dire of the On grounds error, In nine of the appellant 23, 1976, June jury after the had been cho- also contends that there was error in the sen, began, but before the trial the trial guilt-innocence stage of his trial. We find change court overruled the motion for of it necessary to only address five of those venue. At no time did the file con- State grounds. V.A.C.C.P., troverting Art. affidavits under error, grounds appel two Although 31.04. the record in this case is lant contends that confused, his confession is appear inadmis- it does not that the trial Thus, court ed the hearing ever held a the venue motion. issue before us is ruling, motion. not the timeliness of the trial court’s ruling. but the merits of the earlier, As noted the appellant’s second trial ended with the declaration of a mis- Although appellant’s motion 9, 1976, trial. On November asking carry before the the trial court to the venue appellant’s began, third trial again along jury he once with the voir motion dire of the filed a properly supported may right have been a waiver of his to have motion for change granted the motion venue. The record does not re- before selection of jury, question appeal, flect that not before us in this this motion was by controverted State, it was not waiver of his to have the nor does it reflect that the trial granted controverting motion absent evi hearing court held a spe- on this motiоn or Furthermore, dence the State. the se cifically upon ruled it. the record lection of an unbiased is insufficient to does include an order the trial court that satisfy join the State’s burden to issue with prior “all the Motions asserted in the change motion for of venue. See trials of this cause be incorporated herein State, O’Brient (Tex.Cr. 588 S.W.2d 940 by reference and rulings thereon ‍​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍remain App.1979); Henley v. 576 S.W.2d 66 the same purposes for of this the third trial (Tex.Cr.App.1978). As we Henley, stated in of this cause.” “Appellant change was entitled to a As then, we view the case this order show, venue if he though could even by the trial court before the appellant’s possible would be to select a jury whose third trial had the effect of reaffirming the subject members challenge were not previous court’s ruling which overruled the cause, there were influences in appellant’s motion for change of venue community which could affect without a hearing to take evidence and dire, answers on voir testimony or the without controverting affidavits witnesses at trial or that for other State. This was reversible error. impartial reason fair and trial could not ” be had.. .. long It has been the rule in this 576 S.W.2d at 72. state that a defendant is entitled to a change of venue as a matter of law change when a motion for of ven- *6 properly supported motion is ue properly put not in possible preju- contested issue the by the existing State in the dice form of in Wichita County either contro which could verting prevent him by obtaining affidavits or from presented evidence fair and im- partial at a trial. The hearing any controverting on lack of the motion. McManus v. State, evidence the appellant State 591 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); entitled change of venue as a matter Hussey State, v. of law. (Tex.Cr. 590 S.W.2d 505 reason, For this the trial court abused its App.1979); Stapleton State, v. 565 S.W.2d overruling discretion in the motion. 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Durrough State, v. 562 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). above, As appellant stated presents grounds four other of error which raise argues State appellant that dealing contentions guilt-innocence with the waived his pursue to ground of stage grounds of his trial. Because these error because he asked the trial court to error attack matters likely which are not to carry the venue along motion with the voir trial, recur in the event of a new we do not dire of jury. argument This miscon- grounds. address these ceives the ap- contention. The pellant complain does not appeal on that Having determined that this conviction the trial court erred in ruling on his motion reversed, must be we must next determine after jury chosen, was but before the may retry appellant whether the State began. Rather, trial he contends that as a error, if grounds it chooses. In three matter of law his motion should have been contends that the trial court erred granted because the State never controvert- overruling plea in jeopardy, of former

and submitting plea jury. premises? in not “A On the that to the If agreed retrial, with the “Q Uh huh. course, would be barred. we do No, sir, “A premises. not We not agree with the appellant’s contentions. had it. driven “Q you Had in been the area?

