201 U.S. 123 | SCOTUS | 1906
FELTS
v.
MURPHY, WARDEN.
Supreme Court of United States.
*126 Mr. William E. Mason for appellant.
Mr. Harry B. North, with whom Mr. William H. Stead, Attorney General of the State of Illinois, and Mr. Edgar Eldridge were on the brief, for appellee.
*128 MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The uncontradicted facts are that this unfortunate man has been convicted of the crime of murder and sentenced to imprisonment for life, although he did not hear a word of the evidence that was given upon his trial, because of his almost total deafness, his inability to hear being such that it required a person to speak through his ear trumpet, close to his ear, in order that such person should be heard by him.
*129 Counsel for the appellant has cited in his brief cases regarding the mode of procedure which has been sometimes adopted where, from the condition of mind of the individual to be tried, it was doubtful if he were able to understand or comprehend the proceedings of the trial, and it may well be that such a method might properly have been adopted in this case. But upon this writ the question for our determination is simply one of jurisdiction. If that were not lacking at the time of the trial and if it continued all through, then the application for the writ was properly denied by the Circuit Court, and its order must be affirmed. The writ cannot perform the function of a writ of error. Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328; In re Lennon, 166 U.S. 548, 552; In re Eckart, 166 U.S. 481.
In this case the state court had jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the person upon the trial of the accused, and such jurisdiction was not lost during his trial but continued to its end, and it had jurisdiction to direct the judgment which was entered and to have the same executed. If there were any irregularities in the trial of the appellant, because of the failure of the court to see to it that the testimony in the case was repeated to him through the ear trumpet which he had with him, it was at most an error, which did not take away from the court its jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused. The appellant was not deprived of his liberty without due process of law by the manner in which he was tried, so as to violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. That Amendment, it has been said by this court, "did not radically change the whole theory of the relations of the state and Federal Governments to each other and of both governments to the people." In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 448; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175.
We are unable to see how jurisdiction was lost in this case by the manner of trial. The accused was compos mentis. No claim to the contrary is made. He knew he was being tried, on account of the killing of the deceased. He had counsel and understood the fact that he was on trial on the indictment mentioned, *130 but he did not hear the evidence. He made no objection, asked for nothing, and permitted his counsel to take his own course. We see no loss of jurisdiction in all this and no absence of due process of law. It is to be regretted that the testimony was not read or repeated to him. But that omission did not affect the jurisdiction of the court.
Upon the point that the failure to have repeated to the appellant the testimony given on the trial caused the court to lose jurisdiction, the case of Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176, is cited by appellant. We think it plain that the case does not substantiate the contention. The sentence imposed in that case was held by this court to have been beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court to pronounce, because it was against the express provisions of the Constitution, which bounds and limits all jurisdiction; but we are entirely clear that in this case the trial was so conducted that there was not at any time any lack of jurisdiction in the court, and that the most that can be urged is that there might have been an error committed by the trial court in omitting to have the evidence repeated to the appellant as it was given by the witnesses at the trial, even though no demand of the kind was made by petitioner or his counsel.
Although the conviction and punishment of the appellant under the facts appearing on this record may seem to be somewhat hard, yet this court has no jurisdiction to grant the relief asked for.
The order of the Circuit Court refusing the writ was right, and is
Affirmed.