Defendant-Appellant Mark J. Ferrell was convicted of Burglary, a Class B felony, Forgery, a Class C felony, and Theft, a Class D felony. Ferrell was sentenced to sixteen (16), eight (8), and four (4) years, respectively, all sentences to run concurrently for a total of sixteen (16) years. Hе appeals directly to this Court and raises the following three issues:
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding the unoccupied structure Ferrell broke into was a dwelling as defined by Indiana law;
2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the convictions and sentences imрosed; and
3. Whether the sentences imposed are manifestly unjust.
The facts most favorable to the verdict show that on or about September 1, 1987, Ferrell broke into a residence owned by the victim, Raymond Bond, who had been previously married to Ferrell’s aunt. While at the residence, Ferrell, posing as Bond, contacted Gus Maseari of Beech Grove Auction to sell various items of furniture located in the residence. Maseari went to the house and bought a video-cassette recorder, a color television set, a living room set, a table and chairs, a chest and dresser, a queen size bed, and a refrigerator from Ferrell, who signed the sales agreement/receipt in Bond’s name. The Indianapolis Police apprehended Ferrell in the residence. At the time of his arrest, Ferrell was wearing a sweater, shorts, and a gold braсelet which belonged to Bond.
In a statement he later gave to the police, Ferrell admitted that he had forced open the back door of the house without the permission of the owner. Ferrell also admitted he did not have permission to sell the items in thе house to a used furniture dealer or sign a receipt in the owner’s name.
I. Was Bond’s House a Dwelling?
Ferrell’s first contention is he should have been found guilty of only a class C felony, burglary, because the structure he broke into was not a dwelling for purposes of the burglary statute, IC 35-43-2-1. That statute providеs:
A person who breaks and enters the building or structure of another person, with intent to commit a felony in it, commits burglary, a Class C felony. However, the offense is a Class B felony if it is committed while armed with a deadly weapon or if the building or structure is a dwelling, and a Class A felony if it results in either bodily injury or serious bodily injury to any person other than a defendant.
The term “dwelling” is defined in IC 35-41-1-10 as follows:
a building, structure, or other enclosed space, permanent or temporary, movable or fixed, that is a person’s home or place of lodging.
Ferrell argues the structure in question did not contain “those accoutrements usual to the convenience of habitation” and therefore did not constitute a dwelling, citing
Burwell v. State
(1988), Ind.App.,
the term “dwelling” has been legislatively enlarged to afford protection to interests in the sanctity and security of habitation which, once established, do not necessarily fail because of the lack of use for purposes of sleep.
Burwell,
a structure, once a dwelling, does not lose that character until such time as its inhabiter vacates the premises to the extent it no longer contains those accoutrements usual to the convenience of habitation.
Id. at 815.
In the instant case, Ferrell contends the house he burglarized did not contain those accoutrements usual to the convenience of habitation. Unlike Burwell, Ferrell argues the victim in the instant case had put his house up for sale and had not slept there for approximately four months prior to the burglary. In fact, Bond did testify he was living with his girlfriend on a regular, full-time, basis at the time of the burglary and kept very little food in the house because he ate at his girlfriend’s рlace. According to Ferrell, Bond merely stored his furniture, appliances and clothes in the house while it was listed with a real estate broker to be sold. The record, however, reveals evidence to the contrary. Bond maintained his home mailing address and tеlephone number at the house. In addition, Bond testified he went to the house nearly every day to pick up his mail and occasionally would go inside for a few hours to watch television or to get something to eat. In our opinion, Bond’s furniture, appliances, clothing and food which he kept in the house did constitute those accoutrements usual to the convenience of habitation; therefore, his house did not lose its character as a dwelling. Burwell, supra.
In
Phillips v. State
(1987), Ind.,
This Court has traditionally held burglary, like arson, to be an offense against the habitation.
Carrier v. State
(1949),
We find no error on this issue.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Ferrell contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements of the crimes charged. He concedes that he was in Bond’s home, sold certain items belonging to Bond and signed Bond’s name on a sales receipt. However, Ferrell maintains his innocence because he claims he did not have the requisite criminal intent to commit the crimes of burglary, theft and forgery. Specifically, he alleges Bond gavе him permission to stay at the house and use Bond’s guaranteed life card for identification purposes to assist him in selling Bond’s video-cassette recorder. Bond testified he did not give Ferrell permission to reside in the house, sell any of the goods, or sign his name. We have hеld that the uncorroborated testimony of
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one witness is sufficient to convict, even if the witness in question is the victim.
Henley v. State
(1988), Ind.,
Regarding his burglary conviction, Ferrell specifically challenges the sufficiency of evidence regarding the breaking itself. Breaking is proved by showing that even slight force was used to gain unauthorized entry including opening an unlocked door.
Henley,
We find there was sufficient evidence to sustain Ferrell’s convictions.
III. Propriety of Sentences
Finаlly, appellant contends the sentences imposed were manifestly unjust. Ferrell cites IC 35-38-1-7(c) and maintains the trial court should have considered the following mitigating circumstances: the crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm to persons or property; there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the crime, though failing to establish a defense; the person has made or will make restitution to the victim of his crime for the injury, damage, or loss sustained; and imprisonment will result in undue hardship to the defendant. Ferrell contends the burglarized house was not seriously damaged; he believed Bond authorized him to stay in the house and to sell his video-cassette recorder; the money received from the used furniture dealer was returned; and imprisonment will result in undue hardship to Ferrell due to his young age. We dо not agree with this analysis. We have reviewed the trial judge’s findings and conclusions prior to sentencing and find that he properly weighed the mitigating and aggravating factors before enhancing the presumptive sentence.
Our standard is clear: we will not revise a sentence authorized by statute except where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and character of the offender. A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to the particular offense and offender for whom such sentence is imposed.
Coleman v. State
(1986), Ind.,
The trial court is affirmed.