First, the appellant argues that his terminated, first was improperly trial and Yes, sir, “A we had been in the area. therefore, both his second and third “Q you Who were with time? 1.10; trials were barred. Art. Art. exactly; “A I don’t remember Mr. 27.05, V.A.C.C.P. argu The flaw in this in Fields was the car with us. ment is that when his first trial ended he “Q Why you all were out there? had yet placed in jeopardy. “A In reference to his statement that he State, In McElwee v. 589 S.W.2d 455 had given. trying We were to veri- (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held that crimi- fy some concerning information prosecution, nal jeopardy attaches when the where he had stood at the time the jury impaneled and sworn. See also Crist murder had been committed. Bretz, v. “MR. ESTRADA: Your Honor— At the time the trial objection. “THE COURT: Sustain the court declared a during appel- mistrial The jury is instructed not to consider lant’s proceeding, only first potential three question or the answer. jurors had been chosen and none these “MR. We move for a mis- ESTRADA: juror. had been jeopardy sworn in as a No trial, your Honor. yet attached. “THE Let me think about COURT: In support appel- of this contention the go jury that. You all inside the room a Jorn, lant cites United v. States minute.” (1971); granted The court then the mistrial. He Perez, Wheat.) United (9 States explained jury to the that the statement to (1824); 6 L.Ed. 165 United States Sgt. which was an Shelton referred inad- Kin Ping Cheung, (5th F.2d Cir. missible oral statement law 1973); McLelland 420 S.W.2d “very explicit.” 417 (Tex.Cr.App.1967). We find none of Where circumstances which these point. cases be on a mis- In each are cause mistrial not attributable trial was declared without the defendant’s prosecutorial judicial overreaching, consent, or a mo but each the trial was ended tion the defendant for mistrial is ordi during presentation of evidence. narily reprosecu assumed to be no bar to none of these cases was the trial ended This even tion. is so when the motion is before impaneled. required by prosecutorial judicial error. *7 Second, appellant argues the the Dinitz, 600, See United States 424 U.S. 96 during mistrial declared his second trial 1075, (1976); Chvojka 267 47 L.Ed.2d should have barred his third In his triаl. (Tex.Cr.App.1979). 828 S.W.2d second a trial number of tes- witnesses had Jeopardy the Double Clause tified for the State. The State then called protect does a defendant from bad faith Sgt. James Shelton the Wichita Falls prosecutor judge conduct a or which is Department. During Police redirect exami- provoke request. to a intended mistrial nation following the occurred: Jorn, 470, United States v. “Q Shelton, Sgt. response to Mr. Bai- 547, (1971); 27 L.Ed.2d 543 Downum v. ley’s question being about States, 734, 1033, United Hairpin, have you ever been out 10 L.Ed.2d 100 night—than there other the than you time went out to arrest James characterize appellant seeks to Shelton, Brown? questioning Sgt. set out first April appellant’s 22. The upon ruled above, overreaching. We prosecutorial 10,1976. previ- As began May on charac- trial then support to such a find no evidence during the stated, trial ended this ously prosеcutor for the terization. It was error May 11. jury voir dire on the exist- testimony to elicit which revealed statement, but appellant’s oral ence of the trial, appellant’s to his second Prior required to show over- more than error beginning motions several new counsel filed reaching. appellant has demonstrated and were heard May These motions 14. gross nor neither intentional misconduct be- the second trial just before upon ruled negligence part prosecutor. of the on trial also 24, After this June 1976. gan on We, therefore, prosecu- do not find that the mistrial, appel- counsel for the in a ended a questioning provoke tor’s was intended to pre-trial new mo- filed several again lant request. mistrial 20, 1976, co-counsel September tions. On appel- reasons, represented the appel- Bailey, Dale ‍​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍who had Fоr these we hold that the for, February asked and lant since plea jeopardy properly lant’s of former to withdraw as counsel. granted, permission the trial court as a matter of overruled mo- filed several new follows, then, Remaining co-counsel law. It that the court did not November, These motions 1976. refusing to the issue to the tions in err in submit 12. presented upon for the on November jury. No fact issues were were ruled jury’s resolution. 18, 1977, appel- Finally, January on day until the began. trial Not lant’s third con appellant makes another trial, January did the on before tention which we must answer. He con requesting dismiss- appellant file his motion right speedy tends that his to a trial as a provide him al of the case for failure to guarantied by the Sixth Amendment to speedy trial. United States Constitution was violated when his third trial was held some seven case we of the Under the circumstances months after the second mistrial was de Sixth find no denial clared, just year over after his one Al- speedy to a trial. right Amendment arrest.1 just until case was not tried though this appellant was arrest- Wingo, year

