FENG LI v. STUART RABNER, in his official capacity as Justice of the State of New Jersey, and in his individual capacity, ARTHUR BERGMAN, in his official capacity as a Judge of the State of New Jersey, and his individual capacity, BERNARD A. KUTTER, in his official capacity as a Special Ethics Master of the State of New Jersey, and in his individual capacity, JANICE L. RICHTER, in her official capacity as Council of Office of Ethics Counsel, and in her individual capacity, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY ETHICS DISCIPLINARY REVIEW BOARD, SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, STATE OF NEW JERSEY
No. 15-1711
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit
March 17, 2016
“To establish a violation of substantive due process rights, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state action was ‘so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.‘” Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep‘t, 577 F.3d 415, 431 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)).
According to the second amended complaint, Bartels was traversing his neighbor‘s property wearing a bathrobe and slippers when two Village police officers shouted at him that he was trespassing, and “pursued him.” App. 22. Bartels then “sought refuge” in the neighbor‘s home and “thereby avoided being pursued.” Id. Bartels alleged that Officer Morrissey removed a taser from his holster, placing Bartels in fear of physical harm. Id. In his deposition, however, Bartels stated that he saw Officer Morrissey “screwing around” with something on his belt, which Bartels thought “was a cellphone.” Dkt. No. 46-2, at 44-45. On appeal, Bartels admits that while he “initially thought” the object was a taser, it “came to light that the object was a cell phone.” Appellant‘s Br. 7. At no point did the officers make physical contact with Bartels. Dkt. No. 46-2, at 46.
Nothing about the officers’ actions was improper, let alone “shocking, arbitrary, and egregious.” Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129, 143 (2d Cir.2003). Their “pursuit” does not even implicate the Fourth Amendment, as Bartels was not “seized” at any point. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) (no Fourth Amendment seizure occurs until physical force has been applied or there has been submission to an assertion of authority).
Thus, under the circumstances, no reasonable jury could find that Bartels‘s substantive due process rights were violated, and summary judgment was properly granted.
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We have considered all of Bartels‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FENG LI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Stuart RABNER, in his official capacity as Justice of the State of New Jersey, and in his individual capacity, Arthur Bergman, in his official capacity as a Judge of the State of New Jersey, and his individual capacity, Bernard A. Kutter, in his official capacity as a Special Ethics Master of the State of New Jersey, and in his individual capacity, Janice L. Richter, in her official capacity as Council of Office of Ethics Counsel, and in her individual
Feng Li, NY, pro se, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
No appearance, for Defendants--Appellees.
PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, ROSEMARY S. POOLER, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Feng Li, a lawyer proceeding pro se, appeals the district court‘s judgment dismissing his
A district court has the inherent authority to “dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee.” Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363 (2d Cir.2000). We have not yet decided whether such dismissals are reviewed de novo or for abuse of discretion, but we need reach that issue here because the district court‘s decision “passes muster under the more rigorous de novo review.” Id. at 364 n. 2. Further, we may “affirm a decision on any grounds supported in the record, even if it is not one on which the trial court relied.” Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 460 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 2006).
Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed the complaint. Except as discussed below, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough April 22, 2015 decision.
On appeal, Li argues that the defendants are not immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because he sought prospective relief. As to the State and its courts, the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit “regardless of the nature of the relief sought.” Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). As to the individual defendants, generally, state officials are not immune under the Eleventh Amendment if the “complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm‘n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‘s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
Moreover, Li‘s brief does not identify the equitable relief he seeks or advance any argument explaining how the relief he sought in the complaint would be prospective. As an attorney, Li is not entitled to a liberal reading of his brief. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir.2010). He has therefore failed to show that the dismissal of these claims was erroneous.
As to the court‘s Rooker-Feldman ruling, this doctrine does not apply to Li‘s challenge to the constitutionality of the state court rule. “[A] state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts, but a statute or rule governing the decision may be challenged in a federal action.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011); see also D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 487-88, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
Nonetheless, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Li requested that the court declare New Jersey Court Rule 1:20-3 void because “it allows [the] New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics to regulate out-state attorney for a contract dispute which happened out-state without jurisdiction violating out-state attorney‘s constitution rights.” The jurisdiction of the Office of Ethics is set out in a different rule, Court Rule 1:20-1(a), which provides that every attorney “authorized to practice law in the State of New Jersey ... shall be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as set forth in the Constitution of 1947, Article 6, Section 2, Paragraph 3.”
Regardless of which Rule he challenges, Li‘s argument that New Jersey violated his right to due process by disciplining him for his conduct in New York is frivolous, and he cites to no legal authority for his proposition that New Jersey could not constitutionally discipline a member of its bar for conduct in another state.
We have considered all of Li‘s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.