*1 al., FELZAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RALPH HRUBY et GERALDINE Defendants-Appellants.

Second District No. 2 — 05—0848 Opinion Rehearing September filed denied October 2006.— *2 Wheaton, Schroeder, Schroeder, Ltd., appellants. E for Carl F. of Carl Sullivan, Taylor Taylor, & Emily R. Carrara and Maureen Sullivan both Wheaton, Gumina, PC., appellee. for of the court: opinion

JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the 22, August from an Defendants, Ralph Hruby, appeal and Sondra failing contempt of court for 2005, holding them in indirect civil order visitation, 1995, grandparent 15, providing for obey a June motion to dismiss denying their and from a June 1995, 15, Felzak’s, the June petition enforce plaintiffs, Geraldine part part. and vacate order. We affirm

I. BACKGROUND married in 1977 and had Hruby Hruby and Deborah were Ralph 1983; 25, Jeffery, born Greg, together: three children born November 22, Katie was 4, 1985; Katie, Shortly after July and born August 1992, 16, Ralph hemorrhage. July On born, died of cerebral Deborah Ralph, Son- marriage after her Hruby. Sondra Soon was married to April 1993. On Hruby children on November adopted dra mother, grandparent for petition filed a plaintiff, Deborah’s the Il- to section Hruby children visitation with (750 (the Act) ILCS Marriage Act Dissolution of Marriage linois and 1992)). 5/607(b) (West visitation, alleged that plaintiff grandparent

In her lives after Hruby children’s despite her continued involvement her to longer permit no daughter, the death of her defendants would alleged Plaintiff that after Hruby children. have visitation with children, daughter, provided regular death of her she care for the shoes, holiday bought arranged birthday them clothes that soon after plaintiff alleged them. celebrations married, plaintiff visitation defendants defendants refused to allow answer, during claimed that with the children. In their children, disparaging made plaintiff continually visitation with Sondra, the visitation was remarks to the children about and that detracting attempts defendants’ harming Hruby children and from agree plaintiff’s family. parties to nurture and build their 1993. In their boys visitation with two ended on December answer, boys defendants contended that the did not to visit want with plaintiff boys and that defendants would not force the to continue to plaintiff. visit Defendants also claimed that continued overnight alternating April visitation with Katie on weekends until plaintiffs petition Defendants’ answer to visita- tion included an provisions affirmative defense that the of section 607 pertaining Act visitation were unconstitutional.

On April the court entered an conciliation order referring Dr. Hynan counseling Daniel for conciliation *3 on the Hynan defendants, issue visitation. Dr. interviewed plaintiff, and Hruby children and psychological administered tests. On 28, 1994, October Dr. Hynan that recommended it was the best interest of the children plaintiff. to continue visitation with As a result Hynan’s recommendations, of Dr. agree defendants decided to to visita- defense, tion. Before the court ruled on defendants’ affirmative parties agreed 16, 1994, entered into an allowing order on December plaintiff Hruby visitation with the three children day per one month for six allowing telephonic hours and visitation with the children for up to 30 per exchange, plaintiff minutes once month. In her withdrew claims for part agreement, par- visitation. As of their order, provided disputes agreed ties also that they arose over the counseling would return to dispute submitting to mediate the before dispute to a court. The order retained provided also that the court jurisdiction to enforce the order. 10, 1995, April plaintiff

On filed petition a for further conciliation relief, and alleging provide any other that defendants had failed to 16, 1994, Greg visitation with and pursuant Jeff to the December order, agreed asking parties visitation that the court order the counseling, requesting overnight return to and visitation Katie. with 1995, Following pretrial April 10, conference the court entered an on Jeff, allowing plaintiff Greg requir- interim order to write to ing encourage respond. defendants to them to The interim order also provided parties attempt overnight that the should to resolve visita- 24, 1995, plaintiff May tion between and Katie. On the court entered 1, an order setting plaintiffs petition hearing August on 15, 1995, however, plaintiff On June and defendants entered into that, agreed previously per order in lieu of the ordered six hours children, Hruby plaintiff month of visitation the three allowed with month, per p.m. visit with Katie p.m. twice between 3:30 8:30 on days agreed upon by parties. provided to be The order further that plaintiff pending petition would her for conciliation and withdraw other relief. 24, 2005, February plaintiff petition

On filed a to enforce the agreed petition, plaintiff alleges order of June 1995. In that years following 15, 1995, agreed order, for nine the June she visited Katie and Katie testified never missed visit. Both later time, during agreed plaintiff outside of court that would they per have one 10-hour visitation with Katie month instead of two In periods, parties. 5-hour because this was more convenient for both alleges February petition, plaintiff May two birthday, stopped plaintiffs months before Katie’s fifteenth completely. Hruby visitation with Katie Sondra testified that this was crying April because Katie returned home after her 2004 visit with plaintiff, go and that Katie did not on more visits with want did the court to plaintiff. alleges Plaintiff that defendants not ask she modify prior stopping visitation and that visitation 15, 1995, agreed the June order on requested defendants abide Katie ceased. several occasions the months after her visitation with 3, 2005, stating that because the Il- Ralph February wrote (750 5/607(b) (West 1992)) linois statute ILCS 15, 1995, unconstitutional, the June had been found he believed that Katie void and agreed granting plaintiff visitation with unenforceable. plaintiffs February to enforce response order, to dismiss

June defendants filed motion Code) (the 2—619 of the Code of Civil Procedure pursuant to section (735 (West 2004)), by superseded which was later ILCS 5/2—619 dismiss, to section also May amended motion *4 alleged to dismiss that 2—619 of the Code. The amended motion Act, statute visitation because section unconstitutional, held plaintiff brought petition, upon which authority to enter and no the court had no 15, 1995, visitation. agreed the June order for amended motion to 8, 2005, denied defendants’ On June the court 1995, 15, was still agreed of June and held that dismiss amended motion denying and effect. In defendants’ full force M.M.D., by In re dismiss, that this case was controlled the court held (2004), in that case our 105, 114-15 were not void agreed that visitation held orders the court denied be enforced. At the time unconstitutional and should dismiss, for defendants counsel defendants’ amended motion by the order to that defendants would not abide informed the court 15, 1995, that requested order of June enforce the visitation contempt holding defendants in indirect civil court enter an order The court refused appeal question jurisdiction. enable them to prepare peti suggestion plaintiff this and instructed counsel for rule to cause. tion for show 2005, Katie, with and on plaintiff requested

On June visitation 17, 2005, plaintiff they June that would not defendants informed Then, 30, 2005, petition filed a permit plaintiff visitation. on June response, a rule defendants asked to show cause other relief. plaintiff’s and to reconsider its June deny 2005, denial defendants’ to dismiss. Defendants cited a motion Dobbs, opinion, Marriage recent Fifth District In re did which held that a court not have allowing parent to enter visitation 6, 2005, July granted plaintiffs peti his adult child. On the trial court tion for a rule to show cause and appear ordered defendants to 16, 2005, August they not be held in why show cause as to should 15, 1995, contempt failing obey civil June order. hearing hearing

A contempt August was held on 2005. After defendants, testimony plaintiff from the court found defendants contempt obey willful of court for failure to the court’s order of despite June and reasserted that M.M.D. controlled the case that defendant be holdings of Dobbs. The court ordered each by until abide alternating incarcerated on weekends defendants held defendants could June visitation order. The court purge visitation with contempt providing themselves of the order of day Katie to for 10 hours a to be held on one weekend month party neither per sponte month. The court further ordered sua “the outcome of the Court any communication with Katie as to holding time.” A written order impact case or contempt August entered on indirect civil of court was 22, pending stay

The trial court refused to defendants’ incarceration *5 appeal, this temporary but entered a stay days. September for 30 On 8, 2005, granted this court defendants’ stay motion to the contempt judgment pending appeal. appeal 25, 2005,

Defendants filed their notice August on appeal- ing 22, 2005, both the trial August holding order them in contempt indirect civil forbidding of court and communication with case, 8, 2005, Katie about the and its June denying order their motion plaintiffs petition dismiss 15, 1995, to enforce the June order.