In Barker v. after the S.Ct. over ed, that it was at all the record reflects United were numerous ease. There emphasized States times an active each of to motions filed before require pre-trial Constitution does not the State timely upon. ruled These were try specific peri- a defendant within a time three trials. addition, several Rather, appellant had od. whether a In the determination of one-year pe- during this right speedy changes defendant’s trial of counsel has depends upon balancing denied of four riod.2 length delay,

factors: the reason for therefore, the total We, do not find either right, delay, thе defendant’s assertion of his appellant’s ar- between the period of time prejudice to the defendant. trial, period of time his third rest and trials, to be case, second and third In this was arrested between his for the view of the reasons January 1976. He was indicted on excessive in appellant did not January appointed delay. and had counsel We note speedy trial until represent February assert his him on After addition, day his third trial. change February of counsel on several before alleged that has not pre-trial beginning were note that the motions filed *8 delay. prejudiced by the March 5. These motions were heard and he was Although does not reflect when the the record a 2. 1. The does not claim that there was change place, counsel right speedy we note that trial under took violation of his to a trial during appеllant’s 32A.02, trial was different the third state law. See Art. V.A.C.C.P. attorneys filed the who had from of the pre-trial motions. various against hearing punishment. him at the on appel- For these reasons hold that the lant Supreme has not been denied right his to a The said: Court speedy guarantied trial as by the Sixth respondent questioned “.. . was That Amendment to the United States Constitu- by psychiatrist designated by the trial tion. court to competency conduct a neutral examination, by police rather than offi Because the trial court erred in overrul- cer, informant, government prosecut ing appellant’s change motion for ing attorney, is immaterial. When Dr. venue, admitting testimony and erred in Grigson beyond simply reporting went to punish- Drs. Morris and Tomlison at the competence the court on the issue of trial, stage ment of the we re- prosecution penal testified at the fоr the verse re- judgment conviction and ty phase crucial issue of respon on the mand for a new trial. dangerousness, dent’s future his role changed essentially

MeCORMICK, and became like that Judge, concurring. of an agent recounting of the State un Smith, 454, Estelle v. post-arrest warned made in a statements S.Ct. a Texas During psychiatric setting. custodial .capital murder defendant was examined evaluation, respondent assuredly was psychiatrist who had been ordered phase adversary sys ‘faced of the with a trial to evaluate the court defendant’s com- presence tem’ in the and was ‘not of [a] petency to stand trial. At the time of personf acting solely in his interest.’ Id. ] examination, the defendant had been indict- at 16 L.Ed.2d [384 U.S.] attorney ed been appointed and an Ops.2d237, 10 Ohio Misc. 36 Ohio examination, him. psychiatric Before the given Yet he was ALR3d 974. no was not defendant informed he had a compulsory indication that the examina right silent nor to remain that evidence gather tion used to would be evidence during the obtained examination could be whether, convicted, if necessary to decide against punishment phase used him in the he to death. He was should be sentenced attorney apparently his trial. His that, accordingly, not informed he had a not notified in advance that examina- right not to constitutional answer the tion encompass would the issue of future questions put to him.” 454 U.S. at dangerousness. at 1875. In reaching holding its in Estelle Supreme Court therefore concluded: Smith, Supreme argu- Court discounted defendant, “A criminal who neither ini- ments of Texas State that the Fifth tiates a evaluation psychiatric nor at- only applicable guilt- Amendment is to the tempts any psychiatric to introduce evi- рhase innocence of the trial and not the dence, compelled respond to punishment Likewise, may not be determination. psychiatrist if his statements can be persuaded Court not that the conclu- capital sentencing used sions him at drawn from interview were based respondent on not proceeding. nontestimonial factors. Because did The Court psychiatric consent psychiatrist opin- pretrial showed that the based his to the exami- ions right on the content of ideas informed of expressed by being nation after his Supreme possible defendant. The to and the use of there- remain silent fore, statements, rely could privi- held that the Fifth Amendment State lege Grigson [psychia- in the what was involved case before it. he said to Dr. dangerous- his future establish trist] The United States Court con- ness.” at cluded that the defendant’s Fifth Amend- rights ment were violated because failure to warn the defendant also held failure of his to the possibility notify be silent and the counsel exam- that evidence to defense gathered psychiatric in the interview could used ination examination

