FELTROP v. MISSOURI
No. 90-7928
Sup. Ct. Mo.
June 28, 1991
111 S. Ct. 2918 | 115 L. Ed. 2d 1081
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
No. 90-1749. TRAILER MARINE TRANSPORT CORP. v. ZAPATA GULF MARINE CORP. C. A. 5th Cir. Motion of petitioner to strike resрondent‘s supplemental brief denied. Certiorari denied.
No. 90-7928. FELTROP v. MISSOURI. Sup. Ct. Mo. Certiorari denied.
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting.
In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738 (1990), this Court held that, once a defendant is sentenced to death by an erroneously instructed jury, a reviewing court can resentence the defendant to death only if it clearly and expressly engages in eithеr harmless-error analysis or reweighing of permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id., at 741, 752, 754. It is conceded that the petitioner in this case was sentenced to death by an erroneously instructed jury. Nonetheless, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the trial court‘s summary denial of petitioner‘s motion to set aside the jury sentence constituted a constitutionally adequate resentencing. Because Clemons does not permit us to infer from the trial court‘s silence that it engaged in the requisite reweighing or harmless-error analysis, I wоuld grant the petition for certiorari.
I
Petitioner was convicted of capital murder. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of his trial, the jury determined that the murder “involved depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible оr inhuman.” 803 S. W. 2d 1, 14 (Mo. en banc 1991). On the basis of this single aggravating factor, the jury sentenced petitioner to death. Id., at 6. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to rеduce his sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the “depravity of mind” aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague under this Court‘s precedents. The trial court denied the motion, stating from the bench that it “‘has listened attentively to [petitioner‘s argument] and has recalled the testimony and the evidence in this cause, and the Court will overrule the Motion for Reduction of Sentence.‘” Id., at 16.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. The cоurt acknowledged that the “depravity of mind” aggravating factor was uncon
In my view, the Missouri Supreme Court‘s reliance on Walton was clearly misplaced. As used in Walton, the “presumption” that a trial court has followed the law stands only for the proposition that еrror cannot be inferred where a trial court, acting as the initial sentencer, fails expressly to articulate its reliance оn a limiting construction of what would otherwise be an unconstitutional aggravating factor. However, this presumption is clearly rebutted whеn, as here, the trial court erroneously instructs a sentencing jury by omitting any reference to the necessary limiting construction. Under such circumstances, the question is no longer
This presumption is completely at odds with this Court‘s decision in Clemons v. Mississippi, supra. As in this case, the trial court in Clemons erred by failing to instruct the jury on a necessary limiting construction of a facially vague aggravating factor. This Court held that under such circumstanсes a reviewing court may itself resentence the defendant to death either by engaging in harmless error analysis or by reweighing the properly defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id., at 744-750, 752-753. Nonetheless, because it was “unclear whether [the reviewing court] correctly employed either of these methods,” this Court vacated the sentence and remanded. Id., at 741; see id., at 752, 754. In particular, becausе the reviewing court‘s opinion was “virtually silent” on whether fresh consideration had been given to the mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant, this Court declined to infer that the reviewing court had correctly perceived the requirements of its resentencing functiоn. Id., at 752.
Under Clemons, there can be no question that the trial court‘s summary denial of petitioner‘s postsentence motion does not constitute a constitutionally adequate resentencing. Nothing in the trial court‘s brief remarks from the bench even remotely suggested that it had engagеd in reweighing or harmless error analysis. The record in this case is not “virtually silent” on whether the reviewing court understood the nature of the original sentencing error; it is completely silent. Indeed, because the reviewing court in this case was the very court responsible for injecting the error into the sentencing process, there is every reason to believe that it was completely oblivious to the very necessity for resentencing. To apply a “presumption” that the trial court understood and applied the law under these circumstancеs is to turn a
The Missouri courts have failed to rectify the clear constitutional defect that has infected petitioner‘s death sentence. I believe that this Court is likewise remiss in its responsibilities when it рermits a life-threatening error of this nature to go uncorrected.
II
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition and vacate petitioner‘s death sentencе even if I did not view the issue in this case as being independently worthy of this Court‘s plenary review.
No. 90-96. SIEGERT v. GILLEY, 500 U. S. 226;
No. 90-1320. CRAIG ET AL. v. UNITED STATES, 500 U. S. 917;
No. 90-1496. STEEG ET UX. v. CITY OF DEARBORN HEIGHTS, MICHIGAN, ET AL., 500 U. S. 942;
No. 90-7340. NICHOLS v. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH ET AL., 500 U. S. 908;
No. 90-7344. WILLIAMS v. ARIZONA, 500 U. S. 929;
No. 90-7418. DELBRIDGE ET AL. v. NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, 500 U. S. 921;
No. 90-7447. IN RE ALSTON, 500 U. S. 941;
No. 90-7490. BRIDGES v. SPILLER-BRIDGES, 500 U. S. 923;
No. 90-7525. VINIK v. MIDDLESEX COUNTY PROBATION DEPARTMENT ET AL., 500 U. S. 935;
No. 90-7534. IN RE PREUSS, 500 U. S. 914;
No. 90-7565. MCCONE v. SAGEBRUSH PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL., 500 U. S. 944;
No. 90-7595. REESE v. HILL, WARDEN, 500 U. S. 945;
No. 90-7598. AGHA v. SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, 500 U. S. 925;
No. 90-7648. MORRISON v. LEE ET AL., 500 U. S. 956;
No. 90-7700. MARTIN v. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 500 U. S. 936; and