63 Iowa 484 | Iowa | 1884
The court seems to have thought that the acceptance was sufficiently within the terms of the offer, and, while it seems to have had some doubt as to whether the reply was made in time to necessarily constitute a contract, it held that it did so, unless the plaintiff immediately, upon the receipt thereof notified the defendant that he had withdrawn his offer. The instruction given is in these words: “The letters given in evidence, one from plaintiff to defendant, proposing to defendant to use defendant’s money in plaintiff’s hands and allow him interest at the rate of ten per cent, and the other from defendant to plaintiff, accepting the proposal, or consenting to plaintiff’s use of the money, if written by the respective parties, would constitute a written contract between them as to that matter, binding on both, unless the plaintiff, immediate^ on the receipt of the defendant’s letter, gave notice to the defendant that he had withdrawn his offer, or declined to accept the money as a loan.” The giving- of this instruction is assigned as error.
The plaintiff’s letter containing his offer bears date, “Lincoln, May 1,1871. The offer is in these words: “I want to say to you, if you was coming out here in the fall, I will rise your money until you come, and give you ten per cent for it. I have a payment to make on my place before a great while,
The position taken by plaintiff, that the acceptance was not made within the terms of the offer, rests upon the fact that the offer contains the words: “If you was coming out here in the fall,” and the acceptance makes no reference to such condition. To this we have to say that it does not appear to us that we can'give the words the force of a condition. They seem to have been used rather as an introduction to, or reason for, the plaintiff’s proposal, and not as essentially concerning any object which the plaintiff' was desiring to secure. In our opinion, the acceptance was substantially within the terms of the offer.
There remains only to be considered whether the error in the instruction is such that we could regard it as without prejudice. If the undisputed facts showed that the letter of acceptance was mailed within a reasonable time, then the error rvould be without prejudice. The contract would have been proved, and the defendant would have been entitled to an instruction even more favorable to him than that of which the plaintiff complains.
Several other questions are presented, but we omit- to determine them. They arise mainly upon the pleadings or evidence, and are not of such a character that they will probably arise upon another trial. The evidence, as it is presented to us, appears to us, from such examination as we have been able to give it, to be in many respects unintelligible. IIow a proper verdict could have been founded upon it we do not see. If the case shall be tried again, it will be seen, doubtless, that a more careful and somewhat fuller and more systematic examination of the witnesses will be necessary.
Neversed.