MEMORANDUM
Plаintiff is an African-American female and former chief of staff for Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson. She accuses Congresswoman Johnson — -the first African-American female to reрresent Dallas, Texas, in Congress — of race and gender discrimination. She asserts claims of unequal pay, disparate treatment, and retaliation for her opposition to the firing оf another African-American female. Before the Court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment will be granted where the papers on file show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
*104
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
For the reasons set forth below, I have concluded that the uncorroborated and self-serving statements of plaintiff herself, upon which she chiefly relies, do not raise genuine issues of material fact, and that plaintiff has not met the challenge presented by defendant’s motion for summary judgmеnt. The motion will accordingly be granted.
A. Unequal pay claim
Plaintiff was the highest paid employee in Rep. Johnson’s office at all times during her employment. She nevertheless alleges that, when her pay is compared to that of the legislative director, it was unequal. Even if that allegation is well-founded, however, her claim must be dismissed, because it is untimely.
The congressional equivalent of thе Equal Pay Act is found at 2 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. The jurisdiction of the district courts over such actions is expressly premised on the employee’s having completed counseling and mediation. Id. § 1408(a). The statute furthеr requires that counseling be requested within 180 days after the date on which the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred. Id. § 1402(a). Plaintiff did not file a timely request for counseling.
The factual basis of plaintiffs pay claim is the allegedly disparate raises she and the legislative director received in 2003. The defense asserts that these raises happened in May of 2003. 1 The plаintiff obliquely responds that the raises were “effective” in the “Summer” of 2003, and that she “contacted” the Office of Compliance in “October-November 2003 about filing her claims,” but that “the paperwork was not completed until the early part of December 2003.” Plaintiffs representations about the relevant dates are vague and self-serving. The record establishes thаt the date of the pay raises was no later than the end of May 2003, and that counseling was requested no earlier than mid-December 2003 — when more than 180 days had elapsed.
B. Disparate treatment claim
Plaintiff appears to allege disparate treatment with respect to her termination and the conditions of her employment before she was fired. These disparate treatment clаims fail, however, because plaintiff has neither adduced direct evidence of discriminatory intent,
see Holbrook v. Reno,
Plaintiff alleges that Rep. Johnson made dеrogatory statements about black employees and laudatory statements about Asian and white employees.
2
See Fields Deposition
[Dkt. 53, Exhibit 6] at 79-84, 281-83. She offers no evidence to support these chargеs except her own testimony, and she has produced no corroboration of her story, notwithstanding her assertion that these alleged statements were overheard by others, direсted towards others, and complained about by others.
Id.
at 79-84,
Plaintiffs claim that she alone was made to do the congresswoman’s chores, even if it is a claim of race and gender disсrimination by disparate treatment, is wholly uncorroborated. There is a statement from another person to the effect that he witnessed her cleaning on one occasion, but that very same statement suggests that others were made to do chores as well, such as having the congresswoman’s car serviced and filled with gas. Stewart Declaration [Dkt. 56, Exhibit 5] at ¶¶ 15-16.
If plaintiff is to proceed without direсt evidence to support a claim of discrimination, she must establish a prima facie case and then, if the defendant proffers nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse aсtion complained of, offer evidence of pretext.
Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment in her work conditions because she has not identified an appropriate comparator. She was the chief of staff. Even if she had adduced evidence other than her own testimony showing that she had to stay lаter, work harder, and take leave less often than employees of other races and genders, such proof would not, without more, amount to a prima facie case оf disparate treatment. A comparator is necessary and the standards for similarity are high.
See, e.g., Holbrook,
As to plaintiffs claim that her demotion and firing were discriminatory: she has not refuted Congresswoman Johnson’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons with any evidence of pretext. The congresswoman’s proffered reasons for demoting and then terminating Ms. Fields are that the staff complained about her behavior, thаt her behavior was unprofessional, that she lied to the congresswoman, and that an independent investigation revealed that office morale was low and the staff mismanaged during her tenure as the chief of staff. See Reistrup Declaration [Dkt. 53, Exhibit 12], Smith Declaration [Dkt. 53, Exhibit 5], Hamlett Declaration [Dkt. 53, Exhibit 7], Gokcigdem Declaration [Dkt. 52, Exhibit 3], Kircher Declaration [Dkt. 53, Exhibit 13]. Rather than offer evidence of pretext, plaintiff—herself—simply avers that these declarations are not credible. In the face of a motion *106 for summary judgment, that simply will not do.
C. Retaliation claims
Plaintiff has made two retaliation claims—that she was demoted for opposing what she believed was the discriminatory firing of another staff member, Ms. Howie, and that she was fired for filing a discrimination complaint with the Office of Compliance. Both claims founder on the requirement that a plaintiff prove some causal connection between the protected activity and an adverse employment action.
See, e.g., Brown v. Brody,
Plaintiffs offer to prove the necessary causal connection on her claim of retaliatory termination is actually rеfuted by an intervening event that completely explains the decision to fire her.
See Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Assoc.,
Plaintiffs final plaint is that she was retaliated against when shе was demoted for opposing the discriminatory firing of the scheduler, Ms. Howie. This claim fails because plaintiff has established neither that she actually opposed the firing of Ms. Howie nоr that her employer knew that she opposed it.
Once again, plaintiffs claim finds support only in her own testimony. She states in her most recent affidavit that she told “Employment Counsel” for the defendant that she opposed the firing and that she would not lie to protect the congresswoman. She further claims that this information “got back” to the congresswoman and that this resulted in a series of negative actions against her. Fields Affidavit [Dkt. 56, Exhibit 1] at ¶¶ 28-30. But it was plaintiff who actually carried out Ms. Howie’s firing. She failed to oppose the action in any formal manner, and she recommended Ms. Howie’s replacement. Against those facts, which are undisputed, plaintiffs uncorroborated and self-serving affidavit will not create a genuine issue of material fact as tо whether she opposed Ms. Howie’s termination as discriminatory- or, more importantly for a retaliation claim, whether her employer was on notice of the protected activity.
Notes
. Defendant's submissions do not appear consistent in this regard. Compare Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. 52] at 17 (March) with id. at 17 n. 92(May). The documentary evidence appears to substantiate the May date. See Inman Declaration [Dkt. 52, Exhibit 1] at ¶¶ 8-10. Even using the May date, however, the complaint is untimely.
. The alleged statements include that: "black staffers are lazy,” "white staffers have a better work ethic,” and "Asian staffers are subservient, smarter.”
. See, e.g.,
Chung v. Washington Metro. Area Trans. Auth.,