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Fernando Belmontes, Pr v. Jeanne S. Woodford, Warden, for the California State Prison at San Quentin
359 F.3d 1079
9th Cir.
2004
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Docket

*1 part, private parties AFFIRMED in Subpoenaing REVERSED duct at issue. commercial liti private with in connection part appellants. and remanded. Costs to the sort little resemblance gation bears the doctrine is petitioning governmental

of Nevertheless, assum protect.

designed available, is the defense

ing arguendo protect does not Noerr-Pennington

fails. litigation. See

“objectively baseless” sham Investors, Inc. v. Real Estate Co

Prof'l Inc., Indus., Pictures lumbia 1920, 123 L.Ed.2d 611 BELMONTES, pr, Fernando magistrate judge found that the sub etitioner-Appellant, P “transparently egregiously”

poena was acted with overbroad and defendants WOODFORD, Warden, faith. Jeanne S. for gross negligence and bad This finding subpoena to a tantamount the California State Prison at San objectively baseless. Quentin, Respondent-Appellee. urge us to look Defendants No. 01-99018. underlying litigation, merits of the Appeals, United States Court of They apparently think a subpoena. at the Ninth Circuit. any and litigant immunity should have for discovery long as his lawsuit all abuses so Feb. they surprisingly, has some merit. Not Sacramento, Christopher Wing, Esq., H. authority implausible offer no for that CA, Multhaup, Esq., Valley, Eric Mill S. Assuming Noerr-Pennington proposition. all, CA, Petitioner-Appellant. it is no bar for applies we hold challenged discovery conduct where Johnson, Anthony Esq., Mark Sacra- objectively itself is baseless.6 mento, CA, Respondent-Appellee. for Having dismissed all the federal claims, REINHARDT, O’SCANNLAIN, jurisdic- the district court declined Before pendent PAEZ, tion state law claims Judges. over Circuit 1367(c)(3). § Because under 28 U.S.C. of some of the federal

reverse dismissal ORDER claims, we reinstate the state claims. also deny panel petition has voted to dismissal of the We REVERSE Stored rehearing petition for re- for claim, Act AFFIRM dis- Communications hearing en banc. O’Scannlain claim, Wiretap of Act and RE- missal petition for rehear- grant would prejudice dismissal with VERSE rehearing for en banc. petition and the Act Computer Fraud and Abuse claim with petition advised of the The full court was to dismiss with leave to rehearing judge requested en A banc. of also REVERSE dismissal amend. We matter en whether to rehear the a vote on the state claims. 60-61, prong litigation excep S.Ct. 1920. That of Noerr-Pennington U.S. at s sham here; requires proof subjective presumably, intent to tion also also satisfied the test is prohibit legal process to the evil use achieve any objectively subpoena purpose baseless exemption is ed the statute which private information. is to uncover Investors, Real Estate claimed. See Prof'l *2 1080 First, failed to receive a ma- panel’s

banc. The matter sons. conclusion defies of the nonreeused active jority of the votes Supreme prece the record and clear in favor of en banc reconsideration. judges Second, dent. O’Scannlain notes FED. R. APP. P. 35. dissent, in his un panel’s conclusion “strong policy against dermines the retri rehearing for en banc is petition years denied. als after the first trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than CALLAHAN, Judge, with whom Circuit speculation.” Belmontes 350 at F.3d O’SCANNLAIN, TROTT, Judges Circuit 915(citing Boyde California, v. 494 U.S. KLEINFELD, GOULD, TALLMAN, 370, 380, 1190, 110 S.Ct. 108 L.Ed.2d 316 join, dissenting BYBEE BEA from (1990)). Third, reaches its con rehearing denial of en banc: despite Supreme clusion the California I respectfully dissent the order Court’s unanimous conclusion “no le denying rehearing en banc. gitimate believing basis” existed for 1982, In found Fernando Bel- the trial court misled guilty first-degree montes murder about sentencing responsibilities. its Bel nineteen-year-old beating a woman to I, 802, montes 45 Cal.Rptr. Cal.3d 248 death with dumbbell bar and sentenced 126, 755 P.2d 310. him to death.1 On automatic appeal to the Court, California Belmontes ar alia, gued, inter that the trial court misin- proper structed the on the role of Amendment, Eighth Under the sympathy general character and back must consider all relevant evi ground during penalty the trial’s dence that a presents defendant to it and (“Belmontes phase. People See v. Belmontes afford weight that evidence such as it ), 744, 799, I” 45 Cal.3d 248 Cal. Johnson, appropriate. Penry deems v. 126, (1988), Rptr. 755 P.2d 310 cert. de 782, 797, 1910, 532 U.S. 121 150 S.Ct. nied, 1034, 848, 488 U.S. 109 S.Ct. 102 (2001). L.Ed.2d Simply allowing 9 a de (1989). court, supreme L.Ed.2d 980 present fendant to mitigating evidence to properly viewing instructions and enough. Penny is not Ly whole, arguments as a concluded that “no naugh, 302, 319, 2934, 492 U.S. 109 S.Ct.