II. DISCUSSION appeal, On defendants contend that the trial court erred both when it denied their plaintiffs amended motion to dismiss petition to 15, 1995, enforce its June visitation order and when it entered its August holding order in defendants indirect contempt civil failing obey 15, 1995, of court for its June visitation order. argue Defendants that the trial court cannot enforce the June 1995, order allowing plaintiff visitation, grandparent because it is void subject jurisdiction. for lack of matter argue Defendants also that even subject if jurisdiction exists, 15, 1995, the June order they entered into is Furthermore, void for lack of consideration. defendants contend that the trial court’s sua sponte order at the August 16, 2005, contempt hearing, forbidding from hav- ing communication with Katie about this violates their fourteenth rights care, amendment custody, to the and control of their child. Subject

A. Matter Jurisdiction Defendants contend the trial court lacked visitation, over claim for grandparent because plaintiff brought petition her grandparent for 607(b) Act, section supreme which our court declared unconsti Byrne, (2002), tutional Wickham v. Ill. 2d April 320-21 18, 2002. any power Defendants assert that this nullified the trial result, court had to enter an urge this case.1As a void, that because the June order is the trial court can April petition grandparent visitation, 1In her plaintiff failed 607(b) specify provision applied Wickham, which of section in her case. In our 607(b)(1) (b)(3) (750 specifically court declared sections ILCS (b)(3) (West 5/607(b)(l), 2000)), visitation, pertaining Wickham, plaintiff petitioned unconstitutional. 199 Ill. 2d at 320-21. Because 607(b), the court visitation under section implicitly specific provisions invoked the of section that were held although expressly unconstitutional. We also note that Wickham did not ad 607(b), remaining provisions holdings ap dress the of section its affect the 607(b)(2) plicability provisions. merely right of both those Section restricts the contempt them in nor hold against them neither enforce the order obeying the order. this case. as to standard review parties disagree ques is a argue that because Defendants argues should law, that we is de novo. Plaintiff tion of review only against contempt order of it is the trial court’s reverse evidence, final entered weight manifest contempt. contends an order of Plaintiff the trial alleged order is willful or the noncompliance with whether fact, question excuse is to which contemnor a valid of her manifest-weight-of-the-evidence applies. support standard Kneitz, 3d 299 In re argument, Marriage cites applied manifest-weight-of-the-evidence where this court *6 analyze suspending a court order visita standard to whether Louisiana for of an Il provided respondent’s tion valid excuse violation Plaintiff that like Louisiana court argues linois visitation order. order, alleged subject jurisdiction trial court’s lack matter must of obey be examined as valid excuse not to a court order. 8, 2005,

Although generally we June would review court’s denying under standard defendants’ motion to dismiss a de novo (Brennan Kadner, 963, (2004)), August Ill. App. v. 351 967 and its 3d contempt against weight order of to see if it manifest was (Kneitz, 303), the evidence 341 Ill. at issue App. primary 3d subject jurisdiction whether the trial court had matter this entire over argue action. Defendants do not that their willful violation of court order was allowed because an affirmative matter excused the viola 15, tion, 1995, they argue but rather violated the June they never subject court order because the order for lack of matter was void jurisdiction. Consequently, appeal the trial issue on not whether but, erroneously contemptuous found defendants’ behavior rather, all, authority whether the court had to enter an order regardless Subject of the jurisdiction question facts. matter is a law Chrobak, Marriage that we review de novo. In re 349 Ill. 3d (2004). 894, result, novo As a we review de the issue of whether its proper subject jurisdiction the trial court had matter to enter June Chrobak, Ill. App. order. 3d at 897. 607(b)(1) (b)(3), grandparent granted in sections 607(b)(2) nothing therefore decision Wickham left section (West 607(b)(1.5) (750 5/607(b)(1.5) Furthermore, regulate. section ILCS 2002)), allowing visitation, stepparent declared unconstitutional 790, Marriage Engelkens, re 354 Ill. holdings in Wickham. matter,

As a preliminary we must address contention that the trial subject jurisdiction matter over this action is of no relevance. Because the parties agreed visitation, plaintiff argues that the court must enforce the order of visitation even if the court never subject jurisdiction matter original over the action. We disagree.

A consent decree is upon based the agreement parties. People ex rel. Fahner v. City Colorado Lot Ass’n, Owners & Taxpayers (1985). 106 Ill. 2d Ordinarily, a consent decree cannot be chal lenged, because it is a recording agreement of an between judicial and not a Fahner, determination of rights. 106 Ill. 2d at 8. However, a court will vacate a consent decree in limited circumstances. City of Highwood (1992). Obenberger, It is well settled subject jurisdiction matter cannot be conferred consent, by stipulation, Chrobak, or waiver. 349 Ill. App. 3d at 897. Although a consent judicial decree is not a rights determination of (Fahner, 8), 106 Ill. 2d at it is a parties’ recordation of the private agreement 114). in judicial (M.M.D., Any order or judgment of a court is void in subject the absence of jurisdic may tion and be any attacked at time. Sarkissian v. Chicago Board of (2002). Education, 201 Ill. 2d result, that, As a we conclude order, like an agreed order is void the court lacks to enter City Radke, it. Marseilles v.

Plaintiff argues further is not an issue because whether a court provision enforce a of a consent providing decree MM.D., visitation was addressed which holds that courts uphold must parents agree orders which visitation, *7 despite holdings of Wickham. In response, argue defendants that M.M.D. jurisdictional does not confront the is- sues this case and that Dobbs is directly point. agree on We with defendants that M.M.D. jurisdictional does not resolve the issues in case, this but apply we do not Dobbs. M.M.D.,

In supreme our court considered provision whether a of a consent granting grandparent decree visitation was void as a result of its M.M.D., decision Wickham. 213 Ill. 2d at 113-14. original ac tion in M.M.D. involved two consolidated cases brought under the Il (755 (West 1996)) linois Probate Act of 1975 ILCS and the Il 5/11a—4 (750 (West Parentage linois Act 1996)), of 1984 ILCS seq. et 45/1 M.M.D., respectively. 213 Ill. 2d at 107. As a result of those consolidated cases, a father agreed entered into an order with his child’s maternal grandparents, allowing grandparent M.M.D., visitation. 213 Ill. 2d supreme at 108. After our Wickham, court’s decision in father

703 exclude modify parties’ agreement trial court petitioned the void a result provision this was as grandparent visitation M.M.D., supreme Ill. 111. Our court concluded 2d at Wickham. allow provision trial of a consent decree that the court could enforce agreed to the visita ing grandparent visitation because parent’s tion, therefore, and did not interfere with the state implicated. were not rights, holdings fundamental Wickham M.M.D., further held that courts 213 Ill. 2d at The M.M.D. court by fit agreements made obligated uphold voluntary are visitation M.M.D., Ill. 2d public long they policy. as as do not parents violate at 116. M.M.D., similarities

