21 Ga. 447 | Ga. | 1857
By the Court.
delivering the opinion.
So in the matter of Gangwere’s estate, (14. Penn. Rep. 417, the Court held, that an inquisition of lunacy finding the party a lunatic without lucid intervals, is prima facie evidence, but not conclusive; and that even a petitioner for the proceeding, who was a witness also, is not estopped from asserting the truth against it, and showing that the party had lucid intervals. And in Hutchinson vs. Sandt, 4. Rawle 234, it was held that one of the inquest himself was not estopped, and that the finding was persuasive evidence only.
In Hopson vs. Boyd, 6. B. Monroe’s Rep. 296, the Court held that an inquisition of lunacy is only prima facie evidence against strangers; and is entitled to but little weight in Kentucky, unless it find the subject to be an idiot from birth.
The same doctrine is maintained in Doe ex dem. Morris Aber, and Morris Aber, Jun. against John Clark, 5 Holstead’s Rep. 217; namely, that an inquisition of lunacy is not conclusive against any person, not a party to it, and that when admitted in, evidence, the party against whom it is used, may introduce proof, that the alleged lunatic was of sound mind at any period of time covered by the inquisition.
Some of the Courts (see the case in 14. Pick.) in this country state, the reason for the English rule does not apply here. We are unable to satisfy ourselves of the truth of this assumption. While we appreciate the evils, not to say the great inconveniencies that must result, from not holding the judgment of the Ordinaiy conclusive, until the letters of guardianship are revoked, still as the doctrine appears to be well settled in England, and our own Courts are divided, we think it safest perhaps to hold that the inquisition is not conclusive upon third persons, not parties to it; still we must say, that it should require the clearest and most satisfactory proof, that the alleged lunatic was of sound mind, and had been fairly dealt with in a contract made with him at a period of time covered by the letters of guardianship. For myself I am free to say that I am not entirely content with the judgment, and I know not that my colleagues have come rather reluctantly to this conclusion. Perhaps the Legislature would do well to intervene upon this subject.
Judgment reversed.