legitimate believing basis” existed for (1989). 106 L.Ed.2d 256 A jury must be jury. trial court had misled the Id. at consider, able to not refuse to 802, 126, Cal.Rptr. 248 755 P.2d 310. consider, any constitutionally relevant mit Now, twenty-one years after Belmontes’ igating Angelone, evidence. Buchanan v. years trial and fifteen after the California 757, 522 U.S. 118 S.Ct. 139 ruling, Court’s deci- (1998). L.Ed.2d 702 Such con sion reverses Belmontes’ sentence. do- looking siderations include at a defendant’s so, majority concludes that past drawing behavior and favorable infer had, fact, the trial court misinstructed ences probable about his future conduct. regarding sentencing responsi- its Carolina, Skipper 1, 4-5, bilities. v. South 350 F.3d at 908. U.S. This conclusion is in error for three rea- 90 L.Ed.2d 1 Specifically, specific convicted Belmontes intent that death occur. Bel first-degree special (“Belmontes murder with circum- II'’), montes v. Woodford special findings stances. It made that Bel- (9th Cir.2003). F.3d montes was the actual killer and that he had includes a defendant’s panel agrees, argues, and regard by character.”2 494 U.S. in this trial erred 1190; Buchanan, por- consider the see also advising (concluding that tended 118 S.Ct. 757 mitigating evidence tion of his *3 jurors adapt prison directing well to to base their decision that he would to show evidence,” that a member on “all the the instruction constructive and would become jurors properly a life sentence. allowed the to consider society granted evidence). The any mitigating panel, on this how- prevail for Belmontes order ever, instructions, by likelihood” must concludes that these “a reasonable argument, plain language, encompass the court’s their do not understood exist caused it not to events or considerations unrelated Bel- way in a instructions constitutionally culpability, particularly relevant evi- montes’ forward- this consider looking 110 S.Ct. considerations such as Belmontes’ Boyde, 494 U.S. dence. decision, in pris- no future conduct if sentenced to life Contrary panel’s to the II, exists. on. 350 F.3d at 901. This reasonable likelihood such wrong. conclusion is A noted, just Court has began instructing judge The trial (k) jury to told us that factor instructs the all of by stating that “it shall consider and consider defendant’s received dur- evidence which has been Boyde, character. 494 U.S. at case, except of this any part of the trial ing has further noted S.Ct. 1190. Court may be hereafter instructed.” you as jury’s of “a defen- consideration list of read an enumerated judge then as indicative of his past dant’s conduct The last circumstances. mitigating seven is an inevitable probable future behavior circumstance, (k),” “factor the so-called element of criminal undesirable “[a]ny to consider oth- structed sentencing.” Skipper, 476 U.S. which extenuates er circumstance added). any If doubt (emphasis it is not a though the crime even gravity of remained, judge, here further clarified for the crime.” legal excuse (k) factor sentencing instructions and that “the by informing the interpreted fac- Supreme Court has your read for (k) circumstances which have jury “to directing a specifically tor as you merely are consideration any circumstance other you the factors that crime, certainly examples of some of which might excuse the Woodford, Boyde suggested to the that it could Payton never decision in 2. Our recent banc), (9th Cir.2003) (en character not consider 346 F.3d 1204 (k) nothing change background. this conclusion. Factor See specific Now, ambiguous under the facts of in Belmontes by Payton. We that conclusion reached prosecutor explicitly told Payton, carefully distinguishing Boyde. See religious experi- Belmontes' should consider 346 F.3d at 1211-12. ence, community his future value to ability prisoners when to work with other his Boyde grounds. distinguished on two We determining his sentence. First, Payton “posi-crime” mitigat- concerned Thus, very Boyde did not reasons for (not ing Boyde Bel- evidence. mention Payton, Payton does not now control control II) "pre-crime” evidence. montes concerned Holding ignores our otherwise Belmontes. Second, Payton "repeatedly prosecutor in description of en banc (k) own did not that factor en- stated high-lights misapplication precedent. This Payton's mitigating compass evidence of his danger implications of the religious good behavior conversion prosecutor decision. prison.” Id. at 1212. The surrounding take into account as reasons decid- factors. The record further impose penalty not to a death or a supports presumption. this upon Mr. Belmontes.” death sentence (emphasis B added). Assuming, arguendo, Even that one contends that the trial