Despite the case before us concerns its In supreme different that our court in M.M.D. explored issue from M.M.D., trial court our court not consider whether the supreme did subject jurisdiction disputes concerning grandparent had matter over visitation, allowing a provision but of a consent decree whether M.M.D., Ill. grandparent as unconstitutional. visitation was void agree 2d at 112. in M.M.D. While we an constitutionally court held enter and enforce trial can agreed parents grandparent order in which allow for visitation (M.M.D., 116), this presented Ill. 2d at the issue case concerns prerequisite any subject entry to court’s or enforcement of order: jurisdiction (Sarkissian, 103; matter 2d at Diaz v. Provena (2004)). Hospitals, M.M.D., In subject jurisdiction had it agreed to enter the order because deciding justiciable recognized matters in both the Illinois Probate Act and the Parentage M.M.D., Illinois Act. 213 Ill. 2d In this at 107. case, subject jurisdiction the court’s could to enter only power grant grandparent arise from its the relief of visitation. authority If a court petition, has no to hear the matter of a otherwise, enters, agreed order it is void unenforceable. Diaz, Radke, 1173; at 761. case is from distinguishable M.M.D.because object seeking to the hear claims visitation, including agreed rather than its enter an power to part a case it to decide. authority has although agree we with defendants that M.M.D. does jurisdictional in this agree resolve issues we do not Dobbs, directly point. Dobbs is decree at issue was consent result of Mar an action for marital dissolution under Illinois (750 (West riage Marriage seq. Act Dissolution ILCS et 5/101 2002)). Dobbs, though 3d at 313. Even the court enter an order in the divorce *8 case, the Dobbs held provisions court it could not enforce of their agreement agreed marital settlement parents which the to visita Dobbs, tion with their child. 358 App. adult Ill. 3d at 313. The Dobbs agreement held public court that policy visitation violated clearly contrary because it was to what statute declared to be public policy subject that the court did not have matter jurisdiction grant Dobbs, visitation an with adult child. 358 Ill. App. at3d 312-13. Defendants Dobbs to construe mean that consent decrees cannot be entered without subject jurisdiction. Although matter we with agree proposition above, Dobbs, for the reasons discussed M.M.D., like does not address subject jurisdic a trial court’s matter agreed tion enter an order but rather court had subject whether the jurisdiction provision decree, matter to enter specific a of the consent 310). is, (Dobbs, App. visitation an adult child 3d at already may agreement M.M.D. has held that a court enforce providing within it a consent decree when subject jurisdiction M.M.D., at has matter to hear the case. 213 Ill. 2d different purposes, analysis 114. For our from Dobbs no authority M.M.D. Both confront the court’s enforce substance decree, subject jurisdic of the consent rather than court’s matter case, agreed tion to enter any order or otherwise. the question

neither Dobbs nor M.M.D. answers a trial court whether jurisdiction subject has matter an action over visita proceed we Consequently, tion. to address whether trial court had subject jurisdiction matter to enter an order. Diaz,

A contempt powers use its its orders. enforce if a App. judgment upon 3d at 1173. which contempt void, contempt judgment order is based then cannot be Diaz, judg An sustained on 3d at 1173. order or review. subject jurisdiction ment is void if the court lacks matter over the Diaz, jurisdic Subject matter before it. matter power refers of the court to hear and determine cases. tion U.S.A., Sales, Inc., Toyota, Inc. v. 199 Ill. 2d Toyota Belleville Motor subject jurisdiction a case matter does simply jurisdiction particular mean the over the but the court’s belongs. jurisdiction over the class of cases which the case Health (1999). Therefore, Sevilla, Cost Controls v. claim, plaintiff defectively stated her the circuit even jurisdiction. Toyota, Belleville necessarily deprived subject Inc., noted, judgment court that lacked by 199 Ill. 2d at 340. As proceed jurisdiction may be attacked time consent, by stipulation, ing, cannot be conferred Chrobak, waiver. adminis power court’s review exception circuit

With statute, circuit action, which is conferred trative Bel entirely by our state constitution. is conferred *9 Thus, legislature 2d cannot cre Inc., Ill. Toyota, leville 199 at through statute. regulate subject ate the court’s However, Inc., legislature Ill. 2d at 335. Toyota, See Belleville 199 subject can that become to justiciable create new issues Inc., Accordingly, Ill. if a jurisdiction. Toyota, 199 2d at 335. Belleville exist, justiciable justiciable to statute that created a issue ceases jurisdic eliminated, longer no has issue is and court Inc., Ill. 2d Toyota, tion. Belleville 199 at 335. trial court lacked argue

Defendants grandparent over visitation because plaintiffs claim brought grandparent visitation 607(b) supreme Act. that our section of the Defendants note 607(b) the Act provisions pertaining declared the of section of they grandparent visitation unconstitutional Wickham because required parents’ rights fit make deci the state to interfere with care, custody, Wickham, sions about the and control their children. of any power 199 Ill. 2d at 320. Defendants claim Wickham nullified grandparent visitation, provi had to grant because when power sions of section were unconstitutional the court’s found grant grandparent disagree. disappeared. visitation We 607(b)(1) Wickham, court declared sections and (b)(3) unconstitutional, facially grant the Act holding a court’s right, of interfered with a fundamental parent’s visitation Constitution, under the fourteenth amendment to the United States care, custody, to make and control of his concerning decisions children, exposed parent because it decision of a fit to the unfet judgment judge micromanaging tered value and state. Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d at An is void unconstitutional statute ab (1990). Gersch, 384, v. 135 2d 392 means that a People initio. Ill. This holding applied retroactively, a statute unconstitutional decision had, returning the law the law to nullifying effect and Gersch, adoption its state before of the unconstitutional statute. Although recently been 135 Ill. 2d at 392. the ab initio doctrine has (Perlstein Wolk, v. applied qualifications procedural matters rights 161, (2004)), 349 3d constitutional App. party’s 168 where vindication, the ab doctrine is application are in need of strict initio U.S.A., App. 3d appropriate. Corp, Yakubinis v. Yamaha Motor 365 (b)(3) (2006). 607(b)(1) 128, affected substan 134 Because sections violating parents’ rights, and declared unconstitutional tive were 320), (Wickham, Ill. 2d the ab liberty interests constitutional (see initio strictly applies Gersch, 392; doctrine Yakubi 134). 607(b)(1) (b)(3) nis, 365 Ill. Accordingly, sections inoperative Hurst, are inception. treated from their Ill. App. at 820. justiciable grandparent visitation was not a issue created 607(b).

solely by section equitable powers of the court over grandparent visitation existed at common prior independent law to and 607(b). Chodzko, enactment of section Chodzko v. 66 Ill. 2d (1976); Hawkins, Hawkins v. (1981); Boyles Boyles, v. Under the common statute, prior law that existed to the visitation was upon showing awarded special Squellati, circumstances. Bush v. (1988) 122 Ill. 2d (“Special grant circumstances sufficient rights grandparents have been found where the natural father into was inducted the armed forces and he had petitioned the court to allow his parents during to visit with his child his absence (Solomon 618), Solomon where natural father died and parents had named his fund trustees of a which *10 (Lucchesi was for the his benefit of child v. Lucchesi 330 Ill. 506). App. Boyles Boyles (1973), 14 v. Ill. 3d appellate court found to deny grandparents’ [also] it be error to natural as a just for visitation law where the child had lost his mother and to extremely grandparents by close his virtue of death, prior fact that to his mother’s the child had visited with the grandparents day”); every Chodzko, see also 66 Ill. 2d 32. at As a result, grandparent justiciable visitation was not a created 607(b) legislature disappear and therefore did not when section inoperative. became

