Fields v. CSX Transp., Inc.Fields v. CSX Transp., Inc.
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Sean C. Gallagher, Eileen A. Gallagher, Patricia Ann Blackmon
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
Patrick C. Booth
David A. Damico
Ira L. Podheiser
Burns White L.L.C.
Four Northshore Center
106 Isabella Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15212
Brian D. Netter
Mayer Brown L.L.P.
1999 K Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20009
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael L. Torcello
Christopher Murphy
Doran & Murphy P.L.L.C.
1234 Delaware Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14209
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, CSX Transportation, Inc. (“CSX“), appeals the June 8, 2012 decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas that denied its motion for administrative dismissal of the claims of plaintiff-appellee, Pearl Fields, as representative of the estate of Paul H. Fields. For the reasоns stated herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
{¶2} Pearl brought this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Locomotive Inspection Act, following the death of her husband, Paul, who allegedly was exposed to various substances, including asbestos and asbestos dust, during the course of his employment as a trainman and conductor for CSX. Paul worked for CSX from 1950 until 1989. He was diagnosed with lung cancer in July 2007 and subsequently died in November 2007.
{¶3} Under the сomplaint, the first cause of action alleges that as a result of CSX‘s negligence, Paul developed severe and permanent injuries, including lung cancer. The second cause of action alleges aggrаvation of a pre-existing condition, to the extent any is shown. The third cause of action asserts a wrongful-death claim.
{¶4} Thus far, the dispute has centered on whether CSX is entitled to have the complaint administratively dismissed рursuant to
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{¶7} The trial court‘s rulings with regard to an administrative dismissal, as well as Paul‘s smoking status, have resulted in several appeals to this court. In Fields v. CSX Transp., Inc., 189 Ohio Apр.3d 268, 2010-Ohio-3877, 938 N.E.2d 68 (8th Dist.) (“Fields I“), we remanded the case to the trial court for a proper determination of whether Paul
{¶8} Upon the first remand, thе trial court made a determination on Paul‘s smoking status without considering his medical records. Because the trial court failed to properly consider the evidence that had been submitted by both parties, we agаin remanded the matter in Fields v. CSX Transp., Inc., 197 Ohio App.3d 561, 2011-Ohio-6761, 968 N.E.2d 70 (8th Dist.) (“Fields II“).
{¶9} Upon the second remand, the trial court reviewed the evidence that had been submitted by both parties and found in pertinent part as follows:
The statute is very specific in its definition of a smoker [footnote omitted], it does not encompass the occasional use of tobacco. There is no evidence of Mr. Fields’ rate of consumption, if any, between 1989 and 1996.
Therefore, the mоst probable inference to be drawn from all the evidence is that Mr. Fields was not a smoker as defined by HB 292 from 1989 to 1997. This Court, having considered all the evidence submitted by both Defendant and Plaintiff, hereby overrules Defendant‘s Motion for Administrative Dismissal.
{¶10} It is from this ruling that CSX timely appeals. CSX‘s sole assignment of error is as follows:
The trial court erred in finding that Paul Fields (decedent) was not a “smoker” pursuant to the Ohio asbestos statute.
{¶11} In this appeal, CSX argues that the trial court‘s ruling was based on unfounded speculation and that the trial court did not properly weigh the evidence. Upon our review, we must determine whether the trial court‘s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶12} While CSX suggests that the trial court only considered portions of the medical records while ignoring other information, we are not persuaded by its argument. Consistent with our mandate in Fields II, the trial court “considered all the evidence submitted by both [parties]” on the issue. While the trial court may not have detailed every document in its opinion, it is apparent that the court considered all competent, credible evidence that was provided, including the medical records.
{¶13} During its review, the trial court attempted to reconcile an apparent contradiction with Paul‘s history of smoking. The court recognized a statement in a
{¶14} CSX arguеs that the asbestos questionnaire indicated a stop date of 1996 and that Dr. Steinmetz did not limit the number of years smoked to a maximum of 40. CSX points to the opinion of plaintiff‘s expert, Dr. Rao, who stated that “[a] review of the mеdical records indicate [Paul] was a smoker from the age of 21 until 69 for more than 40 pack year[s].” Also, CSX relies on Paul‘s medical records, which consistently report Paul‘s history of having been a smoker for over 40 pаck years, having quit in 1996. However, even accepting that Paul may have smoked until 1996 and that he had a history of more than 40 pack years, this evidence does not conclusively establish his rate of smoking from 1992 through 1996, which is the pеrtinent time frame in this matter.
{¶15} Pursuant to
{¶16} Fifteen years prior to Paul‘s diagnosis with lung cancer was July 1992, and there is no contentiоn that he smoked after 1996. Thus, Paul only would have smoked for three and one-half to four and one-half years within the relevant 15-year period. Applying the above calculation, to meet the statutory definition of a “smoker,” Paul needed to have smoked an average of at least five cigarettes per day during that time.
{¶17} While CSX points to several medical records indicating that Paul quit smoking in 1996, and which note a pack year of use and smoking a pack and a half per day, these medical records were properly weighed against evidence presented by Pearl to show that Paul was a nonsmoker during the pertinent time frame. Pearl testified that she never smoked and could not stand smoke in the house. She stated Paul began to quit smoking in 1989, when they were married, and he quit altogether in 1991. Paul‘s
{¶18} When conducting a manifest weight review, every reasonable presumption must be made in favor of the trial court‘s finding, and when the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction, we are bound to apply an interpretation that is consistent with the trial court‘s decision. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 21, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984), fn. 3. Upon thoroughly reviewing the record, we find that the trial court‘s finding that Paul does not meet the statutory definition of a “smoker” is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Accordingly, the assignment of error is overruled.1
{¶19} Judgment affirmed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR