7 S.E.2d 800 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1940
1. It is the statutory duty of the driver of a motor vehicle along a public highway in this State, whether actually moving or parked, to have such vehicle equipped with a suitable device for dimming or changing the *346 focus of the headlights thereon, so as to prevent "dangerously glaring or dazzling rays" from affecting the eyesight of drivers of approaching vehicles, and it is likewise the duty of such driver to dim his headlights or change their focus when necessary to prevent such "dangerously glaring or dazzling rays" from affecting the eyesight of the driver of an approaching vehicle.
2. The petition in this case, in which it is alleged that the defendant parked his automobile on the public highway with the headlights burning and the rays projecting down the highway, that the lights were not dimmed or their focus changed upon the approach of another automobile, and that the driver of the approaching automobile was blinded by the lights of the defendant's automobile and thereby prevented from observing the plaintiff who was on the shoulder of the highway beyond the parked automobile and to the right of the approaching automobile, that the driver of the approaching automobile swerved to his right and on to the shoulder of the highway, and struck and injured the plaintiff in a described manner, and that the defendant was negligent in having his automobile parked on the highway with lights under the condition described, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, set out a cause of action. This is true, assuming that the plaintiff, who was a police officer, was negligent in not causing the defendant to have his lights dimmed or changed so as to prevent the rays from affecting the sight of the drivers of approaching vehicles, and notwithstanding any negligence on the part of the driver of the approaching automobile or on the part of the plaintiff.
3. The court did not err in overruling the general demurrer.
It was further alleged, that the defendant's wrecker was parked on the pavement on the south side of the highway with two electric headlights shining "with dazzling and glaring rays blinding the driver of the oncoming truck" which was approaching from the east; that the defendant, "in addition to having the two powerful *348 electric headlights with dazzling and glaring and blinding rays down said highway, had a high-powered spot light which also was dazzling and glaring with blinding rays down said highway directly in the face of the driver of the oncoming truck, further blinding him;" that from where the defendant's wrecker was parked in the highway there is an upgrade "eastward towards Augusta," of approximately seven and one-half degrees, and that some sixty yards therefrom in the same direction the highway turns suddenly at "right angles from a southwesterly direction in a westerly direction," so that from the crest of the hill "was a straightaway up which said three powerful, dazzling and glaring headlights shone," blinding the driver of the truck, and "incapacitating him and making him unable to see" the plaintiff's position of peril "on the shoulder of said highway endeavoring to escape the danger from the oncoming truck;" that there was attached to this truck a trailer loaded with mules, and when Brown came upon this "straightaway, up which" such lights from the "defendant's wrecker were shining," he was blinded and unable to see down the highway, and so sought to pull to the right of the road, and applied his brakes so as to bring his truck to a stop, but before the truck was stopped it struck plaintiff inflicting the injuries sued for; that the plaintiff was at his post of duty as a deputy sheriff, and in the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence, and engaged in an effort to prevent any one from being injured by the blocking of the road or by passing automobiles and other traffic at this point, at the time he was injured, all of which was known to the defendant; that the defendant had knowledge of the plaintiff's dangerous and perilous situation, and knew that a failure on his part to dim the headlights of his wrecker would blind an approaching driver of another vehicle to such an extent as to prevent him from seeing the plaintiff; that the "bright, dazzling and glaring lights of defendant's wrecker did blind" Brown and prevent him from seeing the plaintiff; and caused him to drive his truck into the plaintiff; that the defendant's failure to dim the lights on the wrecker, and parking it as he did, were the efficient proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries; that the defendant's failure to dim such lights was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and the defendant knew that the failure to dim the lights "was calculated to bring about such a dangerous situation with reference to petitioner as would *349 naturally result in his injury and actually resulted" in the plaintiff being injured; that at the time and place the plaintiff was in the exercise of all due care and caution, and could not have avoided his injuries by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence; that Brown, the driver of the approaching truck which struck the plaintiff, was at the time and place in question in the exercise of all ordinary care and diligence, and that the plaintiff's injuries resulted solely from the carelessness and negligence of the defendant as stated.
The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground that no cause of action was set forth against him, because it was not alleged that the defendant had violated any duty owed to the plaintiff, because it affirmatively appeared from the petition "that the proximate cause of said collision was not the alleged negligence of this defendant," because it affirmatively appeared from the petition "that the proximate cause of said casualty was the negligence of Thomas Brown, and because the petition affirmatively showed that the proximate cause of the casualty was the negligence of plaintiff." The defendant also demurred on various special grounds, and the material defects in the petition so pointed out were cured by amendment. The judge overruled the demurrer "on each and every ground thereof." The defendant excepted.
It is the duty of one operating a motor vehicle along a public highway in this State to have it equipped with "a suitable device for dimming or changing focus" of the headlights thereon, "so as to prevent dangerously glaring or dazzling rays from the lamps" thereof from affecting the eyesight of the driver of an approaching vehicle; and it is his duty to dim the lights or change the focus when it is necessary to do so to prevent such dangerously glaring or dazzling rays from affecting the eyesight of the driver of an approaching vehicle. A jury may infer that a failure so to do on the part of the driver of a motor vehicle, under certain conditions, would be negligence on his part.American Bakeries Co. v. Johnson,
It is contended by the defendant that the petition shows that the driver of the approaching motor truck was negligent in not bringing his truck to a stop, or in not checking its speed before he had gone far enough beyond the parked automobile of the defendant to strike the plaintiff. The defendant also contends that it appears that the driver of the approaching motor truck was negligent in turning the truck which he was driving so far to the right *351 that he ran off the paved portion of the highway and onto the shoulder, and thereupon struck the plaintiff. The defendant states that this negligence on the part of the driver of the truck contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. Conceding that this is true, and that this negligence on the part of the driver of the truck, together with the negligence of the defendant in failing to have his automobile equipped with a proper device for dimming or changing the focus of the lights thereof, and his failure to dim his lights on the approaching of the truck from the opposite direction, caused the plaintiff's injuries, the petition would not be subject to the general demurrer. A plaintiff, injured by separate and concurring acts of negligence of two persons, may bring an action against both or either of them.
This case is distinguishable from Sprayberry v. Snow,
Even if the plaintiff, as deputy sheriff and patrol officer, was under a duty, as contended by the defendant, to cause the defendant to have his lights in proper condition and not so as to blind approaching drivers, or to cause the defendant to desist from illegal parking in the road, it can not be said as a matter of law, under the facts alleged in the petition, that this alleged failure of the plaintiff, even if negligence, was the proximate cause of his injuries. It is nevertheless a jury question, under the allegations of the petition, whether the plaintiff was injured as a result of the *352 negligence of the defendant. The petition set out a cause of action. The court did not err in overruling the demurrer.
Judgment affirmed. Sutton and Felton, JJ., concur.