197 Md. 488 | Md. | 1951
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was instituted on March 29, 1949, in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, by Denton J. Ferguson (appellant) against The Baltimore and Annapolis Railroad Company, a body corporate, (appellee). It is grounded on negligence and arises out of an accident in an attempt by the plaintiff to board the defendant’s train. The defendant filed general issue pleas, the case was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict for the defendant, and upon judgment entered thereon the plaintiff has appealed.
The facts are as follows: The plaintiff lives at Wood-lawn Heights, in Anne Arundel County, and had for several years before the occasion of the accident. Wood-lawn Heights is a short distance from Woodlawn Station on the defendant’s railroad. Plaintiff worked in Baltimore City and commuted to and from his work via the defendant’s railroad. On the afternoon of April 1, 1946, the plaintiff went to the station for the purpose of taking a train to Baltimore City. He was the only
Ferguson, at the time of this accident, had a deformed right hand. The three middle fingers thereof were cut off and he only had a thumb and a little finger on his right hand. This was the result of an industrial accident, for which he received compensation. He testified, nevertheless, that the grip of his right hand was strong.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case defendant submitted a motion for a directed verdict, which was refused; and at the conclusion of all of the testimony the defendant renewed its motion for a directed verdict, which was refused.
It is the contention of the appellant that the court committed reversible error in its charge to the jury. But, however that may be, if the court was wrong in submitting the case to the jury because the plaintiff had submitted no evidence legally sufficient to show that the defendant was guilty of primary negligence which was the direct and proximate cause of the accident, then the court committed error in this respect; and the fact that the jury found a verdict for the defendant did not injure the plaintiff.
“In all cases of this kind there are two questions involved. First, whether there be negligence on the part of the defendant which produced the injury complained of? and, secondly, whether the party injured might, by the exercise of ordinary care on his part, under the circumstances of the case, have avoided the accident?” Baltimore & O. R. R. v. State, to use of Hauer, 60 Md. 449.
“But while such is the general principle, in each case the special facts and circumstances must be considered, and their bearing upon the propriety of the conduct of the party injured, except where the facts are clear and undisputed, must be submitted to the jury for their consideration.
“The want of ordinary care on the part of the party injured is matter of defense, and the onus of proof of the fact is upon the defendant. And in considering the facts, the question of ordinary care on the part of the party injured is not to be determined in an abstract way, but relatively, as it may be connected with and dependent upon the duty and obligation of the defendant. It is settled, by all respectable authority, that while the carriers of passengers are not insurers of absolute safety, yet they are bound to exercise reasonable care, according to the nature of their contract; and as their employment involves the safety of the lives and limbs of their passengers, the law requires the highest degree of care which is consistent with the nature of their undertaking.” Baltimore & O. R. R. v. State, to use of Hauer, supra; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Kane, 69 Md. 11, 13 A. 387; Cumberland Valley R. R. v. Maugans, 61 Md. 53; United Rys. & Electric Co. v. Weir, 102 Md. 286, 62 A. 588; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 72 Md. 519, 20 A. 2, 8 L. R. A. 673. See Hunter v. Cooperstown & S. V. R. Co., 112 N. Y. 371, 19 N. E. 820, 2 L. R. A. 832; and Hunter v. Cooperstown & S. V. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 18, 26 N. E. 958, 12 L. R. A. 429.
The cases above cited are based upon the principle that if an agent of a carrier induces a passenger to act in a manner that might be negligent (provided it is not a gross or wanton act) then that negligence may be explained away by all the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence, and it is generally a matter for the jury. But where there is a failure to show
This case should have been withdrawn from the jury. The plaintiff suffered no injury by the jury’s verdict. It should have been instructed by the court to return the verdict it did.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.