148 Ark. 553 | Ark. | 1921
(after stating the facts). It is first insisted that the court erred in consolidating the suit of George F. Fenner and Lillie Fenner, his wife, against F. F. Reeher, to foreclose the mortgage on the 180 acres of land in Izard County, Arkansas, with the suit of F. F. Reeher against George F. Fenner for the specific performance of the contract to exchange the 180 acres of land in question for the Coffeyville property.
The court did not err in consolidating the- suits. Section 1081 of Crawford & Moses ’ Digest provides that when causes of a like nature, relative to the same questions, are pending in the circuit court or chancery court, the court may consolidate said causes when it appears reasonable to do so. In Little Rock Gas & Fuel Co. v. Coppedge, 116 Ark. 334, the court held that separate actions by the husband and wife to recover damages for injuries sustained by the wife on account of the alleged negligence of the gas company were properly consolidated. The object of the act in question is to save a repetition of evidence, and an unnecessary consumption of time and costs in actions depending upon substantially the same evidence or arising out of the same transaction.
Again it is urged that the court erred in setting off the judgment recovered by George F. Fenner and Lillie Fenner against F. F. Reeher. Lillie Fenner has not appealed and can not be prejudiced by the action of the court in this respect, however erroneous it might be. The decree of the court shows that Fenner is indebted to Reelier in a greater amount than Reelier was indebted to'bim. The court gave Fenner credit on the judgment of Reeher against him in the amount of his judgment against Reeher. This action of the court resulted in no prejudice to him, inasmuch as the decree must be affirmed for the reasons hereinafter given.
The principal issue raised by the appeal is whether or not Reeher was entitled to specific performance. The contract provided that Reeher should give Fenner a clear title to the 180 acres of land in question and should give him an abstract showing a good, merchantable title. It is a just principle in the law relating to the specific performance of contracts that Fenner should receive that for which he contracted before he can be compelled to part with the consideration he agreed to pay. The contract provided that he was to receive an abstract showing a good, merchantable title.
In the case of Dobbs v. Norcross, 24 N. J. Rep., p. 327, cited in Griffith v. Maxfield, 63 Ark. 548, to sustain the holding of the court, in discussing this question it was said:
“The court will never compel a purchaser to take a title where the point on which it depends is too doubtful to be settled without litigation, or where the purchase would expose him to the hazard of such proceedings; or, as it is usually expressed, it will not compel him to buy a lawsuit. That may be a good title at law, which a court of equity,'in the exercise of its discretionary power, will not force on an unwilling purchaser. Every purchaser of land has a right to demand a title which shall put him in all reasonable security, and which shall protect him from anxiety, lest annoying, if not successful, suits be brought against him, and probably take from him or his representatives land upon which money was invested. He should have a title which shall enablé him, not only to hold his land, but to hold it in peace; and, if he wishes to sell it, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will come up to disturb its marketable value. ’ ’
This court has adopted the rule there laid down. Griffith v. Maxfield, 63 Ark. 548; Leroy v. Harwood, 119 Ark. 418; Mays v. Blair, 120 Ark. 69, and Shelton v. Ratterree, 121 Ark. 482. The doubt, however, must be reasonable, or such as would induce a prudent man to hesitate. It does not mean a captious or frivolous objection.
We now come to consider the title in the present case tendered by Reeher to Fenner under the contract in question and must determine whether it is so far free from reasonable doubt as to justify the affirmance of the decree ordering the contract to be specifically performed. There was an incumbrance of $400 which John C. Ashley, who abstracted the title for Reeher, testified had been fully satisfied. His testimony was not disputed. Hence this alleged incumbrance passes out of the case.
This brings us to the mortgage made by Reeher to Michael. In the first place, Reeher all the way through claimed that he would pay off this mortgage and only declined to pay to Michael’s attorney because Michael was not there to satisfy the record. He again offered to pay off this indebtedness at the trial, and the court credited his judgment against Fenner with the amount of the indebtedness. Under these circumstances, it did not constitute an encumbrance which would warrant Fenner in refusing to carry out the contract on his part. It seems that there was some other objections to the title, but the evidence does not disclose what they were. Ashley testified that the title was a merchantable one, and that Fenner told him he would not take anything less thau a perfect title. This, as we have already seen, he was not entitled to under the terms of the contract. The contract gave him a merchantable title, and this Reeher offered to give him at all times. He could not refuse to accept the title thus offered on the ground that there was a possibility of there being a flaw in it. The record does uot show any reasonable ground which would warrant Fenner in turning down the title offered him by Reeher. The title which Reeher seeks to compel Fenner to accept is a merchantable one, within the meaning of onr decisions cited above, and the conrt properly entered a decree for the specific performance of the contract.
It follows that the decree must be affirmed.