Defendants cite several cases since refused Wickham to apply special-circumstances applies the common-law test it because Ross, Marriage best-interests standard. In re (2005); Ill. Graff, 1169-70 Beurksen v. 150 (2004); Langman Langman, 107-08 Wickham, Defendants note that in court held that a best- standard, judge to decide if a independently interests which allowed a child grandparents, should visit his the fourteenth with violated infringe judge amendment because it allowed a to on the decisions of parents merely fit a “better” could be made and to decision presumption parents do so in child’s absent that the acted best Wickham, interests. 199 Ill. 2d 320. Defendants contend that prior because the common in used the law existence to section Wickham, same unconstitutional the common-law standards ruled special standard is also unconstitutional. circumstances circumstances” offered “special rule However, while the relief, did not grant it power of its guideposts for a court’s exercise Although jurisdiction. Wickham bounds of the court’s determine the in which a cause of action the circumstances dramatically narrowed exists, we do not believe Wickham grandparent visitation altogether. In justiciable as a grandparent eliminated visitation Wickham, parents’ interfere with held that the state cannot the court care, their custody, and control of rights to the fourteenth amendment health, welfare, safety of protect or children unless it does so Wickham, parent presumed Ill. 2d at A fit the children. 317. child, consequently, of her interference act best interest presumption. parental making begin decision must with this result, Wickham, court held that at 318. As a the Wickham visitation, petition for a trial court ruling grandparent on a when special weight a fit parent’s must accord some determination Wickham, Ill. 2d child’s best interest. at 320. Because sections 607(b)(1) (b)(3) decision, weight parent’s failed to to a accord liberty they significantly parents’ interfered with interests under Furthermore, Wickham, fourteenth amendment. compelling Wickham court found no interest that case that would justify rights. Wickham, such an intrusion on these 2d at 317. recognized parent’s While that the state interfere with a health, right care, custody, protect to the and control of her child child, safety, parent’s welfare it found that decision Wickham, prevent presented no such threat. Ill. 2d found that no compelling state the parents’ interest existed to overcome fourteenth rights Wickham, amendment to limit visitation. 2d at 317. holdings of Wickham the earlier common-law narrowed granted

doctrine that grandparent special visitation could be under circumstances, by finding it court make a unconstitutional presumption decision in the child’s that the best interest without *11 (see 34; Chodzko, interest 66 Ill. 2d at parent acted child’s best 604). Boyles, Consequently, findings 3d at the of Wickham in a of severely limited the circumstances cause action which Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d at grandparent visitation could be successful. However, Wickham, supreme our court made no determination 320. grant the grandparent as to whether a court can visitation when parents act in the interest their children is presumption best of overcome, a can show that visitation must occur or when did health, well-being, safety the or of a Wickham child. Thus, justiciable not eliminate visitation a matter. as although the special-circumstances longer common-law no test provides the appropriate guideposts for a trial court’s exercise of its authority, grandparent justiciable remain cases matters that trial courts of this state hear. to

However, argue that because her petition filed pursuant Act, to section the com- law, mon the law common cannot now be used to jurisdiction. invoke application Defendants contend that of the common law would be unfair because the case was filed settled under the terms of sec- 607(b). tion We disagree.

In order to the subject invoke the of circuit court, as plaintiffs by complaint framed the petition, or must present justiciable Toyota, Inc., issue. Belleville 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The presence justiciable test for the of a is issue found in the nature of the made by pleading sought. Sullivan, case as the the relief However, Ill. App. 3d at 563. the nature of the case is not determined strictly by invoked, by presented statute statutes but the issues by pleading requested. People the facts and the relief ex rel. Janson, Scott v. 57 Ill. 2d true especially This when justiciable the statute has created matter and where the justiciable matter remains even after the statute ceases exist.

Because the of a invoked, nature case more than statute beyond courts have looked the statute listed the pleading to notably, Janson, determine nature the case. Most 57 Ill. 2d at broadly, defined the nature of case holding filing that the petition pursuant provisions its of (Ill. Stat., Supp., 111½, Environmental Protection Act Rev. ch. par. seq.) et did not only constrain nature the case to ac brought pursuant Janson, Attorney tions to that statute. seeking General Illinois filed an ex parte and others action emergency injunction, hearing, permanent injunction enjoin and a garbage dump, citing defendant’s use of land as a commercial (Ill. provisions Stat., of the Environmental Protection Act Rev. Supp., 111½, Janson, 57 Ill. par. seq.). ch. 1001 et 2d at 454. The granted injunction, plaintiffs’ petition parte circuit court for an ex injunction, finding but ex parte later dismissed the that there was no emergency required by extreme Environmental Act. Protection Janson, Ill. 2d at The then filed a defendant motion dismiss Janson, the case. 57 Ill. 2d at 454. the circuit denied Janson, defendant’s motion dismiss case. stipulation then in which defendant entered into a Protection up the site and the Environmental clean abide Janson, Thereafter, guidelines. Act 57 Ill. 2d at 454. the defendant

709 Janson, 57 Ill. 2d stipulation. by provisions the the failed abide in and later held him court fined the defendant at 455. The circuit as court’s assessment his contempt cooperate with the failing Janson, 455; rel. v. Janson, People 57 2d at see also ex Scott sets. Ill. (1974). The (1973), rev’d, 57 Ill. 2d Ill. 3d 790 451 App. 10 was void because the claiming stipulation that the appealed, defendant the subject jurisdiction matter over the case after trial court had no dismissed, as the Environmental emergency relief petition was rule only Act the circuit court to Protection authorized rulings for administrative emergency relief and reserved the other Janson, 2d action. Ill. at 453. 57 defendant, holding the with the appellate court subject proceed matter the jurisdiction

trial court lacked over the the ings parte injunction, the of the ex after dissolution granted by relief the complaint specifically procedure invoked the and laws, Act, and the Environmental Protection and not other statutes or did authorize the the Environmental Protection Act other relief sought Janson, App. plaintiffs in circuit court. Ill. 795. Our reversed, Environmental holding, first, that Protec supreme court the plaintiffs bring tion Act allowed the in the circuit action court. Janson, addition, in defined broadly rights the nature of case much more than the statute, invoked and instead all the looked at issues raised plaintiffs and the complaint requested relief the to determine Janson, presented justiciable the claim Ill. 2d at matter. 460. Our supreme generally held the nature of case was “to that, restrain and pollution although violations” Environmental to, specifically pollution Act Protection was referred the issues of presented justiciable abating raised in the complaint matter of Janson, public complaint 57 Ill. 2d at 460. Because the nuisances. injunctive relief, pollution sought justiciable outlined violations presented existed under the law. See Jan was son, 57 Ill. 2d at 460. (1997),