723 impor opinion danger- would lead to an rule. The other two factors become on future ousness violated the defendant’s Sixth only purpose tant when the does not favor right Amendment to counsel because the retroactivity. As for prospectivity either psychiatric stage interview was a critical of criteria, purpose Supreme Court proceedings. The Supreme Court did of said, only when an assessment “And right hold that counsel had a to be upon the reli probabilities those casts doubt present during the examination but did hold guilt past ability of the determinations of that notification is important so that a de- new rule procedural criminal cases must the attorney termination can be made U.S., retroactively.” page 447 at applied be and defendant as to whether par- or not to Therefore, 329, S.Ct., page at 100 ticipate in the examination. announced, when a new rule is it must be applied retroactively only procedure if the

Thus, Supreme Court overruled a of the upon used casts doubt the fairness number of decisions of this Court. See efficacy finding truth trial or the Livingston State, (Tex.Cr.App.1976), v. 542 655 S.W.2d States, procedure. In Williams v. United 933, t. denied 431 97 U.S. cer 646, 1148, 2642, 401 91 28 L.Ed.2d 338 S.Ct. (1977); S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d Shippy 250 State, (1971), that retroac- Court said 556 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), S.W.2d 246 tivity only appropriate cert. is where the former 935, 422, denied 434 U.S. 98 54 S.Ct. likelihood (1977); practice “presents L.Ed.2d 294 substantial Byrd State, Von 569 S.W.2d 883 of a number of those trials (Tex.Cr.App.1978), results cert. denied 655, 967, U.S., 441 2418, factually were 401 60 L.Ed.2d 1073 incorrect.” (1979); State, S.Ct., Wilder v. at 1153. 583 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), and Gholson v. passing, though it would note in 542 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), cert. de certainly controlling importance, not of 911, nied 432 U.S. 97 S.Ct. 53 L.Ed.2d years relying for law enforcement officials (1977). holdings this Court’s followed question threshold that must be de- Smith, procedures set out in Estelle v. su- Smith, cided is whether Estelle v. supra, is pra. Numerous defendants in this State retroactive in its effect or whether procedure alone have been convicted via the holdings enunciated in that case should be capital outlined in that case. These murder applied only prospectively. majority weeks, months, trials often lasted for if not fails to discuss this issue. and retrials in all of these cases would certainly jus- burden the administration of Walker, Linkletter v. 381 U.S. tice in this State and others. See also State (1965), held that Osborne, 631 P.2d Idaho prohibits Constitution neither nor re- quires retroactive effect for decisions ex- pounding new affecting constitutionаl rules holdings changed Both in Estelle v. Smith Therefore, criminal trials. a constitutional years the law in Texas. This Court may rule applied prospectively and not rejected Never be- claims on these bases. occurring cases before the rule was an- court-appointed fore had it been held that a nounced. expert mental health must warn a defend- and that ant of his to remain silent

Recently, Louisiana, in Brown v. inter- psychiatric evidence adduced in the view could be used him. Never principles discussed the held that the defendant retroactivity. before had The Court held that three attorney psy- factors must receive notice before a (1) purpose should be considered: rule; (2) dangerousness new extent chiatric interview on the is- of reliance law fact, rule, (3) enforcement on the in numerous old sue could be held. rejected effect on the justice administration of cases this Court the contentions retroactivity. important proceedings The most con- in Estelle v. used trolling purpose rights. factor is the new violated a defendant’s Smith

