88 A.D.2d 561 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1982
Lead Opinion
— Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Klein, J.), entered September 23, 1981 dismissing petitioner-appellant’s CPLR article 78 proceeding as time barred, reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the motion to dismiss denied, and the petition reinstated. The facts have been fairly stated in the dissenting opinion. So has the question presented — whether CPLR 2103 is available to extend the 60-day period of limitations for three days because the order triggering the running of the 60-day period was served by mail. We agree also that the applicability of the three-day extension depends op. whether the commissioner’s triggering order was “in a pending action”. We disagree with the restrictiveness of the dissent’s apparent holding that a “pending action” must necessarily be a “judicial action”. We disagree with the pivotal finding of Special Term that CPLR 2103 does not apply to papers served by an administrative agency. The holdings of both the dissent and Special Term are in conflict with prior rulings of this court which we find controlling. In Weingarten v Cohen (275 App Div 253, affd 300 NY 528), the paper was served by an administrative agency and no judicial action was pending. This court added three days to a six-month period of limitations because the triggering workers’ compensation order was served by mail (see, also, Matter of Bolton v City of New York, 264 App Div 964; Matter of Adams v Atlanta Constr. Co., 198 App Div 430). So, too, in Matter of R.E. Assoc, v McGoldrick (278 App Div 347), the paper was served by an administrative agency and no judicial action was pending. This court added three days to a 30-day period of limitations because the triggering State Rent Administrator’s order was served by mail. The dissent would free itself of the constraint of these cases by observing that they were governed by the Civil Practice Act which unlike CPLR 2103 (subd [b]) did not limit the extension of three additional days for mailing to “a pending action”. It is true that section 163 of the Civil Practice Act did not use those exact words, but it did restrict its applicability to papers “required to be served in an action” (see L 1920, ch 925, art 18, § 163). We view this change from “required to be served in an action” to “in a pending action” to be a difference without a distinction. It was so
Dissenting Opinion
dissent in a memorandum by Fein, J., as follows: Petitioner, a licensed medical doctor, was charged with dispensing controlled medications without proper prescription. After a hearing before a representative of the Commissioner of Health, petitioner was fined $69,020 and his right to issue prescriptions was suspended for a period of two years. The commissioner’s order, dated March 26,1981, was mailed to petitioner and his attorney by certified mail on April 3,1981, in accordance with subdivision 7 of section 3393 of the Public Health Law as follows: “Any notice, application, order or other paper required to be served upon any party to a proceeding hereunder may be served in person, by registered mail or by certified mail upon either the party or an attorney who has appeared on his behalf.” Subdivision 1 of section 3394 of the Public Health Law provides for “judicial review as provided in article seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules.” “Application for such review must be made within sixty days after service of the order or determination upon the person whose license, certificate, right or privilege is affected thereby or upon the attorney of record for such person.” (Public Health Law, § 3394, subd 2.) This proceeding was commenced by order to show cause and petition served upon respondents on June 4,1981, the sixty-second day after mailing of the administrative determination. The order to show cause was dated June 2, 1981, the sixtieth day. The question is when the service was complete and, if complete upon mailing, whether the 60-day period of limitation should have been extended three days for mailing (CPLR 2103), so as to have commenced on April 6, thus giving petitioner at least until June 5 to institute this proceeding timely. Special Term dismissed the petition as untimely, ruling that the additional time for mailed service under CPLR 2103 did not apply to papers served by an administrative agency. CPLR 2103 (subd [b], par 2; subd [c]) prescribe the following with respect to service of papers on a party or his attorney “in a pending action”: “(b) Upon an attorney. Except where otherwise prescribed by law or order of court, papers to be served upon a party in a pending action shall be served upon his attorney * * * 2. * * * where a period of time prescribed by law is measured from the service of a paper and service is by mail, three days shall be added to the prescribed period * * * (c) Upon a party. If a party has not appeared by an attorney or his attorney cannot be served, service shall be upon the party himself by a method specified in paragraph one, two or four of subdivision (b).” The applicability of the three-day exténsion rule turns on whether the commissioner’s order was served here “in a pending action” (CPLR 2103, subd [b]). In Matter of Express Limousine Serv. v Hennessy (72 AD2d 864), a CPLR article 78 proceeding to challenge denial of a carrier permit, the petition was dismissed because it sought to review an order which had been rendered upon an untimely application for reconsideration. Although not necessary to the decision, the court noted that “CPLR 2103 has no application to the service of papers by administrative agencies prior to the commencement of a judicial proceeding” (72 AD2d, supra, at p 865). In Jackson v State of New York (85 AD2d 818, 818-819) it was ruled: “CPLR 2103 (subd [b]) is concerned with papers to be served in a pending action. In the present case, no action was pending until claimant served his claim instituting the action and, consequently, this section has no application herein (see Monarch Ins. Co. v Pollack, 32 AD2d 819).” The notice of appeal from a referee’s decision to the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board under
This section was amended in 1951 to substitute the word “law” for the phrase “statute or in the rules of civil practice” (L 1951, ch 554, § 2).