Similarly, Rodriguez, v. Rochon Commissioners, County Maddox Williamson Board of complaints although filed their (735 pursuant provisions Review Law ILCS the Administrative (West 1992)), and Fifth inapplicable, which was the First 5/3—112 Districts, complaints justiciable stated respectively, found although Rochon, complaint held that matters. First District set pursuant Administrative Review Law was reviewable jurisdic complaint, forth in the the circuit court set forth a complaint pleading tion to consider the because the justiciable question of whether the defendants had breached sections of the Chicago Rochon, Municipal Code. 3d at 956. Maddox, Similarly, although Fifth District held that complaint Law, was to the Administrative Review where the inapplicable, Administrative Law Review the trial court had grant relief under common-law certiorari though even specifically Maddox, common law was not referenced. *13 Janson, Rochon, Maddox, case, Similar to and in plaintiff this 607(b) petitioned court pursuant specific statute, the to section Act, the to receive certain relief. Just the Janson court considered the nature of that case to be “to restrain pollution violations” rather specifically grant than to relief the to Environmental Protec- Act, tion plaintiffs we believe that the nature of case was obtain to grandparent and solely grandparent visitation not visitation as provided by section petition, the Act. Plaintiff’s entitled Visitation,” Grandparent “Petition for alleging set forth facts that she visitation, had not grandparent requested received and relief. such Thus, justiciable petition the set forth the matter of grandparent visitation. do not We believe that the recitation of the unconstitutional in petition, specifically statute the or the failure to invoke the common law, changes fact petition justiciable the that the concerns the matter visitation, grandparent jurisdiction. over which the court has case, Janson, Maddox, in Rochon,

We note that this as in the jurisdiction court had subject grant matter to the same relief for asked petition, pursuant in the to authority by different from that cited plaintiff. significantly grants This is different from when a relief Williams, that has in requested petition. not been the Ligon App. complaint Because the frames the nature requested, of the case and circumscribes the relief a court does subject jurisdiction grant in requested have matter relief not the complaint it it simply granted because could such relief if had requested. Ligon, example, Ligón, been 264 Ill. 3d at For in App. 707. plaintiff petition filed a the find a requesting parent- child, relationship child the defendant and that the between pay support. Ligon, defendant child 3d at When hearing issues, appear failed on these the court custody Ligon, awarded to the defendant. child In reviewing custody decision, at 703. the trial court’s the First District subject jurisdiction grant held that the trial court lacked matter defendant, custody requested such petition because no Ligon, although relief. at 707-08. the court power grant generally, subject had the it did not have the custody petition before requested grant relief jurisdiction matter Ligon, it. in this Ligón from distinguishable at bar is

The case from that relief different grant any court did not case the circuit and, therefore, from the never varied requested plaintiffs petition Here, considered by the relief petition. as framed nature of case visitation, court, as the relief was the same by grandparent plaintiffs peti Although cited requested petition. statute unenforceable, justiciable set forth a petition tion have been grandparent case petition matter. defines a Where visitation, subject has grandparent and a court asks for the relief visitation, grandparent jurisdiction requesting matter over cases jurisdiction petition. over that Because subject court has of case and not jurisdiction type determined itself, it fails state petition the individual case does not matter relief action, merely if it facts and asks for a cause of but states Inc., type Toyota, the court decides. Belleville create a of case 607(b), invoking despite 340. We believe that section visitation, and because framed case issue, justiciable visitation is a the court had mat plaintiffs petition. ter over

Subject merely through par door which argue ties enter the the door courtroom. *14 607(b) provid as as of provisions was shut soon the section ing for grandparent visitation were found unconstitutional. We disagree. subject Statutes do not confer or limit the court’s jurisdiction, they may justiciable Toyota, but create issues. Belleville Inc., 607(b), Ill. 2d at Prior the enactment of section matter, therefore, grandparent justiciable despite visitation awas 607(b), the disappearance grandparent section visitation remained addition, justiciable greatly issue. In limited the while Wickham visitation, may grant grandparent courts it did circumstances which ability grandparent not ehminate visita involving their decide cases Thus, tion. circuit court to hear and determine had grandchil grandparents whether entitled to with their were is at validity petition dren. The individual issue. is Toyota, Inc., Belleville 199 Ill. 2d at 340. issue whether grant court had the of relief that power type 340; Inc., Health Cost requested. Toyota, Belleville 2d at Controls, App. it 587. We believe did. Whether litigate in the grandparent chose to the issue of visitation once M.M.D., parents their decision. 213 Ill. 2d courtroom was at When agree visitation, obligation courts have uphold agreement, except circumstances, under very limited such agreement as when the against public (M.M.D., is void as policy (see 114), Ill. 2d at or when the court subject lacks 760). Radke, case, In this defendants did not chal lenge agreement against whether the void public policy, was as and we hold that the consent decree entered into defendants is not void for lack jurisdiction. result, agreement As a the parties’ visitation is We enforceable. next consider whether 15, 1995, the June visitation order is void other grounds. on

B. Consideration Defendants plaintiffs petition, pursu contend that because filed ant Act, law, to section of the no basis the forbearance of provided her claim agreement no for the consideration for visitation. argue agreement Defendants that because the was void for lack of consideration, 15, 1995, embodying agreement June order was result, unenforceable. As a defendants maintain that the trial court 2005, erred 8, when it denied defendants’ June motion to dismiss plaintiffs petition order, to enforce the June and when it August 22, entered its holding contempt defendants in violating dispute the June of the parties order. None facts as to this matter. is review de novo. See AC&S v. (1999). Comm’n,

Industrial A upon agreement parties consent decree is based M.M.D., contractual nature. 213 Ill. 2d 114. Once a decree has entered, binding been it and cannot be amended or varied party. M.M.D., without the consent of each 213 Ill. 2d at 114. agreement, Like other an agreed order is to the law of Works, Theater, contracts. Advance Iron Inc. ECD Lincolnshire (2003). result, L.L.C., As consent decrees upon showing set from been aside resulted coercion, misrepresentation, incompetence fraudulent or of one of the parties, gross disparity position capacity parties, or Motors, Inc., newly Majcher discovered evidence. v. Laurel no holding 729-30 Defendants cite case a consent decree for lack of void consideration. we believe agreement there proper parties’ consideration for in this give opinion we no consent to whether lack consideration voids a *15 decree. requires offer, acceptance,

Formation a an of contract Vega, 154, Bank Ill. consideration. La Salle National v. 167 (1988). disadvantages one Any promise party act or that benefits of a support another is sufficient consideration to the formation (1991). 1018, Passalino, 222 v. contract. De Fontaine generally adequate forgo pursuit legal a claim is promise A to Colgate- v. contract. Kalis support to formation consideration this Co., 898, 901 In defendants Palmolive as a agreed to forbear legal plaintiff claims are mistaken to which 15, 1995, 15, 1995, On June agreement. parties’ June result agreed plaintiff in which and defendants entered into plaintiff relief in conciliation and other petition to her for further withdraw grand plaintiff with her exchange allowing defendants to visit for Katie, a month five hours each visit. Defendants daughter, twice for 1995, 15, agreement for June was contend that consideration their 607(b) of the right of her to sue under section forbearance Wickham, in the Act, 199 Ill. 2d at 320. which never existed. agreement forgo pursu to her claims plaintiff agreed of June 16, 1994, and agreement ant December parties’ previous to the 607(b). rights agreement her In the given to section 16, plaintiff visit with December allow and Katie once a month for six hours and allow older children Hruby children in telephonic plaintiff between communication exchange plaintiff withdrawing visita peti filed a agreement, tion. When defendants breached returning which agreement, tion to enforce the terms of included 15, 1995, plaintiff of June counseling. agreed order legal rights, conceded a claim to enforce her contract and not claim 607(b). plaintiff’s under We now if forbearance of her section examine 16, 1994, agreement rights proper contract under the December parties’ agreement. consideration for the June supreme cases, Mulholland v. rely Defendants two older Bartlett, (1874), Dunham, (1880), v. 95 Ill. 583 Heaps 74 Ill. 58 position plaintiff’s of her claims support their forbearance agreement. A provided parties’ brief discus no consideration sion of the as it relates to the forbearance regarding law consideration Although promise forgo helpful. of a claim that is in doubt support pursuit legal generally adequate of a claim is consideration (Kalis Co., Colgate-Palmolive Ill. App. formation of a contract v. 63). (2003)), (Mulholland, Ill. at exceptions are there Watkins, McKinley court decided legal 143-44 it held that of a claim was which forbearance “honestly supposed claimant valid consideration for a contract opined further good McKinley cause action.” The that he had a prevail on the party ultimately it is which would immaterial pretense merits, and is mere wholly unless the claim is unfounded McKinley, money. extort *16 supreme