724 State, that Estelle v. was retroactive Livingston State, found Smith supra; Shippy v. v. State, supra; Byrd supra; Von v. Wilder v. the Fifth Amendment issue. as related to State, State, supra, supra. and Gholson v. Amend- Battie did not address the Sixth fact, In the Supreme United States Court However, question. ment this Court is not many had denied certiorari in of those other by bound decisions of federal courts cases. the Until United States District Court, State, Supreme than the Pruett v. Estelle, Court decision in v. 445 Smith F.2d upon (Tex.Cr.App.1970), 463 191 S.W.2d (N.D.Tex.1977), 647 had been no there consideration, compelled disagree I am contrary judicial voice in Texas. That the with the conclusion reached in Battie. rule in Estelle v. was a new rule Smith Battie, the federal court found that explicitly recognized by the federal courts announced no new rule of Estelle v. Smith as a factor in excusing the defendant from opinion essentially said that Es- law. contemporaneous objection the rule. The application an and exten- telle v. Smith was Supreme United a footnote States Court in Arizona, 436, sion of Miranda v. 384 86 U.S. said, “For the reasons stated the Court 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 S.Ct. of Appeals reject argument we the State’s said, Fifth Circuit “A decision establishes that respondent the waived Fifth overruling principle new of law either by failing Amendment claim to make a litigants may past precedent clear on which timely, specific objection Grigson’s to Dr. relied, deciding have an issue of first said, testimony.” The Fifth in Circuit had impression clearly resolution was ‍​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍not whose part, interpreted “. . . Texаs courts the saying, After so the Fifth Fifth foreshadowed.” permit and Sixth Amendments to tes timony admitted, completely like the Grigson’s proceeded ignore Dr. to be Circuit e.g., State, see Livingston fact, mention, v. 542 S.W.2d and omitted that state case 655, (1976), 661-662 cert. denied 431 U.S. upheld procedure after state case had 933, (1977), 53 L.Ed.2d 250 used in Estelle v. It was on that Smith. apparent futility held that of ob past precedent litigants clear that jecting alleged to an constitutional violation in its relied. That this Court was in error object.” excuses a failure to v. Es Smith interpretation is now Constitution telle, (5th 1979), 602 F.2d 694 Cir. at 708. litigants question. without Certainly, if the defendant could not have certainly rely upon entitled to were rule, anticipated the new neither could highest court in this State decision of State. differently. found until the federal courts Barlow’s, Inc., In Marshall 436 Peltier, In United States (1978), 98 S.Ct. (1975), L.Ed.2d 374 45 Supreme Court held administrative search constitutional Supreme Court held that the warrants were needed for unconsented Almeida-Sanchez, 413 rule announced ruling inspections. OSHA That was held not to be retroactive in Home Indus- Savina retroactively. applied would not Labor, tries Secretary 594 F.2d fact that despite The Court held (10th 1979), Cir. “. . . the clearest since applied principles familiar Almeida-Sanchez pronouncement regarding lower court Sec- fifty years old law almost of constitutional 8(a)’s constitutionality tion had been that had never Court vio- inspections warrantless OSHA were not before, the fact situation issue ruled on the Amendment”, lative of the Fourth 594 F.2d agents relying were law enforcement at 1364. lower court valid statutes and apparently highest This criminal court in decisions. proce- type had sanctioned the said: Smith, supra. dure condemned in Estelle v. n validly еn- upon “It was in reliance opinion am not unmindful of the recent standing statute, by long supported Estelle, (5th acted Cir. Battie v. 655 F.2d continu- regulations and 1981). opinion In that the Fifth Circuit administrative States, 429 F.2d v. United also Woodard that Border Patrol judicial approval, ous why which discusses (D.C.Cir.1970), respondent’s agents stopped and searched “foreshad- parties acknowl- rule has been automobile. a new Since whether of retro- *11 not be determinative was first owed” should edge that Almeida-Sanchez by decided roving patrol case to be border activity. Court, to hold that unless we are inevitably and me- not did That Miranda legal pro- rely upon any parties may not can be v. compel Estelle Smith chanically than this nouncements from sources other and the Berry, Incrimination in Self seen blameworthy regard we cannot A Pro- Examination: Mental Compulsory prevail- to the parties those who conform in (1973), cited 919 posal, 15 Ariz.L.Rev. ing statutory or constitutional norm.” when a There, Berry says, “. . . Battie. 541-542, S.Ct., U.S., at 2319. 422 at 95 psychiat- because writer concludes in this case as in It should be noted that occurs while the defendant ric examination Peltier, supra; v. v. Johnson United States by state-em- custody and is conducted is in 719, 1772, 86 16 Jersey,