effectively any clarity might consider the undid Bel- court’s instruc montes’ achieved ambiguous, tions to be did not giving “superceding qualifying directive.” reach its verdict in a vacuum. For this Specifically, points Id. at 902. to reason, we look to the mitigating evidence *4 following instructions: “You judge’s the introduced into the record to discern what pay careful attention to each of should jury evidence the considered when faced Any these one of them standing factors. allegedly with the ambiguous instructions. a decision that may support alone death is 1190(stat- 384, 110 punishment appropriate the this ing that “the introduction objec without According panel, juror to the case.” who tion of volumes of mitigating evidence cer followed these instructions would think tainly is relevant to deciding jury how a that or could-not he she consider nonstatu- would understand an instruction which is evidence, tory namely, that the Here, ambiguous.”). worst the juror testimony could not consider tending interpretation own of suggests the record to show that Belmontes would lead a con- that jury the must have considered Bel- prison. structive life in Id. thus potential montes’ future as a prisoner. life suggests that the last two sentences of the panel states, As the put Belmontes on jury jury instructions caused the to com- . “substantial” evidence that pletely ignore preceding the he could be- sentences. This interpretation logic. prisoner defies come model pose and would not danger. a future Belmontes Nothing jury in the instructions was at 907. personally addressed contradictory. judge enumerated sev- jury, asking jurors the spare his life en mitigating circumstances. He told the give and to him “an opportunity to achieve jury that those enumerated circumstances ” [himjself.” goals try to better Id. at “examples were of some the factors (alteration in original). In an “emo- jury should judge consider. The tional closing argument,” de- jury told that he had them ex- fense counsel “asked amples spare examples to which the factors — Belmontes’ life pay ground should careful attention on the and ex- he amples alone, standing positive could would support make if contributions al- a decision appropriate. that death is not lowed to live out prison.” his natural life in Nowhere did the limit judge to Id. at 907. It is hard to imagine that the considering only mitigat- the enumerated presented defense could have the issue of Rather, circumstances. he told them or poignantly. life death more Perhaps just opposite. telling, most prosecution told that it should consider Belmontes’ presume

We follows its in- religious experience, his future value to the structions. Angelone, Weeks v. community and ability his to work with 145 L.Ed.2d 727 prisoners other determining We when his sen- presume therefore must (O’Scannlain, J., knew that tence. the enumerated cir- See id. at 910-11 “examples” cumstances were of mitigating dissenting). appeared certain factors’ that penalty- ‘those Thus, aspects four at least ” listing.’ considered in ‘the 350 F.3d at indicate

phase Belmontes’ fu- forward-looking respect panel, evidence of all due With (1) evidence re- the “substantial” judge jury’s colloquy ture: read the far dif- (2) character, Bel- garding Belmontes’ ferently. allow for the personal plea montes’ Juror Hern asked whether (3) himself, the defense improve him to should the “statement about to consider directions prosecution’s aggravation mitigation of the circum- (4) forward-looking evidence Notably, stances.” “statement” ex- all evidence instruction to consider court’s told the plicitly con- panel nevertheless presented. factors were nonexclusive. The cor- jury was confused about cludes that “yes.” rectly answered Juror Hern then consider the evidence

