267 Mass. 397 | Mass. | 1929
This is a suit by the trustee in bankruptcy of William H. Edwards to have declared void a conveyance by William H. Edwards of a two-thirds interest in the estate of his mother, Rhoda Edwards, to Alfred J. Edwards, his father, and to have that interest adjudged to be a part of the estate of the bankrupt. The contentions of the defendant Alfred J. Edwards are that the real and personal property standing in his wife’s name at the time of her decease was impressed with a trust for their joint benefit. Mrs. Ed
Upon the facts found there was no resulting trust in Alfred J. Edwards, the property having been placed in his wife’s name in part for her own benefit. Pollock v. Pollock, 223 Mass. 382. Sigel v. Sigel, 238 Mass. 587. The trust relied upon by him was an expressed trust not in writing. Such a trust would be unenforceable because of the statute of frauds. That statute does not require that a trust in land be created by deed but only that it be manifested or proved by writing. Urann v. Coates, 109 Mass. 581, 585. A conveyance of property to carry out the terms of an oral trust in land is upon a consideration which the law recognizes. It is the performance of an equitable obligation which the court so far as possible will protect. Hutchins v. Mead, 220 Mass. 348, 349. Liberty Trust Co. v. Hayes, 244 Mass. 251. When such conveyance has been made it will be valid against creditors of the grantor unless the facts are such as to give rise to the doctrine of estoppel. Briggs v. Sanford, 219 Mass. 572, 575. Hutchins v. Mead, supra. When the trust has been executed “it is not necessary to inquire whether it might have been enforced.” Hutchins v. Mead, supra.
The statute of frauds cannot be invoked to defeat an estate conveyed. Bailey v. Wood, 211 Mass. 37. In the case last cited there was a definite understanding and agreement between the deceased and her brother that she should not make a will, but should allow her property to pass by descent to him to be by him distributed to his wife and children. She refrained from making a will in reliance upon his promise to make distribution as requested. After her death her brother, then being insolvent, in performance of what he considered to be his duty and obligation, distributed the whole estate to his wife and children, transferring certain mortgages on real estate to his daughter as part of her share. The court held that when an oral trust has been fully executed it may be proved by oral evidence even if it concerns land, and that
The fact that husband and wife cannot make a valid contract with each other does not require the court to set aside conveyances made to carry out the understanding between them as to the title to property held by the wife for their joint account. The question whether a trust could or could not have been enforced by the husband is not a controlling consideration. Bancroft v. Curtis, 108 Mass. 47, 49. “Equity will not undertake ordinarily to set aside a real trust binding upon the conscience of the trustee and by him carried into effect.” Briggs v. Sanford, supra. Hutchins v. Mead, supra. The facts in this case distinguish it from English v. English, 229 Mass. 11.
The trust found to exist in the case at bar was not in violation of the statute of wills. See Bailey v. Wood, supra. The complete legal title to the property was in Mrs. Edwards, and there is nothing to show that it was the understanding of herself and husband that the arrangement between them was intended to be testamentary in character or that the purpose was to evade the statute of wills. Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227. Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co. 251 Mass. 309. We interpret the findings to mean that throughout the married fife of the parties whenever earnings of the husband were placed in the hands of the wife they were received with the understanding that they were then impressed with the trust obligation. The son took such title as he had subject to an unenforceable oral trust; he made the conveyances and transfers to give effect to the understanding of the parties and in recognition of his father’s equitable right; the title thereby gained by his father was upon a consideration which is recognized by the law and cannot be disturbed in these proceedings.
Decree affirmed with costs.