46 F. 88 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Tennessee | 1891
In this equity cause a decree was originally rendered for the plaintiffs on their bill and for costs. An appeal was taken, and the case was reversed in the supreme court, (10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13,) with directions to dismiss the bill and render judgment for costs against the plaintiffs and the surety on their prosecution bonds. The costs claimed for defendants are as follows:
Clerk’s fees, paid by the receiver, - $ 391 40
Marshal’s “ “ “ “ << . 208 26
Examiner’s •• “ “ “ 8 20
Master’s “ “ “ <• “ on printing record, 500 00
Expense “ “ “ •• “ “ “ << 829 62
Receiver’s commission, “ “ - 2,731 60
Docket fee on final hearing, .... 20 00
Docket “ “ 98 depositions, - 245 00
Costs taxed in the supreme court, .... 135 15
Clerk’s fees since the appeal, - 49 75
Marshal’s 53 54
Costs paid by defendant on Walker’s deposition, 7 00
Costs of transcript in Be Ferguson, bankrupt, 6 00
Making in all claimed by defendants, - $5,185 52
Of which the clerk has so taxed all but receiver’s fee, $2,731 60
Leaving as the 'clerk’s taxation, $2,453 92
1. A docket fee of $2.50 has been taxed on each deposition “taken and admitted in evidence,” amounting in all to $245 on the 98 depositions on file. Of these depositions, 14 were taken outside this district; 71 before examiners at Memphis, where the court is held; and the remaining 13 in this city, before officers other than an examiner or master. For the plaintiffs, who are adjudged to pay costs, it is contended that these fees are not taxable upon depositions taken within the jurisdiction of the court before one of its examiners, and this objection goes to the above 71 depositions so taken, but does not apply to the other 27. The record in this case shows that as a matter of fact each of the depositions so taken before the master or an examiner were by written interrogatories and written answers, just as depositions are usually taken, and not “in narrative form,” as insisted in the brief of counsel. The argument against the taxation of these fees is that the testimony so taken is simply the examination of the witness, and not his deposition, and that, therefore, such fee is not taxable, since the statute applies only to “depositions.” It is as follows: “For each deposition taken and admitted as evidence in a cause, two dollars and fifty cents.” Rev. St. § 824. Section 862 of the Revised Statutes provides that “the mode of taking proof in causes of equity and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction shall be according to rules now or hereafter prescribed by the supreme court, except as herein specially provided.” And the sections of the revision immediately following prescribe the mode of taking depositions de bene esse “in any civil cause depending in a circuit or district court,” (Rev. St. §§ 863-865,) and under a dedimuspotestatem, “according to common usage;” and in perpetuam rei memoriam, “according to the usages of chancery,” (Id. §§ 866-870.) The original supreme court equity rule No. 67 prescribes how “commissions to take testimony may be taken out * * * upon interrogatories filed by the party taking out the same. * * * If the parties shall so agree, the testimony may be taken upon oral interrogatories by the parties or their agents without filing any written interrogatories.” This rule was amended at the December term, 1854, by giving the judge of the court authority “to vest in the clerk of said court general power to name commissioners to take testimony.” Later, at the December term of 1861, the rule was further amended by providing that “either party may give notice to the other that he desires the evidence to be adduced in the case to be taken orally, and thereupon all the witnesses to be examined shall be examined before one of the examiners of the court; * * * and such examination shall take place in the presence of the parties or their agents, by their counsel or solicitors, * * * and which shall be conducted as near as may be in the mode now used in common-law courts. The depositions taken upon such oral examination shall be taken down in writing by the examiner in the form of narrative, unless he determines the examination shall be by question and answer in special instances. * * * When the examination of witnesses before the examiner is concluded, the original deposition, authenticated
Nor does the word “deposition,” as used in this fee statute; (Rev. St. § 824, supra,-) appear by the decisions of the courts to be confined in its meaning or application by any such limitations, or by the weight of authority, probably, restricted by any limitations whatever. In Stimpson v. Brooks, 3 Blatchf. 456,—an equity case, decided by Judge Betts in 1856, and the first decision, I think, under this clause of the statute,
“In its strict and appropriate sense it is limited to the written testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial proceeding, either at law or in equity.”