whether should should balance those asked she factors. points O’Scannlain presented. judge again correctly answered in the out, pro- conclusion turns entire this finally affirmative. Juror Hailstone asked Id. at “into a virtual charade.” ceeding psychiatric if Belmontes could have treat- (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. 914-15 *5 judge responded, again ment. The once 1190). S.Ct. correctly, jury that the cannot consider testimony. Hughes Borg, such See C 700(9th Cir.1990) 695, (noting that F.2d that a series of panel The also concludes jurors present- can consider jurors individual and questions between trial). at ed that proves judge during the deliberations permitted are under law to ask Jurors interpreta- This jurors the were confused. questions; asking questions, the mere exchange than far more into the tion reads juror not establish confu- does existed. fact, questions just these as easi- sion. jury the had deliberated for sever- After duty ly jury taking show that the was its hours, judge, al Juror Hern asked Ap- a seriously reaching before verdict. aggravation statement about “[t]he speculate why a pellate courts should circumstances, now, that mitigation of the juror particular question. a asked listing?” responded, The court was the assume, argu- if for the sake of yes, ma’am.” Even we listing, was the She “[t]hat asked, ment, jurors factors we that the were confused when then those certain “[o]f and then must also they questions, were to decide one or the other asked their court answered: balance the sheet?” The that understood presume balancing process.” Weeks, right. It is is judge’s “[t]hat answers. See thereafter, asked Shortly Furthermore, Juror Hailstone even 120 S.Ct. “possible [Belmontes] it was that whether their jurors remained confused after during treatment psychiatric could have judge, he instructed discussion with the “That judge responded: this time?” go “to over the in you cannot consider something to deliberations again.” The returned making your decision.” questions. further did not return with information, further “Had the desired not contend that would, sig- have probably they might, Rather, the wrong. judge’s answers were ut- to the Court. The nified their desire exchange limited panel concludes from this gratify manifested to willingness most juror it is “clear that at least one them, may fairly presumed be ... should consider believed productive society. farther to ask.” Arm- member of they nothing be Toler, strong v. Wheat. California Court concluded that presume To otherwise L.Ed. 468 duty had understood its to consid- every time a require “would reversal er such evidence. a matter of constitutional

inquires about decision, In reaching its su state significance, regardless judge’s an- preme court noted had in Weeks, swer.” jury that structed the “the cir your cumstances which I read for have takes few isolated incidents you are merely consideration into a amplifies them constitutional examples you of some of the factors infirmity. ignores This may take into account as reasons for decid “[jjurors Court’s observation that do not impose not to a death upon sentence solitary parsing sit in isolation booths I, Mr. Belmontes.” Belmontes 45 Cal.3d in meaning structions for subtle shades Cal.Rptr. 755 P.2d 310 lawyers way might.” the same in (emphasis original). The court then 380-81, 110' Boyde, 494 U.S. noted that prosecutor’s argument “[t]he To the extent that have different reinforces our conclusion as instruct instructions, interpretations of these ed, fully must have understood its “may differences be thrashed out obligation weigh all of the defendant’s process, deliberative with commonsense mitigating evidence.” Id. While Cali understanding of the instructions fornia Supreme Court did not examine the light place of all that taken at the trial has specific question of whether the con likely hairsplit- over technical prevail potential sidered adapt *6 ting.” at 110 Id. Unfor- prison and become a constructive member tunately, hairsplitting and technical subtle society, ques it did examine the broader parsing exactly of the instructions is how tion of whether had considered panel reaches its conclusion. background. character examination, From this the California Su II preme legitimate Court concluded that “no This is not the first time courts finding basis” existed for that the did have had occasion to examine whether Bel- not obligations.3 understand its at Id. duty montes’ was confused about its Cal.Rptr. Now, 755 P.2d 310. to all mitigating evidence. More later, years fifteen panel reexamines years than ago, argued fifteen Belmontes whether considered all of the California constitutionally relevant evi trial court had misinstructed the on dence. proper sympathy general role of only The California Court not character background evidence in the conclusion, reached a considered but it had penalty phase. O’Scannlain the benefit of a record that was fifteen dissent, notes in his presented Belmontes years court, younger. As a federal habeas only background character and evidence to “should, course, give great weight jury. Belmontes the considered of a coequal conclusions Belmontes’ character and thus Fenton, provided judiciary.” state Miller v. possible basis for the jury to conclude Belmontes could still U.S. 88 L.Ed.2d Notably, present appeal the district court also concluded factors. The is from this deci- had considered all sion. tempted swing “strains a chair another ward instead structured, in the unpersuasively perceive while he was institution- mightily —to —and comprehensive in the al environment of the Youth Au- error California constitutional giv- proper jury thority. Id. at 873. The heard that perfectly judge.” trial Belmontes “good counseling en the state Belmontes had been (O’Scannlain, J., dissent- F.3d at 908 young repeat inmates not to the mistakes ing). They he made.” Id. at 907. also pleaded guilty heard that Belmontes