After McKinley, Mulholland, court decided in which it discussed the McKinley that, decision and concluded although forbearance of a claim consideration, claim is valid the forgone must Mulholland, have been at or in equity. sustainable law 74 Ill. 62-63. at Mulholland, In traveling home, while the defendant far from was a debt confronted collector the defendant with a debt of partnership. a Mulholland, 74 at The Ill. defendant had been never connected to the partnership indebted and informed the he that was not a collector member partnership. Mulholland, of such Although at 63. he agreed pay to debt in exchange the for the collector immediately suit, filing the defendant agreement stated settlement that he had no Mulholland, association with the partnership. 74 Ill. at 59-60. The Mulholland court held that forbearance of the suit was no consideration for the contract because the defendant no reason ground making Mulholland, able for a promise. such at 62. The Mulholland court noted that circumstances pointed affect cases and out that options agree the defendant had few other than the detained, incarcerated, be possibly settlement or in a place far from home, Mulholland, defending a frivolous suit with few resources. McKinley, Ill. at 63-64. Unlike in in Mulholland our analysis good-faith did not its on focus of consideration the belief of but, rather, the judged claimant claim light forbearance in supported brought against whether the facts the claim Mulholland, defendant. analysis Ill. at 63-64. The Mulholland blurred the claim distinction between a that is in and a claim doubt utterly Mulholland, without foundation. See 74 Ill. at 63-64.

The in reasoning Heaps. court’s Mulholland was later cited However, Heaps, 95 Ill. at 592. Heaps decision the idea reinforced that there ais distinction a between forbearance of claim with doubtful facts and a claim made Heaps, with no basis law. Heaps, plaintiff, alleged In 16-year-old girl 590-91. a who that the her, defendant impregnated compromise had seduced and defendant, bastardy seduction, $1,050. against two suits Heaps, challenged 95 Ill. at 591. When the defendant the settlement of claims, the both court first held that the claim was bastardy rightfully because, though girl’s settled even the fact of doubt pregnancy ful, and, challenged the defendant could have the facts asserted instead, Heaps, chose settle the suit. at 591-92.

court next held that there was no valid consideration for the settle claim, only girl’s parent file a ment seduction could seduction, bring right Heaps, claim she had no this claim. disparate 95 Ill. at 592. The of these two Heaps treatment conveyed long legal bring party right claims that so as a has a a even consideration provides proper claim, of the claim his forbearance Heaps, 95 Ill. the merits. See his be unsuccessful claim would claims the was made between the distinction long ago as As sup the evidence right to assert and claims claimant has no App. at Pyle, Murphy, port. Pyle insightful Court offered 25-26, Appellate District Fourth a that is in doubt can analysis of claim as whether forbearance reasoned, in Pyle light serve as consideration for contract. provide of a claim to valid in order for forbearance Heaps, of consideration, to as person making right claim must have right claim; however, legal has a to assert sert if the claimant such claim, good prove faith that he can such that claim and believes *17 if even his provides proper his of the claim consideration forbearance the 26. Pyle, App. claim fail when tried on merits. at would Pyle distinguished from The Mulholland other cases concern doubt, ing of a claim that in the Mulholland forbearance because court stressed the duress under the settled the claim which defendant very Pyle, and stated much 180 Ill. that circumstances affect cases. App. Mulholland, 25. Unlike in Pyle, supreme at our court reviewed issue, supported whether the facts of the case the at claim not whether right legal bring Mulholland, the claimant had a the suit. Ill. at Pyle Mulholland, Despite any differences that exist between supreme the our Heaps, by fact remains that decided court after Mul holland, similarly is Pyle analysis. Heaps consistent with the may where the distinguished the forbearance of claims evidence not support legal them from the forbearance of claims made without a Pyle, As Heaps, by Heaps basis. at 590-91. noted court’s bastardy supports treatment the conclusion tkat claim provide in may proper forbearance of a claim that is doubt consider Pyle, ation. at App. 180 Ill. 26 . Moreover, of is Pyle analysis Heaps decision consistent discussing with the appellate most recent court cases forbearance thk a of of claim as Interestingly, despite the existence consideration. holdings Mulholland, of moderii court in these Heaps appellate LeMas in opinion decisions evolved from the Fifth District’s ,rev'd on Industries, ter v. (1982) Inc., App. Amsted 110 Ill. 3d 729 (1089). grounds Inc., other 131 Ill. 2d 308 Group, Wilson v. Hoffman snot i at LeMaster court of a claim th held that forbearance claim valid2may as long serve as for a contract as consideration “ ” App. LeMaster, not ‘entirely foundation.’ without not do cases, analysis 2While our is in accordance with these modern ¡we Similarly, re Herwig, Estate 237 Ill. App. of (1992), this court held that the of compromise disputed a claim is suf ficient consideration for the formation of a contract if even that claim valid, long addition, as as that in good claim is made faith. In both the First and Fifth Districts have held that even where the evidence a supported party’s potential claim, never if forbearing party agreement enters the good to forbear the claim in faith and never knew or should known he could not of recover the time agreement, then the forbearance of his suit is sufficient consider ation. F.H. Prince & Co. v. Tower Financial Corp., 275 Ill. (1995); Co., Keller v. State Farm Insurance

This modern trend appellate of court cases is consistent Heaps decision all of claimants in the cases discussed legal claims, above had bring a basis to their even their claims were were, therefore, doubt. These claims entirely without founda tion, because there was foundation in the law for the bring litigated. their claims before the court to be These decisions are compatible Heaps analysis therefore with the bastardy although claim in that the evidence of the claim unsupportive, be weak or brought settlement a claim right bring good good faith with a such an action will serve Heaps, 591-92; Pyle, consideration. See 95 Ill. at at 26. Consequently, support Pyle these cases conclusion that the forbear action, regardless claim, ance cause the merits of the can provide Pyle, valid for contract. consideration at 26. 'er, change corresponding How: this does not tenet that where *18 perfil another, legal right bring "rxs no to a against claim the forbear rjf ance Heaps, such a claim not serve as does consideration. 95 Ill. just a claim be as policy may legally This is because where a serted, doubt, settling alleged by even if the facts in the claim are in tii. to dispute, party having the of not opposing reaps the benefit litigate However, Kalis, App. all. the suit at 3d at 901. bring, where merely right party legal a forbears a claim he has no to the o' a -oordig party should never have had to defend such suit first . not therefore, does ,s, the settlement of a claim such may not belie-/c ths that term “not a claim t their use valid” to describe prevail on describe enough prefer to precise purposes. We merits is may claims merits, serve may that forbearance prevail not on the but whose as proper distinguishes Consideration, This that “in doubt.” as claims are than, claims has that the claimant may on from clEdms not succeed the merits legal no bring. ba-sis to avoiding reason, merely this to defendant. For a benefit provide legal no claimant has that necessary to determine litigation a settle- consideration for bring provide proper right to a suit does ment contract. legal right no case, argue plaintiff had

