Opinion by
The question involved may be succinctly stated: Did Fessman agree to support his son during his minority, or did the support agreemеnt terminate on Fessman’s death? ; . ■.....•.
*449 The Orphans’ Court awarded the bulk of Fessman’s estate to a trustee for the minor’s support during minority. From this decree one of the residuary legatees appealed.
Fessman and his wife had a child, Charles Richard Fessman, who was born March 17, 1949. Mrs. Fess-man, on May 24, 1949, filed a complaint in divorce a mensa et thoro. On January 18, 1951, the Court ordered Fessman to pay his wife |14Q. a month as alimony pendente lite. On July 27, 1951, Fessman executed a will in which he left his residuary estate to be divided equally between his parents on the one hand and Eva Puccinelli, the appеllant, on the other hand. On March 18, 1952, Mrs. Fessman’s complaint was amended to ask for an absolute divorce.
On July 15, 1952, Fessman еxecuted and his attorney, Tasso E. Camarinos, sent to Mrs. Fessman’s attorney, William J. Graham, the following important letter:
“July 15, 1952
Mr. William J. Graham
Attorney at Law
620 Frick Building
Pittsburgh 19, Penna.
Dear Mr. Graham:
It is understood and agreed that I will continue to pay to Minnie Fessman, the sum of $100.00 monthly payable between the 10th and 15th day of each month for the support of Charles Richard Fessman in lieu of the Order of Common Pleas Court dated January 18, 1950. * Very truly yours,
Chaeles H. Fessman”
*450 On July 16, 1952, without any foreknowledge on the part of the parties, the Court granted an absolute divorce to Mrs. Fessman.
Fessman made payments of $100. a month for the support of his son under and in accordance with the letter of July 15, 1952, except that at the time of his death on October 11, 1954, he was in arrears in such payments in the total sum of $580. On ■ February 3, 1954, Fessman wrote his former wife enclosing some money to pay part of his arrearages for the support of their son and asked her to marry him. However, Fess-man did not change his last will dated July 27, 1951, in which as above noted he gave Miss Puccinelli onе-half of his . residuary estate. Miss Puccinelli contends that the agreement for support of Fessman’s son terminated uрon Fessman’s death, and that she was entitled to one-half of his residuary estate. The Court interpreted Fessman’s lettеr of July 15, 1952 (in conjunction with certain oral testimony) to impose a liability upon the father to support his son during minority; and awarded to Mrs. Fessman arrearages for the support of their son, and a large sum to a trustee to pay for the support of the son $100. a month from Fessman’s death on October 11, 1954.
The letter from Fessman to Graham dated July 15, 1952, promising to pay .the sum of $100. monthly for the support of his son, is undoubtedly ambiguous for the reason that it is silent as to the duration of the рayments. Appellant contends that parol evidence as to the intention of the parties and the duration of Fess-man’s obligation was inadmissible, under the well settled general rule: Where an agreement purports to cоntain the entire agreement between the parties, and there is no averment and proof that anything.was omittеd therefrom by fraud, accident or mistake, all prior ne
*451
gotiations and verbal agreements are merged in and superseded by the subsequent written agreement and parol evidence is inadmissible to alter, contradict, vary, subtraсt from or add to the written agreement:
Grubb v. Rockey,
Where a contract does not fix a definite time for the duration of the relationship or the terms or obligations which are created therein, parol evidence is admissible to show “the surrounding circumstances, the situation of the parties, the objects they apрarently had in view and the nature of the subject-matter” of the agreement,
in order to ascertain the intention оf the parties-. Lipsie v. Dickey,
375 Pa., supra;
Price v. Confair,
Mr. Graham, counsel for Mrs. Fessman, was permitted by the Auditing Judge to testify that upon receipt of Fessman’s letter of July 15, 1952, he telephoned Fessman’s attorney, Mr. Camarinos, who prepared the ambiguous letter, and objected to the words “in lieu of the order of Common Pleas Court dated January .18, 1950”. Graham testified that he told Camarinos that the clause “in lieu of the Order of Common Pleas Court” was entirely unnecessary, since the support оrder (alimony order) in the Common Pleas Court was for Fessman’s wife and this agreement was to be for the support of thеir boy during Ms *452 minority; and that Camarinos replied that his client’s word was good for the support of the boy during his minority. The auditing Judge believed Graham’s testimony.
The aforesaid conversation with, and admissions by, Fessman’s attorney are admissible in evidencе with the same force and effect as if they had been made directly by Fessman himself, since Fessman’s counsel was acting within the scope of his express or implied authority to negotiate a settlement with Fessman’s wife of their marital difficulties and her claims for alimony and the support of their son:
McGarity v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
We have not overlooked the principles of law advanced by appellant that a father, in the absence of a contract, has no legal obligation to support his children after his death, and is under no legal obligation to leave his children anything by will. However, these principles are inapplicable when a father contracts to support his child during minority; in such a case, the father’s contract for support is valid and will be binding upon his estate:
Huffman v. Huffman,
Amended Decree affirmed; costs to be paid by appellant.
Notes
The parties agree that 1950 was erroneously inserted for 1051. • . • ....