New 384 U.S. S.Ct. doctors, Miranda protections ployed Denno, (1966), L.Ed.2d 882 and v. Stovall evading apply, he is Arizona should 293, 1967, 388 87 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 U.S. S.Ct. analysis. The differences challenge legal (1967), question concerns the retroactiv- and custo- the mental examination between affecting admissibility a ity of rule important no less interrogation are dial by rather than a litigant evidence offered a light In of all the than the similarities.” procedure used in the trial as in Brown v. did foregoing, I find that Estelle v. Smith Louisiana, supra, or Hankerson v. North therefore, is, in It сhange the law Texas. 2339, Carolina, 233, 97 432 U.S. S.Ct. purpose determine the necessary to (1977). L.Ed.2d 306 whether the holding Estelle v. and in Smith While I do not believe that the Fifth affected adversely used procedure holding Amendment in was Estelle Smith consider Initially, I shall search for truth. merely an inevitable extension of Miranda be a defendant requirement “clearly nor that foreshad that he need the interview warned before owed”, holding a can be a new rule lawof any- and that to the interview not submit yet by prior have been foreshadowed a against him. may be used thing says he See, example, case. v. Louisi Brown Justice Warren opinion In an Chief ana, Louisiana, supra. In Burch v. 441 U.S. Jersey, supra, the United Johnson v. New 130, 1623, (1979), 99 S.Ct. 60 L.Ed.2d 96 that its decision Supreme Court held States Court held that a conviction Arizona, supra, requiring that Miranda v. person jury nonunanimous six violates a when he warnings given a defendant defendant’s and Fourteenth Amend Sixth police, is not retroactive. questioned rights. holding ment That had been dis Florida, tinctly foreshadowed in Williams v. Johnson, Johnson and co-defendants 1893, S.Ct. 26 L.Ed.2d 446 faced death sen- Cassidy, both of whom Georgia, and Bal lew v. 435 U.S. tences, Fifth and their Sixth claimed 55 L.Ed.2d 234 Cassidy violated. rights were Amendment a. m. for murder arrested at 4:00 Louisiana, supra, in Brown v. m., he hours. At 10:25 a. interrogated for Court addressed the issue of He was interro- partial confession. gave retroactivity holding rather than noon, gave he a more After gated more. in- threshold that there was no new rule m., By p. 11:40 incriminating confession. determining volved. The test for if there is accepted It was gave a final confession. he changed a new rule is whether the decision and been denied requested that he had holding has prevailing law. Whether a attorney before with an to consult been foreshadowed is a factor to be con- he was not confessing, confessing. Prior to purpose sidered if the of the rule does warnings. type clearly retroactivity prospectivity. given favor Miranda police officers must warn If the rule that m. for the p. at 5:00 Johnson was arrested questioning questioned rights prior routinely suspect He same crime. magistrate. At briefly application, before a subject and taken to retroactive is not to the homicide 2:00 a. m. he was taken require that the new reason to can see no interrogation he continued scene. After court-appointed psychiatrist rule that a. m. It was gave a confession at 6:20 psychiatric give warnings must requested and been accepted that he had In Tehan v. Unit interview be retroactive. to confession he attorney. denied an Prior Shott, 382 ex rel. ed States warnings. The given was not Miranda Su- (1966), the Su said, here preme Court “We stress California, held that Griffin preme Court retroactivity and nonretro- choice between *12 the value of the activity way in no turns on retroactively. applied (1965), was not to be To guarantee constitutional involved. ... Tehan, testify. did not the defendant disparage ... we a consti- reiterate do argument, commented in prosecutor, The any by de- guarantee tutional in manner Supreme extensively upon this failure. U.S., clining apply retroactively.” 384 to to overturn the conviction refused Court S.Ct., Supreme at 86 at 1778. saying, retroactively, apply and Griffin Court added: privilege Amendment’s the Fifth “. . . ques- “Finally, emphasize that adjunct is not an self incrimination against rule of a constitutional tion whether privi That of truth. to the ascertainment en- procedure does or does not criminal proteсtion quite of lege stands as a . . . fact-finding reliability hance the of the re values —values constitutional different matter of process necessarily at trial is society for the of our flecting the concern effect to degree. gave We retroactive let alone.” individual to be right of each Denno, 368, 84 Jackson v. [378 S.Ct., U.S., at 465. at 86 (1964)] supra, be- highly how the failure of likely cause confessions are to be to see I am unable if persuasive jury, give proper with a coerced expert health to mental they may untrustworthy by well their jury be mislead a warnings might significantly hand, the other we de- very nature. On to be availa- incorrect information or cause application nied retroactive to Griffin in obtain- The method used jury. to