The only case cited by counsel against the taxation here is Factory v. Corning, 7 Blatchf. 16, and the precise question before the court there was whether the fee was taxable upon oral testimony taken before the master “on the accounting” before him, and evidently after the final decree settling the rights of the parties to the cause. Judge Nelson in disallowing the taxation says the statute “relates to testimony taken out of court, under authority which will entitle it to be read as evidence in court, and has no relation to oral testimony taken in court or before a master. It applies in cases at common law where depositions are given in evidence upon the trial, and in suits in equity where depositions are read at the hearing.” The decision obviously was made not so much upon any distinction between depositions taken before one officer, rather than another, as upon the idea that the statute confines these, as it does the other docket fee mentioned in it, to depositions used “on a trial before a jury,” or “on a final hearing in equity or admiralty.” And other cases seem to have held the same doctrine, as will be seen hereafter, though the statute as to these deposition docket feos contains no such limitation as to the time when or purpose for which they are “admitted in evidence in a cause,” or “in the cause,” as originally enacted. 10 St. U. S. 161. While in Dedekam v. Vose, 3 Blatchf. 77, it was held that upon the trial of an admiralty appeal in the circuit court these fees were not taxable there upon depositions read from the district court transcript, (in which court they were taxable,) yet, upon depositions taken for the circuit court after the appeal, they were taxable under the Statute. In Jerman v. Stewart, 12 Fed. Rep. 271, where depositions taken in the state court were used by agreement in a case at law here, I held the fee taxable because the statute “does not mean that the deposition shall be formally taken, and the fees allowed only for such as are formally taken, but for those that are taken in any way and admitted in evidence. The use of the deposilion on the trial is what entitles the attorney to the fee.” Archer v. Insurance Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 660; Wooster v. Handy, 23 Fed. Rep. 49, 59, 63. In the admiralty cause of The Sallie P. Linderman, supra, there had been a reference to a commissioner, upon which 21 depositions were taken and returned to the court with the commissioner’s report, and “admitted in evidence by the judge in deciding the cause.” The motion to retax costs was overruled, and the $2.50 on each deposition was allowed to proctor for the prevailing party. In Amer
The question whether these attorney’s fees can be taxed upon depositions unless admitted in.evidence “on a trial” at law or “on a final hearing” in equity and admiralty is not here presented for adjudication, as all these depositions were used in proof at the hearing, and taken for that purpose, there being no reference or collateral proceedings in the cause in which or for which any of this testimony was taken. The following cases, in which such fees were disallowed upon that ground, do not, therefore, apply here: Strauss v. Meyer, 22 Fed. Rep. 467, where the depositions were used in part upon motion for preliminary injunction, and in part taken and used on reference to the master to ascertain damages; Spill v. Celluloid Manuf'g Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 870, where certain depositions were taken to be used upon such reference, and others in a col-, lateral proceeding in the cause for contempt of court; Dalzell v. The Daniel Kaine, 31 Fed. Rep. 747, where the testimony was taken before a commissioner appointed to make distribution of a fund in admiralty; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 684, and Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Texas, etc., R. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 775, 776, where, in suits for the foreclosure of a railroad mortgage, intervenors for damages caused by the receiver made proof by depositions taken and used before the master upon a reference to him. In Tuck v. Olds, 29 Fed. Rep. 883, such fees were disallowed by Judge SevereNS in an equity case; but the report does not show whether the depositions were taken to be used on the “final hearing” or otherwise in the cause. The court, in the opinion, says:
“It is probable that the statutory provision was intended to provide for compensation in cases where depositions are taken bene esse, and in such other eases, not within the scope of the ordinary method of taking testimony in cases pending in the federal courts, as may arise.”
But this decision was expressly overruled in Ingham v. Pierce, 37 Fed. Rep. 647, by an oral opinion of Judge Jackson, concurred in by Judge Severens, because the practice under a long-established interpretation of the statute throughout this circuit has been to allow such lees; the 23 depositions in that case having been taken before, notaries public under
2. At the hearing of this cause before the late Mr. Justice Mathews and Judge Hammond the following decree was made by the court:
“On good cause shown * * * the master in chancery is hereby ordered and directed to have the record in this cause printed, consisting of the pleadings and proof in the cause. He will observe and follow the form and method of printing the records in cases of appeals or writs of error to the supreme court of the United States, so that copies of the printed record can be used in case of appeal in the cause. It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that W. A. Wheatly pay the costs of said printing out of any funds in his hands as receiver, or hereafter to come into his hands as such. Said master in chancery will cause as many as forty copies of said record to be printed, to be distributed under the direction of the court. * * * It is further ordered that the master prepare and print with the record an index of it.”
