182 Ga. 20 | Ga. | 1935
J. M. Kline, doing business as J. M. Kline Company, filed a petition against Mrs. C. F. Veal and Felton Beauty Supply Company, to restrain them from interfering with any contracts after they have been entered into between the plain
This petition was demurred to on 'the grounds, among others, that it fails to set forth any equitable cause of action; that it is uncertain, indefinite, and presents merely the conclusion of the pleader; that insolvency of the defendants is not alleged; that it is not shown that the defendant corporation authorized the acts of its agent, Mrs. Veal, nor is there set forth a collateral agreement between that defendant and Mrs. Veal as to the authority of said agent, but the petition shows she is a saleslady for the defendant corporation; that she is a special agent; that no joint acts of the defendant corporation and its sales agent are alleged to show that they conspired to do the things which the plaintiff says they are doing; that no facts are set forth to substantiate the allegation that the damage to the plaintiff is or will be irreparable; that the petition merely shows' that the plaintiff and the defendant are business competitors; that the defendants, according to the allegations,
The Felton Beauty Supply Company filed its answer and a cross-petition in which it set forth numerous instances of interference by Kline with contracts made by Felton Beauty Supply Company with its customers, and prayed judgment against Kline in the sum of $10,000, and that he be enjoined from interfering with valid and existing contracts made by the defendant with its customers, and that Kline’s agents and employees also be enjoined. To this answer and cross-petition Kline filed his demurrer, in which he claims that the cross-petition fails to set out a cause of action against the plaintiff; that it does not allege that1 the plaintiff authorized and directed his agents and representatives to do the things charged against him and them, or that they were done with his knowledge and consent; that no reason is shown why the alleged acts should constitute a defense to the plaintiff’s suit; that no. allegations are made as to acts committed by Kline himself, but the cross-petition merely states that Kline is threatening to interfere with the defendant’s business and contracts, etc.
On February 13, 1935, Judge Moore, after hearing evidence, passed an order enjoining Kline and his agents from interfering with any valid contract between Felton Beauty Supply Company and its customers. On March 18, 1935, Judge Edgar E. Pomeroy passed an order enjoining both Kline and Felton Beauty Supply Company from allowing or permitting a named individual to do certain things; permitting both the plaintiff and the defendant to take certain orders for products, but ordering that such orders should not be filled until further order of the court. On March 22, 1935, Judge Humphries passed an order sustaining the demurrers filed by the defendants against the original petition, and the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendants’ cross-action. Felton Beauty Supply Company et al. excepted, and Kline filed a cross-bill of exceptions.
1. The court did not err in dismissing Kline’s equitable suit. The plaintiff shows no grounds for equitable interference. If he has suffered damages because of the wrongful acts on the part of the defendant company, he has his action at law, and that is ade
2. The defendant filed a cross-action, which was also dismissed, the court below assigning as grounds for dismissal that “the cross-action is not germane to the original petition, and that the injunction sought, having reference to an occasion which has already passed, has become moot.” And besides, the cross-action does not state any cause for injunctive relief, for the same reasons stated in the foregoing ruling in reference to the original action.
Judgments in both cases affirmed.