the ble California [380 now be unconstitu- may information ing the (1965)] supra, despite the fact casting doubt tional, nothing but there testify fаilure to that comment on the Therefore, reliability. would upon its concern- may sometimes mislead in Es- requirement set forth hold that has ing why the reasons the defendant Smith, be supra, that a defendant telle v. the witness stand. We refused to take to the he need not submit warned that question with a are thus concerned expert mental health with the interview account, probabilities and must take as a garnered the information and that factors, of the extent to among other may used interview of such an result safeguards are available to which other him, require- a retroactive against is not the truth-deter- protect integrity ment. U.S., mining process at trial.” Amend- to whether Sixth I now turn 728-729, S.Ct., at 1778. in Estelle Smith holding set out ment Johnson, therefore, in Supreme Court opportunity given prior a defendant be requirement held that the Miranda par- attorney about his his consult with be warnings defendant must receive before for a examination psychiatric in a ticipation not be ing interrogated by police would is retroac- dangerousness determination convictions. retroactive and affirmed the tive. retroactivity Johnson also addressed Illinois, supra, a defendant In Escobedo Illinois, Escobedo v. attorney His for murder. 1758, 12 arrested discussed below. was L.Ed.2d attorney type in this case casts doubt numer- police went to the station and made requests speak ous with his client. His fact-finding proceeding. on the As the Su- requests noted, were denied. The defendant preme Court in Estelle v. Smith making repeated meanwhile was also ef- purpose of the notice in examination cases attorney. forts to consult with his These is to allow an informed decision as to requests were likewise denied. After he guard participate, whether to and not to speak attorney, not allowed to with his that, It unfairness. is true if inculpatory Escobedo made an statement attorney in- had been notified to the that was admitted in his trial. The Su- terview, appellant may partici- not have preme using “guiding hand of pated, it is also true if Johnson’s but language counsel” that is in Estelle v. found Johnson, attorney had conferred with John- Smith, held that counsel had been denied at may son not have confessed. It is not a stage thereby a critical of the proceedings, question of whether the evidence used leading inculpatory to the statement adduced, would not but rather found that the Sixth Amendment had been whether the trial and introduced evidence violated. important were unreliable that is in deter- mining retroactivity. Nowhere Estelle v. Jersey, Johnson v. New su- pra, express any does the Smith United States Court de- cided reservation to the holding accuracy proce- in Escobedo was not Compare, retroactive. dure used there. Brown v. Loui- *13 siana, supra. nothing find that would In Wade, United States v. unreliability nothing indicate (1967), S.Ct. would mislead finder of fact. In Unit- participated defendant lineup. in a Peltier, supra, majority ed States lineup was conducted after indictment and Supreme every noted case Court after appointed. counsel was Defense in which relevant evidence was excluded to counsel was not notified to his client’s guarantee enforce a constitutional not re- participation more, lineup. cit- Once fact-finding process, prin- lated to the such ing the need for the “guiding hand of coun- ciples applied only have been prospectively. sel”, Court found that the lack of notice to counsel violated the defendant’s Therefore, I princi- would find that the right Sixth Amendment to effective assist- ples of constitutional law set forth in Es- ance of counsel and reversed the conviction. telle v. Smith are not retroactive. Estelle 18,May was announced Smith Denno,

In Stovall v. district court decision in v. Estelle Smith 18 L.Ed.2d was announced December 1977. The affirmed a death sentence specif- ically question interview here in held that and the trial the rule in Wade would not Therefore, applied be occurred before either. since retroactively but ap- would be plied only also, applied Estelle v. prospectively. Smith should be retro- Adams Illinois, actively, I would not reverse ground. conviction on that

The danger of Wade-type unfairness in a lineup certainly greater much than that

presented here since the attorney has a

right to present lineup guard

against any procedure unfairness in the

whereas he has no present to be at the psychiatric ‍​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‍fact, interview. it is much likely

less psychiatric that a interview will be unfair or compared unreliable lineup

of suspects police. conducted I am

not convinced that the lack of notice to the

Case Details

Case Name: Fields v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Feb 3, 1982
Citation: 627 S.W.2d 714
Docket Number: 64519
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
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