Under this order 40 copies of the record wore printed and indexed, making a volume of 836 pages in the exact stylo of type, paper, size, etc., as the records on appeal are printed in the supreme court, and the expense of the printing, paper, and binding, $829.62, with the master’s fee allowed in the case, $500, in all $1,329.62, was paid by the receiver, and has been taxed by the clerk as costs against plaintiffs, to which they object by this motion. After this a decree was rendered in this
The statutes prescribe the fee of the clerk for making such copy of a record, (Rev. St. § 828,) and that, upon appeal, a transcript, etc., “shall be transmitted to the supreme court.” Rev. St. § 698. Rule 8 of that court requires that “the clerk of the court to which any writ of error may be directed shall make return of same by transmitting a true copy of the record and of the assignment of errors, and of ail the proceedings in the case, under his hand and the seal of the court;” and its rule 10provides for the printing of records on appeal, (25 copies in each case) the fees for which are prescribed by rule 24, made under the authority of an act of congress approved March 3, 1883. Rule 24 of the supreme court also contains the provision that “in cases of reversal of any judgment or decree in this court costs shall be allowed to the plaintiff in error or appellant unless otherwise ordered by the court;” and rule 10 further provides that “in case of reversal, affirmance, or dismissal, with costs, the amount of the cost of printing the record and of the clerk’s fee shall be taxed against the party against whom costs are given.” Section 983 of the Revised Statutes governing costs in the federal courts is as follows:
“The bill of fees of the clerk, marshal, and attorney, and the amount paid printers and witnesses, and lawful fees for exemplifications and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use on trials, in cases where by law costs are recoverable in favor of the prevailing party, shall be taxed by a judge or clerk of the court, and be included in and form a portion of a judgment or decree against the losing party. Such taxed bills shall be filed with the papers in the cause.”
The final decree of the supreme court in this case was “that the said defendants, Geo. G. Dent et al., recover against the said Isaac A. Ferguson et al. $135.15 for their costs herein expended, and have execution
3. At the commencement of this litigation a receiver was appointed at the instance of the plaintiffs. His settlement with the court has been accepted as correct by the parties as to the compensation retained by him and otherwise. From his reports it appears that he has been paid for his services as receiver the sum of $2,731.60,- being 10 per cent, commissions on the gross collections of rent. The defendants claim that this amount should lee taxed as costs against the plaintiffs, but the clerk did not so tax it, and the defendants by their motion ask the allowance of this item in their favor. The bill was originally filed to obtain possession of certain valuable real estate in Memphis, to cancel the muni-ments of title in defendants as clouds upon that of plaintiffs, and establish the title therein to themselves. The receiver, in his settlement, 1ms paid over to defendants the balance of the funds in his hands. In support" of defendants’ motion counsel cite and rely upon two .cases. In one—Lockhart v. Gee, 3 Tenn. Ch. 332—the bill was filed to enforce a vendor’s lien, and a receiver was appointed to collect the rents on the' land up to the date of its sale, on the apprehension by plaintiff and the court that the proceeds of such sale would not be sufficient to satisfy the lien. Under the Tennessee decisions, however, such a vendor has right to satisfaction only out of the land find is never entitled to a receiver to collect rents. Per Cooper, J.:
“Having no right to a receiver, the complainant is, of course, liable to the •defendants for all the consequences of having had one appointed. The costs of the receivership, including the compensation of the receiver, must therefore be paid by the complainant ”
“Upon an examination of the cases it will be found that in every case there was no question made as to the legality or propriety of the appointment of the receiver; that in each case the receiver closed up the business, and settled his accounts in pursuance of his appointment. * * * We think it would be an unjust and inequitable rule if in all cases the receiver should be entitled to his compensation from the fund in his hands, wittiout reference to the legality of his appointment. ”
Subsequently, in a case whose facts strikingly resemble those of the one at bar, like questions again came before that court in Radford v. Folsom, 55 Iowa, 276,7 N. W. Rep. 604, in which French v. Gifford, supra, was urged upon the court. It was an action to quiet title and recover possession of lands, and a receiver was appointed to collect rents, pay taxes, and discharge incumbrances. Plaintiff claimed title under a deed which the court held to be a mortgage, finding a large sum due plaintiff, and granting defendants the right to redeem the land upon paying same, title to vest in plaintiff in case of failure to so pay. The receiver, as here, made settlement with the court, paying balance in his hands over to defendants. The opinion holding the appointment of the receiver proper uses this language:
“The mere fact that the court found, and so decreed, that the plaintiff and defendants sustained the relations of mortgagee and mortgagors, does not demand a different conclusion. * * * The receiver was duly appointed in the exercise of the lawful jurisdiction of the court,” and “discharged the duties presented until the case was finally decided, and the rights of the parties settled, and an order made disposing of the balance of the funds in the reeeiv*98 er’s hands. * * * It is believed that the authorities uniformly hold that when no question is made as to the legality and propriety of the appointment of the receiver, and he has closed up the business in pursuance of his appointment, his compensation should be paid from the funds in his hands.”