In this that by sec them, rights guaranteed claim her against because to assert a 607(b) out, the consider pointed as we existed. tion never under 15, 1995, plaintiffs rights agreement was the June ation for agreement parties’ enforce the 607(b), right to but section A party to important This difference. 16, 1994. of December Cha, Pantry, Hen Inc. v. See White may sue on the contract. contract (1991). 16, 1994, the December party As a pursuant bring claims plaintiff right individual agreement, had 16, 1994, agreement ultimately Even if the December agreement. that guaranteed by section rights because the had no consideration clear, existed, plaintiff had a by no proposition never which means litigate agreement valid and could be right whether was Abrams, Plaintiff enforced. See Awotin v. 15, 1995, their right on June when the settled gave up 16, 1994, agreement. dispute the December when over forgo right she have under December plaintiff 16, 1994, in doubt. agreement, gave up she claim that was Whether 16, 1994, fact, the December plaintiff, proper had consideration for. plaintiff even if would agreement is not material because her claim to the prevailed not have merits of 1994, agreement, a claim is valid December the forbearance of right and did so in party bring if the had a claim consideration Co., 590; 95 Ill. at F.H. Prince & good Heaps, faith. See could, 801; Keller, have chal 546. Defendants 16, 1994, agreement they had lenged validity December claims. plaintiff, plaintiff’s made to settle but instead chose under plaintiff’s Defendants from the settlement of claims benefitted 16, 1994, agreement, they did not have to the December litigate agreement. This benefit received the merits was successfully challenged defendants, ultimately if they even could have validity agreement. addition, she entered the June all the facts indicate that when she could 1995, agreement, good faith that plaintiff believed no indication that agreement. There is enforce December December way knowing rights under the necessarily This is true agreement may been invalid. 607(b)(1) (b)(3) until not held unconstitutional since sections were Wickham, 199 Ill. entered. See eight years agreement after the *19 Therefore, at 320. because plaintiff legal right had a pursue contract faith, claims asserted this right good the forbearance provided of her claims valid parties’ 15, consideration for the June 1995, agreement. Co., 801; Keller, F.H. Prince & 275 Ill. 180 Ill. 3d at 546.

Finally, Media, defendants cite Capital Inc., Hurst v. Cities 812, (2001), for the proposition that “contracts which depend [an on statute] unconstitutional for their are consideration Hurst, void.” In the court did not address whether the forbear ance of claima made pursuant to an unconstitutional statute could fact, provide consideration for a In contract. did not Hurst concern but, rather, contracts all discussed the effect of the ah initio doctrine refiling on the voluntary Moreover, of claim after a dismissal. neither the case Hurst proposition, cites for this v. Peoples Mills & Light Gas Co., 508, Coke by Mills, nor the case cited Board of Highway City Bloomington, 164, Commissioners v. (1911), confronts the issue of whether the forbearance of a claim pursuant to a statute later found unconstitutional is valid consider Therefore, ation for a contract. we believe that whether the forbear ance of an invalid claim is consideration is better addressed long Furthermore, line cases discussed above. consideration at issue in plaintiff’s this case is the forbearance of parties’ 16, claims under 1994, agreement, December and not the forbearance of her claims Act, to section 15, 1995, agreement consideration for the June not depend did on an statute, agreement unconstitutional but rather on made between parties. 15, 1995, agreed Because the June order is not lack void either consideration, lack it remains in ef- fect. we affirm the trial court’s June denying defendants’ motion to plaintiffs petition dismiss enforce the June order, and the trial August holding contempt. indirect civil when, part

We next consider whether the trial court erred of its August 22, 2005, order, contempt it parties ordered the to refrain from speaking to Katie about the outcome of the case.

C. Order Not to Communicate With Katie limited Defendants contend that it the trial court erred when daughter August defendants’ communication with their its ruling plaintiffs petition order. for a cause rule show court, relief, sponte, and other the trial sua raised the of com issue munications with Katie and held that were not to com- this time. of the case at the outcome Katie about municate with prevent com authority no the court had argue Defendants *20 maintain and their child. Defendants parents fit munications between an order because courts to enter such authority lacked that the court care, the rights to fourteenth amendment may parents’ not intrude on Where, here, the on question their children. custody, and control of facts, undisputed the the law appeal application limited to the of is Torres, 214 2d Ill. City Champaign v. standard of review is de novo. of (2005). 234, 241 constitutionality challenged of the appellant has Where but, rather, his presents the trial court protective order before argument argument appeal, time on his constitutional for the first 1037, Wagner, 3d may Zielke v. be considered waived. (1993). case, 59, (1997); Lutz, 3d 66 In this v. Ill. 1040 Doe 253 trial court that the any argument to make before the defendants failed daughter the outcome of the telling from their prohibiting them However, ap rights. case their fourteenth amendment violated rigid objec the basis of the plication of the forfeiture rule is less where Maher, In 3d tion own re 314 is trial court’s conduct. (1998). 1088, citing Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317 People v. authority trial court had enter we consider whether the speaking daughter, to their Ka prohibiting an order defendants from tie, light fourteenth about the outcome of the of defendants’ care, rights custody, amendment and control of their child. The fourteenth amendment United States Constitution life, provides “deprive any person liberty, that no state shall of Const., amend. property, process without due U.S. XIV law.” process grants heightened protection against government due clause Wickham, rights. interference fundamental at 316. with rights amend protected One of the fundamental under the fourteenth care, concerning right parents ment is to make decisions custody, and their unwarranted state intru control of children without Wickham, parent’s regard sion. 199 Ill. 2d at 316. Because a decision Wickham, Ill. 2d at ing great child entitled to deference his care, 318), in the parent’s cannot decisions state overcome his the court has differ custody, simply control of child 320). Wickham, 199 Ill. 2d at ent the child’s best interest opinion of interest their presumption parents is a that fit act best There family Wickham, children. at 318. L. Massachusetts, beyond regulation. Prince 321 U.S. v. (1944). 438, 442 The state interfere with Ed. 64 S. Ct. health, rights safety, or parental fundamental when the welfare R.G., Wickham, 317; People Ill. 2d at see also child is at risk. M.M.D., supreme court, Wickam,, applying found that a ability parents’ court’s agreements enforce regarding grandparent visitation was constitutional specifically parents because the were not and, therefore, ordered the court to act the court had not interfered M.M.D., parents’ rights. with the Similarly, 213 Ill. 2d at 114. in this case, the court’s involvement in regarding defendants’ decisions control, custody, and care their child only derived from court’s obligation agreement. to enforce defendants’ provision 114. A prohibiting discussing from case Katie was not contained in the 1995, agreement June between the parties. Therefore, authority court’s to forbid defendants from speaking to Katie was not derived from defendants’ earlier consent. Consequently, next order, we consider the trial addressing matters outside of agreement, was an intrusion defendants’ parental rights. protected liberty right

