Fidelity Const. Co. v. Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc.Fidelity Const. Co. v. Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc.
This is a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc. v. Knight et al., 117 So.2d 740, upon an alleged conflict with a decision of the District Court, Third District, in the case of Shirey v. Thompson et al., Fla.App., 115 So.2d 203, certiorari denied.
Both decisions involve a dispute as to liability for workmen‘s cоmpensation under
“Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter * * * shall be liable for and shall secure the payment to his employees of the compensation рayable under
§ 440.13 * * *. In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his contract work to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such сontractor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business establishment, and the сontractor shall be liable for and shall secure the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractоr who has secured such payment.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar the petitioner Fidelity Construction Company subcontracted a portion of its construction contract to the respоndent Collins, who in turn was found to have subcontracted to one Humphries
Upon very similar facts in the Shirey case, supra, the District Court, Third District, withоut opinion, left standing a commission ruling, under the same statute, that subcontractors, as well as employees, of a subcontractor would be covered by compensation policies of the latter, who “had become a contractor within the meaning of this section.” Decision No. 2-819, Florida Industrial Commission, filed April 22, 1959.
There exists a prima facie conflict betwеen the two decisions upon the pivotal point of law and on closely related facts, and one which is in this instance nonetheless direct because of the failure of the сourt to write an opinion in the Shirey case to substantiate its decision therein. Lake v. Lake, Fla., 103 So.2d 639; Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Branham, Fla., 104 So.2d 356, at page 357. This conclusion follows logically from a consideration of general principles governing scope and effect of an initial judicial review, whether by certiorari or otherwise, of rulings by administrative bodies in this jurisdiction. Wilson v. McCoy Mfg. Co., Fla. 1954, 69 So.2d 659; Vol. 1, Fla.Jur., Administrative Law, Sеction 182. See also State ex rel. Gordon v. Trimble, 328 Mo. 760, 300 S.W. 475.
The liability imposed by the commission in the Shirey case could, upon the face of its opinion, have rested on no logical ground other than the statutory rule аnnounced, in view of the commission‘s express refusal in that case to resolve an alleged conflict as to whether claimant‘s immediate employers were in fact subcontractors or were themselves employees of the first subcontractor against whom the award was made. The statute in controversy,
The ultimate question here is whether the Florida Industrial Commission has correctly interpreted the provision of the Workmen‘s Compensation Act here in question. As the administrative body charged with the responsibility of administering the Act, its interpretation is entitled to great weight. While not conclusive upon the courts, such an administrative interpretation should not be overturned by the courts unless clearly erroneous and for the most cogent reasons. Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., Fla., 59 So.2d 788. Contrary to the conclusion reached by the Second District Court of Appeal in the decision here reviewed, we do not find the commission‘s interpretation to be “clearly erroneous“; nor dо we find “cogent reasons” for overturning the same. In fact, it is our view that the only reasonable and practicable interpretation of the provision of the act here in questiоn is that made by the commission. Its interpretation follows that of a leading authority in this field. See Schneider, Workmen‘s Compensation, Vol. 2, Sec. 326, p. 177. And our independent research — no cases from other jurisdictions having been cited by the parties in their briefs — reveals that the commission‘s interpretation is in accord with decisions by courts of other jurisdictions on this question.
The appellate court, in the decision here reviewed, relied upon “the legislative
It was also pointed out in the Qualp case, supra, that the general contractor (referred to as “the еmployer“) could have avoided liability to employees of subcontractors and sub-subcontractors “by providing for compensation liability in his subcontract, in the event of a seсondary subcontract.” The meaning of this statement is made clear by the Pennsylvania court in the later case of Byrne v. Henry A. Hitner‘s Sons Co., 1927, 290 Pa. 225, 138 A. 826, 828, 58 A.L.R. 865, in which a claim was made against the general contractor, even though the subcontractor carried workmen‘s compensation insurance. In distinguishing the Qualp case, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court said that when the subcоntractor “has taken out insurance, or is otherwise legally responsible, the state no longer has use for the statutory employer [the general contractor]. * * * The principаl contractor is no longer bound and is not required to answer `in the same manner and to the same extent as to his own employees.’ To reason on any other basis would lead to an absurdity and foist on the principal contractor a responsibility not contemplated by the Compensation Act and out of all proportion to reasonable requiremеnts.”
We agree with the statement in the decision here reviewed that “It is manifest that the purpose of
Accordingly, for the reasons above stated, the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal here reviewed should be and it is hereby quashed, and the order of the commission reinstated.
TERRELL, HOBSON and DREW, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, C.J., and THORNAL, and O‘CONNELL, JJ., dissent.