53 Ga. App. 309 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
The Bank of Dawson, as holder in due course, brought suit on a promissory note against Ferguson. The defendant filed his verified plea and answer setting up that he was not indebted on the note; that the indorsement of the payee thereon was not genuine; that the bank was not a bona fide holder in due course, for value and without notice, of the contract sued on; that the note was wholly without consideration, and the defendant received nothing from the original payee, and was and is due him no sum whatever; and that the note was given to the payee as payment for 100 shares of the stock of the NuGrape Company, which were not owned by the original payee and have never been delivered to the defendant, and which stock is wholly worthless. The first trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff, and a writ of error was sued out to this court to review the judgment overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Whereupon this court certified certain questions of law made by the record to the Supreme Court, and that court answered the same. Ferguson v. Bank of Dawson, 179 Ga. 861 (177 S. E. 694). Applying the principles of law laid down by that court in its answers, this court reversed the judgment of the trial court overruling the defendant’s motion for new trial. Ferguson v. Bank of Dawson, 50 Ga. App. 604 (179 S. E. 236). The second trial resulted in a second verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was denied, and the defendant excepted. The plaintiff in error (defendant) having died while this writ of error was pending, the temporary administrator of his estate was made a party in his stead.
One ground of the motion for new trial is that a member of the jury trying the case, Dallas Spurlock, was a disqualified juror, for the reason that he was the comity farm agent for Terrell County, and the income received by him for wages, compensation, office supplies, etc., was obtained from various sources, among which was a contribution of $6.25 per month made each month by the plaintiff bank. The evidence in support of this ground showed
Where the disqualification of the juror because of interest, etc., is shown to be true without dispute, and the same was not known to movant or his counsel until after the verdict and they could not have discovered the same by the exercise of due diligence, it is error for the court to refuse a new trial. Perrett v. State, 16 Ga. App. 587 (85 S. E. 820); Edwards v. State, 174 Ga. 632 (163 S. E. 157); Georgia R. v. Hart, 60 Ga. 550; Bullard v. Trice, 63 Ga. 165; Bank v. Tuck, 107 Ga. 211 (33 S. E. 70); Groover v. Simmons, 152 Ga. 423 (110 S. E. 179); Brooke v. Pickett, 21 Ga. App. 422 (94 S. E. 601). This is so even though the juror filed an affidavit that he was not prejudiced on that account. Swift v. Mott, 92 Ga. 448 (17 S. E. 631). “It is contrary to public policy
Under the facts of this case, it was improper for the court to give in charge to the jury the latter portion of Michie’s Code, § 4294(196) (Code of 1933, § 14-1806) and the explanation thereof, to wit: “Provided this act shall not apply to sales after the original purchase-price has been paid and certificates of stock have been issued; means that if stock has been sold by the company to some individual, and that such individual makes a second sale of such stock, the law above quoted does not apply to such latter sale.”
The other grounds of the motion for new trial are amplifications of the original grounds; and as the evidence may be different upon another trial, this court will not now pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence.
Judgment reversed.