Parents’ interests include the to make deci education, religion, general sions about their children’s upbring *21 Wickam, ing. Ill. at compromised 2d 317. These are interests when state interferes in family relationship on behalf of the R.G., child. concerning at 344. Court proceedings domestic can, themselves, relations in so disruptive parent-child be rights that the relationship parent to make basic determina tions about child’s Lulay, welfare are implicated. Lulay 193 Ill. 474-75 In usurped this the trial court defendants’ power, parents, as to decide whether to discuss the outcome of the daughter. topics case with their conversation barred grandmother trial court involved both Katie’s visitation with her her parents’ imprisonment, both of which concern her care upbringing. result, As a forbidding we conclude that the court’s order liberty such discussion interfered with defendants’ parental interests as guaranteed by Wickham, the fourteenth amendment. 199 Ill. 2d See justified only 316. Such intrusion will has be when the state compelling Lulay, interest. See at 475. in

Although parents’ liberty state interfere with interests health, welfare, (Wickham, protect safety order to or of a child 317), in nothing defendants assert that the record indicates forbidding that trial protection purpose was the agree. Upon We defendants’ communication with Katie about the case. parties any its order that neither of the with Ka have communication effect, that, tie to or the outcome of the case its the court stated reason, her frankly, “There is no that she needs to that know grandmother loggerheads parents possibility and her are at with the somebody going jail to over it on this case.” The court made no entered. The trial court findings why order was further about knowledge party as to how Katie’s argument from either never heard Moreover, health, safety, being. or well of the case would affect dismiss and defendants’ motion to throughout proceedings on to cause, no offered evidence was petition for a rule show outcome disclosure of the limiting an order defendants’ show that In health, well-being. safety, or justified protect Katie’s the case was in which defendants were fact, hearing, August at the it cause, did noted that specifically the trial court required show In addi Katie’s interests. sufficient to determine best evidence had notice tion, parties sua no sponte, because the issue was raised Therefore, point was evidence on this warranted. argument or in record indicate that such restrictions were anything without health, well-being, or the court necessary protect safety, Katie’s care, regard to the in defendants’ decisions intervening no basis for agree beyond enforcing child defendants’ custody, and control their 114; Wickham, M.M.D., 2d at plaintiff. ment with result, it entered an As a find that the court erred when we speaking required defendants refrain from sponte sua contempt. daughter their about order of brief, In limit reply their defendants also contend that the order ing their Katie their first amendment communication with violates court, rights that, equity because this a law court and not an doing the court could not order to do refrain from 15, 1995, agreement. beyond the June anything provisions of their appellants’ these issues were not raised brief. 341(e)(7) (210 R. Supreme under Rule Ill. 2d Court 341(e)(7)) reply these issues are waived and cannot be raised addition, brief, argument, rehearing. or on oral reply authority arguments cite of their in their no 341(0e)(7) appellant authority for requires brief. Rule also that the cite 341(e)(7). Therefore, arguments. 210 2d R. new his defendants’ *22 Trimble, 181 People that arguments are waived for reason also. 356-57 prohibiting find that the trial court’s order we unjustifiably the case speaking Katie about from por- infringed we upon rights, their fourteenth amendment vacate tion the order.

III. CONCLUSION hold arguments appeal, we reviewing all of defendants’ After it did err entered its June that the trial court when denying defendants’ motion it August to dismiss when entered its holding contempt, defendants in because its June 1995, order was not void. that when, We also hold the trial court erred August 22, 2005, order, in its it directed defendants not to com- daughter municate with their about the outcome of the and we portion vacate that of the order. part

Affirmed in part. and vacated in BOWMAN,J., concurs. McLAREN, dissenting part

JUSTICE specially concurring in part:

I part dissent in I because believe that the has majority violated a principle procedural interpretation. basic majority The that states single by plaintiff count filed relates to a statutory cause of action found to be ab unconstitutional and void The majority initio. should stopped only there and said that the pled give count does jurisdiction, and the cause should be dismissed as void.

Unfortunately, proceeds the majority reinterpret the statutory claim is determines that it also a I common-law claim. submit that, that it is statutory claim, axiomatic a count is a it cannot also be Assuming, arguendo, were, a common-law claim. it it still pled separate required by should be as a count as section 2— (735 613(a) (West 2004)). of Civil Code Procedure ILCS 5/2— majority procedure requires plead subverts the rule of parties to *** many have, “as as they may causes action and each shall be (West 613(a) separately designated and numbered.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 2004).

Analogically, the has majority apple determined that the is not an it both merely apple, apple orange. and an It accomplishes legerdemain by reviewing this feat of factually inap- case law posite general and applying the statements of law contained therein placing without a single statements context. Not case cited majority a complaint involved wherein the count or counts were all interpreted single deemed to be void. Not case count as one (or properly improperly) containing multiple one causes of action. Not single plead separate case allowed a causes of action in a majority count. Not case do it does in this one allowed to what disposition interpolate clearly a common-law cause of action —to statutory example improper upon cause of action. An reliance *23 to reference majority’s in the is embodied inapposite case law U.S.A., Sales, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d Toyota Toyota, Inc. v. Motor Belleville factually case not similar. precedential authority. The is as the argument rejected the defendants’ therein Our jurisdic Act a Motor Franchise period in the Vehicle limitations and complaint court reviewed prerequisite tional suit. a stated complaint in the allegations set forth determined that However, the of statute of limitations. independent of action cause matter “Thus, subject invoke the say, in order to court went by as framed court, of circuit a jurisdiction ex justiciable People matter. petition, present must a complaint or (1974) (if a a states Janson, complaint rel. Scott v. authority of the court general which the belonging case to a class over attaches) Belleville, extends, subject jurisdiction [citations].” matter complaint 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The court in Belleville reviewed integrated not or find a at common law parse did words cause action It statutory a It did find the count void. into void cause. not even not merely particular a limitations in a statute was period found that jurisdictional. conclusion, action as an interpolate a common-law cause of proceed

integral statutory count and trial court to part a allow the separate requirement a count vitiates the without common-law courts to “read between lines” plead separate counts allows defective, count, a Plaintiff pled. establish that no matter how has been However, law. That is true. argues that such relief existed at common jurisdiction by matter determined whether or not jurisdic- Subject complaint. cause of action exists outside of a least not the contains at complaint tion determined whether or alleges right had the justiciable one count that issue. Plaintiff claim, than but chose not to do so. plead more one version she justiciable statutory claim and she allege She did not set complaint no of the does not filed other count. review single count majority forth a matter unless the treats justiciable not, Because something that it is a common-law count. count, the trial court lacked failed to include a common-law appealed from are void. jurisdiction, the orders opinion majority I specially portion concur as communicating with parents from prohibiting vacates the order majority. disagree analysis I do with the daughter. their above establishes analysis partial contained in the dissent and, subject matter the trial court did not have com- prohibiting the order therefore, to enter no Schumacher, In re Adoption first instance. See munication (1983) (petition for rule to show cause was properly dismissed because it upon alleged was based violation of a order). void visitation I the same applies believe rationale here. *24 CAREY, B. Plaintiff-Appellee, ERNEST v. RICHARDS BUILDING SUPPLY

COMPANY,Defendant-Appellant. Second District No. 2 — 06—0712 Opinion September 28, filed Mendoza, Bell, LLC, Boyd Lloyd, & Robert R. Brown and Maria A. both of Chicago, appellant. Jr., Jr., Turner, Turner, Richard L. of Law Office of Richard L. Sycamore, appellee.