In Beckwith v. Carroll, 56 Ala. 12, (cited for plaintiffs,) the receiver was appointed to gather and dispose of crops from land leased to partners,. (the original parties plaintiff and defendant in the cause,) and the owner of the land by petition subsequently became a complainant. The fund was insufficient to pay the rent; but the receiver’s compensation was ordered to be paid out of it, and the land-owner appealed. Held no error, Manning, J., in the opinion of the court, saying:
“When it becomes the duty of a court of equity to take property under its own charge through a receiver, the property becomes chargeable with the necessary expense incurred in taking care of and saving it, including the allowance to the receiver for his services. ”
Such is' unquestionably the well-settled law, and a citation of authority in support of it would seem to be needless. No case to the contrary has been cited by counsel, nor any in support of their position, except those heretofore noticed; and it is believed that not one decision can be found holding that the proper expenses of a receiver or his compensation shall be taxed as costs against the losing party where his appointment was proper and legal, and made by a court in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, and where the fund in his hands is sufficient to pay same. Nor does the legality or propriety of his appointment depend at all upon the event of the suit; because it is ultimately determined that plaintiff in an action is not entitled to recover or to the relief he seeks, non constat that the action of the court or the conduct of the parties in the appointment of a receiver has been irregular, improper, erroneous, or unnecessary. But, under the circumstances of this case, the defendants ought not, in any event, to be held entitled to the relief they seek by this motion, and a proper and sound exercise of the discretion inherent in a court of equity over the matter of costs should not aid them. The property in dispute at the institution of this suit was overburdened with back taxes in the sum of nearly $7,000 due the city, county, and state. Suits for the sale of much of it for such taxes were pending in the state courts. Its sanitary condition was extremely bad, and proceedings for the condemnation of portions of it were on that account threatened, and, perhaps, in some instances already commenced; and there was great danger of the property being wholly lost to whomever it should be eventually adjudged to belong, unless taken in charge of and protected and preserved by the court. The services of the receiver have been in the highest degree satisfactory to the court and the parties. He has kept the property intact, put it in as good sanitary condition as was possible, kept it insured and repaired, paid off or discharged all the past due and current taxes, and paid most of the costs of this expensive litigation, besides paying the defendants (including amounts to their counsel) some $6,000 or more; and upon the argument it was stated at the bar that this receiver is now in possession of the
The reasoning upon which the foregoing conclusions have been reached render it unnecessary to consider the question discussed at the hearing, whether the provisions of section 983, Rev. St., quoted heretofore in this opinion, are an inflexible limitation upon the federal equity courts in the matter of cost taxation. Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527; Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U. S. 116, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed. Rep. 20; Coy v. Perkins, 13 Fed. Rep. 111, and notes; Spaulding v. Tucker, 2 Sawy. 50; Gunther v. Insurance Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 830. Nor, for the same reason, has it been deemed material for the purposes of this case to discuss the well-recognized distinction of costs “as between party and party,” and those as between “party and solicitor.”