Ill being accessory an after the fact to volun- tary manslaughter crime as and that he had bat- labels Belmontes’ so, In doing attempted pregnant heinous.” tered and to choke his “especially allegedly innocu- girlfriend, causing drop her to their infant theorizes crime, would not daughter. ous nature of the Id. at 873. had it sentenced Belmontes death

have have achieved occasion- duties. The charac- understood its al, prison. moderate success The rec- distorts greatly of the murder terization provided, ample aggra- ord also the record. vating evidence for the to sentence nineteen-year-old struck did, all, him to death. Belmontes after twenty times Steacy McConnell fifteen to savagely nineteen-year- beat an unarmed bar, a in the head with an iron dumbbell woman with a old dumbbell bar and leave him that he with to her house. brought bar her to die. expert

An testified that the blows would IV pot.” Steacy cracked have sounded “like a injuries defensive to her also suffered Capital always cases are difficult. Our feet; arms, at legs apparently she justice perform system of asks attack, to ward off this brutal but tempted imaginable: the most difficult tasks to re- delivering After these fatal to no avail. credibility, guilt solve to determine or blows, Belmontes still had the wherewithal nocence, and to life and decide between Steacy’s equipment and ex to take stereo perform death. Jurors these duties view- plain accomplices simply to his he *7 ing the evidence and the defendant first- out a “had to take witness.” hand. day, Bel 350 F.3d at 870. Later not now undo the deli- This court should Steacy’s montes sold stereo $100 a de- process by second-guessing berative

bought some beer. jury’s squarely cision that was within the Meanwhile, found their Steacy’s parents unfortunately, panel, province. lying pool unconscious a daughter twenty-one-year- It a just that. dissects shortly afterward from blood. She died second-guess jury’s deci- old record by the hemorrhaging caused cerebral so, a “reasonable doing sion. finds simple to her head. This was not a blows supreme likelihood” of error where a state “robbery gone wrong.” and a States district court court United by misinter- found none. It finds error decidedly presents

The record also Supreme Court preting United States character and picture mixed of Belmontes’ a different result. precedent demands relies so background, on which way in a that undermines It finds error testimony heavily. heard finality by ignoring in criminal cases structured, in the insti- Belmontes “thrived against years retrials after “strong policy prison.” tutional environment of Id. the claimed error at- first trial where They also heard that Belmontes speculation.” “mitigating than of his witnesses constituted amounts to no more A trial court cannot 110 S.Ct. 1190. evidence.” so instruct Boyde, 494 U.S. jury. finds constitutional Simply put, none exists.

error where proposed instruction would have reasons, judge constituted a comment the trial I For these dissent. proffered that he considered Belmontes’ BEA, Judge, with whom Circuit Circuit mitigating evidence be evidence. joins, dissenting TALLMAN Judges supposed are not to make such rehearing denial of en banc: comments about the evidence. The judge the sole exclusive of the credibil- join Judge her dissent Callahan ity weight of the evidence.1 To rehearing from the denial of en banc. Ad- majority says struct the as the should ditionally, respectfully I also dissent from have done would have been constituted denying rehearing en banc the order with charge proffered that Belmontes’ evidence following comments: Only constituted evidence. First, majority in finding errs persons where reasonable must accept properly the trial court did not character- credibility weight of the evidence and its “mitigating.” ize Belmontes’ evidence as proper. would such a characterization be The trial refused to read the most an Such instruction would amount to a important part requested instruc- directed verdict on an issue. tion, which stated: should not ‘[Y]ou Such instruction also would have been your limit of mitigating consideration argumentative. A trial judge should not specific circumstances to these factors. pick and choose from the evidence and tell any You also consider other circum- what evidence to consider on an ... imposing stances as reasons for not That issue. is the function of counsel. the death sentence.’ The was not informed that it mitigat- should consider Second, majority repeatedly mis- bearing evidence on Belmontes’ quotes and language mischaracterizes the probable future conduct if sentenced to (k)” of “factor application narrow its prison life in without the possibility of only preceding to factors the commission parole.... Rather than ju- instruct the of the crime. language The actual of fac- rors that it their duty to consider (k) broader; tor is much it allows consider- and, to, give if appropriate, effect all of ation of predicts evidence that presented by jail. actions in defendant.... majority correctly quotes lan- 335 F.3d at 1040. (k)” guage of “factor to allow the

By language, majority this “[a]ny the deter- consider other circumstance which testimony mines that gravity and that extenuates the of the crime even ness, majority's proposed 1. including instruction is di- but not to limited the fol- rectly contrary given to the lowing: instruction daily triers of fact in California trial courts: The demeanor and manner of the witness testifying; quality while The character and judges You are the sole and exclusive of the testimony; believability of that ... weight of the witnesses the The existence or non bias, interest, given testimony to be existence of a the of each witness. or other mo- tive; determining believability previously by A statement made of witness you may any matter that has a witness that is [consistent] [or] [inconsis- witness; tendency reasonably prove disprove testimony to tent] or with the of the ... testimony the truthfulness of the wit- of the Cal. BAJI 2.20. “Moreover, (k), factor as noted above: un- legal excuse for it not a though is language crime,” interprets Boyde, ‘society” ‘long like has not had a but then culpability for “petitioner’s likely to mean held view’ that a defendant’s future at 1061- crime he committed.” mitigate can or conduct serve excuse his read, naturally this instruction “Most Rather, commission of a serious crime. jury to consider evidence allows the legal concept peculiar the doctrine is a by of the crime the commission upon bears capital punishment cases.” 335 F.3d at his mitigates and excuses or the defendant By plain the offense.... its culpability for majority again talking is about the the instruction language, crime, of a of gravity commission not the or considerations encompass not events mitigation crime. All for the commis- cul- unrelated to the defendant’s are execution; precede of a crime its sion must pability.” Id. grav- the circumstances that extenuate the language of the instruc- By changing necessarily of a not ity precede crime do of the gravity tion “extenuates the its execution. crime,” ...” to for the “culpability crime Practically all that has be said is said the focus to factors majority shrinks quite by Judge well O’Scannlain: or at the have occurred before which must (k) Likewise, because factor allows the of the crime. But time of the commission jury to consider Belmontes’s character reading not an accurate is background, there is no reason to gravity phrase “extenuates thought think that would have lessen, means: “To crime.” “Extenuate” using it was foreclosed from such infor- diminish; To lessen or to weaken.... potential mation to consider his future (of an of- the seriousness seem to lessen prison. life in sentenced to Su- etc.) fense, by giving excuses or guilt, noted, preme has “Consideration serving as an excuse.” Webster’s Una- ed.1979) past of a defendant’s conduct as indica- (2d Dictionary (emphasis BRiDGED added). probable tive of his future behavior is an inevitable and not undesirable element Indeed, a much “extenuate” sentencing.” Skipper, of criminal (k) by the meaning by factor than broader 90 L.Ed.2d U.S. dictionary: something it includes that can added); l(emphasis see legal guilt lessen but does not constitute 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (k), I read factor example, excuse. For (“Petitioner through an opportunity paid include restitution would (k) argue factor that his by caught. a thief after he was victim or ‘excused’ and character ‘extenuated’ suggest language I would crime, and see the seriousness of the on “gravity of the crime” focuses ju- no reason to believe that reasonable criminal, but includes culpability view, ‘long rors would resist the held society general. the effect on To society,’ appropriate that in an case such gloats the criminal taunts or extent of a imposition would counsel crime, gravity of the crime is after his death.”); less than John- sentence cf. that the criminal enhanced. To the extent *9 son, 2658, 125 remorse, repents or rehabilitates shows L.Ed.2d 290. himself, gravity -the of the crime is dimin- ished. at 1073. majority argu- a defense has taken majority agree, does not but dis- (good pre-trial conduct establishes changing language of ment

agrees after conduct) and elevated good future hope Nothing instruction. required

it into a or allows that. requires

the law America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, PALLARES-GALAN, Alfredo

Jose

Defendant-Appellant. 02-10532.

No. Appeals,

United States Court

Ninth Circuit.

Argued July Submitted

Filed Feb.

Case Details

Case Name: Fernando Belmontes, Pr v. Jeanne S. Woodford, Warden, for the California State Prison at San Quentin
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 5, 2004
Citation: 359 F.3d 1079
Docket Number: 01-99018
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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